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
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HALLECK'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW

VOL. II.

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Henry Wager Halleck

HALLECK'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW

OR

*RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES
IN PEACE AND WAR*

A NEW EDITION

REVISED WITH NOTES AND CASES

BY

SIR SHERSTON BAKER, BART.

OF LINCOLN'S INN, BARRISTER-AT-LAW

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VOL. II.

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1878



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§ 1. As a general rule, every citizen is bound to serve and defend the State of which he is a member, as far as he is capable. This concurrence, for the common defence and general security, is one of the principal objects of every political association, and without this, society could not be maintained. When, therefore, a State has declared war, every citizen is bound to assist in carrying it to a successful conclusion, whatever may be his individual opinion of the necessity or propriety of the resort to arms by his own Government. Even though he may not deem the objects of the war justifiable, or its motives commendable, he is, nevertheless, bound to stand by the State in the prosecution of that war. This, however, will not pre-

vent his directing his best efforts and influence to bring about a just and satisfactory settlement of the causes of the war. If he thinks that his own Government has entered into the contest rashly and inconsiderately, he may seek to convince it of its error, and to induce a withdrawal or modification of its pretensions, and a concession of some of the enemy's demands; but, however justifiable and proper his efforts to restore peace, till this is effected the State is entitled to his services in carrying on the war.

§ 2. Although every man, capable of bearing arms, is bound to take them up if required, in the service of the State, this duty is limited and regulated by municipal law. At present most nations maintain regular military and naval forces, which are increased in time of war by volunteers, militia, or new levies.¹ Moreover, the soldiers and sailors required for carrying on military operations are generally enlisted without compulsion, which greatly mitigates the evils of war. Even where levies are made to fill up the ranks of the army, or to supply the navy, the great body of the people are left to pursue their ordinary peaceful avocations.² Occasionally, however, the public authorities of particular places call out all citizens capable of carrying arms; but even then there are certain classes exempt from military duty. Old men, women and children are, in general, unfit for the occupation of war, being incapable of handling arms, or of supporting the fatigues of military service. Magistrates, and other civil officers, are exempted, their time being occupied in the administration of justice and the maintenance of order. The clergy are also usually exempted from military service, the duties of their profession being deemed incompatible with those of war. All these classes, which, by general usage, or the municipal laws of the belligerent State, are exempt from military duty,

¹ The laws, rights, and duties of war are applicable not only to the army, but likewise to militia and corps of volunteers complying with the following conditions: 1. That they have at their head a person responsible for his subordinates; 2. That they wear some settled, distinctive badge recognisable at a distance; 3. That they carry arms openly; and 4. That, in their operations, they conform to the laws and customs of war. In those countries where the militia form the whole or part of the army they shall be included under the denomination of 'Army.'—Brussels Conference, 1874, Art. 9.

² It is obvious that in the present condition of Europe, and the means adopted by the several great military powers to increase their forces, the text would admit of very considerable qualifications.

are not subject to the general rights of a belligerent over the enemy's person. To these are added, by modern usage, all persons who are not organised or called into military service, though capable of its duties, but who are left to pursue their usual pacific avocations. All these are regarded as *non-combatants*.

13. Nevertheless, it often happens, in case of invasions and in the siege of fortified towns, that not only merchants, mechanics, and the common peasantry, but also the clergy, magistrates, old men, women, and even children, take up arms and render good service in the common defence. In doing this they lose the character of *non-combatants*, and become subject to the ordinary rules of war. Those who voluntarily leave their peaceful avocations and engage, either directly or indirectly,¹ in hostile acts towards the enemy, whether by the orders of their Government, or their own free will, are liable to the consequences which lawfully result from such acts, but to none others.²

14. 'As war cannot be carried on without soldiers,' says Vattel, 'it is evident that whoever has the right of making war has also naturally that of raising troops.' This is true with respect to the State in its sovereign capacity, but not with respect to the particular departments into which the government of the State is divided. The Constitution must determine to what department these powers shall belong, and whether they shall be combined or separate. In most European countries they both belong to the sovereign, and are regarded as prerogatives of majesty. In England the sovereign declares war, but he cannot compel persons to enlist, nor can he, without, keep an army on foot without the concurrence of Par-

The armed forces of the belligerents may be composed of combatants and non-combatants. In the event of being captured by the enemy, each one and the other shall enjoy the rights of prisoners of war. (Hague Conference, 1874, Art. 11. Persons in the vicinity of the theatre of war who do not directly form part of them, such as correspondents, newspaper reporters, 'volunteers,' contractors, &c., may also be made prisoners of war. These persons should, however, be furnished with a certificate issued by a competent authority, as well as with a certificate of exemption. Ibid. Art. 34. See also *post*, p. 82.

¹ *De iure belli ac pacis*, by Vattel, ch. vi. § 10; ch. viii. § 145; Burlamaqui, *Le droit de la guerre*, tome v. pt. ii. ch. 3.; Phillimore, *On International Law*, vol. ii. § 70, 74; De Felise, *Droit de la Nat.*, &c., tome ii. § 25; Rousseau, *Des lois Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. x.; Real, *Des lois de la guerre*, tome v. ch. ii. sec. vi. § 5; Bello *Derecho de la guerra*, ed. pt. ii. cap. iii. § 4.

liament. In the United States, Congress alone can declare war, or authorise the raising of troops. The general right of the State to raise troops is a part of the *jus eminens*, or superior right, which the entire body may, for the common good, exercise over the individual members of which it is composed.

§ 5. If every citizen, as among the Romans, took his part in serving in the army, such service would naturally be gratuitous. But where only a portion are called into military service, while the others are left to pursue their ordinary avocations, it is right and proper that those who bear arms should be paid by those who do not, for no individual is bound to do more than his proportion for the service and defence of the State. The duty of the State to support its troops is evident, and its right to levy taxes for this purpose results from its general sovereign power over property within its territory, when necessity or the public good requires. It is a part of the *jus eminens*, which, when it regards property, is called by writers on public law *dominium eminens*. This right has, by some, been placed on the ground of an implied consent of individuals to part with a portion of their property for the public good, while others regard it as arising from the obligations of natural equity, the obligation to contribute to the support of the Government being similar to other obligations of secondary natural law, resulting as consequences from the institution of civil society.¹

§ 6. The rights and duties of a State, with respect to the support of its soldiers, are not limited to the time of actual service in bearing arms; the provisions made for the support in old age, or when disabled by toil, sickness, or wounds—such as pensions, asylums, hospitals, &c.—are, therefore, regarded as constituting a part of their military support, and the extent of these provisions generally determines the character of the State, and of its citizens, for humanity, generosity, and good government. A country which does not properly support and pay those who bear arms in its service will soon find itself without the means of defence, and a Government which leaves those who have wasted their strength and shed their blood in its service, to beg their bread or perish with want, deserves, as it will always receive, the contempt

¹ Grotius, *de Jur. Bel. ac. Pac.*, lib. i. cap. i. § 6.

every noble and generous heart. Moreover, if the State neglect to provide for its troops regularly and systematically, they will provide for themselves by pillage, robbery and massacres while in the field, and by a subversion of the civil government on the return of peace. It is only, with respect to their conduct in war, that the provisions made by State for the support of its troops become matters of serious international interest. The horrible atrocities committed by the unpaid troops of the middle ages form the most bloody pages in the annals of history.¹

§ 7. Foreigners, who voluntarily serve a State for stipulated pay, are called *mercenaries*. The right of citizens of one State to be so employed by another, and of this other to so employ them, has often been discussed by publicists.² That any citizen, with the consent of his own State, may serve another, cannot be denied. But, in doing this, he changes his nationality, and must thereafter look for support and protection to the State in whose service he is engaged. The right of a State to permit its citizens to be employed in the military service of another, is very questionable, but the right of this other to so employ them, (with such permission,) cannot be doubted. The *Act* of doing so, is a very different question. Mercenaries exist voluntarily, for no State has a right to require such service of undomiciled foreigners. Domiciled foreigners may be required to do duty in the militia, or the civic and national guards, for the preservation of order and the enforcement of the laws, within a reasonable distance of their place of domicile. But such duty is rather of a civil than a military character. It

¹ Hallam, *Middle Ages*, ch. ii.

² By 33 and 34 Vict. c. 93 (Foreign Enlistment Act), if any person within the licence of Her Majesty, being a British subject, within or without Her Majesty's dominions, accepts any commission from a foreign State at war with any foreign State at peace with Her Majesty, or whether a British subject or not, within Her Majesty's dominions, induces any other person to accept any such commission, he is liable to fine and imprisonment.

By the common law of England it is an indictable offence to enter the service of a foreign Government without leave of the sovereign. During the contest between Don Carlos and Isabella, the late Queen of Spain, the Foreign Enlistment Act was suspended to allow British subjects to join the auxiliary legion raised in England for the cause of that queen. Sir George Sutherland and Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Napier commanded the navy of Donna Maria during her contest for the throne of Portugal. On the other hand, during the late Crimean war, the British Government raised a German and an Italian legion.

does not include service against a foreign enemy, nor general military service in a civil war.¹

§ 8. Partisan and guerrilla troops are bands of men, organised and self-controlled, who carry on war against a public enemy, without being under the direct authority of a State. They have no commissions or enlistments, nor are they enrolled as any part of the military force of the State; and a State is, therefore, only indirectly responsible for their acts. As a general rule, it will neither recognise their acts nor attempt to save them from the punishment due for their violations of the laws of war. At most, the Government of

¹ Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. xxii.; Bello, *Droit International*, pt. II. cap. i. § 5; Ward, *Law of Nations*, vol. II. p. 3; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 62.

In 1861, during the American civil war, the British Government declared that if enforced enlistments of *British subjects* for the war persisted in, the Government would be obliged to concert with other neutral powers for the protection of their respective subjects; but neither in the Northern or Southern States was the discharge of any British subject, enlisted against his will, refused on proper representation. There is no international law prohibiting the Government of any country from requiring aliens to serve in the militia or police, yet at the above-mentioned date the British Government intimated that, if the United States permitted no alternative of providing substitutes, the position of British subjects to be embodied in that militia would 'call for every exertion being made in their favour on the part of Her Majesty's Government. The British Government, in 1862, informed Mr. Stuart that as a general principle of international law neutral aliens ought not to be compelled to perform any military service (i.e. working in trenches), but that allowance might be made for the conduct of authorities in cities under martial law and in daily peril of the enemy; and in 1864 the British Government saw no reason to interfere in the case of neutral foreigners directed to be enrolled as a local police for New Orleans.

By the United States Act, April 14, 1862, naturalised aliens were entitled to nearly the same rights, and are charged with the same duties as the native inhabitants; and aliens not naturalised, if they have at the time assumed the right of voting at a State election, or held office, according to the opinion of Mr. Attorney-General Bates, liable to the Acts for enrolling the national forces. (See also Act, 3 March, 1862, and Act, 24 February, 1864; proclamation of President, May 8, 1862.) This was acted on during the American civil war, and tacitly acquiesced in by the British Government.

In England, civic and national guards are unknown, and now serve in the militia and yeomanry is, in practice, voluntary; but when it is enforced, it seems never to have been authoritatively decided whether an alien can be obliged to serve therein or not. Aliens, even if naturalised, are exempt from serving the office of parish constable. (See *Ferdinand de Mierre*, 5 *Bur.* 2790.) Nor can they be obliged to serve as special constables, but, if willing to act, they are capable of being appointed (5 and 6 Will. IV. c. 43).

It is interesting to note, as an example of this, that Louis Napoleon (afterwards Napoleon III.), did duty as a special constable in Fitz Square, London, April 1848.

winks at their crimes, while it profits by their depredations upon the enemy. Questions have sometimes arisen, whether a state can properly make use of such forces, and whether, when taken by the other belligerent, they are to be treated as ordinary prisoners of war. The answer to the first question is obvious. If authorised and employed by the State, they become a portion of its troops, and the State is as much responsible for their acts, as for the acts of any other part of its army. They are no longer partisans and guerrilleros, in the proper sense of those terms, for they are no longer self-controlled, but carry on hostilities under the direction and authority of the State. The solution to the second question may not be quite so obvious. It will, however, readily be admitted, that the hostile acts of individuals, or of bands of men, without the authority or sanction of their own Government, are not legitimate acts of war, and therefore, are punishable according to the nature or character of the offence committed. The taking of property by such forces, in offensive hostilities, is not a belligerent act authorised by the law of nations, but a *robbery*. So, also, the killing of an enemy by such forces, except in self-defence, is not an act of war, but a *murder*. The perpetrators of such acts, under such circumstances, are not enemies, legitimately in arms, who can plead the laws of war in their justification but they are robbers and murderers, and, as such, may be punished. Their acts are unlawful; and, when captured, they are not treated as prisoners of war, but as criminals, subject to the punishment due to their crimes. Hence, in modern warfare, partisan and guerrilla bands, such as we have here described, are regarded as outlaws, and, when captured, may be punished the same as freebooters and banditti. As examples, we refer to the conduct and punishment of the guerrilla bands, in Spain, during the Peninsular War, and by General Scott, in Mexico, during the war between that republic and the United States.¹

12. Some have attempted to apply this rule to the insurgent inhabitants who, under the authority of the State, rise *en masse* and take arms to repel an invasion. The distinction between the two cases is too manifest to require an extended

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. I. p. 94; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. II. c. 1. § 226; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 96; Klüber, *Pract. Int. Law*, § 267; Hautevole, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. iii. ch. n.; Scott, *Des. Orders*, No. 372, Dec. 12, 1847.

discussion. In the kind of guerrilla warfare before spoken of the individuals composing the bands acknowledge no authority but that of their own chiefs. They derived no authority from the State, and the State is no more responsible for the acts than for the unauthorised acts of any other subject. But, in the case of a levy *en masse*, the inhabitants are organised and armed under the direction of the public authorities, and the State is directly responsible for their acts.¹ In guerrilla warfare the individual alone is responsible for his

¹ The population of a non-occupied territory, who, on the approach of the enemy, of their own accord take up arms to resist the invaded troops, without having had time to organise themselves in conformity with Art. 9, shall be considered as belligerents, if they respect the law and customs of war.—Brussels Conference, 1874, Art. 10.

In 1870 the Prussians required each French franc-tireur to wear uniform recognisable at gun-shot distance, and the distinctive marks of such uniform to be inseparable from his person. In this case he would be treated as an enemy of war.

A corps of francs-tireurs, 'Les partisans de Gers,' had papers showing that they were in the Government service; their officers held commissions, and their military character was admitted, though their only distinctive marks were a red sash, black coat, and Calabrian hat. But the original type of franc-tireur carried no papers, wore no recognisable uniform, nor were the chiefs of bands responsible to any superior officer.

The German Governors punished with death everyone who should take up rails or place obstacles on the lines of railway, or, when the offender could not be discovered, imposed a fine of 1,000 thalers on the nearest commune.

A notice at St. Mihiel declared that francs-tireurs or other persons bearing arms, but not wearing uniforms so as to distinguish them from the civil population, were by the 'Prussian laws of war' punishable with death. Another notice at Vendresse declared that persons in plain clothes fighting without papers, or authorisation from their Government, would be tried by court martial, and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, or, in aggravated cases, executed.

No case presented itself during the war of 1870 which had not been provided for in the American instructions (*see p. 36 et seq.*), except perhaps, the offence of concealing, in an occupied district, arms or provisions for the enemy. This offence was punished by the United States during the civil war by sacking and burning any house in an occupied district, found to contain such stores. In France, the village in a occupied district, harbouring francs-tireurs or troops of that character was set on fire.

The Prussian military code, if it really exists in a separate and complete form, is inaccessible to the public, but may be studied all the same in the American Instructions. Mark out of them the article which under certain conditions sanctions a levy *en masse*, and substantially the two codes are identical. Incendiarism was practised in America during the civil war as a punishment, so was it also by the Prussians, but both nations seem to have a strong suspicion that the punishment is a barbarous one. It is not mentioned in the American instructions, nor was it alluded to in the minatory proclamations put forth by the Prussian Edwards, *Germans in France*.

acts, but where the mass of the people of a city or district bear arms under the direction of the Government, they have become a legitimate part of the army, and the whole State is chargeable with any breach of the laws of war which they may commit. Any non-combatant may become a combatant without incurring any other penalty than that of being made subject to the laws applicable to active belligerents. If captured, they are entitled to the treatment of ordinary prisoners of war. The law of nations has, not unfrequently, been violated in European wars by disregarding the distinction which we have here pointed out between the unauthorised acts of self-constituted guerrilla bands, and the authorised acts of *levées en masse*, organised and armed under the authority of the State. The French generals, in the Peninsular War, often punished like all Spanish peasants found in arms, whether or not under the authority and direction of their own Government. And, in the invasion of France, in 1814, the allies punished with death the armed French peasants, although they had been levied and forced to bear arms by the local authorities, under the proclamations of the emperor. The proper distinction was made by Wellington, in his invasion of the south of France, in 1814. The troops of Mina and Morillo committed the greatest excesses in plundering the French peasants. This conduct was severely rebuked by Wellington. 'A sullen obedience followed,' says Napier, 'for the moment, but the plundering system was soon resumed, and this, with the mischief already done, was sufficient to arouse the inhabitants of Bayarray, as well as those of the Val de Baigorri, into action. They commenced and continued a partisan warfare until the Duke of Wellington, incensed by their activity, issued a proclamation calling upon them to take arms openly and join Soult, or stay peaceably at home, declaring he would otherwise burn their villages and hang all the inhabitants . . . Thus it happened that, notwithstanding all the outcries made against the French for resorting to this system of repressing the warfare of peasants in Spain, it was considered by the English general both justifiable and necessary. However, the threat was sufficient for the occasion.'

§ 10. A distinction is sometimes drawn between hostilities

¹ Napier, *Hist. Peninsular War*, b. xxiii. ch. iii.; Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, ch. lxxiv. vol. iv. p. 329; Manning, *Law of Nations*, p. 153.

of private subjects on land and on the high seas, but it does not seem to rest upon a substantial foundation, or to be supported by satisfactory reasons. The case is fully presented in the following extracts from the commentaries of Chancellor Kent: 'Although a state of war,' he says, 'puts all the subjects of one nation in state of hostility with those of the other, yet, by the customary law of Europe, every individual is not allowed to fall upon the enemy. If subjects confine themselves to simple defence, they are to be considered as acting under the presumed order of the State, and are entitled to be treated by the adversary as lawful enemies; and the captures which they make, in such a case, are allowed to be lawful prize. But they cannot engage in offensive hostilities without the express permission of the sovereign; and if they have not a regular commission, as evidence of that consent, they run the hazard of being treated by the enemy as lawless banditti, not entitled to the mitigated rules of modern warfare.' But, in speaking of the hostilities of private subjects on the high seas, he says: 'Vessels are now fitted out and equipped by private adventurers, at their own expense, to cruise against the commerce of the enemy. They are duly commissioned, and it is said not to be lawful to cruise without regular commission. Sir Matthew Hale held it to be a depredation in a subject to attack the enemy's vessel, except in his own defence, without a commission. The subject has been repeatedly discussed in the Supreme Court of the United States, and the doctrine of the law of nations is considered to be, that private citizens cannot acquire a title to hostile property, unless seized under a commission, but they may lawfully seize hostile property in their own defence.' If the

¹ All captures made by private vessels without commission, pass to the Crown as prizes of war, or *droits of Admiralty*. This is the general prize law of Great Britain, of France, and of the United States. The same, where vessels, commissioned against one power, seize the property of another with whom war has subsequently broken out. And the same, if the capture be made by a tender to a man-of-war, if it be *without authority or a commission*, although it be manned by some of the man-of-war's crew. (The 'Charlotte,' 5 Rob. Adm. R. 280. But *contra* as to a ship's boats and authorised tenders, the 'Carl,' 2 Sp. Adm. R. 261.) Such commissioned persons have no *right* to any part of the capture they may have made, but the English prize courts have often awarded a recompense, even the whole value of the prize, to the captors. Although in the United States there are in strictness no *droits of Admiralty*, a prize taken under the above circumstances is condemned to the Government, and if

depredate upon the enemy, without a commission, they act upon their peril, and are liable to be punished by their own sovereign; but the enemy is not warranted to consider them as criminals, and as respects the enemy, they violate no rights by capture. Such hostilities, without a commission, are, however, contrary to usage, and exceedingly irregular and dangerous, and they would probably expose the party to the unchecked severity of the enemy; but they are not acts of piracy, unless committed in time of peace. Vattel, indeed, says that private ships of war, without a regular commission, are not entitled to be treated like captives made in a formal war. The observation is rather loose, and the weight of authority undoubtedly is, that non-commissioned vessels of a belligerent nation may at all times capture hostile ships, without being deemed, by the law of nations, pirates. They are lawful combatants, but they have no interest in the prizes they may take, and the property will remain subject to condemnation in favour of the Government of the captor, as *assets of the Admiralty*. It is said, however, that in the United States, the property is not strictly and technically condemned upon that principle, but *jure republicæ*; and it is the settled law of the United States that all captures by non-commissioned captors are made for the Government.' It certainly is not easy to reconcile the language used in the different parts of these extracts. If private individuals, who engage in offensive hostilities on land, without a regular commission, 'are not entitled to the mitigated rules of modern warfare,' but are liable to be 'treated by the enemy as lawless banditti;' if such hostilities on the high seas are 'exceedingly irregular and dangerous,' and 'expose the party to the unchecked severity of the enemy,' it is difficult to understand why 'the enemy is not warranted to consider them as criminals,' and why such parties 'violate no rights of capture' 'as respects the enemy.' If private individuals, by offensive hostilities on the high seas without commission or authority, violate no rights as against the enemy, certainly that enemy cannot treat them with 'unchecked severity.' If, when made in self-defence, the captor on sending the prize to port for adjudication has a claim for salvage, it is very questionable whether in England by the *Common Law* the whole seizure should not go to the captors. See *Murrough v. Comyns*, 1 *Wils.* 213; *Howe v. Lord Camden*, 1 *Hy. Bl.* 476, and 2 *id.* 533.

severity.' The distinction here drawn by Kent is not found in reason, nor is it well supported by authority. It is that Mr. Wheaton, and some other modern writers, express similar views, but we know of no English or American decision which sustains them; the cases to which they refer consider the lawfulness of such captures with respect to the Government of the captors, but not with respect to the right of the opposing belligerent to punish the act as against him. The doctrine is sustained in the dissenting opinion of Justice Story in the 'Nereide,' but it was neither involved in the case nor decided by the Court. The continental publicists generally do not admit the distinction attempted to be drawn by Kent. Hautefeuille says, 'It is admitted by all nations that, in maritime wars, every individual who commits acts of hostility, without having received a regular commission from his sovereign, however regularly he may make war, is regarded and treated as guilty of piracy.' In the British naval regulations, established by the King in Council, published in 1787, it is declared (§ 4) that 'if any ship or vessel shall be taken acting as a ship of war or privateer, without having a commission duly authorising her to do so, her crew shall be considered as pirates, and treated accordingly.'¹ Nevertheless, a capture made by such vessel from an enemy is regarded as a prize, and condemned as a *droit of Admiralty*. All acts of *defensive* hostilities on the high seas, as well as on land, without a commission or public authority, are not criminal, but acts fully authorised by the laws of war.²

§ 11. Since about the beginning of the fifteenth century public licence or commission has been considered necessary in order to authorise private vessels to cruise against an enemy. In order to encourage *privateering*, it is usual

¹ By Art. 5 of the British Naval Regulations of 1787, the commissions of captured privateers were to be preserved. If such commissions were not found, the crew were to be committed as pirates. It is so at the present day; see Queen's Naval Regulations, 1861.

² Kent, *Commentaries on Am. Law*, vol. 1, pp. 94, 96; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. xv. § 226; Martens, *Essai sur les Armateurs*, ch. i. § 8; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 124; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations*, Nouveau tit. iii. ch. ii.; Massé, *Droit Commercial*, liv. ii. tit. i. ch. ii.; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 9; Robinson, *Collectanea*, p. 21; Spence, *Dip. Correspondence*, vol. i. p. 443; *Journals of Congress*, vol. vii. p. 1; the 'Georgiana,' 1 *Dod. Rep.*, p. 397, the 'Dos Hermanos,' 10 *Wheaton Rep.*, p. 320; the 'Nereide,' 9 *Cranch. Rep.*, p. 447; the 'Am Isabella,' 6 *Wheaton Rep.*, p. 1, Brown 2; The U. S., 8 *Cranch. Rep.*, p.

allow the owners of such vessels to appropriate to themselves a portion, at least, of the property they may capture ;¹ and, as a necessary precaution against abuse, such owners are required to give adequate security that they will conduct the cruise according to the laws and usages of war, and bring their prizes in for adjudication.² But this depends upon the muni-

¹ In 1814, during the war between the United States and Great Britain, the Legislature of New York passed an Act, to constitute every association of five or more persons embarking in the trade of privateering, a body politic and corporate, with corporate powers, on their complying with certain formalities.

² 55 Geo. III. c. 160, which was enacted to expire with the last French war, contained provisions with reference to letters of marque. Security was always taken on the grant of letters of marque for the due observance of the conditions thereof, and this security became forfeited on their transgression. *R. v. Ferguson*, *Edw.* 84. Letters of marque may be vacated by the Court of Chancery (*R. v. Carew*, 3 *W. & A.* 669). *1 Vern.* 54. Cruelty, such as firing into a prize and killing a man after she has struck, has been held to forfeit letters of marque under the provisions of the above statute (the *'Marianne'*, 5 *Rob. Adm. R.* 4), and this seems no more than a formal declaration of the ancient law of the Admiralty.

Instructions for the commanders of vessels, having letters of marque and reprisal against the inhabitants of Genoa and the territories of the Pope, styling themselves the Ligurian and Roman Republics, were issued by the British Government, September 29, 1798, and enacted. *Inter alia* the said privateers should succour any British ship in distress, set on or taken by the enemy; should keep up a correspondence with the Admiralty; should not wear any jack, pennant, or other ensign usually borne by ships of war, but that they should, besides the colours usually borne by merchant ships, wear a red jack with the union jack quartered in the canton at the upper corner thereof; should not ransom or sell at liberty any captured ship, or cargo, or any prisoners; and should be held for good behaviour in the sum of 3,000*l.*, or, if the vessel carried less than 150 men, 1,500*l.*

A proclamation, given at St. James's, January 1, 1801, after ordering that all ships or vessels should wear the flag, jack, pennants, or colours of the Government, and that those ships having letters of marque and reprisal should wear the merchant colours, with the red jack as above mentioned, but that no one else should presume to wear these distinctions, enjoins the Admiralty to punish all offenders against this proclamation. In pursuance of the 1st Article of Union between Great Britain and Scotland there was a similar proclamation.

The United States Government, in 1812, issued the following instructions to the commanders of American privateers—

'The high-seas referred to in your commission you will understand to refer to low-water mark; but with the exception of the space between low-water, or three miles, from the shore of countries at peace with Great Britain and the United States. You may nevertheless exercise your commission within that distance of the shore of a nation at war with Great Britain, and even on the waters within the jurisdiction of that power, if permitted so to do. You are to pay the strictest regard to the rights of neutral Powers and the usages of civilized nations; and in all proceedings towards neutral vessels you are to give them as little offence or interruption as will consist with the right of ascertaining

principal regulations of each particular State, and the influence of the particular Government which issues the commercial licence. All commercial States have deemed checks of this kind essential to their own character and safety, as well as to the protection of the rights of neutrals. But even with the most prudent precautions, privateering is usually accompanied by great and enormous excesses. The use of *privateers*, or armed vessels under *letters of marque and reprisal*,¹ has been discussed by publicists and text-writers on international law, and has recently been made the subject of direct correspondence and negotiation between the United States and the principal European powers. The general opinion of public writers is that privateering, though contrary to national sentiment and the more enlightened spirit of the present age, is nevertheless allowable under the general rules of international law. It leads to the worst excesses and crimes, and has a

marked tendency to destroy the neutral character, and of detaining and bringing them into adjudication in the proper cases. You are particularly to avoid the appearance of using force or seduction, with a view to deprive the vessels of their crew or of their passengers, other than persons engaged in military service of the enemy. Towards enemy's vessels and towards you are to proceed, not exercising the rights of war, with all the humanity which characterise the nation of which you are. The master and one or more of the principal persons belonging to the captured vessels are to be sent, as soon after the capture as possible, to the judge, or judges, of the proper court in the United States, to be examined upon oath touching the interest or property of the vessel and her lading; and at the same time are to be delivered to the judge, or judges, all passes, charter-parties, bills of lading, letters, and other documents and writings found on board; and the papers to be proved by affidavit of the commander of the vessel, or some other person present at the capture, to be proved that they were received, without fraud, addition, subtraction or embellishment.

See, on instructions to privateers of the United States, *United States v. Smith and Susan*, 1 Wheat. 46.

¹ With reference to the origin of letters of marque, it appears that a foreign prince or State seized or spoiled the goods of subjects of England, the king made reprisals upon the goods of the other party within the realm, or enabled the party to whom the wrong was done by letters of marque, the goods of other subjects of the same State to be seized. *Revinere et appropriare quousque restitutio fuit uti.* 1 *Roll.* 114, 175, l. 20, per Coke; 1 *Roll.* 175; 4 *Com. Dig.* 428. subject of the king cannot take the goods of the subjects of a prince in amity with the king by force of letters of marque or of a sovereign or State. 2 *Ler.* 592; 4 *Com. Dig.* 428. As to the letters of marque, see introduction to Godolphin's *Adm. Jur.*

In the Act passed by the British Parliament during the American revolution, to authorise privateers against the Colonists, the word *of permission* were employed, not *letters of marque*, as the law applies to a foreign enemy only.—*Annual Regis.*, 1777, p. 53.

ing influence upon all who engage in it, but cannot be punished as a breach of the law of nations. The enlightened opinion of the world is most decidedly in favour of abolishing it, and recent events lead to the hope that all the commercial nations of both hemispheres will unite in no longer resorting, in time of war, to so barbarous a practice. Nevertheless, it being generally supposed that privateers furnish to the smaller maritime powers a powerful instrument of war against the military marine of an enemy, it is not easy to obtain their consent to its entire abolition.¹

§ 12. The efforts, however, which Mr. Wheaton says 'have been made by humane and enlightened individuals to suppress it (privateering), as inconsistent with the liberal spirit of the age,' have already produced their effects upon the conduct of belligerent nations, although they have not yet been able to change the law which tolerates it.² During the war between the United States and Mexico, no letters of marque, it is believed, were issued by either party; Mexico offered commissions for privateers, but neutral States forbade their subjects to accept them. In the recent war between Russia, on the one side, and Turkey, France, England, and Sardinia, on the other, the allied powers resolved to issue no letters of marque, and the other States of Europe strictly prohibited their subjects from any participation, by accepting letters of marque, or otherwise, in aiding the belligerents. An Austrian decree of May 25, 1854, prohibits the subjects of his Imperial Majesty from using letters of marque, or any participation in the armament of a vessel, no matter under what flag, and if they violate that order, they will not only be deprived of the protection of the Austrian Government, and liable to be punished by another State, but will also be proceeded against by the criminal courts of Austria. The entry of foreign privateers into Austrian ports, is forbidden. An almost simultaneous order, issued by the Queen of Spain, prohibited pro-

¹ *Journal du Droit des Assurances*, ch. xii. sec. 35; *Edinburgh Review*, vol. 5, p. 13, 15; *North American Review*, N. S., vol. ii. p. 10; *Encyclopédie de la Mer*, tome ii. lib. iii. ch. i.; Pistoye et Fournier, *Précis*, &c. iv. ch. ii. sec. 1; Franklin's *Works*, vol. 2, p. 427 et seq. *Hydrophile*, *Droit Maritime*, l. 1. tit. ii. § 29; *Encyclopédie*, l. 1. tit. ix.; *Encyclopædia Americana*, verb. *Privateering*.

² The United States, in 1785, agreed by treaty with Prussia to employ no privateers in any future war with that power.

prietors, masters, or captains of Spanish vessels, from letters of marque from any foreign power, or giving them unless in the cause of humanity, in the case of fire-wreck. Denmark, and Sweden, and Norway, gave notice to friendly powers that during the existing contest, privateers would not be admitted into their ports, nor tolerated anchorage of their respective States. Other Governments issued similar orders with respect to their own shipping (either directly or indirectly,) in privateering the shipping or commerce of any of the belligerents. The Secretary of State of the United States, in reply to the communications of the English and French ministers, communicating the resolutions of the two allied powers not to authorise privateers, said, 'the laws of this country impose severe restrictions only upon its own citizens, but upon all persons who are residents within any of the territories of the United States, against equipping privateers, receiving commissions, or listing men therein, for the purpose of taking part in foreign war.'¹

§ 13. On the 16th of April, 1856, at the Conference of the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, and Turkey adopted a 'declaration concerning maritime law,' containing the following principles which were made indivisible: '1. *Privateering is, and remains, abolished.* 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under an enemy's flag. 4. Blockades, in order to be just, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coasts of the enemy. This declaration was not to be 'binding, except between powers which have acceded to, or shall accede to it; and it was also agreed, by the plenipotentiaries, that the powers which had or should agree to it, 'cannot hereafter enter into any arrangements in regard to the application of the rights of neutrals in time of war, which does not, at the same time, conform to the four principles which are the objects of the said declaration.'

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. ii. ch. ix. § 19, note; *Cong. Rep.*, 1st Sess., H. Rep. Ex. Doc. No. 103; Martens, *Précis des Gens*, § 259.

² Protocols, Nos. 23 and 24, Congress of Paris, 1856: *Procès-Verbaux*, No. 12, 1856; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. app. Crotolan, *Théor. math. de la Mer*, tome ii. app. special, pp. 516-518.

§ 14. This declaration of the six powers of the Paris Conference was communicated to other States, and it was stated, in the memorandum of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Emperor, dated June 12, 1858, that the following powers had signified their full adhesion to all the four principles, viz : Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Bremen, Brazil, the Duchy of Brunswick, Chili, the Argentine Confederation, the Germanic Confederation, Denmark, the two Sicilies, Ecuador, the Roman States, Greece, Guatemala, Hayti, Hamburg, Hanover, the two Hesses, Lubeck, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Nassau, Oldenburg, Parma, the Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Saxony, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Weimar, Sweden, Switzerland, Tuscany, Wurtemberg. The executive Government of Uruguay also gave its full assent to all the four principles, subject to the ratification of the Legislature. Spain and Mexico adopted the last three as their own, but, on account of the first article, declined acceding to the entire declaration. The United States adopted the second, third and fourth propositions, independently of the first, offering, however, to adopt that also, with the following amendment, or additional clause : *'and the private property of the subjects, or citizens of a belligerent on the high seas, shall be exempted from seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerent, except it be contraband.'* The proposition, thus extended, has been accepted by Russia, and some other States have signified their approbation of it. There is reason to hope that all the maritime nations of Europe will eventually adopt the extension. But if they should not, the United States will stand almost alone in their adhesion to, and advocacy of privateering—a practice condemned by their wisest statesmen and best writers on public law, and now abandoned by its former advocates and supporters in Europe. The abstract right, under the law of nations, to use privateers, cannot be questioned ; and it must also be observed that the advantage to be derived from the use of private armed vessels, in case of war would be much greater to the United States than to any European power ; moreover, that these European States, now most active in advocating the abolition of privateering, were its strongest supporters when it was most necessary to their own power. Unfortunately, nations, like individuals, are more influenced by immediate self-interest,

than by the progress of civilisation, the ultimate peace of the world, and the happiness of the human race.¹

§ 15. It being established that a belligerent has a right to commission and use private armed vessels in carrying on the war, it remains to enquire by whose authority such commissions may be issued, and who may use them. The right to issue letters of marque is inherent in the Government of an independent State, and is a part of its war-making power; but its own constitution, or internal laws, must determine² by what particular branch of the Government this right is to be exercised.

¹ Marcy, *Letter to Count Sartiges*, July 28, 1856; *The Paris Declaration*, July 14, 1858; Lawrence, *Visitaton and Search*, p. 195.

² From the fourteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century maritime legislation respecting privateers was in every country of Europe involved in a chaos of obscurity. The French Government, when in alliance with the American States, in 1778, observed more of usual respect toward neutral vessels, but in 1796 they changed their views, and seemed to think that privateering could not be too much encouraged, and for some years after privateering absorbed the naval energy of the State. This was carried to such an unlimited licentious degree, that neutral vessels avoided the French coast, and entailed much injury on the commerce of that country. Accordingly, in 1800, a decree of Napoleon Bonaparte, annulling the decisions of 1778 and others, and restoring the usages of 1778.

In 1861, the Confederate States of America employed privateers against the Federal States, in consequence of which a Bill was introduced into the Senate during the Session of 1861-2 (at the suggestion of which the Government, but failed to become law), to authorise the President during the continuance of the insurrection, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to revive in relation to all that part of the United States, where the inhabitants have been declared in a state of insurrection, and the vessels and property to them belonging, the laws passed on this subject during the war of 1812. It was opposed, because it was assumed that letters of marque could only be granted against an independent State, and that their issue might be regarded as a recognition of the Confederate States. Such a measure might also be regarded as a mark of weakness of the Federal navy. More so, privateering, when attempted by the Confederate States, was branded by the President and the public sentiment of the North as piracy. (*Congressional Globe*, 1861-2, p. 3325.) Nevertheless, by the 5th section of the Act of August 5, 1861, the President might instruct the commanders of 'armed vessels sailing under the authority of any letter of marque or reprisal granted by the Congress of the United States, or the commanders of any other suitable vessels,' to subdue, &c., vessels engaged in piratical aggressions. The Secretary of the Navy, in a note to the Secretary of State, October 1, 1861, says 'under the (above) clause letters of marque under proper restrictions, or guards against all that might be granted. This would seem to be lawful, and perhaps liable to the objection of granting letters of marque against our citizens, and that, too, without law or authority from the only constitutional power that can give it.' However, early in 1863, a bill was passed by Congress, empowering the President, during three years, to issue letters of marque, but this power does not seem to have been employed.

When, in 1569, the Prince of Orange issued letters of marque to the gentleman and others, who became so notorious as the *corsaires de mer*, many of them were punished as pirates; 'not so much,' says Martens, 'on account of their excesses, as because it was not thought that the Prince of Orange had power to grant such letters of marque.' The authority which grants the commission determines what limits shall be imposed on the exercise by the privateer of belligerent rights; and, if such vessel exceed the limits of its commission, and commit acts of hostility not warranted by the letter which it carries, such acts be not in violation of the laws of war, it is responsible to and punishable by the State alone from which the commission was issued. 'A vessel,' says Phillimore, 'which takes a commission from *both belligerents* is guilty of piracy, for the authority conflicts with the other. But a nicer question has arisen with respect to a vessel which sails under two or more commissions granted by *allied powers* against a *common enemy*. The better opinion seems to be, that such practice is irregular and inexpedient, but does not carry with it the substance or name of piracy.'¹ Kent does not make this distinction, but states the proposition in general terms, 'that a cruiser, furnished with commissions from two different powers, is liable to be treated as a pirate.' Hauteseuille says, that if a privateer receives commissions from two sovereigns, it is to be treated as a pirate, 'even where the letters of marque emanate from two powers allied for a common war.' Another question to be noticed is, what is the character of a vessel of a *neutral* State, armed as a privateer, with a commission from one of the belligerents? Phillimore says, 'that such a vessel is guilty of a gross infraction of international law; that she is not entitled to the liberal treatment of a vanquished enemy, is wholly unquestionable; but it would be difficult to maintain that the character of piracy has been stamped upon such a vessel by the decision of international law.' Kent is of opinion that the law of the United States, which declares such an act a high misdemeanour, punishable by fine and imprisonment, is 'in affirmance of the law of nations.' Ortolan thinks that such an act is not piracy in international law, but that it ought to be made so. Hauteseuille

¹ A vessel commissioned by two powers, even if they are allies, is a pirate - see *Le Jure* *Jenkins's Herald*, ii. 174.

feuille is of opinion that they are not to be treated as pirates unless made so by interior laws or treaty stipulations of a neutral State. We have already alluded to the recent laws and instructions of European States on this question, and will only add here, that by the law of Plymouth Colony in 1682, it was declared to be felony to commit hostilities on the high seas, under the flag of any foreign power, upon the subjects of another power in amity with England; and the same acts were declared to be felony by the law of the Colony of New York in 1699.¹

§ 16. Some States have covenanted, in their treaty stipulations, that they will prevent their subjects, under heavy penalties, from accepting commissions or letters of marque from other States. Such was the character of the treaty of September 26, 1786, between France and England. In other treaties, it is stipulated that no subject, or citizen of either of the contracting powers, shall accept a commission or letter of marque to assist an enemy in hostilities against the other, under pain of being treated as a pirate. Such is the character of the treaties entered into between the United States and France, Holland, Sweden, Prussia, Great Britain, Spain, Columbia, Chili, &c. Some of these treaties, however, have expired without this provision being renewed in any subsequent treaty. It may be remarked that, whatever be thought of the character, in an international war, of a neutral vessel taking a commission from a belligerent, the other belligerent is justified in treating such vessel as a pirate, when it is so stipulated in a treaty with the neutral State, or when the laws of the neutral State declare such acts to be piracy. This case is readily distinguishable from that in which the slave trade is made piracy by the municipal law of a particular State, for such trade is not considered as prohibited by the law of nations.²

§ 17. The implements of war, which may be lawfully used against an enemy, are not confined to those which are openly employed to take human life, as swords, lances, fire-arms, and cannon; but also include secret and concealed means of de-

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 100; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. i. § 358; Klüber, *Droit des Gens*, § 260; Ortolan, *Exp. de la Mal*, liv. ii. ch. xi.; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. iii. ch. ii.; Abreau, *Traité de las Presas*, pt. ii. cap. i. §§ 7, 8; Martens, *Essai sur le Droit des Armateurs*, ch. ii. § 14.

² Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. i. § 10, note *.

struction, as pits, mines, &c. So also, of new inventions and military machinery of various kinds; we are not only justifiable in employing them against the enemy, but also if possible, of concealing from him their use.¹ The general effect of such inventions and improvements is thus described by a distinguished American statesman: 'Every great discovery in the art of war has a life-saving and peace-promoting influence. The effects of the invention of gunpowder are a familiar proof of this remark, and the same principle applies to the novelties of modern times. By perfecting ourselves in military science (paradoxical as it may seem) we are therefore assisting in the diffusion of peace, and hastening the approach of that period when "swords shall be beaten into ploughshares, and spears into pruning hooks; when nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."' The same views are expressed by Ortolan and other recent writers on the laws and usages of war. At one point, however, it was considered contrary to the rules of military honour and etiquette to make use of unusual implements of war. Thus the French Vice-Admiral, Marshal Conflans, issued an order of the day, on November 8, 1759, forbidding the use of hollow shot against the enemy, on the ground that they were not generally employed by polite nations,² and that

The laws of war do not allow to belligerents an unlimited power as to the choice of means of injuring the enemy. Brussels Conference, 1864, Art. 12. According to this principle are strictly forbidden: (a) the use of poisoned weapons, (b) murder by treachery of individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army, (c) murder of an individual who, having laid down his arms or having no longer the means of defending himself, has surrendered at discretion; (d) the promise that no quarter will be given; (e) the use of arms, projectiles, or explosives 'malin' which may cause unnecessary suffering, as well as the use of the projectiles prohibited by the declaration of St. Petersburg, 1864; (f) abuse of the flag of truce, the national flag, or the colours, regalia or uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive signs of the Geneva Convention; (g) all destruction or seizure of the property of the enemy which is not imperatively required by the necessity of war. *Ibid.*, Art. 13.

During the Franco-Austrian war (1859) the battle of Montebello was won by the French, through the support they received in the rapid arrival of fresh troops by railway. Each train disgorging its thousands of armed men and immediately hastening back for more.

A declaration between Great Britain, Austria, Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Prussia, and North German Confederation, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and Württemberg, signed at St. Petersburg, November 11, 1864, the contracting parties engaged to renounce, in case

the French ought to fight according to the rules of honour. The same view was taken of the use of hot shot, grape than shot, split balls, &c.¹

§ 18. But, while the laws of war allow the use of new invention of arms, or other means of destruction, against the life and property of an enemy, there is a limit to this rule beyond which we cannot go. It is necessity alone that justifies us in making war and in taking human life, and there is no necessity for taking the life of an enemy who is disabled, or for inflicting upon him injuries which in no way contribute to the decision of the contest. Hence, we are forbidden to use poisoned weapons, for these add to the cruelties and calamities of a war, without conducing to its termination. We may wound an enemy in order to disable him, but when so disabled, we have no right to take his life; we, therefore, cannot introduce poison into that wound so as, subsequently, to cause his death. 'It is therefore with good reason,' says Vattel, 'and in conformity with their duty, that civilised nations have classed, among the laws of war, the maxim which prohibits poisoning of arms.'

of war among themselves, the employment by their military or naval troops of any projectile, of a weight below 400 grammes, which is either explosive, or charged with fulminating or inflammable substances. This engagement does not oblige when, in a war between contracting or acceding parties, a non-acceding party shall join one of the belligerents.

¹ Butler, B. F., *Address on the Military Profession*, p. 25; Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, liv. iii. ch. i.

The 'Tourterelle' French ship in an action with the 'Lively' used red-hot shot. The employment of hot shot is not usually deemed honourable warfare; but the blame, if any, rested with those who had equipped the ship for sea. *Jas. Nav. Hist.* vol. i. 283.

Among the langridge which the American privateer, the 'General Armstrong,' used, in 1814, against the boats of the British ships 'Platagenet' and 'Rota,' were nails, brass buttons, knife blades, &c., and the consequence was that the wounded suffered excruciating pain before they were cured. *Ibid.* vol. vi. 350.

² Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii. § 156; Grotius (b. iii. ch. i.) forbids the taking of the life of an enemy by poison, or by the hands of assassins, doing violence to women or to the dead, making slaves of prisoners, the wanton ravage of a country, or the destruction of buildings and public monuments. The use of barbarian troops in a war between civilised nations appears to be still tolerated, but due precaution should be taken by those employing them that such troops in no way outrage the laws of war. Russia brought Circassians into Hungary in 1848, and towards the end of the Crimean war (1855) she was preparing to use some savage races within her empire. The French employed savages against the British in America; the British, notwithstanding Lord Chatham, did the same against their revolted colonists; the French Government employed the Turcos against the Austrians in 1859, against the Prussians in 1870. The last example was the employment of Basa-Bauuks by Turkey against the Servians in 1876.

19. The practice of poisoning wells, springs, waters, or any kind of food, for the purpose of injuring an enemy, is now also universally condemned. In addition to the reasons given for prohibiting the use of poisoned weapons, there is the additional one, that by poisoning waters and food, we may destroy innocent persons, and non-combatants. The practice is, therefore, condemned by all civilised nations, and any State or general who should resort to such means, would be regarded as an enemy to the human race, and excluded from civilised society.¹

20. The same may be said of assassination, or treacherously taking the life of an enemy. Not unfrequently the success of a campaign, or even the termination of the war, depends on the life of the sovereign, or of the commanding general. Hence, in former times, it sometimes happened that a resolute person was induced to steal into the enemy's camp, under the cover of a disguise, and having penetrated to the general's quarters, to surprise and kill him. Such an act is now deemed infamous and execrable, both in him who executes, and in him who commands, encourages, or rewards it. The consul, Caius Fabricius and Quintus Æmilius rejected with horror the proposal of Pyrrhus's physician to poison his master, and cautioned that prince to be on his guard against the traitor.² The proposal of the Prince of the Catti to destroy

¹ Grotius, *de Jur. Bel. ac. Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. iv. § 17; Leibner, *Polit. et Jur.*, b. vii. §§ 24, 25; Rayneval, *Inst. du Droit Nat.*, &c., liv. iii. chap. i. Heister, *Droit International*, § 125; Burlamaqui, *Droit de la Nature des Gens*, tome v. pt. iv. ch. vi.; De Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. i. ch. § 24.

² On February 14, 1862, in the House of Lords, Lord Stanhope called the attention of Lord John Russell to the report, that a second fleet of ships, laden with stone, was to be sunk by the Government of the United States, in the Maffitts Channel of Charleston Harbour. The sinking of large ships, laden with stone, on banks of mud at the entrance of a harbour, could only end in the permanent destruction of the same, and such was not justified by the laws of war. It was not an act against man, but against the bounty of Providence, which had bestowed harbours for the advantage and intercourse of one people with another. On this ground we (the British) were well entitled to protest against the act. Lord John Russell approved of the protest, and condemned the destruction of commercial harbours a most barbarous act, declared that the French Government took the same view, and were desirous to communicate with the United States Government.

On February 28, Lord John Russell informed the House that he had received a dispatch from Lord Lyons, to the effect that Mr. Seward stated that he had not been a complete filling up of Charleston Harbour, and that some more ships would be sunk there.

¹ In 1800 a foreigner waited on Mr. Fox, then Secretary of State, and

disguise and treachery which gives to the deed the character of murder or assassination. The conduct of Leonidas and the Lacedæmonians, who broke into the enemy's camp and made their way directly to the Persian monarch's tent, was justified by the common rules of war, and did not authorise the king to treat them more rigorously than any other enemies. The act of Mucius Scaevola, in entering, in disguise, the tent of Porsenna with the intention of killing him, was excused by the age in which he lived, but would not be justified by the rules of modern warfare.

§ 22. War makes men public enemies, but it leaves in force all duties which are not necessarily suspended by the new position in which men are placed towards each other. Good faith is, therefore, as essential in war as in peace, for without it hostilities could not be terminated with any degree of safety, short of the total destruction of one of the contending parties. This being admitted as a general principle, the question arises how far we may deceive an enemy, and what stratagems are allowable in war? Whenever we have expressly or tacitly engaged to speak the truth to an enemy, it would be perfidy in us to deceive his confidence in our sincerity. But if the occasion imposes upon us no moral obligation to disclose to him the truth, we are perfectly justifiable in leading him into error, either by words or actions. Feints, and deceptions of this kind, are always allowable in war. It is the breach of good faith, express or implied, which constitutes the perfidy, and gives to such acts the character of *lies*.¹

§ 23. *Stratagems* in war are snares laid for an enemy, or deceptions practised on him without perfidy, and consistent with good faith. They are not only allowable, but have often constituted a great share of the glory of the most celebrated commanders.² 'Since humanity obliges us,' says Vattel, 'to

¹ Baymore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 94; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. c. viii. § 1; Leibniz, *Political Ethics*, b. vii. §§ 24, 25; Gronovius, *De Jur. Fil. ac. Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. viii. §§ 4, 5; Puffendorf, *de Jure Nat. et Gent.* lib. viii. cap. vi. § 6; Gaden, *De Diplomatie*, liv. vi. § 7; Bello, *Law of International*, pt. ii. cap. vi. §§ 1, 2; Lynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Nat.* lib. 2.

² *Stratagems (ruses de guerre)* and the employment of means necessary to procure intelligence respecting the enemy or the country invaded, is subject to Art. 36. that the population of an occupied territory shall be compelled to take part in military operations against their own country) are considered lawful means.—Brussels Conference, 1874, Art. 14.

prefer the gentlest methods in the prosecution of our rights, if by a stratagem, by a feint devoid of perfidy, we can make ourselves masters of a strong place, surprise the enemy, and overcome him, it is much better, and is really more commendable, to succeed in this way than by a bloody siege, or the carnage of a battle. These feints, or pretended attacks, are frequently resorted to, and men and ships are sometimes so disguised as to deceive the enemy as to their real character, and by this means enter a place or maintain a position advantageous to their plan of attack or of battle. But the use of stratagem is limited by the rights of humanity and the established usages of war. Even if devoid of perfidy, and consistent with the faith due to the enemy, they must not violate commercial usage, or contravene the stipulations of particular treaties. Vattel mentions the case of an English frigate, which, in the war of 1756, is said to have appeared off Calais, and made signals of distress, with a view of decoying out some vessel, and actually seized a boat and some sailors who generously came to her assistance. If the fact be true, that unworthy stratagem deserves a severe punishment.¹ It tends

¹ No trace can be found of this occurrence; Vattel merely tells us that 'it is said' to have happened. The following example, however, is trustworthy, and has been verified by affidavit made before the (colonial) mayor of New York, February 13, 1783. In that year the 'Sybille,' a French frigate of thirty-eight guns, Captain Le Comte de Krengeon de Soemaria, entered the British ship 'Hussar,' twenty guns, Captain J. M. Russell, by displaying an English ensign reversed in the main shrouds, and English colours over French at the ensign staff. She was also under jury-masts, had some shot holes, and in every way intimated herself to be a distressed prize to some of the British ships. Captain Russell at once approached to succour her, but she immediately, by a preconcerted and rapid movement, aimed at carrying away the bowsprit of the 'Hussar,' raking, and then boarding her. This *ruse de guerre*, of a black tint, was only prevented taking full effect, by the promptitude of Captain Russell, who managed to turn his ship in such a way as only to receive half the raking fire. He then engaged with the 'Sybille,' and, eventually capturing her, publicly broke the sword of the French captain, whom he considered had sullied his reputation by descending to fight the 'Hussar' for above thirty minutes under false colours, and with signals of distress flying. 'She' (the 'Hussar'), said Captain Russell, 'had not had fair play, but Almighty God has saved her from the most foul snare, the most perfidious enemy.' He confined the captain of the 'Sybille' a State prisoner. It appears that the latter was subsequently brought to trial by his own Government, but was acquitted.

James narrates (*Narr. Hist.*, vol. vi) that, in 1813, two merchants of New York, encouraged by a promise of reward from the American Government, formed a plan for destroying the British 74-gun ship 'Ramilles,' Captain Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy. A schooner was laden with several casks of gunpowder, having trains leading from

to damp a benevolent charity, which should be held sacred in the eyes of mankind, and which is so laudable even between enemies. Moreover, making signals of distress is asking assistance, and by that very action, promising perfect security to those who give the friendly succour. Therefore, the action attributed to that frigate implies an odious perfidy. Ortolan refers to the conduct of an English frigate and two vessels at Barcelona, in 1800, as of the same character as that of the English frigate off Calais, described as above by Vattel. On September 4th, 1800, the English took forcible possession of a Swedish vessel, then neutral, near Barcelona, put a large number of English soldiers and marines on board, and entering the harbour in the night under this neutral flag, and in a neutral vessel, surprised and captured two Spanish frigates which were lying at anchor.¹ Ortolan denounces this as an act of perfidy, and as not being a stratagem allowable by the usages

species of gunlock, which, upon the principle of clock-work, went off at a given period after it had been set. On deck were some casks of flour, as it was known that the 'Ramilies' was short of provisions, and it was supposed that Captain Hardy would immediately seize her to revictual his ship. Thus murderously laden, she approached the 'Ramilies,' which deputed a boat with thirteen men and a lieutenant to cut her off. The crew immediately abandoned the ship, which was taken by the lieutenant. A few hours afterwards she blew up, the lieutenant and ten of the sailors were killed, and the other three men were shockingly scorched.

This is evidently extracted from the 'Précis des événements militaires,' volume p. 117, which contains several misrepresentations concerning the affair. The real facts seem to be that, while Barcelona was under blockade of British ships of war, two Spanish corvettes, of twenty-two guns each, were lying in harbour. Sir Thomas Louis determined to cut them out, and ordered eight boats to assist the 'Niger,' under Captain Hillyar, in so doing. The attack was late in the evening, and one of the boats was at that time boarding a Swedish vessel, bound into the port. To join this boat, and give directions to the officers, Captain Hillyar went alongside, and continued there with all his boats while the vessel stood in toward the mole. As they approached to the distance of three-quarters of a mile, Hillyar and his party quitted the vessel, two shots were at this moment fired, which passed over the boats, and two or three minutes after the enemy's outer ship, in Barcelona, discharged her broadside at them; the shot fell short. This proved that the Spaniards did not respect the neutrality of the Swedish flag, and consequently that it did not avail in protecting the British boats, which immediately pulled in. The outer ship was immediately boarded. The other ship thereupon opened fire, but was also carried. The affair was over after dark, when no flag could be distinguished, but even if the case had been as the Spaniards represent, it did not prevent their being upon a defenceless neutral. The Swedish vessel neither contributed to the success of the enterprise, nor to the safety of the men, but it made an impression to the disadvantage of Hillyar, and it required much explanation before the Admiralty, and Lord Nelson, saw the matter in a true light. (See Brent, *Nav. Hist.* 1.)

of war. This act may be viewed in different lights. So the surprise of the Spaniards is concerned it was a legitimate stratagem. It was their duty to be prepared for such an attack, and they were properly punished for their neglect to take the proper and ordinary precautions to prevent it. As far as the seizure, and the use of the Swedish vessel, and the treatment received by its captain and crew at the hands of the English, are concerned, it was a gross violation of their rights, which would have justified Sweden in declaring war on satisfaction being refused. As between Spain and Sweden it was a gross neglect of neutral duty, on the part of the latter, in not requiring England to restore the captures thus unlawfully made under the Swedish flag. With respect to the attack made by the English under a false flag, it was a violation of their own maritime laws and the established usages of nations, as will be shown in the next paragraph.

§ 24. We will now inquire how far stratagems of this kind are allowable at sea, or rather how far a vessel may act under false colours.¹ 'To sail and chase under false colours,' says Sir William Scott, 'may be an allowable stratagem in war, but firing under false colours is what the maritime law of every country (England) does not permit; for it may be attended with very unjust consequences; it may occasion the loss of the lives of persons who, if they were apprised of the true character of the cruiser, might instead of resisting it, have sought its protection.' It will be noticed that the prohibition against firing under false colours is here put upon the ground of local policy, no reference being made to any general rule of international jurisprudence. 'It is a rule of the law of nations,' say Bynkershoek and Duverdy, 'that on the sea, a vessel cannot attack another vessel before having made known its nationality, and thus put the vessel which it encounters in a position of declaring its own nationality.' The ancient rule of maritime law, as stated

¹ Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, tome ii, liv. iii. ch. i.; *Précis du Droit des Gens*, § 274; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. ii. § 178.

² False colours are usual stratagems in war ('*La Esperanza*,' 1890), but see par. 17, note 1.

The subject of employing false colours was much discussed in the 'Alabama' controversy with the United States, that Government frequently pressing the point on the British Government, especially

lin, was that the *affirming gun* (*coup de semonce, ou d'assurance*) could be fired only under the national flag.¹ Such were the provisions of the ancient ordinances of France. But article 3 of the Arrêté du 2 Prairial merely prohibits the firing a shot (*coup de canon à boulet*) under a false flag, and the law of April 10th, 1823, article 3, provides that captains and officers who *commit acts of hostility* under a flag other than that of the State by which they are commissioned, shall be treated as pirates. Ortolan says that the affirming gun may be fired under false colours, but all acts of hostility must be under the national flag. Massé and Hautefeuille seem to adopt the opinion that the affirming gun (*coup de semonce*) should be fired only under national colours. But as such gun is in no respect an act of hostility, we can perceive no good reason why it may not be fired under false colours.²

§ 25. *Deceitful intelligence* may be divided into two classes : false representations made in order that they may fall into the enemy's hands and deceive him, and the representations of one who feigns to betray his own party, with a view of drawing the enemy into a snare ; both are justifiable by the laws of war. The commanders sometimes make false representations of the number and position of their troops, and of their intended military operations, for the purpose of having them fall into the enemy's hands, and of deceiving him ; this is not only allowable, but is regarded as a commendable *ruse de la guerre*. If an officer deliberately makes overtures to an enemy, offering to betray his own party, and then deceives that enemy with false information, his procedure is deemed treacherous ; nevertheless, the enemy has no right to complain of the treachery, for he should not have expected good faith in a traitor. But if the officer had been tampered with by offers of bribery, he may lawfully feign acquiescence to the proposal with a view to deceive the seducer ; he is insulted by the attempt to purchase his fidelity, and he is justified in revenging himself by drawing the tempter into a snare.

By this conduct,' says Vattel, 'he neither violates the faith of

¹ *Semonceur* means to 'warn in a loud voice,' not to *summon*.

² The 'Peacock,' 3 Rob. Rep., p. 187 ; Pistoye et Duverdy, *Traité des Pr. et de la Mer*, v. ch. 1 ; Massé, *Droit Commercial*, tome i. § 307 ; Hautefeuille, *Droit des Nations Neutres*, tome iv. p. 8 ; Valin, *Traité des Pr. et de la Mer*, ii. sec. i § 9 ; Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, tome ii. hb. ch. 1.

promises nor impairs the happiness of mankind, for criminal engagements are absolutely void, and ought never to be fulfilled, and it would be a fortunate circumstance if the promises of traitors could never be relied on, but were on all sides surrounded with uncertainties and danger. Therefore, a superior on information that the enemy is tempting the fidelity of an officer or soldier, makes no scruple of ordering that subaltern to feign himself gained over, and to arrange his pretended treachery so as to draw the enemy into an ambuscade.¹

§ 26. *Spies* are persons who, in *disguise*, or under *false pretences*, insinuate themselves among the enemy, in order to discover the state of his affairs, to pry into his designs, and then communicate to their employer the information thus obtained. The employment of spies is considered a kind of clandestine practice, a deceit in war, allowable by its rules. 'Spies,' says Vattel, 'are generally condemned to capital punishment, and not unjustly; there being scarcely any other way of preventing the mischief which they may do. For this reason, a man of honour, who would not expose himself to die by the hands of the common executioner, ever declines serving as a spy. He considers it beneath him, as it seldom can be done without some kind of treachery. The sovereign, therefore, cannot lawfully require such a service of subjects, except, perhaps, in some singular case, and that of the last importance. It remains for him to hold out the temptation of a reward, as an inducement for mercenary souls to engage in the business. If those whom he employs make a voluntary tender of their services, or if they be neither subject to, nor in any wise connected with, the enemy, he may unquestionably take advantage of their exertions, without violation of justice or honour.' No

¹ De Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. I. tit. iii. § 24.

² No one shall be considered as a spy but those who, acting secretly or under false pretences, collect or try to collect information in districts occupied by the enemy, with the intention of communicating it to the opposing force.—Brussels Conference, 1874, Art. 19. A spy if taken in the act shall be tried, and treated according to the laws in force in the army which captures him. *Ibid.*, Art. 20. If a spy who rejoins the army to which he belongs is subsequently captured by the enemy, he is to be treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts. *Ibid.*, Art. 21.

During the late Franco-German war, the correspondents of the *Figaro* and *Gaulois* French newspapers were taken at Soultz-les-Français by the Prussians. It was suggested that they should be hanged as spies, but they were remitted by the Crown Prince, to be 'set free as soon as they can do no harm.'

authority can require of a subordinate a treacherous or criminal act in any case, nor can the subordinate be justified in its performance by any orders of his superior. Hence the odium and punishment of the crime must fall upon the spy himself, though it may be doubted whether the employer is entirely free from the moral responsibility of holding out *inducements* to treachery and crime. That a general may profit by the information of a spy, the same as he may accept the offers of a traitor, there can be no question; but to seduce the one to betray his country, or to induce the other, by promises of reward, to commit an act of treachery, is a very different matter. The term *spy* is frequently applied to persons sent to reconnoitre an enemy's position, his forces, defences, &c., but not in disguise, or under false pretences.¹ Such, however, are not *spies* in the sense in which that term is used in military and international law, nor are persons so employed liable to any more rigorous treatment than ordinary prisoners of war. It is the *disguise*, or *false pretence*, which constitutes the perfidy, and forms the essential elements of the crime, which by the laws of war, is punishable with an ignominious death. Article 101 of the rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States provides, 'that in time of war, all persons not citizens of or owing allegiance to the United States of America, who shall be found lurking as *spies*, in or about the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the United States, or any of them, shall suffer death, according to the law and usage of nations, by sentence of a general court-martial.'²

Military men (*les militaires*) who have penetrated within the zone of operations of the enemy's army, with the intention of collecting information, are not considered as spies if it has been possible to recognise their military character. In like manner military men (and also non-military persons carrying out their mission openly, charged with the transmission of despatches, either to their own army or to that of the enemy), shall not be considered as spies if captured by the enemy. To this class belong also, if captured, individuals sent in balloons to carry despatches, and generally to keep up communications between the different parts of an army or of a territory. — Brussels Conference, 1874, Art. 22.

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. x. §§ 179, 182; Grotius, *De Jur. Belli Pacis*, lib. iii. cap. iv. § 18; U. S. Statutes, Act of April 10th, 1806; *Lea, Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. vi. § 2; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 250; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. xii.

² Art. 29, and 30 Viet. 109 (Naval Discipline Act), s. 6, spies can be tried by a naval court martial, and shall suffer death or other punishment.

Hac says (*Pleas of the Crown*) that 'if an alien enemy come into

§ 27. Notwithstanding the criminal character of a has not unfrequently happened that men of high and able feelings have been induced to undertake the office, although this fact has somewhat lessened, in popular the odium of the act, it has failed to diminish the severity of its punishment. Two of the most notable instances of this to be found in military history, occurred during the war of the American Revolution. After the retreat of Washington from Long Island, Captain Nathan Hale recrossed to the British lines *in disguise*, and obtained the possible intelligence of the enemy's forces, and their military operations ; but, in his attempt to return, he was apprehended and brought before Sir William Howe, who gave immediate orders for his execution *as a spy* ; and these orders were carried into execution the very next morning, under circumstances of unnecessary rigour, the prisoner not being allowed to see a clergyman, nor even the use of a Bible, although respectfully asked for both. Every one remembers the story of Major André, how he ascended the Hudson river, crossed the American lines, where he bargained with Arnold for the surrender of West Point and its defences ; how he was captured in his attempt to return to New York *in disguise*, with the documentary evidence of his bribery of Arnold concealed upon his person ; and how, after a full examination and due deliberation, he was condemned, and ordered by Washington to be executed *as a spy*. These two officers,—Hale and André,—were nearly of equal rank and age ; both had talents and accomplishments which gave promise of future greatness, and which had already endeared them to large circles of admiring friends. They both committed the same offence, and both suffered the same punishment, but with

to add to the ignominy of Hale's execution, the Americans spared no exertions to lighten the hours of André's captivity and to show their regret that the stern exigencies of the required his death. Again, while the Americans unanimously condemned the barbarous treatment¹ which Hale had before his execution, they, with equal unanimity, acknowledged the justice of his sentence. Many of them, on the contrary, while acknowledging the kindness of André, by the American officers, and their expressions of sympathy for his fate, not only complained at the time that his sentence was unjust, and his execution

1780, the American General Arnold, commanding the fortress at Mifflin, carried on negotiations with Sir Henry Clinton to enable him to surprise that fortress. Major André was the English agent, and frequent communication with Arnold, on the beach, with boats of both armies. One night, being unable to return by a boat as his custom, *he changed his uniform*, which he wore under a grey common coat, and tried to return on horseback to his own quarters, but was taken prisoner. Two foreigners ignorant of English, and of the most illiterate American generals, were members of the council. The fact of being accidentally (not for any purpose of disguise) dressed as a citizen, instead of being in uniform, was argued as an extenuation to his crime. Three months elapsed before his execution, on the gallows, instead of the rifle, his firmness in some degree surprised them. He only said, 'I die for the honour of my king and country.' General Green, the American commander who presided, observed, 'No, you die for your cowardice and like a coward.' Arnold had signed his death-warrant with great reluctance, and escaped on board a British man of war. The American Government had doubtless have saved André if the British Government had given up the traitor Arnold. (*Faux's Mem. Days*, 402. *Annals*, 358.)

On the other hand Hale was confessedly in *disguise*, and thereby had secured every part of the British army, and obtained the best possible intelligence respecting its situation and intended operation. He was taken prisoner one day, and summarily executed the next morning by a court-martial, 1776. *Holmes, Annals*, 773.

André, in the opinion of King George III, his character was good, a pension was settled on his mother, and his brother was promoted.

1780, Lord Cornwallis, commanding the British forces, commanded the American Major general Gates, that the officers and men of the British Mountain were treated with an *inhumanity* and *barbarity*. Sir Henry Clinton he writes, 'however provoked by the *unprovoked* and *cruel*ties of the enemy in this *disaster*, I have been obliged to soften the horrors of war, and restrain the *excessive* rage of General Gates and the principal officers of his army, from any *excesses* and *atrocities* shown to their wounded and prisoners. I have your excellency's feelings in attempting to restrain the *passions* and *inhuman* murders which are ever too common in war; not only on those who have taken part with us, but on those who refuse to join them.'—*Correspondence*, vol. 2.

a 'blot' upon the reputation of Washington, but the charges have since been repeated by some of their ablest writers, and especially by Lord Mahon in his 'History of England,' and by Phillimore in his 'Commentaries of International Law.' It is not denied that André was within American lines *in disguise*, for the purpose of gaining information of the disposition of our forces, and of closing negotiations with Arnold for their surrender; but it is contended that, being there with the authority of Arnold, and under a passport from him, he was not legally a spy. André himself never attempted so flimsy a defence; he scorned all pretence, and was condemned on his own confessions. His defenders seem to forget that the passport of a traitor, given for treasonable purposes, could afford no protection. It has no more legal force than Arnold's agreement to surrender to American defences; if Washington was bound to recognize this passport, he was equally bound to carry out the agreement, by surrendering to the enemy West Point and its garrison! Moreover, even though André had not been a spy in the strict technical meaning of that term, he nevertheless deserved death, for the laws of war impose that punishment upon anyone who attempts to seduce the fidelity of an officer by bribery, or to induce a soldier to desert his colors. And this penalty is now prescribed by the statute of the United States.¹

§ 28. While all agree that we have no right to require a man to perform the services of a spy, and that if we attempt to tamper with the fidelity of an enemy's officer or soldier, we incur the risk of such punishment as that enemy, under the laws of war, may impose, there is a difference of opinion as to our rewarding such acts. Some say that we may purchase treason or desertion, if we merely accept offers which are made to us; while others contend that, if we pay money for the services of a spy, or for the surrender of a fort, or an army, or for traitorous acts which may lead to their capture, we encourage perfidy and treachery nearly as much as though the offer first came from ourselves. Without attempting to decide this question of ethics, we will merely remark, that

¹ Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 106; Mahon, *Hist. of England*; Hamilton, *Hist. of the Republic*, vol. i.; Sargeant, *Life of André*; Holmes, *Annals*.

The Romans, in their heroic ages, rejected with indignation every advantage offered by an enemy's subjects. They sent back the Falisci, bound and fettered, the traitor who had offered to deliver up the king's children; and they refused to make any account of the victory of their consul over Viriatus, because it had been obtained by means of bribery. In speaking of the lawfulness of such acts, Vattel remarks, that although generals practise them, they are never heard to boast of having done so.

§ 29. It sometimes happens in war that intestine divisions prevail among the enemy's forces, and that one party may favour the objects for which we are contending; in such cases we may, without scruple, hold correspondence with the one faction, and avail ourselves of its assistance to overthrow the other party. We thus promote our own interest and gain the objects of the war, without seducing anyone to crime, or even becoming the partakers of treachery. The right to side with a faction in war is broadly different from the pretended right of forcible intervention in time of peace. A third party may side with the one or the other of the conflicting forces, just as he might in a war between separate and independent nations. If he have just cause of war against one of the parties, he may avail himself of the assistance of the other.¹

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. x. § 181; Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 25; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. vi. § 3.

General Orders,
No. 100.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington,
April 24, 1863.

The following 'Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,' prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., and revised by a Board of Officers, of which Major-General F. A. Hitchcock is president, having been approved by the President of the United States, he commands that they be published for the information of all concerned. By order of the Secretary of War.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD.

SECTION I.

Martial Law—Military Jurisdiction—Military Necessity—Retaliation.

1. A PLACE, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in consequence of the occupation, under the martial law of the invading or occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring martial law, or any public warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not. Martial law is the immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest. The presence of a hostile army proclaims its martial law.

2. Martial law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except by special proclamation, ordered by the commander-in-chief; or by some mention in the treaty of peace concluding the war, when the occupation of a place or territory continues beyond the conclusion of peace as under the conditions of the same.

3. Martial law in a hostile country consists in the suspension, by the occupying military authority, of the criminal and civil law, and of the domestic administration and government in the occupied place or territory, and in the substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of general laws, as far as military necessity requires the suspension, substitution, or dictation.

The commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of all civil and penal law shall continue, either wholly or in part, as at times of peace, unless otherwise ordered by the military authority.

4. Marshal law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war. Military oppression is not martial law; it is the abuse of the power which that law confers. As martial law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honour, and humane virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed.

5. Martial law should be less stringent in places and countries fairly occupied and fairly conquered. Much greater severity may be exercised in places or regions where actual hostilities exist, or are expected as must be prepared for. Its most complete sway is allowed—even in the commander's own country—when face to face with the enemy, because of the absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount duty to defend the country against invasion.

To save the country is paramount to all other considerations.

6. All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual course in the enemy's places and territories under martial law, unless interrupted or stopped by order of the occupying military power; but all the functions of the hostile government legislative, executive, or administrative, whether of a general, provincial, or local character, cease under martial law, or continue only with the sanction, or if deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or invader.

7. Martial law extends to property, and to persons, whether they be subjects of the enemy or aliens to that government.

8. Consuls, among American and European nations, are not diplomats.

agents. Nevertheless, their offices and persons will be subjected to martial law in cases of urgent necessity only; their property and business are exempted. Any delinquency they commit against the established laws, may be punished as in the case of any other inhabitant, and such punishment furnishes no reasonable ground for international complaint.

The functions of ambassadors, ministers, or other diplomatic agents, accredited by neutral powers to the hostile government, cease, so far as regards the displaced government; but the conquering or occupying power usually recognizes them as temporarily accredited to itself.

Martial law affects chiefly the police and collection of public revenue and taxes, whether imposed by the expelled government or by the victor, and refers mainly to the support and efficiency of the army, its discipline, and the safety of its operations.

The law of war does not only disclaim all cruelty and bad faith in military engagements concluded with the enemy during the war, but also the breaking of stipulations solemnly contracted by the belligerents in time of peace, and avowedly intended to remain in force in case of war between the contracting powers.

It forbids all extortions and other transactions for individual gain; and all private revenge, or connivance at such acts.

Offences to the contrary shall be severely punished, and especially so if committed by officers.

Whenever feasible, martial law is carried out in cases of individual crimes by military courts; but sentences of death shall be executed only with the approval of the chief executive, provided the urgency of the case does not require a speedier execution, and then only with the approval of the chief commander.

Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: first, that which is conferred by statute; second, that which is derived from the common law of war. Military offences under the statute law must be tried in the courts therein directed, but military offences which do not come within the statute must be tried and punished under the common law of war. The character of the courts which exercise these jurisdictions depends upon the local laws of each particular country.

In the armies of the United States the first is exercised by courts-martial. All cases which do not come within the "Rules and Articles of War," or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on courts-martial, are tried by military commissions.

Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, admits of the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the usages, laws, and customs of war.

Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally necessary in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of armed enemies, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army; and of such deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith positively pledged, regarding agreements entered into during the war; nor supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be human beings, responsible to one another, and to God.

Military necessity does not admit of cruelty, that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or

wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It admits of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy. In general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.

17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to employ every hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the subjection of the enemy.

18. When the commander of a besieged place expels the non-combatants, in order to lessen the number of those who consume his provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them so as to hasten on the surrender.

19. Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so that the non-combatants, and especially the women and children, may be removed before the bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of war to thus inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity.

20. Public war is a state of armed hostility between sovereign states or governments. It is a law and requisite of civilized existence to live in political, continuous societies, forming organized units, called nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, and suffer, advance and regress together, in peace and in war.

21. The citizen or native of a hostile country is thus an enemy of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subject to the hardships of the war.

22. Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last century, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle is more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen is to be treated in respect to person, property, and honour as much as the exigencies of war permit.

23. Private citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried off to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed in his private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war.

24. The almost universal rule in remote times was, and continues to be with barbarous armies, that the private individual of the hostile country is destined to suffer every privation of liberty and protection, every disruption of family ties. Protection was, and still is with civilized people, the exception.

25. In modern regular wars of the Europeans, and their descendants in other portions of the globe, protection of the inoffensive citizen of a hostile country is the rule; privation and disturbance of private life are the exceptions.

26. Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil officers of the hostile country to take the oath of temporary allegiance or of fidelity to their own victorious government or rulers, and may expel every one who declines to do so. But whether they do so or not, the people and their civil officers owe strict obedience to them as long as they hold sway over the district or country, at the peril of their lives.

27. The law of war can no more wholly disengage with relation

be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence, and the character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.

Unjust or inconsiderate retaliation removes the belligerents farther and farther from the mitigating rules of a regular war, and by rapid steps leads them nearer to the internecine wars of savages.

29. Modern times are distinguished from earlier ages by the existence, at one and the same time, of many nations and great governments related to one another in close intercourse.

Peace is their normal condition; war is the exception. The ultimate object of all modern war is a renewed state of peace.

The more vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.

30. Ever since the formation and co-existence of modern nations, and ever since wars have become great national wars, war has come to be acknowledged not to be its own end, but the means to obtain great ends of state, or to consist in defence against wrong; and no conventional restriction of the modes adopted to injure the enemy is any longer admitted. but the law of war imposes many limitations and restrictions on practices of justice, faith, and honour.

SECTION II.

Public and Private Property of the Enemy—Protection of Persons, and especially Women, of Religion, the Arts and Sciences—Punishment of Crimes against the Inhabitants of Hostile Countries.

31. A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes all public movable property until further direction by its government, and sequesters for its own benefit or that of its government all the revenues of real property belonging to the hostile government or nation. The title to such property remains in abeyance during military occupation, and until the conquest is made complete.

32. A victorious army, by the martial power inherent in the same, may suspend, change, or abolish, as far as the martial power extends, the laws which arise from the service, due, according to the existing laws of the invaded country, from one citizen, subject, or native of the same to another.

The commander of the army must leave it to the ultimate treaty of peace to settle the permanency of this change.

33. It is no longer considered lawful—on the contrary, it is held to be a gross breach of the law of war—to force the subjects of the enemy into the service of the victorious government, except the latter should demand, after a fair and complete conquest of the hostile country or district, that it is resolved to keep the country, district, or place permanently as its own, and make it a portion of its own country.

34. As a general rule, the property belonging to churches, to hospitals, or other establishments of an exclusively charitable character, to establishments of education, or foundations for the promotion of knowledge, to other public schools, universities, academies of learning or observation, museums of the fine arts, or of a scientific character—such property is not to be considered public property in the sense of paragraph 31. but it may be taxed or used when the public service may require it.

35. Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious instruments, such as astronomical telescopes, as well as hospitals, must be treated against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.

36. If such works of art, libraries, collections, or instruments belong-

ing to a hostile nation or government, can be removed without the consent of the capturing state or nation may order them to be sent to the removal of the benefit of the said nation. The ultimate ownership shall be settled by the ensuing treaty of peace.

In no case shall they be sold or given away, if captured by the arms of the United States, nor shall they ever be privately appropriated, or wantonly destroyed or injured.

17. The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries captured by them, religion and morality; strictly private property, the persons of the inhabitants, especially those of women; and the harmonious and domestic relations. Offences to the contrary shall be rigorously punished.

This rule does not interfere with the right of the victorious invader to tax the people of the property, to levy forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses, land, boats or ships, and churches, for religious and military uses.

18. Private property, unless forfeited by crimes or by offences of the owner, can be seized only by way of military necessity, for the support of the army or of the navy, or of the United States.

If the owner has not died, the commanding officer will cause receipts to be given, which may serve the spoliated owner to obtain indemnity.

19. The names of civil officers of the hostile government who remain in the invaded territory, and continue the work of their office, and can execute the laws, in the circumstances arising out of the war—such as judges, administrators or police officers, officers of city or communal government, and persons in the public revenue of the invaded territory, with the military government has reason wholly or partially to discontinue. Sources of measures connected with purely honorary titles are always stopped.

20. There exists no law or body of authoritative rules of action between hostile armies, except that branch of the law of nature and nations which is called the law and usage of war on land.

21. All municipal law of the ground on which the armies stand, or of the countries to which they belong, is silent and of no effect between armies in the field.

22. Slavery, complicating and confounding the ideas of property that is of things, and of personality—that is of *humanity*, exists according to municipal or local laws only. The law of nature and nations has never acknowledged it. The digest of the Roman law enacts the early dictum of the jurists, that so far as the law of nature is concerned, all men are equal. fugitives escaping from a country in which they were slaves, villains, or serfs, into another country, have, for centuries past, been held free, and acknowledged free by judicial decisions of European countries, even though the municipal law of the country in which the slave had taken refuge acknowledged slavery within its own dominions.

23. Therefore in a war between the United States and a belligerent which admits of slavery, if a person held in bondage by that belligerent be captured by or come as a fugitive under the protection of the military forces of the United States, such person is immediately entitled to the rights and privileges of a freeman. To return such person into slavery would amount to enslaving a free person, and neither the United States nor any officer under their authority can enslave any human being. Moreover, a person so made free by the law of war is under the shield of the law of nations, and the former owner or State can have, by the law of nations, no belligerent lien or claim of service.

24. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main

43. All rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as seems adequate for the gravity of the offence.

44. A soldier, officer, or private, in the act of committing such offence disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, is liable on the spot by such superior.

45. All captures and booty belong, according to the modern law of war, primarily to the government of the captor.

46. Property, whether on sea or land, can now only be claimed under the law of nations.

47. Neither officers nor soldiers are allowed to make use of their position or power in the hostile country for private gain, not even for commercial transactions otherwise legitimate. Offences to the contrary committed by commissioned officers will be punished with cashiering or such other punishment as the nature of the offence may require, if by soldiers, they shall be punished according to the nature of the offence.

48. Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, rape, assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and the like, committed by an American soldier in a hostile country against the inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severer punishment shall be preferred.

SECTION III.

Deserters—Prisoners of War—Hostages—Booty on the Battle-field.

49. Deserters from the American army, having entered the service of the enemy, suffer death if they fall again into the hands of the United States, whether by capture, or being delivered up to the American army; and if a deserter from the enemy, having taken service in the army of the United States, is captured by the enemy, and punished by them with death, or otherwise, it is not a breach against the law and usages of war, requiring redress or retaliation.

50. A prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to the hostile army for active aid, who has fallen into the hands of the captor, either fighting or wounded, on the field or in the hospital, by individual combat or by capitulation.

51. Soldiers, of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to the regular militia of the hostile country; all those who are attached to the army for its efficiency and promote directly the object of the war, except such as are hereinafter provided for; all disabled men or officers on the field or elsewhere, if captured; all enemies who have thrown away their arms and ask for quarter, are prisoners of war, and as such exposed to the inconveniences as well as entitled to the privileges of a prisoner of war.

52. Moreover, citizens who accompany an army for whatever purpose, such as soldiers, editors, or reporters of journals, or contractors, if captured, may be made prisoners of war, and be detained as such.

53. The monarch and members of the hostile reigning family, male or female, the chief and chief officers of the hostile government, its diplomatic agents, and all persons who are of particular and singular use and benefit to the hostile army or its government, are, if captured on belligerent ground, and if unprovided with a safe-conduct granted by the captor's government, prisoners of war.

54. If the people of that portion of an invaded country which is not yet occupied by the enemy, or of the whole country, at the approach of a hostile army, rise, under a duly authorised levy, *en masse* to resist the

invader, they are now treated as public enemies, and if captured, are prisoners of war.

52. No belligerent has the right to declare that he will treat a captured man in arms of a levy *en masse* as a brigand or bandit.

If, however, the people of a country, or any portion of it already occupied by an army, rise against it, they are violators of the laws of war, and are not entitled to their protection.

53. The enemy's chaplains, officers of the medical staff, and hospital nurses and servants, if they fall into the hands of the enemy, are not prisoners of war, unless the commander has retained them. In this latter case, or if, at their own desire, they are allowed to remain with their captured companions, they are prisoners of war, and may be exchanged if the commander so directs.

54. A hostage is a person accepted as a pledge for the fulfilment of an agreement concluded between belligerents during the course of a war. Hostages are rare in the present age.

55. If a hostage is accepted, he is treated like a prisoner of war, according to rank and condition, as circumstances may admit.

56. A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being an enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intention of punishing him for any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, mutilation, death, or any other barbarity.

57. So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government, and takes the soldier's oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts, are no individual crimes or offences. No man has a right to declare that enemies of a certain class, colour, or religion, when properly organized as soldiers, will not be treated by him as prisoners of war.

58. The law of nations knows of no distinction of colour, or race. If an enemy of the United States should enslave and sell any captured man of their army, it would be a case for the severest retaliation, and redressed upon complaint.

The United States cannot retaliate by enslavement; there must be the retaliation for this crime against the law of nations.

59. A prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes against the captor's army or people, committed before he was captured, and for which he has not been punished by his own authorities.

All prisoners of war are liable to the infliction of the laws of the captor.

60. It is against the usage of modern war to resolve, in the case of a prisoner of war, to give no quarter. No body of troops has the right to declare that it will not give, and therefore will not expect, quarter. A commander is permitted to direct his troops to give no quarter in certain straits, when his own salvation makes it impossible to comply with the laws of war.

61. Troops that give no quarter have no right to kill enemies disabled on the ground, or prisoners captured by other troops.

62. All troops of the enemy known or discovered to give no quarter in general, or to any portion of the army, receive none.

63. Troops who fight in the uniform of their enemies, or who wear a plain, striking, and uniform mark of distinction of their own, are liable to no quarter.

64. If American troops capture a train containing uniforms of the enemy, and the commander considers it advisable to distribute them among his men, some striking mark or sign must be used to distinguish the American soldier from the enemy.

65. The use of the enemy's national standard, flag, or other mark of nationality, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy in battle, is prohibited.

of parity by which they lose all claim to the protection of the laws of war.

56. Quarter having been given to an enemy by American troops, under a misapprehension of his true character, he may, nevertheless, be ordered to suffer death if, within three days after the battle, it be discovered that he belongs to a corps which gives no quarter.

57. The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war upon another sovereign state, and, therefore, admits of no rules or limitations from those of regular warfare, regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, although they may belong to the army of a government which the captor may consider as a wanton and unjust assailant.

58. Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, indeed, modern war itself, are means to obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war.

1. unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life is not lawful.

59. Outposts, sentinels, or pickets are not to be fired upon, except to drive them in, or when a positive order, special or general, has been issued to that effect.

60. The use of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or arms, is wholly excluded from modern warfare. He that uses it puts himself out of the pale of the law and usages of war.

61. Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if duly convicted, whether he belongs to the army of the United States, or is an enemy captured after having committed his misdeed.

62. Money and other valuables on the person of a prisoner, such as watches or jewelry, as well as extra clothing, are regarded by the American army as the private property of the prisoner, and the appropriation of such valuables or money is considered dishonourable, and is prohibited.

Nevertheless, if large sums are found upon the persons of prisoners, in their possession, they shall be taken from them, and the surplus, after providing for their own support, appropriated for the use of the army, under the direction of the commander, unless otherwise ordered by the government. Nor can prisoners claim as private property large amounts of money and captured in their train, although they had been placed in the private luggage of the prisoners.

63. All officers, when captured, must surrender their side-arms to the captor. They may be restored to the prisoner in marked cases, by the commander, to signalize admiration of his distinguished bravery, or appreciation of his humane treatment of prisoners before his capture. The captured officer to whom they may be restored cannot wear them during captivity.

64. A prisoner of war, being a public enemy, is the prisoner of the government, and not of the captor. No ransom can be paid by a prisoner of war to his individual captor, or to any officer in command. The government alone releases captives according to rules prescribed by itself.

65. Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or imprisonment (such as may be deemed necessary on account of safety, but they are to be subjected to no other intentional suffering or indignity. The confinement and mode of treating a prisoner may be varied during his captivity according to the demands of safety.

66. Prisoners of war shall be fed upon plain and wholesome food, whenever practicable, and treated with humanity.

They may be required to work for the benefit of the captor's government, according to their rank and condition.

77. A prisoner of war who escapes may be shot, or otherwise in his flight, but neither death nor any other punishment shall be inflicted upon him simply for his attempt to escape, which the law does not consider a crime. Stricter means of security shall be used, an unsuccessful attempt at escape.

If, however, a conspiracy is discovered, the purpose of which is a united or general escape, the conspirators may be rigorously punished even with death; and capital punishment may also be inflicted on prisoners of war discovered to have plotted rebellion against the authorities of the captors, whether in union with the fellow prisoners or not.

78. If prisoners of war, having given no pledge, nor made any promise on their honour, forcibly or otherwise escape, and are captured again in battle, after having rejoined their own army, they shall not be punished for their escape, but shall be treated as simple prisoners of war, although they will be subjected to stricter confinement.

79. Every captured wounded enemy shall be medically treated according to the ability of the medical staff.

80. Honourable men, when captured, will abstain from giving any enemy information concerning their own army, and the modern law of war permits no longer the use of any violence against prisoners, in order to extort the desired information, or to punish them for having given false information.

SECTION IV.

Partisans—Armed Enemies not belonging to the Hostile Army— —Armed Prowlers—War-Rebels.

81. Partisans are soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of an army, but belonging to a corps which acts detached from the main army for the purpose of making inroads into the territory occupied by the enemy. If captured, they are entitled to all the privileges of the prisoners of war.

82. Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being part and portion of the regular hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who nevertheless with intermittent returns to their homes and avocations, or with occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, dress themselves in the character or appearance of soldiers—such irregular squads of men, are not public enemies, and therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.

83. Scouts or single soldiers, if disguised in the dress of the civilian or in the uniform of the army hostile to their own, employed in obtaining information, if found within or lurking about the lines of the captors, are treated as spies, and suffer death.

84. Armed prowlers, by whatever names they may be called, or persons of the enemy's territory, who steal within the lines of the hostile army for the purpose of robbing, killing, or of destroying bridges, roads, canals, or of robbing or destroying the mail, or of cutting the telegraph wires, are not entitled to the privileges of the prisoner of war.

85. War-rebels are persons within an occupied territory who take up arms against the occupying or conquering army, or against the authorities established by the same. If captured, they may suffer death, whether they rise singly, in small or large bands, and whether called upon to do so by their own, but expelled, government or not. They are not pri-

not are they, if discovered and secured before their conspiracy led to an actual rising, or to armed violence.

SECTION V.

Fact—Spies—War-Traitors—Captured Messengers—Abuse of the Flag of Truce.

All intercourse between the territories occupied by belligerent powers, whether by traffic, by letter, by travel, or in any other way, ceases. The general rule, to be observed without special proclamation.

According to this rule, whether by safe-conduct, or permission to pass on a small or large scale, or by exchanging mails, or by travel from one territory into the other, can take place only according to agreement made by the government, or by the highest military authority. Violations of this rule are highly punishable.

Embassadors, and all other diplomatic agents of neutral powers, and to the enemy, may receive safe-conducts through the territories occupied by the belligerents, unless there are military reasons to the contrary, and unless they may reach the place of their destination only by another route. It implies no international affront if the safe-conduct is declined. Such passes are usually given by the supreme authority of the state, and not by subordinate officers.

A spy is a person who secretly, in disguise or under false name, seeks information with the intention of communicating it to the enemy.

A spy is punishable with death by hanging by the neck, whether he succeeded in obtaining the information or in conveying it to the enemy.

If a citizen of the United States obtains information in a legitimate manner, and betrays it to the enemy, he is a military or civil officer, or a citizen, he shall suffer death.

A traitor under the law of war, or a war-traitor, is a person in a district under martial law who, unauthorised by the military authority, gives information of any kind to the enemy, or holds intercourse with him.

The war-traitor is always severely punished. If his offence consists in betraying to the enemy anything concerning the condition, operations or plans of the troops holding or occupying the place, his punishment is death.

If the citizen or subject of a country or place invaded or conquered betrays information to his own government, from which he is separated by the army, or to the army of his government, he is a war-traitor, and this is the penalty of his offence.

All armies in the field stand in need of guides, and impress them without blame them otherwise.

No person having been forced by the enemy to serve as guide is punishable for having done so.

If a citizen of a hostile and invaded district voluntarily serves as a guide to the enemy, or offers to do so, he is deemed a war-traitor, and suffers death.

A citizen serving voluntarily as a guide against his own country is a traitor, and will be dealt with according to the law of his country.

Guides, when it is clearly proved that they have misled intentionally, are put to death.

All unauthorised or secret communication with the enemy is considered treasonable by the law of war.

Foreign residents in an invaded or occupied territory, or foreign

visitors in the same, can claim no immunity from this law, to communicate with foreign parts, or with the inhabitants of the country, so far as the military authority permits, but no further; expulsion from the occupied territory would be the very least for the infraction of this rule.

99. A messenger carrying written despatches or verbal messages, one portion of the army, or from a besieged place, to another of the same army, or its government, if armed, and in the uniform of his army, and if captured while doing so, in the territory occupied by the enemy, is treated by the captor as a prisoner of war. If not a soldier, the circumstances connected with his capture determine the disposition that shall be made of him.

100. A messenger or agent who attempts to steal through the territory occupied by the enemy, to further, in any manner, the interests of the enemy, if captured, is not entitled to the privileges of the law of war, and may be dealt with according to the circumstances.

101. While deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means of hostility, and is consistent with honourable warfare, the law of war allows even capital punishment for clandestine or treacherous attempts to injure an enemy because they are so dangerous, and difficult to guard against them.

102. The law of war, like the criminal law regarding other crimes, makes no difference on account of the difference of sexes, complexion, or rank, spy, the war-traitor, or the war-rebel.

103. Spies, war-traitors, and war-rebels are not exchanged, but are subject to the common law of war. The exchange of such persons was formerly a special cartel, authorised by the government, or at a great distance, by the chief commander of the army in the field.

104. A successful spy or war-traitor, safely returned to his country, and afterwards captured as an enemy, is not subject to punishment for his acts, as a spy or war-traitor, but he may be held in closer confinement as a person individually dangerous.

SECTION VI.

Exchange of Prisoners—Flags of Truce—Flags of Protection

105. Exchanges of prisoners take place—number for number—rank—wounded for wounded—with added condition for added condition—such, for instance, as not to serve for a certain period.

106. In exchanging prisoners of war, such numbers of inferior rank may be substituted as an equivalent for one of superior rank as may be agreed upon by cartel, which requires the sanction of the government, or of the commander of the army in the field.

107. A prisoner of war is in honour bound truly to state to his captors his rank; and he is not to assume a lower rank than belongs to him, in order to cause a more advantageous exchange; nor a higher rank, for the purpose of obtaining better treatment.

Offences to the contrary have been justly punished by the captors of released prisoners, and may be good cause for refusing to release other prisoners.

108. The surplus number of prisoners of war remaining after exchange has taken place is sometimes released either for the purpose of a stipulated sum of money, or, in urgent cases, of provision, clothing, or other necessities.

Such arrangement, however, requires the sanction of the government or authority.

109. The exchange of prisoners of war is an act of conveyance.

parents. If no general cartel has been concluded, it cannot be by either of them. No belligerent is obliged to exchange prisoners of war.

It is voidable so soon as either party has violated it.

An exchange of prisoners shall be made except after complete capture after an accurate account of them, and a list of the captured has been taken.

The bearer of a flag of truce cannot insist upon being admitted. He may be admitted with great caution. Unnecessary frequency is to be avoided.

The bearer of a flag of truce offer himself during an engagement can be admitted as a very rare exception only. It is no breach of faith to retain such a flag of truce, if admitted during the engagement. Firing is not required to cease on the appearance of a flag of truce.

The bearer of a flag of truce, presenting himself during an engagement, is killed or wounded, it furnishes no ground of complaint.

If it be discovered, and fairly proved, that a flag of truce has been used for surreptitiously obtaining military knowledge, the bearer thus abusing his sacred character is deemed a spy.

It is the character of a flag of truce, and so necessary is its use, that while its abuse is an especially heinous offence, great care is requisite, on the other hand, in convicting the bearer of a flag of truce of being a spy.

It is customary to designate by certain flags (usually yellow) the places which are shelled, so that the besieging enemy may refrain from them. The same has been done in battles, when hospitals are within the field of the engagement.

Honourable belligerents often request that the hospitals within the power of the enemy may be designated, so that they may be spared.

An honourable belligerent allows himself to be guided by flags of protection as much as the contingencies and the necessities of the case permit.

It is justly considered an act of bad faith, of infamy, or of fiendishness to deceive the enemy by flags of protection. Such act of bad faith is a good cause for refusing to respect such flags.

The besieging belligerent has sometimes requested the besieged to spare the buildings containing collections of works of art, scientific instruments, astronomical observatories, or precious libraries, so that their destruction may be avoided as much as possible.

SECTION VII.

The Parole.

Prisoners of war may be released from captivity by exchange in certain circumstances, also by parole.

The term parole designates the pledge of individual good faith to do, or to omit doing, certain acts after he who gives his parole has been dismissed, wholly or partially, from the power of the captor.

The pledge of the parole is always an individual, but not a collective one.

The parole applies chiefly to prisoners of war whom the captor returns to their country, or to live in greater freedom within the country or territory, on conditions stated in the parole.

123. Release of prisoners of war by exchange is the general rule ; release by parole is the exception.

124. Breaking the parole is punished with death when the person breaking the parole is captured again.

Accurate lists, therefore, of the paroled persons must be kept by the belligerents.

125. When paroles are given and received there must be an exchange of two written documents, in which the name and rank of the paroled individuals are accurately and truthfully stated.

126. Commissioned officers only are allowed to give their parole, and they can give it only with the permission of their superior, as long as a superior in rank is within reach.

127. No non-commissioned officer or private can give his parole except through an officer. Individual paroles not given through an officer are not only void, but subject the individual giving them to the punishment of death as deserters. The only admissible exception is where individuals, properly separated from their commands, have suffered long confinement without the possibility of being paroled through an officer.

128. No paroling on the battle-field ; no paroling of entire bodies of troops after a battle ; and no dismissal of large numbers of prisoners, with a general declaration that they are paroled, is permitted, or of any value.

129. In capitulations for the surrender of strong places or fortified camps the commanding officer, in cases of urgent necessity, may agree that the troops under his command shall not fight again during the war, unless exchanged.

130. The usual pledge given in the parole is not to serve during the existing war, unless exchanged.

This pledge refers only to the active service in the field, against the paroling belligerent or his allies actively engaged in the same war. These cases of breaking the parole are patent acts, and can be visited with the punishment of death ; but the pledge does not refer to internal service, such as recruiting or drilling the recruits, fortifying places not besieged, quelling civil commotions, fighting against belligerents unconnected with the paroling belligerents, or to civil or diplomatic service for which the paroled officer may be employed.

131. If the government does not approve of the parole, the paroled officer must return into captivity, and should the enemy refuse to receive him, he is free of his parole.

132. A belligerent government may declare, by a general order, whether it will allow paroling, and on what conditions it will allow it. Such order is communicated to the enemy.

133. No prisoner of war can be forced by the hostile government to parole himself, and no government is obliged to parole prisoners of war, or to parole all captured officers, if it paroles any. As the pledging of the parole is an individual act, so is paroling, on the other hand, an act of choice on the part of the belligerent.

134. The commander of an occupying army may require of the civil officers of the enemy, and of its citizens, any pledge he may consider necessary for the safety or security of his army, and upon their failure to give it he may arrest, confine, or detain them.

SECTION VIII.

Armistice—Capitulation.

135. An armistice is the cessation of active hostilities for a period agreed upon between belligerents. It must be agreed upon in writing, and duly ratified by the highest authorities of the contending parties.

136. If an armistice be declared, without conditions, it extends no further than to require a total cessation of hostilities along the front of both belligerents.

If conditions be agreed upon, they should be clearly expressed, and must be rigidly adhered to by both parties. If either party violates any express condition, the armistice may be declared null and void by the other.

137. An armistice may be general, and valid for all points and lines of the belligerents; or special, that is, referring to certain troops or certain localities only.

An armistice may be concluded for a definite time; or for an indefinite time, during which either belligerent may resume hostilities on giving the notice agreed upon to the other.

138. The motives which induce the one or the other belligerent to conclude an armistice, whether it be expected to be preliminary to a treaty of peace, or to prepare during the armistice for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, does in no way affect the character of the armistice itself.

139. An armistice is binding upon the belligerents from the day of the agreed commencement; but the officers of the armies are responsible from the day only when they receive official information of its existence.

140. Commanding officers have the right to conclude armistices binding on the district over which their command extends, but such armistice is subject to the ratification of the superior authority, and ceases so soon as it is made known to the enemy that the armistice is not ratified, even if a certain time for the elapsing between giving notice of cessation and the resumption of hostilities should have been stipulated for.

141. It is incumbent upon the contracting parties of an armistice to stipulate what intercourse of persons or traffic between the inhabitants of the territories occupied by the hostile armies shall be allowed, if any.

If nothing is stipulated, the intercourse remains suspended, as during actual hostilities.

142. An armistice is not a partial or a temporary peace; it is only the suspension of military operations to the extent agreed upon by the parties.

143. When an armistice is concluded between a fortified place and the army besieging it, it is agreed by all the authorities on this subject that the besieger must cease all extension, perfection, or advance of his attacking works as much so as from attacks by main force.

But as there is a difference of opinion among martial jurists, whether the besieged have the right to repair breaches or to erect new works of defence within the place during an armistice, this point should be determined by express agreement between the parties.

144. So soon as a capitulation is signed, the capitulator has no right to demolish, destroy, or injure the works, arms, stores, or ammunition, in his possession, during the time which elapses between the signing and the execution of the capitulation, unless otherwise stipulated in the same.

145. When an armistice is clearly broken by one of the parties, the other party is released from all obligation to observe it.

146. Prisoners, taken in the act of breaking an armistice, must be treated as prisoners of war, the officer alone being responsible who gives the order for such a violation of an armistice. The highest authority of the belligerent aggrieved may demand redress for the infraction of an armistice.

147. Belligerents sometimes conclude an armistice while their plenipotentiaries are met to discuss the conditions of a treaty of peace, but plenipotentiaries may meet without a preliminary armistice; in the latter case, the war is carried on without any abatement.

SECTION IX.

Assassination.

148. The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the hostile government, an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any captor, any more than the modern law of peace allows such international outlawry; on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest retaliation should follow the murder committed in consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever authority. Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.

SECTION X.

Insurrection—Civil War—Rebellion.

149. Insurrection is the rising of people in arms against their government, or a portion of it, or against one or more of its laws, or against an officer or officers of the government. It may be confined to mere armed resistance, or it may have greater ends in view.

150. Civil war is war between two or more portions of a country or State, each contending for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming to be the legitimate government. The term is also sometimes applied to war of rebellion, when the rebellious provinces or portions of the State are contiguous to those containing the seat of government.

151. The term rebellion is applied to an insurrection of large extent, and is usually a war between the legitimate government of a country and portions or provinces of the same who seek to throw off their allegiance to it, and set up a government of their own.

152. When humanity induces the adoption of the rules of regular war toward rebels, whether the adoption is partial or entire, it does in no way whatever imply a partial or complete acknowledgment of their government, if they have set up one, or of them as an independent or sovereign power. Neutrals have no right to make the adoption of the rules of war by the assailed government toward rebels the ground of their own acknowledgment of the revolted people as an independent power.

153. Treating captured rebels as prisoners of war, exchanging them, concluding of cartels, capitulations, or other warlike agreements with them; addressing officers of a rebel army by the rank they may have in the same; accepting flags of truce; or, on the other hand, proclaiming martial law in their territory, or levying war-taxes or forced loans, or doing any other act sanctioned or demanded by the law and usages of public war between sovereign belligerents, neither proves nor establishes an acknowledgment of the rebellious people, or of the government which they may have erected, as a public or sovereign power. Nor does the adoption of the rules of war toward rebels imply an engagement with them extending beyond the limits of these rules. It is victory in the field that ends the strife and settles the future relations between the contending parties.

154. Treating, in the field, the rebellious enemy according to the law and usages of war has never prevented the legitimate government from trying the leaders of the rebellion or chief rebels for high treason, and from treating them accordingly, unless they are included in a general amnesty.

155. All enemies in regular war are divided into two general classes ; that is to say, into combatants and non-combatants, or unarmed citizens of the hostile government.

The military commander of the legitimate government, in a war of rebellion, distinguishes between the loyal citizen in the revolted portion of the country and the disloyal citizen. The disloyal citizens may further be classified into those citizens known to sympathize with the rebellion, without positively aiding it, and those who, without taking up arms, give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy, without being bodily forced thereto.

156. Common justice and plain expediency require that the military commander protect the manifestly loyal citizens, in revolted territories, against the hardships of the war as much as the common misfortune of all war admits.

The commander will throw the burden of the war, as much as lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens of the revolted portion or province, subjecting them to a stricter police than the non-combatant enemies have to suffer in regular war ; and if he deems it appropriate, or if his government demands of him that every citizen shall, by an oath of allegiance, or by some other manifest act, declare his fidelity to the legitimate government, he may expel, transfer, imprison, or fine the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge themselves anew as citizens obedient to the law and loyal to the government.

Whether it is expedient to do so, and whether reliance can be placed upon such oaths, the commander or his government have the right to decide.

157. Armed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United States against the lawful movements of their troops is levying war against the United States, and is therefore treason.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE ENEMY AND HIS ALLIES.

1. Character of public enemies—2. Limits to hostility between public enemies—3. With regard to persons and property—4. Allies not necessarily associates in a war—5. How distinguished—6. Hostile alliances—7. The *casus foederis* of an alliance—8. Offensive alliances—9. Defensive alliances—10. Remarks on character and effect of such alliances—11. General presumption in favour of cause of ally—12. Treaties of succour, if the war be unjust—13. If unable to furnish the promised aid—14. Subsidy and succour not necessarily causes of war—15. Capitulations for mercenaries—16. Remarks of Vattel on subsidy-treaties—17. Effect of treaties on guaranty—18. Conflicting alliances—19. A warlike association—20. Vattel's opinion—21. Declaration of war unnecessary against enemy's associates—22. Policy of treating enemy's allies as friends.

§ 1. It has already been stated that a war, duly commenced and ratified, is not confined to the Governments or authorities of the belligerent State, but that it makes all the subjects of the one State the legal enemies of each and every subject of the other. This hostile character results from political ties, and not from personal feelings or personal antipathies; their *status* is that of legal hostility, and not of personal enmity. So long as these political ties continue, or so long as the individual continues to be the citizen or subject of one of the belligerent States, just so long does he continue in legal hostility towards all the citizens and subjects of the opposing belligerent; such are public enemies, whatever may be their occupation, and in whatever country they may be found. The Romans had a particular term (*Hostis*) to denote a public enemy, and to distinguish him from a private enemy, whom they called *Inimicus*. The distinction is a marked one, and should never be lost sight of. Private enemies have hatred and rancour in their hearts, and seek to do each other personal injury. Not so with public enemies. They do not, as individuals, seek to do each other personal harm. And even where brought into actual conflict, as armed belligerents,

there is usually no personal enmity between the individuals of the contending forces. So far from this, when peace is declared, the military forces of the opposing belligerents are usually personal friends, and vie with each other in politeness and mutual kindness.

§ 2. Moreover, there is a limit to public enmity. The law of nature gives to a belligerent nation the right to use such force as may be necessary, in order to obtain the object for which the war was undertaken. Beyond this, the use of force is unlawful; this necessity forms the limit of hostility between subjects of the belligerent States. They, therefore, have no right to take the lives of non-combatants, or of such public enemies as they can subdue by other means, nor to inflict any injuries upon them or their property, unless the same should be necessary for the object of the war.¹

§ 3. We have already stated the general effect of a declaration of war upon the persons and property of the subjects of an enemy found within our own territory, and, that while, by the strict rights of war, we can retain them all as prisoners or prizes, this right, by modern usage, is only applied to the military and to ships of war, mere residents, merchants, and merchant vessels being allowed a certain time to withdraw themselves from our jurisdiction without molestation.²

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii. § 138; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 2; Rutherford, *Institutes*, b. ii. ch. ix. § 15; Burlamaqui, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, tome v. pt. iv. ch. vi.; Corum v. Blackburn, *Doug. Rep.*, p. 644; Massé, *Droit Commercial*, liv. ii. tit. i. ch. ii.; De Felce, *Droit de la Nat.*, &c., tome ii. lec. xxv.; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. xii.

² See *ante*, p. 3. The following Proclamations were issued by the British Government, on the seizure of some English vessels and goods by the French, without declaration of war by that nation. Proclamation issued February 4, 1793. — 'Whereas His Majesty has received intelligence that some ships belonging to His Majesty's subjects have been and are detained in the French ports * * * it is hereby ordered that no ships or vessels belonging to any of His Majesty's subjects be permitted to enter and clear out for any of the ports of France * * * and that a general embargo or stop be made of all French ships or vessels whatsoever now within or which hereafter shall come into any of the ports, harbours, or roads within the kingdom of Great Britain, together with all persons and effects on board the said ships and vessels, but that the utmost care be taken for the preservation of all and every part of the cargoes on board any of the said ships, so that no damage or embezzlement whatever be sustained. And the Right Honourable the Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively appertain.'

Proclamation issued February 11, 1793: — 'Whereas divers injurious

Subjects of a neutral State, resident or domiciled in the enemy's country, are, in many respects, to be regarded as enemies; but, as they are not liable to military duty, in the proper sense of that term, they cannot be treated either as actual combatants or as enemy's subjects, who are liable to be called upon by their own State to oppose us by force. Moreover, our own subjects, resident or domiciled in the enemy's country, are, in certain matters relating to trade and the rights of maritime capture, regarded as legal enemies, but not with respect to their personal *status* and personal duties. Again, as belligerents are not permitted to use force against each other within neutral territory, we cannot exercise there the same rights against the person and property of an enemy as we can within our own or enemy's territory, or upon the high seas. The treatment of an enemy, therefore, depends in a measure upon the place in which he may be found.¹

§ 4. It has already been remarked, that we have the same

proceedings * * * and several unjust seizures have been there made of the ships and goods of His Majesty's subjects, contrary to the law of nations and to the faith of treaties, and whereas the said acts of unprovoked hostility have been followed by an open declaration of war against His Majesty and His ally the Republic of the United Provinces * * * His Majesty is pleased to order that general reprisals be granted against the ships, goods, and subjects of France, so that as well His Majesty's fleet and ships, as also all other ships and vessels that shall be commissioned by letters of marque or general reprisals or otherwise by His Majesty's Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain shall and may lawfully seize all ships, vessels, and goods belonging to France, or to any persons being subjects of France or inhabiting within any of the territories of France, and bring the same to judgment in any of the Courts of Admiralty within His Majesty's dominions; and to that end His Majesty's Advocate-General, with the Advocate of the Admiralty, are forthwith to prepare the draught of a commission * * * to issue forth and grant letters of marque and reprisal to any of His Majesty's subjects or others, whom the said Commissioners shall deem fitly qualified in that behalf and * * * also another draught of instructions for such ships as shall be commissioned for the purposes aforementioned.¹

By the Postal Convention of 1843, between France and England, in case of war, the mail packets between Dover and Calais (now extended to all mail packets of either Government by Convention of September 24, 1856) shall continue their navigation until notification be made by either Government, in which case, they shall be permitted to return freely to their respective ports.

In 1793, vessels carrying mails for the English or French Post Office authorities were permitted to convey the mails between the ports of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the war between those countries.

¹ Burlamaqui, *Droit de la Nat.*, &c., tome v. pt. iv. ch. vi.; Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. ch. vii.; Ragnenat, *Droit de la Nat.*, &c., liv. iii. ch. v. § 4; Beilo, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. ii. § 2.

rights of war against the co-allies or associates of an enemy as against the principal belligerent. It must, however, be observed that general allies are not necessarily associates in a war. The allies of our enemy, therefore, may, or may not, themselves become our enemies, according to the character of the alliance which they have formed with that enemy, the time of making it, and the circumstances under which it was entered into. We must, therefore, distinguish between the general allies of an enemy and his associates in a war.¹

§ 5. But the question here arises, how are we to know whether an enemy's ally is himself to be regarded as an enemy, and to be treated in the same manner as the principal belligerent? In the first place, if he has made common cause with our enemy in beginning or carrying on hostilities against us, we have toward him the same belligerent rights as toward the principal in the war, for both are equally our enemies. There is no need of proving him an enemy, for his own conduct has made him such. Again, even where there are no obligations of treaty, if he freely and voluntarily declares in favour of his ally and against us, he, of his own accord, becomes our enemy, and is to be treated in every respect as the principal. But the simple fact of there being an alliance between our enemy and other nations would not justify us in treating such nations as belligerents.²

§ 6. Alliances, for warlike purposes, are divided into two classes, *offensive* and *defensive*. In the former, the State unites with its ally for the purpose of jointly waging war against a third party; but in the latter, the State engages to defend its ally in case of an attack. Some alliances are both offensive and defensive; others are only defensive; but there is seldom an offensive alliance which is not also a defensive one. Some are against all opponents, and without restriction; while others are only against a particular State, and on specified conditions, with limitations and exceptions. The character of such alliances is discussed elsewhere. We shall here consider their legal effects with respect to belligerent rights and not their moral character. Warlike alliances, made at the commencement of, or during a war, are necessarily binding,

¹ Heffter, *Droit International*, §§ 115-7; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. II, ch. II, §§ 13, 14.

² Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. III, ch. vi, §§ 96-8.

for the contracting parties then know the character of the war and the exact nature of the obligations which they have assumed. Alliances, made under such circumstances, are acts of hostility which make the ally an enemy equally with the principal belligerent. It is important, however, to satisfy ourselves as to the character of such alliances, to see whether or not they are really *warlike* compacts which make the contracting parties also parties to the war. The alliance between France and the English revolted colonies in North America, being made during the war of the American revolution, was very properly regarded by Great Britain as tantamount to a declaration of war on the part of France, and as justifying immediate hostilities against this ally of the revolted colonies.¹

§ 7. A warlike alliance made by a third party before the war with a State, then our friend, but now our enemy, will not, as a general rule, be, of itself, a sufficient cause for commencing hostilities against such third party; for there may be good reason why he should not regard himself as bound by the obligations of the alliance. It would certainly be very impolitic, as well as improper, for us to treat as a belligerent one who may not be disposed to become our enemy. The character of the alliance, and the peculiar circumstances of the case, must serve as guides for our conduct, always keeping in mind the maxim, that it is better to have a friend than an enemy, and the rule of international law, that we are justifiable in engaging in hostilities only so far as may be necessary for our own security and the protection of our just rights. In case of alliances, made before the war, the question is, to determine whether the actual circumstances are such as were contemplated in the engagement,—whether they are such as were expressly specified, or tacitly supposed, in the treaty. This is what the civilians call *casus foederis*, or the case of the alliance. Whatever has been promised, either expressly or tacitly, in the treaty, is due in the *casus foederis*. But if not so promised, it is not due. If the war is not such a case as the treaty contemplated, the ally does not become a party to it; for the *casus foederis* does not take place.²

¹ Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. xi.; Bynkershoek, *Quaest. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. ix.; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 73.

² Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. vi. § 88; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iii. ch. ii. § 15; Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, § 299; Moser, *Versuch*, &c. b. ix. pt. i. p. 24; Garden, *De Diplomatie*, liv. vi. § 2, and liv. vii. § 1.

§ 8. In an *offensive* alliance, made before the war, the ally engages generally to co-operate in hostilities against a specified power, or against any power with whom the other party may declare war. Where an alliance is made in general terms, without any specified conditions, limitations, or exceptions, does the *casus foederis* take place the moment the other party declares war? In other words, does such an offensive alliance differ in its binding effect from one contracted with a party already engaged, or on the point of engaging, in a war, the character of which is already known? Vattel says: 'As it is only for the support of a just war that we are allowed to give assistance or contract alliances, every alliance, every warlike association, every auxiliary treaty, contracted by way of anticipation in time of peace, and with no view to any particular war, necessarily and of itself includes this tacit clause, *that the treaty shall not be obligatory except in case of a just war*. On any other footing the alliance could not be validly contracted.' Mr. Wheaton says: 'To promise assistance in an unjust war, would be an obligation to commit an injustice, and no such contract is valid.' It would seem to follow, from this fundamental principle, that where one of two parties to an offensive alliance, made before the war, declares war against its enemy, even though that enemy be the very nation against which the alliance was formed, the other ally is to be allowed time to examine into the causes of the war; if it be a just war, all his engagements come into force; but if it be unjustly declared, his treaty obligations cease to be binding.¹

§ 9. So, also, in a *defensive* alliance made before the war, the *casus foederis* does not take place immediately on one of the parties being attacked by an enemy. The other contracting party has the right, as indeed it is his duty, to ascertain if his ally has not given the enemy just cause of war, for no one is bound to undertake the defence of an ally, in order to enable him to insult others, or to refuse them justice. If he is manifestly in the wrong, his co-ally may require him to offer reasonable satisfaction; and if the enemy refuse to accept it, and insists upon a continuance of the war, the co-ally is then bound to assist in his defence. But without such offer of reasonable satisfaction, the war continues to be aggressive in character, and therefore unjust, and the ally may properly

¹ Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. ch. ix. § 1.

refuse to render the promised assistance, for the tacit condition on which such assistance was stipulated to be given has not been observed, or, in other words, the *casus foederis* has not taken place.

§ 10. If, on the contrary, a party to the defensive alliance, could call upon his ally to assist him whenever he was assailed, and without regard to the justice of the war, or the circumstances of the attack, there would be no difference between a defensive and an offensive alliance, for, as stated in the chapter on different kinds of war, many wars which are defensive in their *operations* are essentially offensive in their *character* and *principles*. In the words of Wheaton, 'where attack is the best mode of providing for the defence of a State, the war is defensive in principle, though the operations are offensive. Where the war is unnecessary to safety, its *offensive* character is not altered, because the wrong-doer is reduced to *defensive* warfare. So, a State, against which a dangerous wrong is manifestly meditated, may prevent it by striking the first blow, without thereby waging a war in its principle offensive. Accordingly, it is not every attack made on a State that will entitle it to aid under a defensive alliance; for if that State had given just cause of war to the invader, the war would not be, on its part, defensive in principle.'¹

§ 11. Admitting the principle laid down by Vattel, that every treaty of alliance contains the tacit clause that it shall not be binding, except in case of a just war, and that the co-ally has a right to decide for himself upon the character of the war, and whether or not the *casus foederis* has taken place, it is only in case the war is *clearly* and *obviously* unjust that he can claim a release from the obligations which he voluntarily contracted. Whether the alliance be offensive or defensive, or both, if there be strong reasons to doubt the justice of the war, the ally is to be allowed time to examine it before he can be required to render the stipulated assistance; but, unless upon such examination, he find it *manifestly* unjust, he must comply with his engagements. Under ordinary circumstances, and in the absence of any proof to the contrary, he is bound to consider that his co-ally has just cause of war. In speak-

¹ Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 166; Grotius, *de Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. ii. cap. xv. § 13; Gardien, *De Diplomatie*, liv. vi. sec. ii. § 2; Burlamaqui, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, tome v. pt. iv. ch. iii.

ing of the tacit restriction, which Vattel says is necessarily understood in every treaty of alliance, Mr. Wheaton remarks that it 'can be applied only to a manifest case of unjust aggression on the part of the other contracting party, and cannot be used as a pretext to elude the performance of a positive and unequivocal engagement, without justly exposing the ally to the imputation of bad faith. In doubtful cases, the presumption ought rather to be in favour of our confederate, and of the justice of his quarrel.'¹

§ 12. We have already pointed out the distinction between treaties of alliance and treaties of limited succour and subsidy. In a treaty of succour, the ally stipulates to furnish certain assistance in troops, ships of war, provisions, or money. If the succour is to consist of troops, they are called *auxiliaries*; if of money, it is called *subsidy*. The rules already laid down, with respect to the *casus foederis* in treaties of alliance made before the war, apply equally to treaties of limited succour and subsidy. For the reasons there given, such treaties are not binding where the war is manifestly unjust.

§ 13. Again, Vattel says that if the State which has promised succour finds itself unable to furnish it, this inability alone is sufficient to dispense with the obligation. If, for example, one of the allies is engaged in another war, not contemplated by the alliance, and which requires his whole strength, he is absolved from sending assistance to his ally in the war to which he is not yet a party. Again, if he has promised provisions, and his own subjects are suffering from famine, the *casus foederis* does not take effect; for he is not obliged to give another what is absolutely necessary for the use of his own people. It seems to us that a promise is none the less binding because of the inability of the promisor to fulfil his engagements.²

§ 14. It is also proper to remark that even where the *casus foederis* is admitted to take place, and the stipulated succours are furnished, the ally who furnishes them is not necessarily made a party to the war. 'Where one State,' says Wheaton,

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. ii. ch. x. § 90, and liv. iii. ch. vi. §§ 79-82; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iii. ch. ii. § 15; Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. ix.; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. ix. § 1.

² Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. vi. §§ 81, 92; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iii. ch. ii. §§ 14, 15; De Felice, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, tome ii. lec. 28.

'stipulates to furnish to another a limited succour of troops, ships of war, money, or provisions, without any promise looking to an eventual engagement in general hostilities, such a treaty does not necessarily render the party furnishing this limited succour the enemy of the opposite belligerent. It only becomes such, so far as respects the auxiliary forces thus supplied; in all other respects it remains neutral. Such, for example, have long been the accustomed relations of the confederated cantons of Switzerland with the other European powers.'

§ 15. A distinction, however, must be made between simple *treaties of succour and subsidy*, and *capitulations for mercenaries*, like those formerly entered into by the Swiss. Auxiliary troops are usually under the general control and direction of the power which furnishes them, and which is, therefore, in a measure, responsible for their acts. But mercenaries, furnished under capitulations, usually engage in a foreign service for a stated period, and for stipulated pay and allowances, being entirely at the disposition of the power which employs them, that which furnishes them having no part in the conquests which are made, or in the negotiations and treaties which are entered into.³

§ 16. Vattel discusses the question, whether the limited

¹ Vattel, liv. 3, ch. 6, §§ 79, 82; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. xii.; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. ix. § 1.

But in 1859, the Federal Government passed a law—(1.) forbidding any Swiss citizen to enroll himself, as soldier to a foreign State, without the permission of the Government of his Canton, (2.) enacting severe penalties, against whosoever might seek to recruit, (3.) forbidding any Swiss citizen to take service in a foreign country, in a corps, not making part of the national army, of that State for which he was enrolled, (4.) forbidding any Swiss citizen to engage himself to form a corps composed in whole, or in part, of Swiss citizens, for any State; and, on the other hand, prohibiting foreigners to enroll Swiss citizens, or to assist therein.

The Neapolitan Government had some regiments, composed entirely of Swiss soldiers, by virtue of a capitulation, which ended the 15th of June, 1859. In that year, a mutiny broke out among these troops; 300 were shot down by the Neapolitan soldiers, and the remainder were sent back to Switzerland. This occurrence, together with some questions which arose the same year, concerning the employment of Swiss soldiers in foreign States, and especially in Italy, was the immediate cause of the passing of the above-mentioned law.

Swiss troops were, and still are, in the Papal service, but without any capitulation (*Annuaire Historique*, 1859.)

² Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, §§ 301–3; Galiani, *Dei Doveri del Prin.*, &c. lib. i. cap. v. p. 145; Moser, *Versuch*, &c. b. x. pt. i. pp. 139, 140; Romainmatier, *Histoire Militaire des Suisses*, passim; Gardien, *De Diplomatie*, liv. vi. sec. ii. § 2.

assistance rendered to the enemy, under the obligations of a subsidy-treaty, is a just cause of war. If the ally of our enemy, he says, goes no further than to furnish the stipulated succour, and, in other respects, preserves toward us the accustomed relations of friendship and neutrality, we may overlook this cause of complaint. This prudent caution of avoiding an open rupture with those who render to our enemy certain limited assistance, previously stipulated for, has gradually introduced the custom of not regarding it as an act of hostility, especially where it is of a limited character. But, if prudence dissuades us from making use of a right, it does not thereby destroy the right itself. A cautious belligerent may choose to overlook certain offences, rather than unnecessarily increase the number of its enemies, and be influenced by considerations of expediency, in not enforcing the strict rights of war. It is, therefore, a question of policy, whether the assistance furnished an enemy shall be regarded as good and sufficient cause for declaring war against the ally who furnishes it.¹

§ 17. We have described, in another chapter, the general character of treaties of guarantee and surety, as distinguished from ordinary treaties of alliance. The question to be considered here is, how far such treaties bind the party making the guarantee to assist the other party in a war for the defence or the security of the thing guaranteed? For example, Great Britain, by the treaties of 1642, 1654, 1661, 1703, 1807, 1810, and 1815, with Portugal, guaranteed the latter kingdom to the lawful heir of the house of Braganza, and agreed to defend it 'against every hostile attack.' In the case of a war between Portugal and a third power, in which the former was subjected to 'a hostile attack,' was Great Britain bound to join in the war, without regard to its justice or injustice? Some publicists have laid down the general rule, that where one of the allies has guaranteed to the other certain specified rights or possessions, which are taken away or seized by a third power, this third power places itself in a position of hostility towards both of the contracting parties. In this case, it is said, the guaranteeing party cannot refuse to succour his ally. Here his duty is plain and indisputable, and if he should

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. vi. §§ 79-82; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iii. ch. ii. § 14; Heffter, *Droit International*, §§ 115-7.

refuse to take part in the war, he is justly chargeable with a breach of the alliance. The *casus foederis* takes place, it is said, as soon as the rights or possessions so guaranteed are seized or encroached upon. The agreement, being for the security of a specific right, or the possession of a particular territory, it is special, and the covenant cannot be evaded or avoided by any general plea of the injustice of the war. Others say that treaties of guarantee are of the nature of a defensive alliance; and, consequently, that even where territories are guaranteed, the guarantee does not extend to wars provoked by the aggression of the party guaranteed. If, therefore, the war be manifestly unjust on the part of the ally so guaranteed, the *casus foederis* does not take place, and the stipulation is not binding. This view is consonant with general principles; for if the war be morally wrong on the part of one ally, he cannot reasonably demand the auxiliary strength of his co-ally to assist him in its prosecution. Again, in the case of the guarantee of a treaty, it is said that the guarantee is not only not obliged, but is not even authorised to interfere to compel its performance, unless required to do so by a party guaranteed, because the contracting parties are at liberty to vary its stipulations, or dispense altogether with their performance. It follows, therefore, that a party to a treaty of guarantee is not necessarily a party to a war undertaken by his co-ally, even though it be in defence of the thing guaranteed.¹

§ 18. Conflicts not unfrequently occur in warlike alliances. In the case of an alliance for war, made towards and against all, *with the reservation of allies*, this exception is to be understood to include *present* allies only, and not to extend to any subsequent treaty stipulations with other powers. Vattel supposes this case: 'Three powers have entered into a treaty

¹ Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. ix. § 1.

In 1828, the Princess Regent of Portugal required the assistance of Great Britain against Spain, by virtue of the tripartite treaty of 1703 between England, Portugal, and Holland; Mr. Canning argued in the House of Commons that it was necessary to show that a *casus foederis* had arisen, although the existence of the treaty was not denied. It may be questioned whether, even where a *casus foederis* be made out, a State be bound to interfere in the quarrel without inquiring into the merits of the cause. See case of Charles et Georges, *State Papers*, 1859.

A treaty expires if one of the contracting parties should lose its existence, as was the case in the dissolution of Poland, 1795.

'Defensive alliance; two of them quarrel and make war on each other; what shall the third do? The treaty does not bind it to assist either the one or the other. For it would be absurd to say that it has promised assistance to each against the other, or to one of the two to the prejudice of the other. All that is incumbent on it is, to employ its good offices for reconciling its allies; and if such mediation fail, it remains free to assist the one which shall appear to have justice on its side.' The latter part of this quotation should, perhaps, be adopted only with certain restrictions. If the alliances are such as to leave the third party in the position of a neutral, and exempt him from all obligations to assist either party, he cannot be considered at liberty to assist the one whose cause he may deem just. This fact alone would not constitute a justifiable cause of war. Moreover, as a neutral he is bound to treat both the belligerents as having justice on their side. What Vattel probably means to say is, that the third party is at liberty, *so far as his alliances are concerned*, to side with the belligerent whose cause he deems just.¹

§ 19. A warlike association is where the alliance is of such an intimate and perfect character as to form a union of interests; where each of the parties is bound to act with his whole force, and all are alike principals in the war at its commencement, or become so during its progress. 'Every associate of my enemy,' says Vattel, 'is indeed himself my enemy; it matters little whether any one makes war on me directly, and in his own name, or under the auspices of another; the same rights which war gives me against my principal enemy, it also gives me against all his associates. This results directly from my right of security and of self-defence, for I am equally attacked by the one and the other. But the question is, to know who are lawfully to be accounted my enemy's associates, united against me in a war?'²

§ 20. Vattel discusses at some length the question, who are, and who are not to be regarded as such associates in the

¹ Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. ix.; De Felice, *Droit de la Nat. et des gens*, tome ii. lec. xxviii.

² Welhus, *Jur. Gentium*, §§ 730-6; Martens, *Précis du Droit de Gens*, § 300; Gaden, *De Diplomatie*, liv. vi. sec. ii. § 3; Riquelme, *Desche Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. xii.

war? and makes the following distinctions. He regards as associates, *first*, those who make common cause with the enemy, although not appearing as principals; *second*, those who assist the enemy without being bound to do so by any treaty; *third*, those who, under the obligations of an offensive alliance, assist the principal in carrying on the war; *fourth*, those who make defensive alliance with the enemy after the commencement of the war, or on the certain prospect of its declaration, or with special reference to the defence of the enemy against the actual opposing belligerent; and *fifth*, those who have formed with the enemy, even before hostilities have commenced, a real league or society of war. All such are associates in the war. But if the defensive alliance is general in its character, leaving it doubtful when the *casus foederis* will take place, or if it has not been made particularly against me, nor concluded at a time when I was openly preparing for war or had already begun it, or if the allies have only stipulated in it, that each of them shall furnish a stated succour to him who shall be first attacked, such allies are not necessarily associates in the war. If auxiliaries are furnished to my enemy, they are enemies, but the nation that furnishes them are not such of necessity. By attacking such nations for that reason, says Vattel, 'I should increase the number of my enemies, and instead of a slender succour which they furnished against me, should draw on myself the united force of those nations.'

§ 21. As a general rule, it is not necessary to make a formal declaration of war against the associates of the enemy before treating them as belligerents. The nature of their obligations, or the character of their acts, makes them public enemies, and puts them in the same position towards us as if they were principals in the war. Our belligerent rights against them commence, in some cases, with the war, and in others, with their first act of hostility against us. The existence of the alliance, with the acknowledgment of its obligation, and a preparation for carrying on the war, would make them public enemies, even before they actually

¹ Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. ix.; Bello, *Derichte Internacionaal*, pt. ii. ch. ix. § 1.

² See *Ann. Reg.*, 1779, p. 38, et. seq.

take part in the military operations, as was the case between France and Great Britain in 1778.¹

§ 22. But, in modern times, there are very few alliances between States which so bind them together as necessarily to make them associates in a war; it is, therefore, in general, a matter of prudence to seek to disarm the enemy's allies by treating them as friends. It is a cheap and honourable means of weakening an opponent's power, and may save the effusion of much innocent blood. The contrary course is not only impolitic on our part, but tends to prolong the war by making it more general, and by involving new elements of discord, and more complicated and conflicting interests. Neutrality may be *absolute* or *qualified*; *absolute* when the neutral is bound to neither belligerent by a treaty which may affect the other, and *qualified*, when the execution of a treaty with one would affect the other. The relation of the United States to France and Great Britain, at the beginning of the war of 1793, is an example of such qualified neutrality.²

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. vi. § 102; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iii. ch. iii. § 15; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 60; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 120, and see *ante*, vol. i. ch. xvii.

² By the 17th and 22nd articles of the treaty of amity and commerce in 1778, the United States had conceded to France admission for her prizes and privateers into the United States ports, *exclusively* of her enemies; also admission for her public vessels of war in cases of stress of weather, pirates, enemies, or other urgent necessity, to refresh, victual, repair, &c., but this latter concession was not exclusive.

On the breaking out of the French Revolution, in 1793, the American administration entertained no doubt of the propriety of recognising the new authority of France. That every nation possessed a right to govern itself according to its own will, is stated to be the principle on which the American Government itself was founded. General Washington, while approving, unequivocally of the Republican form of government, resolved to maintain the neutrality of the United States; on the rupture between Great Britain and France in that year, he addressed a circular letter to his Cabinet ministers containing the following questions:—

1. Shall a proclamation issue for the purpose of preventing interferences of the citizens of the United States in the war between France and Great Britain? Shall it contain a declaration of neutrality or not? What shall it contain?

2. Shall a minister from the Republic of France be received?

3. If received, shall it be absolutely or with qualifications? and if with qualifications, of what kind?

4. Are the United States obliged by good faith to consider the treaties heretofore made with France as applying to the present situation of the parties? May they either renounce them or hold them suspended till the Government of France shall be *established*?

5. If they have the right, is it expedient to do either? and which?

6. If they have no option, would it be a breach of neutrality to consider the treaties still in operation?

There is an obvious indifference between an interest and an individual, although it is sometimes difficult to draw the line of separation. This subject will be considered in another chapter.

The reader will be interested to know in what way the Government of the United States has been affected by the war.

The Government has been affected in many ways, and it is difficult to say whether it is better or worse than it was before the war.

A great many of the most important changes have been made in the Government since the war began.

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s of power could be considered as having acquired it with the
ent of France, or, as having seized it by violence—whether the
ystem could be considered as permanent or merely temporary.
e of opinion, that it was for future consideration, whether the
of the treaties between the United States and France ought
e provisionally suspended. On the questions relative to the
n of the clause of guarantee, the Cabinet was divided. The
as unanimous against convening Congress.
g this war, vessels of war of England and of other belligerents,
freely entered the ports of the United States in every case of

CHAPTER XX.

RIGHTS OF WAR AS TO ENEMY'S PERSON.

1. General rights of war as to enemy's person—2. Limitation of the right to take life—3. Exemption of non-combatants—4. When the exemption ceases—5. Is limited in particular cases—6. When quarter may be refused—7. Treatment due to prisoners of war—8. Exchange and ransom—9. No positive obligation to exchange—10. Moral obligation of the State towards its own subjects—11. Release on parole—12. Conditions which may be imposed—13. Delays in effecting exchange—14. Duties of a State to support its subjects in the hands of the enemy—15. Duty of the captor in certain cases—16. Historical example—17. Extent of support to be rendered—18. When each belligerent supports its own prisoners—19. May prisoners of war be put to death?—20. Remarks of Vattel—21. Useless defence of a place—22. Sinking a captured town—23. Remarks of Napier—24. Fugitives and deserters found among prisoners of war—25. Rule of reciprocity—26. Limits to this rule

§ 1. IT has already been shown that war places all the subjects of one belligerent State in a hostile attitude towards all the subjects of the other belligerent ; and although, in order to justify us at the tribunal of conscience and in the estimation of the world, it is necessary that we should have just cause of war, and justifiable reasons for undertaking it ; yet, as the justness or unjustness of a war is usually a matter of controversy between the contending parties, and not always easy to be determined, it has become an established principle of international jurisprudence that a war in form shall, in its legal effects, be considered as just on both sides, and that whatever is permitted to one of the belligerents shall also be permitted to the other. The law of nations makes no distinction, in this respect, between a just and an unjust war, both of the belligerent parties being entitled to all the rights of war as against the other, and with respect to neutrals. Each party may employ force, not only to resist the violence of the other, but also to secure the objects for which the war is undertaken. The first and most important of these rights,

which the state of war has conferred upon the belligerents, is that of taking human life. This right, in its full extent, authorises the individuals of the one party to kill and destroy those of the other, whenever milder means are insufficient to conquer them or bring them to terms.¹

§ 2. But this extreme right of war, with respect to the enemy's person, has been modified and limited by the usages and practices of modern warfare. Thus, while we may lawfully kill those who are actually in arms and continue to resist,² we may not take the lives of those who are not in

¹ Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. vii. ch. i.; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii. §§ 136, 137, 138; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 1; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 50.

² During the last Franco-Prussian war, on taking the town of St. Menesbould, the Germans threatened death to any inhabitant who should conceal fire-arms.

In 1813, during the Seminole war, two Englishmen, Arbuthnot and Ambrister, were tried by court-martial by order of General Jackson, and executed. These gentlemen were resident among the Indians who inhabited the ill-defined borders of Georgia and Florida; they were taken by the Americans within the Spanish lines. Mr. Arbuthnot was charged with exciting and stirring up the Creek Indians against the United States, he being a subject of Great Britain with whom the United States were at peace, and with aiding, abetting, and comforting the enemy, and supplying them with means of war. Mr. Ambrister was charged with aiding the enemy, and leading and commanding them. The court first sentenced him to death, but on reconsideration ordered him to be whipped, and confined with a chain for twelve months. General Jackson, of his own authority, revived the former decision, and caused the unhappy man to be shot. The committee of the House of Representatives condemned the conduct of General Jackson, and declared that they could find no law of the United States, authorising a trial before a military court for such offences as those alleged against the two prisoners (except so much of the second charge against Mr. Arbuthnot which contained an allegation that he had acted as a spy, but of which he was found, Not Guilty). In the opinion of the committee no usage authorised or exigency appeared, from the report of the trial, which could justify the assumption and exercise of power, by the court-martial and commanding general, but they were of opinion that the prisoners were entitled to claim from the American Government *that protection, which the most savage of their foes had uniformly experienced when disarmed and in their power*; that humanity shuddered at the idea of a cold blooded execution of prisoners, disarmed and in the power of the conqueror; that the principle assumed by General Jackson, that the prisoners by uniting in war against the United States while at peace with Great Britain had become outlaws and pirates, and liable to suffer death, was not recognised in any code of international law. Considerable correspondence ensued on the subject between the British and American Governments. The matter was subsequently debated in the House of Lords, on the motion of the Marquis Lansdowne for proceeding further with the question, which doubtless was one of great delicacy. It was evident that the act of cruelty and violence of General Jackson, not only was not done by the order of the American Government, but that it was

arms, or who, being in arms, cease their resistance and surrender themselves into our power. The just ends of the war may be attained by making them our prisoners, or by compelling them to give security for their future conduct. Force and severity can be used only so far as may be necessary to accomplish the objects for which the war was declared.¹

§ 3. There are certain persons in every State who, as already stated, are exempt from the direct operations of war. Feeble old men, women, and children, and sick persons, come under the general description of enemies, and we have certain rights over them as members of the community with which we are at war; but, as they are enemies who make no resistance, we have no right to maltreat their persons, or to use any violence toward them, much less to take their lives.²

without any knowledge or participation whatever of that Government. The act which had been committed, formed a charge on the part of the American Government against their general. The only question for the British Government was, if the case was one which called for retribution, and whether they should interfere for the protection of British subjects who engage, without the consent of their Government, in the service of States at war with each other, but at peace with their Government. Any British subject who engages in such foreign service, without permission, forfeits the protection of his country, and becomes liable to military punishment, if the party by whom he is taken chooses to carry the rights of war to that cruel severity. This is a principle admitted by the law of nations, and which, in the policy of the law of nations, has been frequently adopted. It is obvious that if it were to be maintained, that a country should hold out protection to every adventurer who enters into foreign service, the assertion of such a principle would lead it into interminable warfare. The case of Ambrister stands on the ground that he was taken aiding the enemy, and although General Jackson's conduct was most atrocious in inflicting upon him a capital punishment, and contrary to the sentence of the court-martial, that was a question between the general and his Government. Arbutnot's case stands on a different ground. He was not taken in arms, but he was proved—as a political servant rather than as a military agent—to have afforded equal aid and assistance to the enemy, and could not be held to be exempt from punishment; he had placed himself in the same position as if he bore arms. And it was on these considerations, that the above-mentioned motion was negatived. (And see chap. xiii. § 7, note 2.)

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii. §§ 139, 140; Wheaton, *Elements of Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 2; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 91, 95.

² It has passed into French history, that in 1870, the Bavarians having been fired on by some civilians in the uniform of National Guards, set Bazailles on fire, and drove back into the flames, the inhabitants—old, young, women, and children—as they were endeavouring to escape. An eye-witness, 'M.P.' writing to the *Times* (Sept. 8), denies this. Bazailles certainly was on fire in many places, from shells, during the battle of Sedan, and the Bavarians did their best to burn out French soldiers who were attacking them from houses, and who refused to surrender. The same eye-witness speaks of some armed civilians, taken

This, says Vattel, is so plain a maxim of justice and humanity, that every nation in the least degree civilised acquiesces in it. And modern practice has applied the same rule to ministers of religion, to men of science and letters, to professional men, artists, merchants, mechanics, agriculturists, labourers, —in fine, to all non-combatants, or persons who take no part in the war, and make no resistance to our arms. It was the received opinion in ancient Rome, in the times of Cato and Cicero, that one who was not regularly enrolled as a soldier could not lawfully kill an enemy. But afterwards in Italy, and more particularly during the lawless confusion of the feudal ages, hostilities were carried on by all classes of persons, and every one capable of being a soldier was regarded as such, and all the rights of war attached to his person. But as wars are now carried on by regular troops, or, at least, by forces regularly organised, the peasants, merchants, manufacturers, agriculturists, and, generally, all public and private persons, who are engaged in the ordinary pursuits of life, and take no part in military operations, have nothing to fear from the sword of the enemy.¹ So long as they refrain from all hostilities,

with arms in their hands on that occasion, and says that, far from being burnt alive, they were reserved for the rope the next morning. (*Edwards, The Germans in France.*)

After the first occupation of Amiens, the Prussians marched out, leaving their wounded behind. The Mayor, having no armed force with which to protect them, and serious fears being entertained for their safety, wrote over the doors of the hospitals 'Honneur d'Amiens.' 'Respect aux blessés.' This act restrained the excited townspeople. (*Ibid.*)

The United States, by Acts of August 6, 1861, 12 Stat. at L. 319, and July 17, 1862, 12 id. 591-9, declared that the slaves of rebels were free, and might be employed in the civil war.

¹ Talleyrand writing to Napoleon (November 20, 1806) says, 'According to the maxim that war is not a relation between a man and another, but between State and State, in which private persons are only accidental enemies, not such as men, nor even as members or subjects, of the State, but simply as its defenders, the law of nations does not allow that the right of war and of conquest thence derived should be applied to peaceable, unarmed citizens, to private dwellings and properties, to the merchandise of commerce, to the magazines which contain it, to the vehicles which transport it, to unarmed ships which convey it on streams and seas, in one word, to the person and the goods of private individuals.' (But see chap. xxii. §§ 3, 23.)

Private persons should be unmolested unless they forfeit this right by taking part in hostilities; private property, in an invaded country, should not be taken, unless required by the invaders, and in such case on giving a fair value for it. (But see chap. xxi. §. 13.) Marauding should be severely checked.

Lord Wellington writing of the dastardly conduct of the Spanish

pay the military contributions which may be imposed on them, and quietly submit to the authority of the belligerent who may happen to be in the military possession of their country, they are allowed to continue in the enjoyment of their property, and in the pursuit of their ordinary avocations. This system has greatly mitigated the evils of war, and if the general, in military occupation of hostile territory, keeps his soldiery in proper discipline, and protects the country-people in their labours, allowing them to come freely to his camp to sell their provisions, he usually has no difficulty in procuring subsistence for his army, and avoids many of the dangers incident to a position in a hostile territory.¹

§ 4. But this exemption of the enemy's persons from the extreme rights of war is strictly confined to non-combatants, or such as refrain from all acts of hostility. If the peasantry and common people of a country use force, or commit acts in violation of the milder rules of modern warfare, they subject themselves to the common fate of military men, and sometimes to a still harsher treatment.² And if ministers of religion and females so far forget their profession and sex as to take up arms, or to incite others to do so, they are no longer exempted from the rights of war, although always within the rules of humanity, honour, and chivalry. And even if a portion of the non-combatant inhabitants of a particular place become active participants in the hostile operations, the entire community are sometimes subjected to the more rigid rules of war.

§ 5. Moreover, in some cases, even where no opposition is made by the non-combatant inhabitants of a particular place, the exemption properly extends no further than to the sparing of their lives; for, if the commander of the belligerent forces has good reason to mistrust the inhabitants of any place, he has a right to disarm them, and to require security for their good conduct. He may lawfully retain them as

troops, says that they had become odious to their country. The peaceable inhabitants, much as they detested and suffered from the French, almost wished for the establishment of Joseph Buonaparte's government, to be protected from the outrages of their own troops.

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. 1. p. 94; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii. §§ 145, 7; Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pub.*, lib. 1. cap. iii.; Wheaton, *Flem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. §§ 2, 4.

² Spies may be put to death (*Grot. iii. 4*).

prisoners, either with a view to prevent them from taking up arms, or for the purpose of weakening the enemy. Even women and children may be held in confinement, if circumstances render such a measure necessary, in order to secure the just objects of the war. But if the general, without reason, and from mere caprice, refuses women and children their liberty, he will be taxed with harshness and brutality, and will be justly censured for not conforming to a custom established by humanity. When, however, he has good and sufficient reasons for disregarding, in this particular, the rules of politeness and the suggestions of pity, he may do so without being justly accused of violating the laws of war. The presumption, however, is against him, and, if he wishes to preserve a fair fame, he must give good and satisfactory reasons for conduct so unusual.¹

§ 6. As the right to kill an enemy, in war, is applicable only to such public enemies as make forcible resistance, this right necessarily ceases so soon as the enemy lays down his arms and surrenders his person. After such surrender, the opposing belligerent has no power over his life, unless new rights are given by some new attempt at resistance. 'It was a dreadful error of antiquity,' says Vattel, 'a most unjust and savage claim, to assume a right of putting a prisoner of war to death, and even by the hand of the executioner.' By the present rules of international law, quarter can be refused the enemy only in cases where those asking it have forfeited their lives by some crime against the conqueror, under the laws and usages of war.²

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii. §§ 147, 148; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 93, 95.

² Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 90; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii. § 149. Deserters acquire no rights from having joined the enemy, but may be put to death.

Heister says, that persons escaping from captivity and retaken, or even recaptured in war, do not merit punishment, for they only obeyed their love of liberty. But this does not apply to those on parole.

The garrison of El Arish, near Gaza, having capitulated to Buonaparte, during the time of the campaign in Egypt, he set it free on the condition that it should proceed to Bagdad, and not serve against the French for a year. Having arrived at Jaffa, he found it necessary to make an assault before his troops could take possession of it, on which occasion three thousand prisoners were taken, who turned out to be, for the most part, those very soldiers whose lives and liberty had been spared upon conditions which they had immediately violated. To restore these prisoners a second time to liberty, was in fact to send fresh recruits to the Turks;

§ 7. According to the laws of war, as practised by some of the nations of antiquity, and by savage and barbarous nations of the present time, prisoners of war might be put to death, or sold into slavery. But, in the present age, no nation claiming a semi-civilisation makes slaves of prisoners of war, or claims the general right to put them to death, although such a right is sometimes exercised 'in those extreme cases where resistance on their part, or the part of others who come to their rescue, renders it impossible to keep them. Both reason and general opinion concur in showing that nothing but the strongest necessity will justify such an act.' Although, by the milder rules of modern warfare, prisoners of war can not be treated harshly, the captor may, nevertheless, take all proper measures for their security, and, if there be reason to apprehend that they will rise on their captors, or make their escape, he may put them in confinement and even fetter them. But such extreme measures should never be resorted to, except in cases of absolute necessity. Self-security is the first law of the conqueror, and the laws of war justify the use of means necessary to that end, but, beyond that, no harshness or severity is allowable. Each particular case, as it arises, must be judged by the attending circumstances, the means employed, and the danger they were designed to guard against. The responsibility of a commanding officer is always very great, and his conduct should not be hastily condemned, as it may be induced by circumstances not generally known, or easily explained. Too much leniency is often as fatal to his plans as an unjust severity to his reputation for humanity.

to forward them to Egypt under escort was to lessen the strength of an army already too weak. The law of necessity decided their fate, they were treated, in consequence of such an act of perjury, in the same manner as they had treated the French wounded after a battle, whose heads they cut off on the spot.—(*Mem. of Rev.*, i.)

Lord John Russell, writing to Lord Lyons, January 24, 1862, says, respecting the letter of Judge Daly on the question whether Southern privateers' men can be regarded as pirates, 'Her Majesty's Government are glad to find that the pretension has been so successfully combated. There can be no doubt, that men embarked on board a man-of-war or privateer, having a commission, or of which the commander has a commission, from the so-called President Davis, should be treated in the same way as officers and soldiers, similarly commissioned for operations on land. An insurrection extending over nine States in space, and ten months in duration, can only be considered as a civil war; and persons taken prisoners on either side, should be regarded as prisoners of war. Reason, humanity, and the practice of nations, require that this should be the case.' (See also opinion of Judge Daly, *ante*, ch. iii. § 21).

He should be judged by his general course and character, rather than by a single act, the motives of which are so easily misunderstood, and so often misconstrued.¹

§ 8. The ancient practice of putting prisoners of war to death, or selling them into slavery, gradually gave way to that of *ransoming*, which continued through the feudal wars of the middle ages.² By a cartel of March 12th, 1780, between France and England, the ransom in the case of a field-marshal of France, or an English field-marshal, or captain-general, was fixed at sixty pounds sterling. And even as late as the treaty of Amiens, in 1802, between Great Britain and the French and Batavian republics, it was deemed necessary to stipulate that the prisoners on both sides should be restored *without ransom*. The present usage, of exchanging prisoners without any ransom, was early introduced among the more polished nations, and was pretty firmly established in Europe before the end of the seventeenth century.³

§ 9. But this usage is not, even now, considered obligatory upon those who do not choose to enter into a cartel for that purpose. 'Whoever makes a just war,' says Vattel, 'has a right, if he thinks proper, to detain his prisoners till the end of the war.' * * * 'If a nation finds a considerable advantage in leaving its soldiers prisoners with the enemy during the war, rather than exchange them, it may certainly, unless bound by cartel, act as is most agreeable to its interests. This would be the case of a State abounding in men, and at war with a nation more formidable by the

¹ Wheaton, *Flem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 2; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii. §§ 149, 150, 152; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 95; Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, § 275.

² Bynkershoek states, that the Dutch revived the ancient practice of putting prisoners to death, in the case of Spanish prisoners who were not ransomed, also that they decreed death against enemies, who made a descent on the coast for the purpose of plunder, or approached the coast within a certain distance. The same author mentions that the Dutch enslaved prisoners by way of retaliation, when they sold prisoners from the Barbary States to the Spaniards.

The people of Talavera, and Spanish soldiers, beat out the brains of wounded Frenchmen lying on the battle field in the neighbourhood. The English, in every case, checked these inhuman perpetrators, and in some instances fired on them. (*Nap. Pen.* vol. ii.)

³ Wheaton, *Hist. Law of Nations*, pp. 162-4; Burlamaqui, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, tome v. pt. iv. ch. vi.; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 95; Heffter, *Droit International*, §§ 126-9.

courage than the number of its soldiers. It would have been of little advantage to the czar, Peter the Great, to restore the Swedes his prisoners for an equal number of Russians.' In 1810, Great Britain had, confined in prisons, hulks, and guardships, about fifty thousand French prisoners of war, while Napoleon had a much less number of English, but probably enough Spanish and Portuguese prisoners (allies of England) to more than make up the equality of numbers. He offered to exchange the whole against the whole, or one thousand English and two thousand Spanish and Portuguese for three thousand French. But the British negotiators at first insisted upon the exchange being confined to French and English; they, however, afterward consented to a general exchange, beginning with the English for an equal number of Frenchmen. Napoleon would not agree to this, because, he said, as soon as the English got back their own countrymen, they would find some excuse for not carrying the exchange further, and retain the remainder of the French in the hulks for ever. The negotiations were, therefore, broken off. That both parties had a legal right to decline the exchange cannot be denied; and the subsequent attempts of each to cast odium upon the other for refusing its own proposition was unbecoming the character of two great nations. Napoleon's proposition was in accordance with the usages of war in such cases, and not unreasonable in itself; moreover, by the same code England was bound to provide for the exchange of her allies who had been made prisoners in the common cause. But if she believed that she would, by the proposed arrangement, lose more than she gained in relative power, she had an undoubted right to decline its acceptance. And certainly Napoleon had good reasons for declining the arrangement proposed to him by Great Britain.¹

§ 10. But while no State is obliged, by the positive rules of international law, to enter into a cartel for the exchange of prisoners of war, there is a strong moral duty imposed upon the Government of every State to provide for the release of such of its citizens and allies as have fallen into the hands of the enemy. They have fallen into this misfortune only by

¹ Las Cases, *Mémoires de Sainte-Hélène*, tome vii. pp. 39, 40; Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, vol. iii. pp. 394, 395; *Annual Register*, 1811, p. 76; *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. xx. pp. 623, 691.

acting in its service, and in the support of its cause. 'This,' says Vattel, 'is a care which the State owes to those who have exposed themselves in her defence.'

§ 11. Sometimes prisoners of war are permitted to resume their liberty, upon the condition that they will not again take up arms against their captors, either for a limited time, or during the continuance of the war, or until duly exchanged. Officers are very frequently released upon their parole, subject to the same conditions. Such agreements made by officers for themselves, or by a commander for his troops, are valid, and cannot be annulled by the State to which they belong. Agreements of this kind come within the necessary limits of the implied powers of the commander, and are obligatory upon the State.² 'Good faith and humanity,' says Wheaton, 'ought to preside over the execution of these compacts, which are designed to mitigate the evils of war, without defeating its legitimate purposes.'

¹ Grotius, *de Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. vii. §§ 8, 9; Wheaton, *Hist. Law of Nations*, pp. 162, 4; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 95.

² The following answer was directed by the author to be returned to the general commanding the Confederate forces, who had complained that many citizens of the United States, engaged in peaceful avocations, had been imprisoned because they refused to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, while others *per duress* had been required to take an oath not to bear arms against that Government. 'August 13th, 1862. The Government of the United States has never authorised any extortion of oaths of allegiance or military paroles, and has forbidden any measures to be resorted to tending to that end. Instead of extorting oaths of allegiance and paroles it has refused the application of several thousand prisoners to be permitted to take them, and return to their homes in the rebel States. At the same time this Government claims and will exercise the right to arrest, imprison, or place beyond its military lines any persons suspected of giving aid and information to its enemies, or of any other treasonable act. And if persons so arrested voluntarily take the oath of allegiance, or give their military parole, and afterwards violate their pledged faith, they will be punished according to the laws and usages of war. You will assure General Lee that no unseemly threats of retaliation on his part will deter this Government from exercising its lawful rights over both prisoners and property of whatever name or character.'

The Brussels Conference, 1874, declares: Art. 36. The population of an occupied territory cannot be compelled to take part in military operations against their own country. Art. 37. The population of occupied territories cannot be compelled to swear allegiance to the enemy's power. Art. 38. The honour and rights of the family, the life and property of individuals, as well as their religious convictions and the exercise of their religion should be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated. Art. 39. Pillage is expressly forbidden.

³ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 3; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 95; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. xii.

§ 12. It will be shown hereafter that there are certain limits to the conditions which the captor may impose on the release of prisoners of war, and to the stipulations which an officer is authorised to enter into, either for himself or for his troops. The captor may impose the condition that the prisoners shall not take up arms against him, either for a limited period or during the war; but he cannot require them to renounce for ever the right to bear arms against him; nor can they, on their part, enter into any engagements inconsistent with their character and duties as citizens and subjects. Such engagements made by them would not be binding upon their sovereign or State. The reason of this limitation is obvious: the captor has the absolute right to keep his prisoners in confinement till the termination of the war; but on the conclusion of peace he would no longer have any reasons for detaining them. They, therefore, have the right to stipulate for their conduct during that period, but not beyond the time when they would have been released had no agreement been entered into. Nor can the captor generally impose conditions which extend beyond the period when the prisoners would necessarily be entitled to their liberty. Beyond this, their services are due to, and at the disposition of, the State to which they owe allegiance, and they have no right to limit them by contracts with a foreign power.¹

§ 13. By the modern usage of nations, commissaries are permitted to reside in the respective belligerent countries, for the purpose of negotiating and carrying into effect the necessary arrangements for the support, as well as the release and exchange of prisoners of war, but difficulties sometimes occur in arranging the terms of such agreements, and it not unfrequently happens that a considerable length of time will elapse after their capture before they can be exchanged or released. Moreover, by the conditions of their parole, they are sometimes required to remain in the captor's country for a fixed term after their release. During these periods they must be subsisted either by the captor or by their own Government, and it sometimes becomes a question to which this duty properly belongs.²

¹ Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. iii. § 5; De Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. i. tit. iii. § 32.

² Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 3; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 95.

§ 14. Vattel places the duty of a State to support its subjects, while prisoners in the hands of an enemy, upon the same grounds as its duty to provide for their ransom and release. Indeed, a neglect, or refusal to do so, would seem to be even more criminal than a neglect or refusal to provide for their exchange; for the exigencies of the war may make it the temporary policy of the State to decline an exchange, but nothing can excuse it in leaving its subjects to suffer in an enemy's country, without any fault of their own, when the State has the means of relieving them from the misfortune in which they are involved, by acting in its service and by supporting its cause. It follows, therefore, that although a State may properly, under certain circumstances, refuse to exchange its prisoners, it cannot, without a violation of moral duty, neglect to make the proper and necessary arrangement for their support while they are thus retained, by a captor who is willing to exchange them. It is stated by English writers that, in the wars of Napoleon, the British authorities regularly remitted the whole cost of the support of English prisoners, in France, to the French Government, but that the latter failed to make any provision whatever for the support of its subjects in the hands of the English,¹ leaving them to starvation, or the charity of their enemies. If this be true, it is a blot upon the character of the French Government.²

§ 15. It not unfrequently happens in a war, that, although both parties are willing to make an exchange of prisoners, much delay occurs in agreeing upon the terms of the cartel. Such delay sometimes results from a want of good faith on

¹ The Earl of Liverpool, referring in 1814, to the large sum of money then due from the French to the British Government for the maintenance of prisoners of war, remarks that an article to liquidate such debts has usually been inserted in treaties of peace, but that he did not believe in the present case such an article would be likely to give the British Government the money, and that it certainly could not give it without material pressure and inconvenience to the French Government; that it occurred to him, therefore, there might be some grace in abandoning it, and that the honour of the French Government might perhaps be saved, on some other points, by a formal relinquishment of the claim in an article of the treaty; that he was sincerely desirous to see the credit of the French upheld, as far as the English Government could contribute to it without sacrifice of its public principles. *Parl. Papers.*

² Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, vol. iii. pp. 394, 395; Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. xx. pp. 634, 694; Hardenburg, *Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat*, tome ii. p. 438; tome ix. p. 105; Las Cases, *Mémoires de Sainte-Hélène*, tome vii. pp. 39, 40; *Annual Register*, 1811, p. 76.

both sides, the parties entering into negotiations with no intention of coming to an agreement. Again, when the cartel has been negotiated, it is sometimes impossible to carry it into effect immediately, the peculiar circumstances of the war and the character of the military operations interrupting, or preventing, its execution. Such delays are the more frequent in great wars, which embrace several countries and seas, within the theatre of their operations. In all cases where the circumstances prevent an exchange of prisoners of war, or render it impossible for them to receive the means of support from their own State, it is the duty of the captor to furnish them with subsistence; for humanity would forbid his allowing them to suffer or starve. But if their own Government should refuse to make arrangements for their support, exchange, or release, and if the captor should give them sufficient liberty to enable them to earn their own support, his responsibility ceases, and whatever sufferings may result, are justly chargeable upon their own Government. Under ordinary circumstances, prisoners of war are not required to labour beyond the usual police duty of camp and garrison; but where their own State refuses, or wilfully neglects to provide for their release or support, it is not unreasonable in the captor to require them to pay with their labour for the subsistence which he furnishes them. But this can be done only in extreme cases, and even then they should be treated kindly and with mildness, and no degrading or very onerous labour should be imposed on them. All harshness and unnecessary severity would be contrary to the modern laws of war.¹

¹ Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 26; Scott, *United States Army Reg.* 1825, §§ 700, 716; The St. Juan, 5 *Rob. Rep.*, p. 39; Heffner, *Dr. Int. International*, § 129.

The Brussels Conference, 1874, declares: Art. 23. Prisoners of war are lawful and disarmed enemies. They are in the power of the enemy's Government, but not of the individuals or of the corps who made them prisoners. They should be treated with humanity. Every act of insubordination authorises the necessary measures of severity to be taken with regard to them. All their personal effects, except their arms, are considered to be their own property. Art. 24. Prisoners of war are liable to internment in a town, fortress, camp, or in any locality whatever, under an obligation not to go beyond certain fixed limits; but they may not be placed in confinement (*enfermés*) unless absolutely necessary as a measure of security. Art. 25. Prisoners of war may be employed on certain public works which have no immediate connection with the operations on the theatre of war, provided the employment be not excessive, nor humiliating to their military rank if they belong to the army, or to their official or

§ 16. But, sometimes the captor refuses to enter into any cartel for the exchange of his prisoners, or even to release

social position if they do not belong to it. They may also, subject to such regulations as may be drawn up by the military authorities, undertake private work. The pay they receive will go towards ameliorating their position, or will be placed to their credit at the time of their release. In this case the cost of their maintenance may be deducted from their pay. Art. 26. Prisoners of war cannot be compelled in any way to take any part whatever in carrying on the operations of war. Art. 27. The Government in whose power are the prisoners of war, undertakes to provide for their maintenance. The conditions of such maintenance may be settled by a mutual understanding between the belligerents. In default of such an understanding, and as a general principle, prisoners of war shall be treated, as regards food and clothing, on the same footing as the troops of the Government who made them prisoners. Art. 28. Prisoners of war are subject to the laws and regulations in force in the army in whose power they are. Arms may be used, after summoning, against a prisoner attempting to escape. If retaken, he is subject to summary punishment (*peines disciplinaires*) or to a stricter surveillance. If after having escaped he is again made prisoner, he is not liable to any punishment for his previous escape. Art. 29. Every prisoner is bound to declare, if interrogated on the point, his true name and rank, and in the case of his infringing this rule, he will incur a restriction of the advantages granted to the prisoners of the class to which he belongs. Art. 30. The exchange of prisoners of war is regulated by mutual agreement between the belligerents.

It will be proper here to mention the change effected in the practice of modern warfare, through the Convention of Geneva, which may be regarded as a natural consequence of the almost universal *consensus* of civilised nations, that some determined rules should be established for the protection of the sick, and wounded, of either belligerent in war, and also of those, whose duty it is to bestow care and attention on them; for civilisation should tend to alleviate the calamities of war, by weakening the enemy without the infliction of any unnecessary suffering.

Instances, notably the examples of Cyrus, and of the Emperor Aurelian, in ancient history are not wanting, to illustrate the generous feeling of compassion or sympathy for the sick and wounded in war. In the middle ages, the members of the Teutonic Order of Knighthood devoted themselves to the service of sick and wounded soldiers. This order was founded in 1190, during the siege of Acre, by some Bremen merchants, who being moved with compassion at the sight of the miseries which the besiegers suffered, erected a kind of hospital or tent, where they gave constant attendance to all such unhappy objects, as had recourse to their charity. Their dress was a white mantle, with a black cross on it. (*Raynaldi Duelli Hist. Ord. Teut.*) In more modern times, we read of the agreement between Louis XV. of France with Frederick the Great, that those persons who might attend on the sick and wounded, during war, should be treated as neutrals. Napoleon III., after the battle of Mentefello 1859, restored to the enemy all wounded prisoners, without requiring any exchange. The philanthropy of Miss Nightingale and her little band of nurses, the energy of the Russian nuns, and the devotion of the French *Sœurs de Charité*, in the cause of the wounded, during the Crimean war, is well known.

THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA was signed on behalf of Switzerland, Baden, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Hesse-Darmstadt, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, and Wurtemberg, August 22, 1864, and

them on parole. He may, for reasons satisfactory to himself, persist in retaining in confinement the prisoners which he has

the following Powers have since acceded to it:—Austria, 1866; Bavaria, 1866; Great Britain, 1865; Greece, 1865; Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 1865; The Pope, 1868; Persia, 1874; Russia, 1867; Saxony, 1866; Sweden and Norway, 1864; Turkey, 1865.

The articles are as follows:—

ART. I.—Ambulances and military hospitals shall be acknowledged to be neuter, and, as such, shall be protected and respected by belligerents so long as any sick or wounded may be therein.

Such neutrality shall cease if the ambulances or hospitals should be held by a military force.

ART. II.—Persons employed in hospitals and ambulances, comprising the staff for superintendence, medical service, administration, transport of wounded, as well as chaplains, shall participate in the benefit of neutrality, whilst so employed, and so long as there remain any wounded to bring in or to succour.

ART. III.—The persons designated in the preceding article may, even after occupation by the enemy, continue to fulfil their duties in the hospital or ambulance which they serve, or may withdraw in order to rejoin the corps to which they belong.

Under such circumstances, when these persons shall cease from their functions, they shall be delivered by the occupying army to the outposts of the enemy.

ART. IV.—As the equipment of military hospitals remains subject to the laws of war, persons attached to such hospitals cannot, in withdrawing, carry away any articles but such as are their private property.

Under the same circumstances an ambulance shall, on the contrary, retain its equipment.

ART. V.—Inhabitants of the country who may bring help to the wounded shall be respected, and shall remain free. The generals of the belligerent Powers shall make it their care to inform the inhabitants of the appeal addressed to their humanity, and of the neutrality which will be the consequence of it.

Any wounded man entertained and taken care of in a house shall be considered as a protection thereto. Any inhabitant who shall have entertained wounded men in his house shall be exempted from the quartering of troops, as well as from a part of the contributions of war which may be imposed.

ART. VI.—Wounded or sick soldiers shall be entertained and taken care of, to whatever nation they may belong.

Commanders-in-chief shall have the power to deliver immediately to the outposts of the enemy soldiers who have been wounded in an engagement, when circumstances permit this to be done, and with the consent of both parties.

Those who are recognised, after their wounds are healed, as incapable of serving, shall be sent back to their country.

The others may also be sent back, on condition of not again bearing arms during the continuance of the war.

Evacuations, together with the persons under whose directions they take place, shall be protected by an absolute neutrality.

ART. VII.—A distinctive and uniform flag shall be adopted for hospitals, ambulances, and evacuations. It must, on every occasion, be accompanied by the national flag. An arm-badge (brassard) shall also be allowed for individuals neutralised, but the delivery thereof shall be left to military authority.

taken from the enemy, at the same time leaving the enemy to keep and provide for those of his own people, which the latter

The flag and the arm-badge shall bear a red cross on a white ground.

ART. VIII.—The details of execution of the present convention shall be regulated by the commanders-in-chief of belligerent armies, according to the instructions of their respective Governments, and in conformity with the general principles laid down in this convention.

ART. IX.—The high contracting Powers have agreed to communicate the present convention to those Governments which have not found it convenient to send plenipotentiaries to the International Conference at Geneva, with an invitation to accede thereto; the protocol is for that purpose left open.

ART. X.—The present convention shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Berne in four months, or sooner if possible.

In 1868 the following additional articles were proposed and signed at Geneva on behalf of Great Britain, Austria, Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, North Germany, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Wurtemberg. On July 22, 1870, it was stated by the Swiss Government that all those States on whose behalf the original convention had been signed had adhered to the additional articles, Rome and Spain excepted, but that Russia, whilst agreeing to the additional articles, proposed a supplement to Art. XIV., with the view of preventing the abuse to the distinguishing flag of neutrality; that it could not be expected that the declarations of all the contracting States would be received directly, and consequently the final adoption of the additional articles could not take place till a more or less distant time; that the Federal Council of Switzerland had proposed to the North German Confederation and to France to recognise the Convention of Geneva with the additional articles during the war which had just broken out (the Franco-German war), as a *modus vivendi*, and that those Powers had readily acceded to the proposal.

THE ADDITIONAL ARTICLES are as follows:

ART. I. The persons designated in Article II. of the convention shall, after the occupation by the enemy, continue to fulfil their duties, according to their wants, to the sick and wounded in the ambulance or the hospital which they serve. When they request to withdraw, the commander of the occupying troops shall fix the time of departure, which he shall only be allowed to delay for a short time in case of military necessity.

ART. II.—Arrangements will have to be made by the belligerent Powers to ensure to the neutralised person, fallen into the hands of the arms of the enemy, the entire enjoyment of his salary.

ART. III.—Under the conditions provided for in Articles I. and IV. of the convention, the name ambulance applies to field hospitals and other temporary establishments, which follow the troops on the field of battle to receive the sick and wounded.

ART. IV.—In conformity with the spirit of Article V. of the convention and to the reservations contained in the protocol of 1864, it is explained, that for the appointment of the charges relative to the quartering of troops, and of the contributions of war, account only shall be taken in an equitable manner of the charitable zeal displayed by the inhabitants.

ART. V.—In addition to Article VI. of the convention, it is stipulated that, with the reservation of officers whose detention might be important to the fate of arms and within the limits fixed by the second paragraph

may have captured. In such a case, he cannot expect the opposing belligerent to provide for the support of prisoners

of that article, the wounded fallen into the hands of the enemy shall be sent back to their country, after they are cured, or sooner if possible, on condition, nevertheless, of not again bearing arms during the continuance of the war.

ART. VI.—The boats which, at their own risk and peril, during and after an engagement pick up the shipwrecked or wounded, or which, having picked them up, convey them on board a neutral or hospital ship, shall enjoy, until the accomplishment of their mission, the character of neutrality, as far as the circumstances of the engagement and the position of the ships engaged will permit.

The appreciation of these circumstances is entrusted to the humanity of all the combatants. The wrecked and wounded thus picked up and saved must not serve again during the continuance of the war.

ART. VII.—The religious, medical, and hospital staff of any captured vessel are declared neutral, and, on leaving the ship, may remove the articles and surgical instruments which are their private property.

ART. VIII.—The staff designated in the preceding article must continue to fulfil their functions in the captured ship, assisting in the removal of wounded made by the victorious party; they will then be at liberty to return to their country in conformity with the second paragraph of the first additional article.

The stipulations of the second additional article are applicable to the pay and allowance of the staff.

ART. IX.—The military hospital ships remain under martial law, in all that concerns their stores; they become the property of the captor, but the latter must not divert them from their special appropriation during the continuance of the war.

The vessels not equipped for fighting which, during peace, the Government shall have officially declared to be intended to serve as floating hospital ships, shall, however, enjoy during the war complete neutrality, both as regards stores, and also as regards their staff, provided their equipment is exclusively appropriated to the special service on which they are employed.

ART. X.—Any merchantman, to whatever nation she may belong, charged exclusively with removal of sick and wounded, is protected by neutrality, but the mere fact, noted on the ship's books, of the vessel having been visited by an enemy's cruiser renders the sick and wounded incapable of serving during the continuance of the war. The cruiser shall even have the right of putting on board an officer in order to accompany the convoy, and thus verify the good faith of the operation.

If the merchant ship also carries a cargo, her neutrality will still protect it, provided that such cargo is not of a nature to be confiscated by the belligerent.

The belligerents retain the right to interdict neutralised vessels from all communication, and from any course which they may deem prejudicial to the secrecy of their operations. In urgent cases special conventions may be entered into between commanders-in-chief, in order to neutralise temporarily and in a special manner the vessels intended for the removal of the sick and wounded.

ART. XI.—Wounded or sick sailors and soldiers, when embarked, to whatever nation they may belong, shall be protected and taken care of by their captors.

Their return to their own country is subjected to the provisions of Article VI. of the convention, and of the additional Article V.

ART. XII.—The distinctive flag to be used with the national flag, in

thus retained, and the laws of war as well as of humanity require, that he himself shall provide, in a proper manner, for

order to indicate any vessel or boat which may claim the benefits of neutrality, in virtue of the principles of this convention, is a white flag with a red cross. The belligerents may exercise in this respect any mode of verification which they may deem necessary.

Military hospital ships shall be distinguished by being painted white outside, with green strake.

ART. XIII. The hospital ships which are equipped at the expense of the aid societies, recognised by the Governments signing this convention, and which are furnished with a commission emanating from the sovereign, who shall have given express authority for their being fitted out, and with a certificate from the proper naval authority that they have been placed under his control during their fitting out and on their final departure, and that they were then appropriated solely to the purpose of their mission, shall be considered neutral, as well as the whole of their staff. They shall be recognised and protected by the belligerents.

They shall make themselves known by hoisting, together with their national flag, the white flag with a red cross. The distinctive mark of their staff, while performing their duties, shall be an armlet of the same colours.

The outer painting of these hospital ships shall be white with red strake.

These ships shall bear aid and assistance to the wounded and wrecked belligerents without distinction of nationality.

They must take care not to interfere in any way with the movements of the combatants. During and after the battle they must do their duty at their own risk and peril.

The belligerents shall have the right of controlling and visiting them: they will be at liberty to refuse their assistance, to order them to depart, and to detain them if the exigencies of the case require such a step.

The wounded and wrecked picked up by these ships cannot be reclaimed by either of the combatants, and they will be required not to serve during the continuance of the war.

ART. XIV.—In naval wars any strong presumption that either belligerent takes advantage of the benefits of neutrality, with any other view than the interest of the sick and wounded, gives to the other belligerent, until proof to the contrary, the right of suspending the convention, as regards such belligerent.

Should this presumption become a certainty, notice may be given to such belligerent that the convention is suspended with regard to him during the whole continuance of the war.

ART. XV.—The present Act shall be drawn up in a single original copy, which shall be deposited in the Archives of the Swiss Confederation.

The Brussels Conference, 1874, declares:—Art. 35. The duties of belligerents with regard to the treatment of sick and wounded are regulated by the Convention of Geneva of August 22, 1864, subject to the modifications which may be introduced into that Convention.

During the Franco-Prussian war, 1870, French medical officers, protected by the badge of Geneva, attended their own wounded at Soule les Forêts after the battle of Woerth. Even *irregular* workers under the Geneva badge, although arrested, were not detained by either side. It was reported by the German commandant at Lichtenberg that the French had fired on the Geneva badge, and that Turcos had cut off an

their subsistence.¹ After the fall of Tarragona in 1811, Suchet the French commander, offered to exchange his Catalonia prisoners, the best soldiers in Spain, for the French prisoner confined at Cabrera, men utterly ruined in constitution by their cruel captivity. Cuesta, the Spanish general, was disposed to accede to the proposition, but the Regency, at the request of Wellesley, the British envoy, peremptorily forbade the exchange; and the French prisoners therefore remained, say Napier, 'a disgrace to Spain, and to England, for if her envoy interfered to prevent their release, she was bound to insist that thousands of men, whose prolonged captivity was the result of her interference, should not be exposed on a barren rock, naked as they were born, and fighting for each other's miserable rations, to prolong an existence inconceivably wretched.'

§ 17. Where circumstances render it obligatory upon the

officer's head and killed some wounded men. The Crown Prince remarked that the Geneva flag had been fired on several times. (*Russell, Diary during the War.*)

The Prussians, during their occupation of Versailles, required a bulletin of the health of the wounded Frenchmen, lying in the hospital of that town, to be sent to the commanding general every morning. The convalescents received an immediate order to leave for Germany, as prisoners of war. Their departure from the hospital was watched by armed soldiers. The chief physician protested against their removal, as contrary to the fifth additional article of the above Convention, but in vain. (*Deleclot, Versailles, 1870.*)

On the 21st December 1870, a German official gave notice, in writing, to the International French Society of Versailles, that it was dissolved, and that the members of ambulances, who were not native of Versailles, were to leave, for the adjoining departments, within the space of two days. It is unknown, from whose authority this order emanated, but the Prussian commanding general annulled it, and requested the society to continue their duties. (*Ibid.*)

At Rouen, the Geneva flag was employed by the French to protect a hearse. (*Edwards, The Germans in France.*)

Although the United States have not acceded to the Geneva Convention, 'an Association for the Relief of the Misery of Battle-fields' has been formed in America. Moreover, the principles of the Convention are in great measure adopted in their 'Instructions for the government of armies in the field.' (See p. 36 et seq.)

¹ Napier, *Hist. Peninsular War*, vol. ii. p. 409. In 1809, the Spaniards had sent thousands of prisoners of war to the Balearic Isles without any order for their subsistence, and the Junta, when remonstrated with, cast 7,000 ashore on the little desert rock of Cabrera. At Majorca numbers had been massacred by the inhabitants in the most cowardly and brutal manner, but those left on Cabrera suffered miseries that can scarcely be described. Afflicted with hunger, thirst, and nakedness, they lived like wild beasts. Less than 2,000 remained to tell the tale of this inhumanity.

to support the prisoners which he has taken, this support is usually limited to the regular provision ration, and such clothing and fuel as may be absolutely necessary to prevent suffering. Officers and other persons who have the means of paying for their support cannot require any assistance from the captor. But such as have no money, are certainly entitled to an allowance sufficient for personal comfort and modern custom and military usage require that it should be proportioned to the rank, dignity, and character of the prisoner. It, however, can never properly be required for any considerable length of time, as prisoners of this description are bound to provide for their own support as soon as they can procure the means of doing so. The moneys expended for the support of prisoners of war, may constitute a just demand for reimbursement on the conclusion of peace. Indeed, all moneys expended for the support of prisoners of war under ordinary circumstances, are deemed to be on account of their own Government, and such amounts are either settled by commissioners during the war, or become subjects of stipulations in a treaty of peace.¹

118 As there is usually no very great disparity of numbers in the prisoners taken by the opposing belligerents in the course of the war, it is the more modern custom for each captor to support those who may fall into his hands till an exchange can be effected, and a cartel for this purpose is usually negotiated at the earliest possible opportunity. The burden of supporting the prisoners taken during the war is thus not unequally distributed. It, however, sometimes happens that so very large a number are taken by one party, as to leave no probability of an immediate exchange. The captor is then left the alternative to support them, or to release them on parole. But should they refuse to give their parole, or should their own Government forbid their doing so.² In the first case they must suffer the consequences of their own obstinacy; and, in the second case, their own Government has no right to forbid their release on parole, unless at the same time it provides the means for their support during their imprisonment. Attempts have sometimes been made to annul such engagements, and to force released prisoners

¹ Whistman *Int. Law*, vol. ii, p. 26; Gargen, *De Diplomatie*, liv. vi.
² Scott, *United States Army Regulations of 1825*, §§ 709, 716.

war to take up arms again in the same campaign, in direct violation of their parole. Such an act on the part of a belligerent Government is utterly futile as a protection to soldiers, who may thus be made to violate their parole, and is a evidence of ignorance or semi-barbarism of the Government making such a declaration. We have an example in the war between the United States and the republic of Mexico. The Mexican authorities not only attempted by proclamation to induce such of their soldiers as had been released by the Americans on parole to regard that obligation as null and void, but in some cases their unexchanged prisoners were actually forced to re-enter the ranks and fight. Many others, under the promise of plunder, were induced to organise themselves into guerrilla bands under robber chiefs, who were furnished with military commissions from the Government. Such attempts to violate the ordinary rules of war do not only justify, but require prompt and severe punishment. Accordingly, General Scott announced his intention to hang everyone who should be retaken after thus violating his parole of honour. In making further releases on parole, he required, in addition to the ordinary military pledge, the sincerity of a religious oath, administered by the Mexican clergy.¹

§ 19. Cases have sometimes occurred where a general has taken so large a number of prisoners that he cannot keep them with safety, or cannot supply them with food, and is satisfied that, if released on their parole, they would not respect it. If he has not the means of keeping his prisoners, and can safely put them on parole, he is, of course, bound to release them. But the question arises, if he cannot safely do this, and has no means to subsist them, what is he to do? Must he release them, to the imminent danger of his own security, or to his certain destruction, or, will the law of self-defence justify him in putting them to death? If his own safety is incompatible with that of an enemy,—even of an enemy who has submitted,—will his duty to his own State justify him in destroying that enemy?

§ 20. The extreme case here supposed can seldom, if ever,

¹ Grotius, *De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. xiii. §§ 6-10; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. xii.; *Cong. Doc.*, 30 Cong., 1 Sess. H. R. Ex. Doc. No. 56, p. 245.

happen, for a general can almost always find some means of disposing of, or securing, his prisoners of war, short of deliberately putting them to death. Vattel is evidently of the opinion, that cases may occur where such a course would be justifiable. 'But,' he says, 'to justify us in coolly and deliberately putting to death a great number of prisoners, the following conditions are indispensable: 1st, That no promise has been made to spare their lives; and 2nd, That we be perfectly assured that our own safety demands such a sacrifice. If it is at all consistent with prudence, either to trust to their parole, or to disregard their perfidy, a generous enemy will rather listen to the voice of humanity than to that of timid circumspection. Charles XII., being encumbered with his prisoners after the battle of Narva, only disarmed them, and set them at liberty; but his enemy, still impressed with the apprehensions which his warlike and formidable opponents had excited in his mind, sent into Siberia all the prisoners he took at Pultowa. The Swedish hero confided too much in his own generosity: the sagacious monarch of Russia united, perhaps, too great a degree of severity with his prudence. When Admiral Anson took the rich Acapulco galleon, near Manilla, he found that the prisoners outnumbered his whole ship's company; he was, therefore, under the necessity of confining them in the hold, where they suffered cruel distress. But, had he exposed himself to the risk of being carried away a prisoner, with his prize and his own ship together, would the humanity of his conduct have justified the imprudence of it? Henry V., King of England, after his victory in the battle of Agincourt, was reduced, or thought himself reduced, to the cruel necessity of sacrificing the prisoners to his own safety.' 'Nothing,' continues Vattel, 'short of the greatest necessity, can justify so terrible an execution; and the general, whose situation requires it, is greatly to be pitied.' Probably, the opinion of Vattel was justified by the practices of the age in which he wrote, and of those which preceded it, but in the present day, the conduct of any general who should deliberately put his prisoners to death would be declared infamous, and no possible excuse would remove the stain from his character.¹

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii § 151; Manning, *Law of*

§ 21. It was an ancient maxim of war, that a weak garrison forfeit all claim to mercy on the part of the conqueror, when, with more courage than prudence, they obstinately persevere in defending an ill-fortified place against a large army, and when, refusing to accept of reasonable conditions offered to them, they undertake to arrest the progress of a power which they are unable to resist. Pursuant to this maxim, Cæsar answered the Aduatici that he would spare their town, if they surrendered before the battering-ram touched their walls. But, though sometimes practised in modern warfare, it is generally condemned as contrary to humanity and inconsistent with the principles which, among civilised and Christian nations, form the basis of the laws of war. Nor was it altogether admitted by the ancients, for, when Phytos was ordered to be executed by Dionysius the tyrant, for having obstinately defended the town of Rhegium, he protested against it as an unjust punishment, and called upon heaven to avenge his death. Diodorus Siculus regarded such a punishment as unjust; and Alexander the Great ordered some Milesians to be spared *on account of their courage and fidelity*. It is sometimes said, that where a garrison makes an obstinate defence of a weak place against an overwhelming force, it only causes useless effusion of human blood, and that, therefore, the authors of such a sacrifice should be severely punished.¹ But who can say beforehand

Nations, p. 165. Rutherford, *Institutes*, book ii. chap. ix. § 17; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 95; Burke, *Works*, vol. iv. p. 127.

Lord Mansfield has laid it down that no cruelties are permitted by the law of nations that are not necessary to secure a conquest (Cornwall, 2 Blackburne, 2 Doug. 644). Sir W. Scott has adjudged that a belligerent is bound to confine himself to those modes which the common practice of mankind has employed, and to relinquish those which the same practice has not brought within the ordinary exercise of war, however sanctioned by its principles and purposes (Fidoen, 1 Rob. 134). 'Wars,' said Lord Bacon, 'are no massacres and confusions, but they are the highest trials of right, when princes and States shall put themselves upon the justice of God, for deciding their controversies as it shall please Him to put on either side.'

¹ In 1760 General Landolm, on appearing before Breslau to besiege that place, informed the governor *inter alia* that in case of obstinacy he could expect no reasonable terms; that the place was a mercantile town, not a fortress; and that he could not defend it without contravening the laws of war. The governor, Count Tavenner, respected these laws, but did not the less defend the place. He replied that, being surrounded with work and wet ditches, it was to be considered a place of strength, and not merely a mercantile town; that the king had ordered him to defend it to the last extremity, and that he was not frightened at

that such a defence may not save the State by delaying the operations of the enemy? There are numerous instances, in ancient as well as modern times, where courage has supplied the defects of fortifications, and where places generally regarded as untenable have been defended by a brave and determined garrison till the enemy consumed his strength in the operation of the siege, and wasted the most favourable season for conducting the campaign. In case a place is closely besieged it is customary for the besieging general to offer to the garrison honourable terms of capitulation; and if they refuse these terms, and the place is carried by force, they may be compelled to surrender at discretion, and the captor may treat such prisoners with all the severity of the law of war. But that law, says Vattel, can never extend so far as to give a right to take away the life of an enemy who lays down his arms, unless he has been guilty of some crime against the conqueror. Where, however, the resistance is not only evidently fruitless and without any reasonable object, but springs from obstinacy instead of firmness of valour, the officer so resisting is guilty of one of the greatest of crimes—the useless sacrifice of human life; and not only does he deserve to be treated with extreme severity by the captor, but also his own Government should see that he be justly dealt with for so serious an offence. But the resistance in such a case must be obviously useless, and known to be such when it is made. If there is any probability of success he is justifiable in holding out to the last extremity.¹

§ 22. We do not, at the present day, often hear, when a town is carried by assault, that the garrison is put to the sword in cold blood, on the plea that they have no right to quarter. Such things are no longer approved or countenanced by civilised nations. But we sometimes hear of a captured town being sacked, and the houses of the inhabitants being plundered, on the plea that it was impossible for the general to restrain his soldiery in the confusion and excitement of storming the place; and, under that safer

the general's threats to destroy the town, for he was not entrusted with the care of the houses but of the fortifications. The town was most bravely defended, and Landolm eventually was forced to withdraw.

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii. § 143; Bynkershoek, *Quaest. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. iii.; Grotius, *De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. iv. § 13; cap. xi. § 16.

name of *plunder*, it has sometimes been attempted to veil 'all crimes which man, in his worst excesses, can commit, horrors so atrocious that their very atrocity preserves them from our full execration, because it makes it impossible to describe them.'¹ It is true that soldiers sometimes commit excesses which their officers cannot prevent; but, in general, a commanding officer is responsible for the acts of those under his orders. Unless he can control his soldiers he is unfit to command them. The most atrocious crimes in war, however, are usually committed by militia, and volunteers, suddenly raised from the population of large cities, and sent into the field before the general has time or opportunity to reduce them to order and discipline. In such cases the responsibility of their crimes rests upon the State which employs them, rather than upon the general who is, perhaps, unwillingly, obliged to use them.²

§ 23. The truth of these remarks is illustrated by the war of the Spanish Peninsula. None of the generals in that war pretended, for a moment, that the garrisons and inhabitants of places taken by assault were not entitled to quarter, or that any rule of modern warfare justified the sacking of captured

¹ Sir Arthur Wellesley, writing to Lord Castlereagh in 1809, remarks that it is impossible to describe the irregularities and outrages committed by the British troops. He considers that there ought to be in the army a regular provost establishment. All the foreign armies have such an establishment. The French *gendarmerie nationale* are to the amount of forty or fifty with each corps. The Spaniards have their police militia to a still larger amount. 'While we,' says he, 'who require such an aid more, I am sorry to say, than any other nation of Europe, have nothing of the kind.' Nor to this day have any steps been taken by the British Government towards carrying out the above suggestion, with the exception of the appointment of a few men to assist the provost-marshal in barrack police duty, with a view to maintain order and regularity within the lines of a regiment.

Every corps may employ two or three steady soldiers to act as regimental police under the superintendence of the provost-sergeant, when they are to assist in the performance of his police duties. In a closed barrack three men are considered sufficient for this duty. The number is never to exceed six. It is part of the duty of the provost-sergeant, in addition to performing the police duties of the barracks, or of that part of the garrison in or near which the provost-prison is situated, to visit canteens in the neighbourhood, to interfere to prevent drunkenness or riot, to use his authority to suppress all irregularity, and to clear the barracks of any loose or disorderly characters. (Queen's Regulations for the Army, sect. 6, ss. 35 and 100.)

² Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. pp. 92, 93; Pinheiro Ferreira, *Notes sur Martens*, tome ii. note 77; Raquelme, *Derecho Púb. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. xii.

fortresses, and the pillage and murder of their inhabitants. And yet it would be difficult to find in the history of the most barbarous ages, scenes of drunkenness, lust, rapine, plunder, cruelty, murder, and ferocity equal to those which followed the captures of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian. The only excuse offered for these horrible atrocities was: 'The soldiers were not to be controlled!' Napier, the English historian of that war, says, in plain terms, 'That excuse will not suffice; for a young colonel of energetic spirit did constrain his men at Ciudad Rodrigo, to keep their ranks for a long time after the disorder commenced; but as no previous general measures had been taken, and no organised efforts made by *higher authorities*, the men were finally carried away in the increasing tumult.' 'It is said,' remarks the same author, 'that no soldier can be restrained after storming a town, and a British soldier least of all, because he is brutish and insensible of honour! Shame on such calumnies! * * Undoubtedly, if soldiers hear and read that it is impossible to restrain their violence, they will not be restrained. But let the plunder of a town, after an assault, be expressly made criminal by the articles of war, with a due punishment attached; let it be constantly impressed upon the troops that such conduct is as much opposed to military honour and discipline, as it is to morality; * * let instantaneous punishment—death if necessary—be inflicted for such offences. With such regulations, the storming of towns would not produce more military disorders than the gaining of battles in the field.'¹

§ 24. Fugitives and deserters, says Vattel, found by the victor among his enemies, are guilty of a crime against him, and he has an undoubted right to punish them, and even to put them to death. They are not properly considered as military enemies, nor can they claim to be treated as such; they are perfidious citizens, who have committed an offence against the State, and their enlistment with the enemy cannot obliterate that character, nor exempt them from the punishment they have deserved. They are not protected by any compact of war, as a truce, capitulation, cartel, etc., unless

¹ Napier, *Peninsular War*, book xxii. chap. ii.; Jomini, *l'Art Politique et Mil. de Napoleon*, chaps. xiv., xvii. Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, vol. iii. pp. 464, 470; vol. iv. p. 240. Southey, *Peninsular War*, vol. vi. p. 240. Helmas, *Stories, etc.* tome iv. pp. 279, 469, 3pp.; Jones, *War in Spain*, vol. ii. pp. 64, 76, 80; Thiers, *Consulat et l'Empire*, tome xiii. pp. 355, 375.

specially and particularly mentioned and provided for. They are not military enemies in the general meaning of that term, nor are they entitled to the rights of ordinary prisoners of war, either under the law of nations, or by the general terms of a special compact or agreement. But when stipulations of amnesty are introduced into such compacts, in such terms as to include such fugitives and deserters, by fair and proper indentment, good faith requires that all promises of this kind be honestly and fairly carried into effect. A violation of such agreements is infamous. Amnesties of this character are very common where the principal war is accompanied with insurrections and civil commotions, involving questions of personal duty and allegiance.¹

§ 25. In the operations of a war, the belligerent States not unfrequently adopt the *rule of reciprocity*, both with respect to the person and property of the enemy. Moreover, the same rule, as will be shown hereafter, is extended to neutrals. There is much justice and good sense in this rule, if confined within proper limits. As already remarked, modern usage has restricted many of the extreme rights of war, or, at least limited their exercise and application.² But this usage has not yet assumed the character of a *positive law*, and a belligerent will sometimes refuse to acknowledge its doctrines as fully established, or its rules as obligatory. In such a case, the opposing belligerent applies the rule of reciprocity, and metes out to his enemy the same measure of justice which he receives from him. Thus, if his enemy releases, on parole, prisoners of war, he does the same; if his enemy levies heavy contributions upon the conquered, he does the same; and if the enemy, exercising the extreme rights of war, seizes and destroys, or converts to his own use, public and private property, he retaliates by measures of the same character.³

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii. § 144; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 126; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. xiv.

² The Duke of Wellington writing to Sir H. Wellesley, 1810, says, 'Since I have commanded the troops in this country I have always treated the French officers and soldiers who have been made prisoners with the utmost humanity and attention; and in numerous instances I have saved their lives * * * I must do the French the justice to say that our officers and soldiers who fell into their hands have been universally well treated, and in recent instances the wounded prisoners of the British army have been taken care of before the wounded of the French army.'

³ Gardien, *De la Diplomatie*, liv. vi. § 9; the 'Santa Cruz,' i. *Rep. Rep.* p. 64.

§ 26. There is, however, a limit to this rule of reciprocity. If the enemy refuses to shape his conduct by the milder usages of war, and adopts the extreme and rigorous principles of former ages, we may do the same; but if he exceed these extreme rights, and becomes barbarous and cruel in his conduct, we cannot, as a general thing, follow and retort upon his subjects, by treating them in like manner. We cannot go beyond the limits prescribed by international law to the rights of belligerents. Thus, the conduct of Great Britain toward Denmark, in 1807, in condemning Danish vessels as droits of Admiralty, thereby exercising an extreme right of war, justified Denmark in resorting to the corresponding extreme right of sequestrating British debts due from Danish subjects. So, also, the sequestrating of English debts by France, in 1793, justified England in retaliating by a counter-vailing measure. Again, the seizure and condemnation of French vessels by Great Britain, in 1803, was an exercise of an ancient and severe rule of war, for which Napoleon retaliated by the exercise of another and still more extreme right, also contrary to the milder rules of modern usage, by seizing all English travellers in French territory.¹ But suppose an enemy should massacre all prisoners of war, this would not afford a sufficient justification for the opposing belligerent to do the same. Suppose our enemy should use poisoned weapons, or poison springs and food, the rule of reciprocity would not justify us in resorting to the same means of retaliation. A savage enemy might kill alike old men, women, and children, but no civilised power would resort to similar measures of cruelty and barbarism, under the plea that they were justified by the law of retaliation.²

¹ This was regarded by the British Government as a return to barbarism, who therefore refused to regard the *détenus* as prisoners lawfully captured. However, in 1811, Mr Yorke informed the House of Commons that it was the intention of Government that all military and naval prisoners should be first exchanged, and, as there would remain a great surplus of French prisoners, *it seemed a dictate of humanity to relieve the *détenus* by continuing the cartel for them, it being vain to urge the practice of modern warfare on the then French Government.*

² Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. i. § 2; Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, vol. ii. p. 270; Thiers, *Consulat et l'Empire*, liv. xvii.; Las Cases, *Mémoires de Napoléon*, vol. vii. pp. 32, 33; Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, tome ii. p. 16; Gardén, *De la Diplomatie*, liv. vi. § 9.

CHAPTER XXI.

ENEMY'S PROPERTY ON LAND.

1. General right of war as to enemy's property—2. Rules different for different kinds of property—3. The real property of a belligerent State—4. Title to such property acquired during war—5. Who may become purchasers—6. Purchase by neutral Governments—7. Movable property—8. Documentary evidence of debts—9. Public archives—10. Public libraries and works of art—11. Civil structures and monuments—12. Private property on land—13. Exceptions to rule of exemption—14. Penalty for illegal acts—15. Military contributions—16. War in the Spanish peninsula—17. Mexican war—18. Remarks on military pillage—19. Property taken on field of battle or in a siege—20. All booty primarily belongs to the State—21. Municipal laws respecting its distribution—22. Useless destruction of enemy's property—23. Laying waste a country—24. Rule of moderation—25. Questions of booty—26. Ancient courts of chivalry—27. English law respecting booty.

§ 1. IT has already been stated that war, when duly declared, or officially recognised, makes legal enemies of all the individual members of the hostile States; that it also extends to property, and gives to one belligerent the right to deprive the other of everything which might add to his strength, and enable him to carry on hostilities. But this general right is subject to numerous modifications and limitations which have been introduced by custom and the positive law of nations. Thus, although by the extreme right of war all property of an enemy is deemed hostile and subject to seizure, it by no means follows that all such property is subject to appropriation or condemnation, for the positive law of nations distinguishes not only between the property of the State and that of its individual subjects, but also between that of different classes of subjects, and between different kinds of property of the same subject; and particular rules, derived from usage and the practice of nations, have been established with respect to each. We shall confine our remarks, in this chapter, to enemy's property on land.¹

¹ Grotius, *De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. iv. § 8; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. ix. § 163; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 5.

§ 2. It will be hereafter shown that a firm possession is sufficient to establish the captor's title to personal or movable property captured on land, but that a different rule applies to immovables or real property; that a belligerent, who makes himself master of the provinces, towns, public lands, buildings, etc., of an enemy, has a perfect right to their possession and use, but that his ownership or dominion is not complete till his conquest is confirmed, in some one of the modes prescribed by the rules of international jurisprudence. In other words, the possession of real property by a belligerent gives him a right to its *use* and to its *products*, but not a completely valid and indefeasible title, with full power of alienation. The original owner is still entitled to the benefit of postliminy.

Polson, Law of Nations, sec. 6; *Wildman, Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 9; *Manning, Law of Nations*, pp. 172, et seq.; *Bello, Derecho Internacional*, p. ii. cap. iv. § 1; *Merlin, Répertoire, verb. Déclaration de Guerre*; *Heffter, Droit International*, §§ 130, 131; *Hauteville, Des Nations Neutres*, tit. vii. ch. 1; *Kent, Com. on Am. Law*, vol. 2, pp. 110, 111.

According to Grotius, every State has a strict right, on war breaking out between it and another State, to seize the property and the person of anyone belonging to the hostile State, should such property or individual chance to be on the territory of the former. But this harsh rule has been by degrees modified by various treaties, for example, that of Breda between Great Britain and the States General of the Netherlands, allowing the term of six months to the subjects of either party to transport their property; that of Utrecht between Great Britain and France, similar in effect; that of 1766 between Great Britain and Russia, re-enacted in the 12th article of the treaty of commerce between the same parties in 1797; and that of 1795 between Great Britain and the United States, limited to twelve years from the date thereof. But Emericson and later publicists consider modifying treaties as merely affirming the law of nations. Vattel says, that the sovereign who declares war can neither detain those subjects of the enemy who are within his dominions at the time of the declaration of war, nor their effects, for that by permitting them to enter his territories and continue there he tacitly promised them protection to return. Montesquieu notices that 'the Magna Charta of England forbids the seizing and confiscating, in case of war, the effects of foreign merchants, except by way of reprisals. It is an honour to the English nation that they have made this one of the articles of their liberty' (xx.—c. 14). But this enactment seems to have been restricted to the case of merchants absolutely domiciled in England. (*Hale, P.C.* 93.)

The 27 Edward III. c. 17, and 4 Henry V. c. 5, followed the spirit of Magna Charta, but in more definite and liberal terms. In 1854, at the commencement of the Crimean war, Lord Clarendon in answer to a despatch of Russian merchants declared that the Government was disposed to respect the persons and property of all Russian subjects residing as merchants in this country, to the full extent promised by the Emperor of Russia towards British subjects, and that all necessary measures would be adopted to enable them to remain unmolested in the quiet prosecution of their business.

In 1870, at the commencement of the Franco-Prussian war, France

§ 3. Some have asserted that the right of a belligerent to the property of an enemy, should be limited to movables, or such things as may be conveyed or carried away. It is argued that war being but a temporary relation of nations, their practices during such a condition of things should be regulated and limited by the temporary character of that relation; that, as real property must remain after the termination of the war, and may revert to its former owner by the *jus post-liminit*, it can properly never be alienated by the conqueror so long as the war continues. The force of this argument is not readily perceived. The necessity of self-preservation, and the right to punish an enemy, and to deprive him of the means of injuring us, by converting those means to our own use against him, lie at the foundation of the rule, and constitute the right of a belligerent to enemy's property of any kind; and it is difficult to see why this right should be restricted to a particular species of property—to cattle, horses, money, ships, goods—and not include lands or immovables.

decided that subjects of Prussia and of countries allied to her, who were actually in France or in French colonies, should be authorised to continue there as long as their conduct furnished no cause of complaint, but that Prussians and Prussian allies should only be admitted on to French territory in exceptional cases. (*Journal Officiel*, July 21, 1870.)

In the United States the liberal enactments of the Act of Congress, July 6, 1798, c. 66, concerning subjects of a hostile nation, were very considerably restricted by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *Brown v. The United States* (8 *Cranch*, 110), which held that war gives a sovereign full right to detain the person and to confiscate the property of an enemy, but that the exercise of this right in the United States depends on an Act of Congress. And see, the 'Emulous,' 1 *Gall.* 463.

The Germans in the war of 1870 seem to have regulated their conduct towards the French by German historical precedents, such as the invasions of 1792 and of 1814. If the campaign of 1870 was less harsh, it is to be accounted for, not from any modification of the German Law of war, but by the general softening of manners during the last half century. The war from a *military* point of view was conducted with all possible severity. Thus fortified towns—except in the case of Strasburg, where the attempt failed, and of Metz, where the system was impracticable—were reduced by the bombardment, not of the fortifications, but of the town itself. French writers before the war had declared that it would be the duty of French commanders to bombard the civil and commercial quarters of the fortified towns (*Le Spectateur Militaire*, July, 1867), and the French themselves followed the example by bombarding Paris during the Commune, 1871. (Edwards, *Germans in France*.)

A prospectus of the Société Réparatrice de l'Invasion, assuring against requisitions, pillage, and incendiarism, was circulated in Normandy. On the Prussian side, a syndicate of bankers was formed for advancing money to towns unable to meet requisitions and contributions. Four million francs were advanced to Nancy through this channel. (*Ibid.*)

We think, therefore, that by the just rules of war, the conqueror has the same right to use or alienate the public domain of the conquered or displaced Government, as he has to use or alienate its movable property. This principle, we believe to be recognised and sustained by the general law of nations.¹

§ 4. It must not, however, be inferred that the title which the purchaser acquires to the two species of property is the same. On the contrary, it is essentially different. The purchaser of movable property captured on land, acquires a perfect title as soon as the property is in the firm possession of the captor; and the title to a maritime capture is complete when carried *infra praesidia*, or at least after the sentence of a competent court of prize.² But the purchase of any portion of the national domain of a conquered country, takes it at the risk of being evicted by the original sovereign owner, if he should be restored to the possession of his dominions. But if such restoration should not take place, and the title of the conqueror should be confirmed by some one of the modes recognised by international law, the title of the purchaser is then made perfect. It was, before, a good and valid title against all except the original sovereign owner, under the *jus postliminii*, which right is completely extinguished by a confirmation of the conquest. The conqueror cannot, of course, deny his own act, and attempt the recovery of property which he has already alienated, on the ground that the formal cession or confirmation gives him a new title. He sold the title which he acquired by the rights of conquest; a treaty of peace gives him no other title; it simply confirms that which he already had, by depriving the former sovereign owner of the benefit of postliminy, and thus extinguishing an older adverse outstanding title.³

§ 5. A question here arises as to who may become the purchasers of immovable property alienated by the conqueror

¹ Klüber, *Droit des Gens Mod.*, §§ 250-3. Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, §§ 279-282. Bynkershoek, *Quaest. Jur. Pub.*, lib. I. cap. vi; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 90; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. I. tit. I. cap. xii. Lambert, *Annales Pol. et Dip.*, introd. p. 115; Kampts, *Leitfaden des Völkerrecht*, § 307.

² But as a matter of practice, dominion over ships of war captured on the high seas, is necessarily often exercised *instantaneè*, e.g., the ship is destroyed or is equipped for war. This practice came under consideration in the case of the 'Fuscalosa' and of the 'Alabama.'

³ See chapters xxxiii., xxxiv., xxxv.

during military occupation, and prior to the confirmation of the conquest. The object of such alienation is, as already stated, to weaken the enemy, and to supply ourselves with the means of carrying on the war. It is evident, therefore, that the subjects of the conquered or displaced Government cannot, consistently with their duties to their own sovereign, become such purchasers. They have no right to voluntarily supply us with means for carrying on war against the Government to which they owe allegiance. By making such purchases they not only risk the loss of their purchase money on the restoration of the original sovereign to his dominions, but they expose themselves to be punished by their own Government for voluntarily furnishing the enemy with the means of prolonging the war.¹ If, however, they are inhabitants of the conquered territory, and their allegiance should be transferred to the new Government by the confirmation of the conquest, their title would thereby be made valid, and they themselves be free from the risk of punishment for having paid the purchase money. Subjects of the conqueror may become purchasers with no other risk than that of being evicted by the original owner on the restoration or recapture of the real property so alienated. The same may be said of foreigners, or the subjects of a neutral State. Such purchase might, however, in some cases, be deemed a hostile act, and not within the limits of legitimate trade, and not consistent with the character of neutrality, and, therefore, attach to the purchaser the character of an enemy to the displaced or conquered Power, in so much as pecuniary assistance is rendered by the purchase money paid.²

§ 6. Whether a neutral may make such purchases and not become a party to the war, will depend upon the character of the assistance which, by the purchase, is afforded to the conqueror, to the injury of the opposing belligerent. It is certain that if he should attempt to possess himself

¹ The French Government have lately tried some of their subjects for this offence.

By parity of reasoning the American Courts have decided that a policy of insurance which indemnifies an enemy against loss in time of war is unlawful, and that where entered into before hostilities it is abrogated when they occur. (*Tait v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co.*, 19 *Int. Rev. Rec.* 14.)

² ? Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 17; Burlamaqui, *Droit de l'Aut. et des Gens*, tome v. pt. iv. ch. vii.

during the continuance of the war, of the lands so purchased, or to maintain the title so acquired, after the restoration or recapture of the property so alienated, he would assume a hostile attitude toward the original sovereign owner and make himself a party to the war. 'A third party,' says Vattel, 'cannot safely purchase a conquered town or province, till the sovereign, from whom it was taken, has renounced it by a treaty of peace, or has been irretrievably subdued, or has lost his sovereignty: for, while the war continues,—whilst the sovereign has still hopes of recovering his possessions by arms,—is a neutral prince to come and deprive him of that opportunity, by purchasing that town or province from the conqueror? The original proprietor cannot forfeit his rights by the act of a third Power; and if the purchaser be determined to maintain his purchase, he will find himself involved in the war. Thus, the King of Prussia became a party with the enemies of Sweden, by receiving Stettin from the hands of the King of Poland and the Czar, under the title of sequestration. But when a sovereign has, by a definitive treaty of peace, ceded a country to a conqueror, he has relinquished all the right which he had to it; and it would be absurd for him to be allowed to demand the restitution from a subsequent conqueror who wrests it from the former, or from any other prince who has purchased it, or received it in exchange, or acquired it by any title whatsoever.'¹

§ 7. All implements of war, military and naval stores, and in general, all *movable* property, belonging to the hostile State, is subject to be seized and appropriated to the use of the captor. And the title to such personal or movable property is considered as lost to the original proprietor, as soon as the captor has acquired a firm possession; which, as a general rule, is considered as taking place after the lapse of twenty-four hours; so that, immediately after the expiration of that time, it may be alienated to neutrals as indefeasible property.²

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. xiii. § 198; *Treaty of Schwat*, Oct. 6, 1713.

² Where property of a citizen of an insurgent State was seized as an act of war by the officer commanding the troops of the United States in that State, and the captor, after acquiring firm possession of the property, sold it to a third person, it was held that the title of the hostile owner was extinct, at least as against the purchaser. *Coolidge v. Guthrie*, 8 *Am. L. Reg.*, U.S. 22. Capture as prize of war overrides all previous claims. 'The Battle,' 6 *Wall.* 498.

But, with respect to maritime captures, a more absolute or certain species of possession is required the original title not being, by some, considered as completely divested, until regularly condemned in a competent court of prize. But this branch of the subject will be particularly discussed in another place ; we are here considering only the capture of enemy's property on land.

§ 8. We have discussed in a former chapter the right of a belligerent State to confiscate, on the declaration of war, debts owing by its Government, or by its subjects, to subjects of the enemy. We will now consider the right to *capture* them as the property of the enemy, found in hostile territory, by capturing the *documents* which constitute the evidence of such debts. It will be observed that this question is entirely distinct from the right to confiscate a debt, *ipso facto*, by the declaration of war. We have an example from classical history. When Alexander took the city of Thebes, he found an instrument by which it was shown that the Thessalians, who served with him, owed the Thebans an hundred talents. This instrument he gave to the Thessalians as a cancellation of their debt. On the restoration of the Thebans, they demanded the payment of the debt as still due and owing them. The case was referred to the Amphictyonic Council, and their decision is understood to have been in favour of the Thessalians. Quintilian makes a number of objections to the validity of the *gift*, by Alexander, and offers some important arguments in favour of the demand of the Thebans. To all of these objections and arguments, Puffendorf suggests answers, and opposes the demand, on the following grounds : 1st, that the seizure, being made in solemn war, was a just one ; 2nd, that the right acquired by war, to a thing taken in war, is a valid title, and must be so regarded in civil law ; 3rd, that the restoration not being provided for in the treaty of peace, everything is left to the possessor as his own ; 4th, that in capturing Thebes, Alexander captured the action of debt due to Thebes, which he might either retain himself or transfer to another ; 5th, that the conquest destroyed the former body politic of Thebes, and the new commonwealth established by Cassander did not succeed to the rights of the one destroyed by Alexander ; and 6th, that the Thessalians had obtained the instrument in no unjust manner, it having

been given to them by one who had obtained it by the right of conquest. Jurists have generally sustained the supposed decision of the Amphictyons, on the ground of the complete conquest of Thebes, and that Alexander became the universal successor of the conquered State, but not on the ground of the mere capture of the documentary evidence of the debt. The instruments cannot be regarded as the debt, because a creditor may recover his debt, though the instruments be lost or destroyed; they are means, but not the only means of proving that it exists. It is, therefore, held that the mere fact of the conqueror possessing himself of the documents, relating to incorporeal rights, does not give to him the possession of the rights themselves; and as his rights, as derived from military force, are simply those of possession, it is not competent for him to bestow upon, or transfer to another, what he cannot physically take possession of himself.¹

§ 9. There is one species of movable property belonging to a belligerent State which is exempt, not only from plunder and destruction, but also from capture and conversion, viz.: State papers, public archives, historical records, judicial and legal documents, land titles, etc., etc. While the enemy is in possession of a town or province, he has a right to hold such papers and records, and to use them in regulating the government of his conquest; but if this conquest is recovered by the original owner during the war, or surrendered to him by the treaty of peace, they should be returned to the authorities from whom they were taken, or to their successors. Such documents adhere to the Government of the place or territory to which they belong, and should always be transferred with it. None but a barbarous and uncivilised enemy would ever think of destroying or withholding them. The reasons of this rule are manifest. Their destruction would not operate to promote, in any respect, the object of the war, but, on the contrary, would produce an animosity and irritation which would extend *beyond* the war. It would inflict an unnecessary injury upon the conquered without

¹ Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* lib. v. cap. x; Puffendorf, *de Juv. Nat. et Gent.* lib. viii. cap. vi. § 23; Pfeiffer, *Das Recht der Kriegseroberung*, pp. 165-180; Brumleger, *Diss. de Occupatione Bellua*, p. 38; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 561, 562; Heffter, *Prost. International*, § 134; Schenk, *Napoleon und der Krieg*, pp. 74, 82; Tittman, *Ueber den Bund der Amp.*, p. 135.

any benefit to the conqueror. Moreover, such archives, records, and papers, often constitute the basis and evidence of private property, and their destruction would be a useless destruction of private property; in other words, it would be an injury done in war beyond the necessity of war, and therefore, illegal, barbarous, and cruel. The same reasons apply to carrying them off and withholding them from their proper owners and legitimate use.¹

§ 10. Some have contended that the same rule applies to public libraries and to all monuments of art and models of taste. But there is an obvious distinction in the two cases. No belligerent would be justifiable in destroying temples, tombs, statues, paintings, or other works of art (except so far as their destruction may be the accidental or necessary result of military operations). But, may he not seize and appropriate to his own use such works of genius and taste as belong to the hostile State, and are of a movable character? This was done by the French armies in the wars of conquest which followed the revolution of 1789. The practice was condemned by the English writers of that age, but this condemnation seemed rather the result of national prejudice than sound reasoning. The acquisitions of the Parisian galleries and museums from the conquest of Italy were generally obtained by means of treaty stipulations, or forced contributions levied by Napoleon on the Italian princes. They are equally condemned by the English historians. It should be remembered that but few of the masterpieces taken from Italy were in their original places, or in the possession of their original owners. We need hardly mention the Apollo Belvidere, the Dying Gladiator, the Venus, the Laocoon, the Bronze Horses, etc. Major Henry Lee, an American writer of great ability, discusses this question in his 'Life of Napoleon,' and deems these forced contributions as not only justifiable by the laws of war, but as highly creditable to the conqueror, as adding grace and refinement to the warfare, and as reflecting lustre on the French arms, by harmonising the rudeness of military fame with the softer glories of taste and imagination. It is proper to remark, however, that other distinguished and impartial writers dissent from the forego-

¹ Real, *Science du Gouvernement*, tome v. ch. ii.; Leibet, *Political Ethics*, p. vii. § 25; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. iv. § 6.

ing opinion, and regard this species of military contribution as an abuse of the power of conquest, and contrary to the usages of modern civilised warfare. On the invasion of France, in 1815, the pictures, statues, and other monuments of art, collected from other countries, as spoils of war, or acquired under treaties, were seized and distributed among the allies. In the debate in the British House of Commons, February 20th, 1816, Sir Samuel Romilly, speaking incidentally of this proceeding, stated, that 'it was not true that the works of art, deposited in the museum of the Louvre, had all been carried away as the spoils of war; many, and the most valuable of them, had become the property of France, by express treaty stipulations; and it was no answer to say, that these treaties had been made necessary by unjust aggressions and unprincipled wars, because there would be an end of all faith between nations, if treaties were to be held not to be binding, because the wars out of which they arose were unjust, especially as there could be no competent judge to decide upon the justice of the war, but the nation itself. By whom, too, was it that this supposed act of justice, and this "great moral lesson," as it was called, had been read? By the very Powers who had, at different times, abetted France in these, her unjust wars! Among other articles carried from Paris, under the pretence of restoring them to their rightful owners, were the celebrated Corinthian Horses which had been brought from Venice; but how strange an act of justice was this to give them back their statues, but not to restore to them those far more valuable possessions, their territory and their republic, which were, at the same time, wrested from the Venetians? But the reason of this was obvious: the city and territory of Venice had been transferred to Austria by the treaty of Campo Formio, but the horses had remained the trophy of France; and Austria, whilst she was thus hypocritically reading this moral lesson to nations, not only quietly retained the rich and unjust spoils she had got, but restored these splendid works of art, not to Venice, which had been despoiled of them, the ancient, independent, republican Venice, but to Austrian Venice,—to that country which, in defiance of all the principles which she pretended to be acting on, she still retained as a part of her own dominions.' On an examination of all that has been said and written on this subject, and weighing all the circumstances connected

with the formation and spoliation of the rich museum of the Louvre, we think the impartial judge must conclude, either that such works of art are legitimate trophies of war, or, that the conduct of the allied Powers, in 1815, was in direct violation of the law of nations. It is impossible to avoid one or the other conclusion.¹

§ 11. But whatever may be the decision of the question respecting the right of the conqueror to seize or levy upon such works of art and taste, belonging to the hostile State, as come under the denomination of movable or personal property, it is the modern usage, and one which has acquired the force of law, that such works cannot be wantonly, or unnecessarily, destroyed, and that all structures of a civil character, all public edifices, devoted to civil purposes only, all temples

¹ Assuming that these objects of art were seized by Buonaparte, contrary to the law of nations, it is not so clear that the allied Powers violated that law in restoring the same objects to those people to whom they formed a proud inheritance. The objects were not the fruit of French industry, nor, on the above assumption, were they rightly the property of the French nation. The allied armies entered Paris under a military convention (July 3, 1815, which they had concluded with officers of the existing Government. Article 11 of that convention determines that, 'Les propriétés publiques, à l'exception de celles qui ont rapport à la guerre, soit qu'elles appartiennent au Gouvernement, soit qu'elles dépendent de l'autorité municipale, seront respectées, et les Puissances alliées n'interviendront en aucune manière dans leur administration et gestion.' The Duke of Wellington says (*Dispatch*, July 1815), 'I positively deny that this article referred to all to the museums or galleries of pictures.' The French commissioners in the original draft had proposed to provide for this description of property, but Prince Blücher would not consent to do so, as he said there were pictures in the gallery which had been taken from Prussia. It was finally agreed between all parties that the question of the museums and objects of art should be reserved for the decision of the allied monarchs when they should arrive in Paris. The Duke of Wellington refers to this; writing to Blücher to prevent the destruction of the Bridge of Jena, contemplated by the latter, he says, 'Considering the bridge as a monument, I beg leave to observe that its immediate destruction is inconsistent with the promise made to the commissioners during the negotiations of the convention, viz. that the monuments, museums, &c., should be reserved for the decision of the allied sovereigns. Evidently the commissioners considered that the allied army had a right to the contents of the museum, and they made an attempt to save them by an article in the convention. The claim of the allies, through the rejection of the article, was broadly advanced. No works of native industry were demanded or seized by them. It was not a question of the allied Powers being at war with France. Acting as the police of Europe, they caused restoration of certain works of art that had been acquired contrary to international law. There is an obvious difference between despoiling the traveller, and searching the thief who has despoiled him. But who is to distinguish the thief from the captor? That is a grave difficulty, and one evidently felt by Sir Samuel Romilly.

of religion, monuments of art, and repositories of science, are to be exempt from the operations of war. 'If the conqueror,' says Kent, 'makes war upon monuments of art and models of taste, he violates the modern usages of war, and is sure to meet with indignant resentment, and to be held up to the general scorn and detestation of the world.' As examples under this head, we may refer to the conduct of the British forces, in 1814, in destroying the capitol, president's house, and other civil public buildings, and the naval monument at Washington,¹ and that of Blucher, in 1815, in destroying the ornamental trees of Paris, and planning² the destruction of the Bridge of Jena, and the Pillar of Austerlitz.³

¹ It is to be regretted that this event affords an example of the violation of two prime principles of the laws of war: 1. That private or non military buildings be respected. 2. That the efforts of commanders be employed to lessen the calamities of warfare, and that the exertions of belligerents be not directed against unoffending individuals. The naval arsenal, and a house from whence the British troops were fired upon, after they were supposed to be in quiet possession of the city) were destroyed, and such destruction is justifiable, but the destruction of the civil public buildings can only be defended (if at all) on the ground of reprisal; the Americans in the middle of December had set fire to a town in Canada, and had thereby driven the inhabitants into the open country amidst all the severities of a Canadian winter; moreover, on another occasion, when York, the capital of Upper Canada, was in their occupation, they had burnt the public buildings and taken possession of the private property of the governor.

² The demolition of the Bridge of Jena was stopped by order of the Emperor Alexander, after the Duke of Wellington had in vain interposed.

³ Pothon, *Laws of Nations*, sec. 6; Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 11; *American State Papers*, vol. iii. pp. 693, 694; Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. xxx. pp. 526, 527; Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, vol. iv. p. 544. Requele, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. xii.

For other examples concerning structures of a civil character, we may mention that, in 1799, General Brune declared to the Duke of York that it would be contrary to the laws of war for the latter to destroy the dykes in Holland and inundate that country, if such act would not be beneficial to his own forces or detrimental to those of the enemy.

Again, in 1815, the British soldiers were forbidden to cut the trees which formed the avenues in the Bois de Boulogne, or even to tie their horses to them. (Wellington, *Despatches* &c.)

But in 1870, the Prussians considering that the operations of a siege could not fail to occupy some weeks, essayed the plan of 'simple bombardment' on Strasburg, a rich and populous city, with a feeble garrison; knowing that it would have to defend itself on the ramparts in open batteries, and they thought that such bombardment might force the inhabitants to induce the Commandant to surrender. A bombardment was kept up relentlessly for two days, during which time the famous Library and Picture Gallery and other public buildings were destroyed. The roof of the Cathedral was burnt, and the cross on the tower struck by a shell. But as this bombardment did not have the expected result, the Prussians commenced the regular siege operations, and thereupon spared

§ 12. Private property on land is now, as a general rule of war, exempt from seizure or confiscation; and this general exemption extends even to cases of absolute and unqualified conquest. Even where the conquest of a country is confirmed by the unconditional relinquishment of sovereignty by the former owner, there can be no general or partial transmutation of private property, in virtue of any rights of conquest. That which belonged to the Government of the vanquished, passes to the victorious State, which also takes the place of the former sovereign, in respect to the right of eminent domain; but private rights, and private property, both movable and immovable, are, in general, unaffected by the operations of a war, whether such operations be limited to mere military occupation, or extend to complete conquest. Some modern text-writers—Hautefeuille, for example,—contend for the ancient rule, that private property on land is subject to seizure and confiscation. They are undoubtedly correct with respect to the general *abstract right*, as deduced from the law of nature and ancient practice; but while the general right continues, modern usage, and the opinions of modern text-writers of the highest authority, have limited this right by establishing the rule of general exemption. The private property of a sovereign is considered in the same light as that of any other individual.¹

§ 13. But it must also be remembered that there are many exceptions to this rule, or rather, that the rule itself is not, by any means, absolute or universal.² The general theory of war is, as heretofore stated, that all private property may be taken by the conqueror, and such was the ancient practice.

the town itself as much as possible. Even then they shelled one of the towers of the Cathedral, on which the French had established an observatory. (Edwards, *Germans in France*.)

¹ Puffendorf, *de Jure Nat. et Gent.*, lib. viii. ch. vi. § 20; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 133; Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, § 282; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. vii. ch. i.

² The Franco-Austrian campaign, 1859, affords an example of the manner in which war may be carried on without causing ruin to the surrounding country. 'Preserve,' said Napoleon III., when addressing his troops, 'that strict discipline which is the honour of the army. Here—forget it not—there are no other enemies than those who fight against you in battle;' and well was that order obeyed. On the other hand, during the American Civil War, General Sherman on his memorable march to the sea through the Gulf States in 1864, seized private property as booty, and devastated the whole country through which he passed. This act doubtlessly accelerated peace in a very material degree.

But the modern usage is, not to touch private property on land, without making compensation, except in certain specified cases. These exceptions may be stated under three general heads: 1st, confiscations or seizures by way of penalty for military offences; 2nd, forced contributions for the support of the invading armies, or as an indemnity for the expenses of maintaining order, and affording protection to the conquered inhabitants; and 3rd, property taken on the field of battle, or in storming a fortress or town.

§ 14. In the *first* place, we may seize upon private property, by way of penalty for the illegal acts of individuals, or of the community to which they belong. Thus, if an individual be guilty of conduct in violation of the laws of war, we may seize and confiscate the private property of the offender. So also, if the offence attach itself to a particular community or town, all the individuals of that community or town are liable to punishment, and we may either seize upon their property, or levy upon them a retaliatory contribution, by way of penalty. Where, however, we can discover and secure the individuals so offending, it is more just to inflict the punishment upon them only; but it is a general law of war, that communities are accountable for the acts of their individual members. This makes it the interest of all to discover the guilty persons, and to deliver them up to justice. But if these individuals are not given up, or cannot be discovered, it is usual to impose a contribution upon the civil authorities of the place where the offence is committed, and these authorities raise the amount of the contribution by a tax levied upon their constituents.¹

§ 15. In the *second* place we have a right to make the enemy's country contribute to the expenses of the war. Troops, in the enemy's country, may be subsisted either by

¹ In 1870 the Germans levied contributions in money on many towns of France, the principle adopted by them, apparently, being that towns offering resistance, or throwing obstacles in the way of the invaders, were heavily fined, while peaceful towns were held exempt. Thus Dieppe was fined 10000*l.* for a few shots fired from a French steamer at some Prussians. Nevertheless, some towns which had offered resistance, but which had been severely bombarded, such as Strasburg and Péronne, were spared. Edwards, *the Germans in France*. There is no doubt but that the Germans were justified in levying a fine on Dieppe, but the principle of punishing an invaded town for its resistance if the conclusion of the above writer be correct) is inconsistent with the rules of civilisation. See chap. xx., § 21.

regular magazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorised pillage. It is not always politic, or even possible, to provide regular magazines for the entire supplies of an army during the active operations of a campaign. Where this cannot be done, the general is obliged either to resort to military requisitions, or to entrust their subsistence to the troops themselves. The inevitable consequences of the latter system are universal pillage, and a total relaxation of discipline; the loss of private property, and the violation of individual rights, are usually followed by the massacre of straggling parties, and the ordinary peaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and implacable enemies. The system is, therefore, regarded as both impolitic and unjust, and is coming into general disuse among the most civilised nations—at least for the support of the main army. In case of small detachments, where great rapidity of motion is requisite, it sometimes becomes necessary for the troops to procure their subsistence wherever they can. In such a case, the seizure of private property becomes a necessary consequence of the military operations, and is, therefore, unavoidable. Other cases, of similar character, might be mentioned. But even in most of these special and extreme cases, provisions might be made for subsequently compensating the owners for the loss of their property.¹

§ 16. In the invasion of the Spanish peninsula, Napoleon had to choose between methodical operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army, or purchased of the inhabitants, and regularly paid for, and irregular warfare, supplying his troops by forced requisitions and pillage. The former was adopted for some of the main armies, moving on prescribed lines, and the latter for the more active masses. Soult and Suchet, in favourable parts of the country, succeeded for a considerable length of time, in procuring regular supplies for their armies, but most of the French generals obtained subsistence for their troops mainly by pillage. Napoleon, at St. Helena, attributed most of his disasters to the animosities thus created among the Spanish people.²

¹ Jomini, *Tableau Analytique*, ch. ii. sec. 1, art. xiii; Halleck, *Elem. Mil. Art and Science*, ch. iv. pp. 90, 91; Scott, *General Orders*, No. 358, November 25, 1847; *Ibid.* No. 395, December 31, 1847.

² Napoleon, *Memoirs of St. Helena*.

On the principle that wars should be made to pay for themselves—

§ 17. Upon the invasion of Mexico by the armies of the United States, in 1846, the commanding generals were, at first, instructed to abstain from appropriating private property to the public use without purchase, at a fair price, but

a principle which Vattel supports—Bonaparte tried to save France from fresh taxes by making large requisitions on the enemy. In 1806, after the battle of Jena, he caused Prussia to pay upwards of a hundred million francs. After Suchet's conquest of Valencia in 1812 that country was forced to pay fifty thousand francs, together with an additional two hundred million francs for the use of the army.

The Duke of Wellington, on the other hand, was adverse to requisitions, both when he was in the Peninsula and when he was in France, although they could not always be avoided. After the battle of Waterloo his army received their provisions and forage by requisition on the country, but in every case upon regular receipts by the commissioners attached to his troops; this was done not with the view of paying for what had been received, but in order to avoid abuse and plunder, and to restrict the requisition to food and forage only—both strict necessities. (*Wellington's Despatches*, 1815.)

Although requisitions are permissible, they are demoralising, and leave a sting in the memory of the inhabitants who have been forced to contribute. During the Franco-German war, 1870, the French sometimes took away the municipal papers of a town in order that, should the town fall into the hands of the enemy, the latter might not be able to ascertain the taxation, or, consequently, be able to know how large a requisition the town might bear. (*Russell, Diary of last War.*) The Prussians on entering French towns or villages billeted their troops on the inhabitants, writing in chalk on the door of each house the number of soldiers to be provided for within. When there was time for doing things in an orderly manner, requisitions were addressed to the mayor, and by him given out to private individuals; it was for the person executing the requisitions to obtain payment from the mayor, who generally did pay in whole or in part out of the local funds, looking, on behalf of his commune, to the State for future indemnification. Requisitions were issued for every imaginable thing. Horseshoes were constantly the object of requisitions, and on the great lines of march blacksmiths were everywhere impressed into the Prussian service.

According to Bluntschli, invaders are entitled to claim from the invaded, lodging, food, and drink, fuel, clothing and carriage. The Prussians did not, as a rule, call upon the enemy to provide clothing for them, although a quantity of cloth was requisitioned at Elberfeld, Louviers, and other towns; boots and socks were sometimes requisitioned, and late in the campaign, horses were very frequently demanded. In theory nothing was taken for which a receipt was not given, but this rule often broke down in practice.

An idea got abroad that the Germans would, on the conclusion of peace, redeem the requisition papers. This supposition may have had its origin in the fact that during the invasion of 1792 the requisitions issued by the Duke of Brunswick were in the name of Louis XVI., and not, as during the above war, in that of German Generals, or of Commanders of detached corps. These officials alone possessed the right to issue requisitions. (*Edwards, Germans in France.*)

The requisitions, made daily, by the Germans, while in occupation of Versailles, were as follows:—120,000 loaves of bread, 80,000 pounds of meat, 90,000 pounds of oats, 27,000 pounds of rice, 7,000 pounds of roasted coffee, 4,000 pounds of salt, 20,000 litres of wine, and 500,000

subsequently, instructions of a severer character were issued. It was said by the American Secretary of War (Mr. Marcy) that an invading army had the unquestionable right to draw its supplies from the enemy without paying for them, and to require contributions for its support, and to make the enemy feel the weight of the war. He further observed, that upon the liberal principles of civilised warfare, either of three modes might be pursued to obtain supplies from the enemy: *first*, to purchase them in open market at such prices as the inhabitants of the country might choose to exact; *second*, to pay the owners a fair price, without regard to what they themselves might demand, on account of the enhanced value resulting from the presence of a foreign army; and, *third*, to

seize them. Other requisitions were made as required. In theory none was to be made unless the demand was in writing, but the French complain that verbal requisitions were often made. Further, they say that although every written demand should have borne the *visa* of the German General commanding the place, the *visa* was not placed on by him, but at his office, by under-officers or soldiers. These granted it to the first comer, and thereby a great disadvantage was caused to the invaded, for every refusal to comply with a requisition became, not a refusal to the bearer, but a refusal to the Commander-in-Chief. (Deleury, *Versailles*.) Requisitions were also levied by the French troops on their own countrymen. Edwards (*Germany in France*) gives an example of this. Five places in the department of the Orne claimed 11,000 francs for requisitions levied on them by *francs-tireurs* in a regular manner, and 16,000 francs for requisitions levied in an 'irregular' manner.

The Brussels Conference, 1874, declares:—Art. 40. As private property should be respected, the enemy will demand from parishes (*communes*) on the inhabitants, only such payments and services as are connected with the necessities of war generally acknowledged in proportion to the resources of the country, and which do not imply, with regard to the inhabitants, the obligation of taking part in the operations of war against their own country. Art. 41. The enemy, in levying contributions, whether as equivalents for taxes (*vide* Art. 5), or for payments which should be made in kind, or as fines, will proceed, as far as possible, according to the rules of the distribution and assessment of the taxes in force in the occupied territory. The civil authorities of the legal Government will afford their assistance if they have remained in office. Contributions can be imposed only on the order and on the responsibility of the General-in-Chief, or of the superior civil authority established by the enemy in the occupied territory. For every contribution a receipt shall be given to the person furnishing it. Art. 42. Requisitions shall be made only by the authority of the commandant of the locality occupied. For every requisition an indemnity shall be granted, or a receipt given.

In a march of twenty-two miles in an enemy's territory in the *Isle de la Passe*, the British, under Captain Willoughby, abstained from pillaging the least article of property. Even the sugar and coffee land aside for exportation, and usually considered as legitimate objects of seizure, remained untouched, and the invaders when they quitted the shore for their ship, left behind them not merely a high character for gallantry but also for rigid adherence to promises. James, *Nav. Hist.*, vol. v. 278.

require them, as contributions, without paying, or engaging to pay therefor. The last mode was, thereafter, to be adopted, if the general was satisfied that in that way he could get abundant supplies for his forces. There can be no doubt of the correctness of the rules of war, as here announced by the American secretary, but the resort to forced contributions for the support of our armies in a country like Mexico, under the particular circumstances of the war, would have been, at least, impolitic, if not unjust, and the American generals very properly declined to adopt, except to a very limited extent, the mode indicated. It would undoubtedly have led to innumerable insurrections and massacres, without any corresponding advantages in obtaining supplies for the American forces.¹

§ 18. The evils resulting from irregular requisitions and foraging for the ordinary supplies of an army, are so very great and so generally admitted, that it has become a recognised maxim of war, that the commanding officer who permits indiscriminate pillage, and allows the taking of private property without a strict accountability, whether he be engaged in offensive or defensive operations, fails in his duty to his own Government, and violates the usages of modern warfare. It is sometimes alleged, in excuse for such conduct, that the general is unable to restrain his troops; but in the eyes of the law, there is no excuse; for he who cannot preserve order in his army, has no right to command it. In collecting military contributions, trustworthy troops should always be sent with the foragers, to prevent them from engaging in irregular and unauthorised pillage; and the

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. 1. p. 92; Mr. Marcy's *Letter to Gen. Taylor*, Sept. 22, 1846; To *Gen. Scott*, April 3, 1847; *Cong. Doc.*, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., *Senate Ex. Doc.*, No. 1, p. 563; *Scott to Marcy*, May 20, 1847; *Cong. Doc.*, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., *H. R., Ex. Doc.* No. 60, p. 963; *Mason to Gen. Scott*, Sept. 1, 1847; *Marcy to Gen. Scott*, Oct. 6, 1847; *Cong. Doc.*, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., *H. R., Ex. Doc.*, No. 56, pp. 195-7; *Scott, Gen. Orders*, No. 358, Nov. 25, 1847; *Ibid.* No. 395; Dec. 31, 1847.

General Scott wrote as follows, May 20, 1847: 'If it be expected at Washington, as is now apprehended, that the army is to support itself by forced contributions levied upon the country, we may ruin and exasperate the inhabitants and starve ourselves; for it is certain they would sooner remove or destroy the products of their farms than allow them to fall into our hands without compensation. Not a ration for man or horse would be brought in except by the bayonet, which would oblige the troops to spread themselves out many leagues to the right and left in search of subsistence, and to stop all military operations.'

party should always be accompanied by officers of the staff and administrative corps, to see to the proper execution of the orders, and to report any irregularities on the part of the troops. In case any corps should engage in unauthorised pillage, due restitution should be made to the inhabitants, and the expenses of such restitution deducted from the pay and allowances of the corps by which such excess is committed. A few examples of such summary justice soon restores discipline to the army, and pacifies the inhabitants of the country or territory so occupied. But modify and restrict it as you will, the system of subsisting armies on the private property of an enemy's subjects, without compensation, is very objectionable, and almost inevitably leads to cruel and disastrous results. There is, therefore, very seldom a sufficient excuse for resorting to it. If, however, the general be left without the means of support, or if the nature of his operations prevent his carrying subsistence in the train of his army, or of purchasing it in the country passed over, his conduct becomes the result of necessity, and the responsibility of his acts rests upon the Government of his State, which has failed to make proper provisions for the support of his troops, or which has required of him services which cannot be performed without injury and oppression to the inhabitants of the hostile country.¹

§ 19. In the *third* place, private property taken from the enemy on the field of battle, in the operations of a siege, or in the storming of a place which refuses to capitulate, is usually regarded as legitimate spoils of war. The *right* to private property, taken in such cases, must be distinguished from the *right* to permit the unrestricted sacking of private houses, the promiscuous pillage of private property, and the murder of unresisting inhabitants, incident to the authorised

¹ Manning, *Law of Nations*, p. 136; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. vi. ch. ix. § 165; Moser, *Beitrage*, etc., b. iii. § 256; Isambert, *Annales Polit. et Dip. Int.*, p. 115.

During the occupation of Versailles by the Germans in 1870, the French mayor made frequent complaints to the Prussian Commanding-General that many acts of violence were committed by the German soldiers, such as breaking into private houses and plundering or destroying the furniture, especially the clocks. In the populous part of the town order was tolerably well maintained, but not so in the outskirts. These complaints do not appear to have obtained any favourable result (Delerot, *Versailles*.)

or permitted sacking of a town taken by storm, as described in the preceding chapter. In other words, we must distinguish between the *title* to property acquired by the laws of war, and the *accidental circumstances* accompanying the acquisition. Thus, the right of prize in maritime captures, and of land in conquests, may be good and valid titles, although such acquisitions are sometimes attended with cruelty and outrage on the part of the captors and conquerors. So with respect to the right of booty acquired in battle or assault: the acquisition may be valid by the laws of war, although other laws of the same code may have been violated by the general or his soldiers in the operations of the campaign or siege.¹

§ 20. Towns, forts, lands, and all immovable property taken from an enemy, are called *conquests*; while captures made on the high seas are called *maritime prizes*; but all movables taken on land come under the denomination of *booty*. All captures in war, whether conquests, prizes, or booty, naturally belong to the State in whose name, and by whose authority they are made. It alone has such claims against the enemy as will authorise the seizure and conversion of his property; the military forces who make the seizures are merely the instruments of the State, employed for this purpose; they do not act on their individual responsibility, or for their individual benefit. They, therefore, have no other claim to the booty or prizes which they may take, than their Government may see fit to allow them. The amount of this allowance is fixed by the municipal laws of each State, and is different in different countries.²

§ 21. Among the Romans, the soldier was obliged to bring into the public stock all the booty he had taken. This the general caused to be sold, and after distributing a part of the produce of such sale among the soldiers according to their rank, he consigned the residue to the public treasury. It is the general practice in modern times, under the laws and ordinances of the belligerent Governments, to distribute the proceeds, or at least a part of the proceeds, of captured

¹ Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 135; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. iv. § 4. Heffter, *Droit International*, §§ 135, 136.

² Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. 1. p. 101; Grotius, *De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. vi.; Horne v. Earl Camden, 2 H. Black. Rep. p. 533.

property among the captors, as a reward for bravery, and a stimulus to exertion. In France the prize ordinances fully provide for such distribution. In Great Britain, the statutes 6 Anne, c. 13, and c. 37, vest in seamen the prizes they may take.¹ In the United States, the statute of April 23, 1800, and subsequent laws, direct the manner of distributing the proceeds of prizes on condemnation.² Where captures are not so granted away, they enure to the use of the Government, on the elementary principle of the laws of war. Some States, in their municipal laws, distinguish between military captures and prizes at sea; in international law, however, they rest on the same principle. Thus, in England no statute is passed with respect to military captures, but the proceeds belong to the Crown, and are distributed according to the regulations established by the Crown. In the Act of April 10, 1806, establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the United States, article 58 requires that 'all public stores taken in the enemy's camp, towns, forts, or magazines, whether of artillery, ammunition, clothing, forage, or provisions, shall be secured for the service of the

¹ 6 Anne, c. 13 and c. 37, *Ruff.* (being cc. 65 and 64 respectively of the Statutes at Large), were repealed by the 27 and 28 Vict. c. 23.

No British seaman can claim an interest in prize unless it falls within the provisions of the proclamation in force for the time being. The Naval Prize Act, 1864 (27 and 28 Vict., c. 25), expressly declares that nothing therein shall give to the officers and men of any of Her Majesty's ships of war, any right or claim in or to any ship or goods taken as prize, or the proceeds thereof, it being the intent of that Act that such officers and crew shall continue to take only such interest (if any) in the proceeds of prizes as may be from time to time granted to them by the Crown. A royal proclamation usually directs that the net produce of every prize taken by vessels of war (except when acting in conjunction with the army, in which case the distribution is reserved to the Crown) shall be for the entire benefit of the officers and crew making such capture, after the same shall have been adjudged lawful prize. The Crown formerly used to reserve to itself a share in all prizes made by privateers. The Prize Act (55 Geo. III. c. 160, now expired) conferred on the owners of privateers all prizes made by them.

² The last Act of Congress of the United States on the subject of prizes is that of June 30, 1864, c. 174; it directs that the net proceeds of all property condemned as prize shall, when the prize is of superior or equal force to the vessel or vessels making the capture, be decreed to the captors; and that when of inferior force, one half shall be decreed to the United States and the other half to the captors. Provided that in case of privateers and letters of marque the whole shall be decreed to the captors, unless it shall be otherwise provided in the commissions issued to such vessels.

United States;' but no provision is made, as in the case of captures by the naval forces, for distributing such captured property, or its proceeds among the captors, 'as a reward for bravery and a stimulus.' This Act simply affirms the general rule of international law, that such property is to be taken for the Government under whose authority the capture is made, and who is responsible to claimants for the legality of the capture. Congress may direct the disposition of booty of war, either by distributing it among the captors, as is done with prize of war, or by transferring it to the Treasury. In the absence of any statute as to its disposition, it is used and accounted for under the discretion of the President, as commander-in-chief.¹

§ 22. While there is some uncertainty as to the exact limit, fixed by the voluntary law of nations, to our right to appropriate to our own use the property of an enemy, or to subject it to military contributions, there is no doubt, whatever, respecting its waste and useless destruction. This is forbidden alike by the law of nature, and the rules of war. But if such destruction is necessary in order to cripple the operations of the enemy, or to insure our own success, it is justifiable. Thus, if we cannot bring off a captured vessel, we may sink or burn it in order to prevent its falling into the enemy's hands; but we cannot do this in mere wantonness. We may destroy provisions and forage, in order to cut off the enemy's subsistence; but we cannot destroy vines and cut down fruit trees, without being looked upon as savage barbarians. We may demolish fortresses, ramparts, and all structures solely devoted to the purposes of war; but, as already stated, we cannot destroy public or private edifices of a civil character, temples of religion, and monuments of art, unless their destruction should become necessary in the operations of a siege, or in order to prevent their affording a lodgment or protection to the enemy.²

§ 23. There are numerous instances in military history where whole districts of country have been totally ravaged and laid waste. Such operations have sometimes been de-

¹ *Brymer v. Atkins*, 1 *H. Blacks. Rep.*, pp. 189-91; *Cross et al. v. Harrison*, 16 *Howard Rep.*, p. 164; *Cross, Military Laws*, p. 116.

² *Barbini*, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, tome v. pt. iv. ch. vii.; *Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. ii. cap. xii.

fended on the ground of necessity, or as a means of preventing greater evils. It was on this ground that Italy and Spain justified their destruction of the maritime towns on the coast of Africa, which had become mere nests of pirates. But the sacking of towns and villages, and delivering them up to a prey to fire and the sword, are terrible remedies, which are often worse than the evil to be removed. 'Dreadful extremities,' says Vattel, 'even when we are forced into them; savage and monstrous excesses, when committed without necessity.' Another excuse for ravaging a district of country, is to render it a barrier against the advance of an enemy. Thus, the Czar, Peter the Great, laid waste an extent of fourscore leagues of his own territory, to check the advance of Charles XII., of Sweden. The victory of Pultowa was claimed as the result of this sacrifice. Again, in 1812, the Russians laid waste a vast extent of country, and burnt their capital, to prevent its affording a shelter to the French, from the rigours of a Polar winter.¹ The disastrous retreat from Moscow was claimed as the fruit of this circumspection. 'Such violent remedies,' says Vattel, 'are to be sparingly applied; there must be reasons of suitable importance to justify the use of them. A prince who should, without necessity, imitate the Czar's conduct, would be guilty of a crime against his people; and he who does the like in an enemy's country, when impelled by no necessity, or induced by feeble reasons, becomes the scourge of mankind.'

§ 24 The general rule by which we should regulate our conduct toward an enemy, is that of moderation, and on no occasion should we unnecessarily destroy his property. 'The pillage and destruction of towns,' says Vattel, 'the devasta-

¹ Buonaparte had entered Russia with 360,000 men, at a time when a large portion of the Russian army was in a remote part of the empire. The opposing Russian force therefore acted on the defensive, and for a while retreated, keeping, nevertheless, excellent order. At length the time arrived to change these tactics, and a system was adopted for which the greatest sacrifices had been made. A population of 200,000 persons voluntarily quitted their homes, sacrificing their houses and property, in order that Moscow might not afford quarters to the enemy. Every personal enjoyment and private object was given up for the safety of their country. This sacrifice of the people drove the French in discomfiture and disgrace from the Russian empire.

² Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. viii. § 142; ch. ix. §§ 166-72; Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, § 280; Klüber, *Droit des Gens Mod.* §§ 262-65; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 50; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 6.

tion of the open country, ravaging and setting fire to houses, are measures no less odious and detestable, on every occasion when they are evidently put in practice without absolute necessity, or at least very cogent reasons. But as the perpetrators of such outrageous deeds might attempt to palliate them under pretext of deservedly punishing the enemy, be it here observed that the natural and voluntary law of nations does not allow us to inflict such punishments, except for enormous offences against the law of nations, and even then, it is glorious to listen to the voice of humanity and clemency, when rigour is not absolutely necessary. Cicero condemns the conduct of his countrymen in destroying Corinth, to avenge the unworthy treatment offered to the Roman ambassadors, because Rome was able to assert the dignity of her ministers, without proceeding to such extreme rigour.

§ 25. An English *court of admiralty*, as will be shown hereafter, does not, merely of its own inherent powers, exercise jurisdiction of questions of *booty*, or of captures made on land by military forces, without the presence and co-operation of ships or their crews. The federal courts of the United States have never decided directly upon their jurisdiction of such a question, but from the similarity of English and American admiralty and prize jurisdictions, and the opinion of the court in the case of '*The Emulous*,' there is little doubt but that our prize courts are limited, in this respect, the same as those of England. It has also been decided in England that a *municipal court* has no jurisdiction of cases of *hostile seizure*; moreover, that the circumstance of the place where the seizure was made, being in the undisputed possession of British power, with a provisional government and organised courts of justice, did not alter the character of the transaction. Wildman remarks: 'There is no instance in history or law, ancient or modern, of any question, before any legal judicature, ever having existed about it [booty] in this kingdom. It is often given to the soldiers on the spot, or wrongfully taken by them, contrary to discipline. If there is any dispute it is regulated by the commander-in-chief.' As such questions do not come within the jurisdiction of either courts of Admiralty or of law, they must be taken cognisance of by the military tribunals, and be go-

verned by military laws and regulations, and by the laws of war.¹

§ 26. In speaking of the constitution, authority, and functions of the English prize court, and of the wisely formed and admirably developed code of admiralty jurisdiction and rules of procedure, Mr. [now Sir Robert] Phillimore remarks: 'It is not surprising that, in great maritime kingdoms, the jurisdiction of the admiral's court should have thrown into the shade the tribunal of the general. But, that the latter should have left such faint traces of its origin and mode of procedure, and should so soon have fallen into desuetude, is a very remarkable fact in the history of jurisprudence.' Mr. Knapp, in a learned note to his report of the great case of the *Army of the Deccan*, argued before the Privy Council, in 1833, has shown the error of the dicta of Lord Mansfield, in *Lindo v. Rodney*, repeated in the foregoing extract from Wildman, that 'there is no instance in history or law, ancient or modern, of any question ever having existed respecting booty taken in a continental land war, before any legal judicature in this kingdom.' It appears from this note of Mr. Knapp, that in very early times, in England, causes respecting booty were determined in the court of chivalry, before the constable and marshal. Lord Hale says: 'In matters civil, for which there is no remedy by the common laws, the military jurisdiction continues as well after the war as during the time of it; for that part of the jurisdiction of the constable and marshal stands still, notwithstanding the war determines, as concerning right of prisoners and booty, military contracts, ensigns, etc.' A number of instances are cited, where the court of chivalry took cognisance of cases of goods taken beyond the seas, of prisoners, of hostages, ransom, etc., and where, during the minority of the constable of England, his authority to try such cases was delegated to others by special commission. Since the time of Henry VIII., when the office of constable of England ceased, the jurisdiction of this court was frequently disputed, on the ground that it could not be held before the earl marshal alone, and it finally seems to have fallen into desuetude. The last case tried before it was that of Sir

¹ *Le Caux v. Eden*, 2 *Doug. Rep.*, p. 594; *Elphinstone v. Bedrechund*, *Knapp. Rep.*, p. 316; 'The Two Friends,' 1 *Rob. Rep.*, p. 225, the 'Emulous,' 1 *Gallis. Rep.*, p. 563.

Henry Blunt, in 1737. The statute of 13 Richard II., chapter second, limited its jurisdiction to cases 'which cannot be determined by the common law,' and in its proceedings it was to be governed by 'the customs and laws of war.'¹

§ 27. As no action can be maintained in an English court of *municipal* law with respect to booty, and as courts of *admiralty* had no jurisdiction of the matter, the inquiry arises, what became of this jurisdiction when it ceased to be exercised by the court of the constable and marshal?² All booty, as

¹ Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 127; Lord Hale, *De Praerogativa*, cap. xi. § 3. Lando v. Rodney, *Douglas Rep.*, p. 593; *Army of the Decian*, 2 *Knapp Rep.*, pp. 149-51; *Oldis v. Donmille*, *Show. Parl. Cases*, p. 58; Sir H. Blunt's Case, 1 *Atkyn's Rep.*, p. 296.

² It appears from the treatise *De Praerogativa Regis*, xx., cc. 11 and 12, Lord Hale was of opinion that the jurisdiction in matters of booty or military prize, if existing anywhere but in the Privy Council, is in the court of the constable and marshal. Also that in matters civil, for which there is no remedy by the common law, the military jurisdiction continues as well after the war, as during the time of it. There is a direct instance of the exercise of this jurisdiction, in a manuscript treatise of Lord Hale, in Lincoln's-Inn Library, headed, 'Upon certain petitions of late exhibited in the Court of Chivalry there have been raised divers questions of law' The statute of Richard II. enacts, 'to the constable it pertaineth, to have cognisance of contracts touching deeds of arms and of war out of the realm, and also of things that touch war within the realm, which cannot be determined nor discussed by the common law, with other usages and customs to the same matters pertaining. It will be noticed that the word 'marshal' is not employed in the above sentence, although the statute clearly refers to the 'court of the constable and marshal.' Those two persons presided over it as judges. Henry VIII. was advised that it was unnecessary to maintain the office of constable of England. The earl-marshal frequently held a court after the constableness had become extinct. Thomas, Duke of Norfolk, as marshal, held a court for the trial of the Lincolnshire rebels in 1535, being twenty years after the extinction of the constableness. Nor was the jurisdiction of that court in the least contested. (Gilbert, *Hist. of Reform*, 1. lib. iii.) In 1622, in consequence of the jurisdiction of the earl-marshal being questioned by Brook and Treswell, two defendants, the Lords of the Council were required by James I. to investigate and determine the issue. All parties were commanded to be present. Their lordships determined that the authority of the earl-marshal severally, as well as jointly with a high constable, was fully set forth, and that the authorities were so very good that it was plain the earl-marshal was a judge, and had power of judicature in the vacancy of a constable, as well as with the constable, and that there had been as much said to prove the authority of that court as could be said for any court in Westminster Hall. On this report the king issued his commission on the 1st of August following, and declared that 'the constable and marshal were joint judges together, and several in the vacancy of either,' and commanded the earl-marshal from henceforth to proceed 'in all causes whatsoever whereof the court of constable and marshal ought properly to take cognisance, as judicially and definitively as any constable or marshal of this realm, either jointly or severally, hitherto has done.'

before remarked, belongs to the Crown, and is captured under the authority of the Crown. The Crown must, therefore, ultimately decide upon the legality of the capture and the distribution of the booty. The mode in which it now exercises this jurisdiction is to refer the claims of those who petition for a share in the distribution to the Lords of the Treasury, who lay down the principles which are to govern the case, and a board of trustees are appointed under the royal sign-manual warrant to ascertain, collect, and distribute the booty according to the scheme which has been approved and sanctioned by the Crown. The Privy Council have determined that they will not exercise jurisdiction as a court of appeal from the decisions of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, as to grants by the Crown of property accruing to it by virtue of its prerogative.¹ They, however, have advised the Crown,

This court followed the rules of Civil Law, but 'the Course and Custom of Chivalry and Arms' governed all cases for which that law was found wanting. In 1702, the decision in *Chambers v. Jennings* (7 *M. & Rep.* 125), that this court, not being a court of record, could neither fine nor imprison, inflicted an irreparable injury on its authority. Nevertheless it may be fairly questioned whether this court (although slumbering) may not still exist. The statute defining its jurisdiction is unrepealed.

¹ But the Privy Council has now become the ultimate court of appeal in cases of booty, by virtue of the 3 and 4 Will. IV., c. 41, and by the joint operation of the 2 and 3 Vict. c. 65, and 24 and 25 Vict. c. 10, s. 5.

In England all booty or prize of war belongs, and remains to the period of distribution, the property of the Crown (the '*Elzebe*,' 5 *Asb.* 173; *Nicholl v. Goodhall*, 10 *Tes.* 156; *Alexander v. Duke of Wellington*, 2 *Russ.* and *Mylne*, 35). The warrant for distribution is a mere direction from the Crown, like the order from a customer to his banker, it vests no property in the objects of the Crown's bounty until the money has been actually paid to them under it.

Moreover, the Privy Council has exercised an original jurisdiction in matters of prize.

Lord Hale says 'that there is no evidence on record of any Admiralty jurisdiction till the time of Edward III., and asks where the jurisdiction in matters maritime was exercised during all this intermission of Admiralty courts. He answers to this question, 'a very great part thereof, especially touching capture of ships and goods arrested and taken by way of reprisal, was transacted *coram consilio regis* and in Chancery.' (*Margrave Manuscripts*, No. 137, f. 118. 26.)

Original jurisdiction was exercised by the Privy Council in a case which arose out of the captures at Toulon by land and sea forces in 1703; a grant had been made to the navy, but the army concerned in the expedition presented a memorial to the king that the warrant might be recalled, and another issued granting them a share for their co-operation. This memorial was referred to a committee of the Privy Council, who heard the case argued before them by counsel for the army and navy, and finally advised the king not to recall his warrant. Similar jurisdiction was exercised by the Privy Council in the case of the captures at Serangapatam.

as in the case of the army of the Deccan, to allow the Lords of the Treasury to hear counsel upon points arising between the claimants and the trustees, as to what shall, or shall not, be considered legal booty. By the statute of 1833, the Privy Council were authorised to hear or consider any matter referred to them by the Crown, and to advise thereon; and the statute of 1840¹ extends the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty to all matters and questions concerning *booty of war*, or the distribution thereof, which it shall please the Crown, by the advice of the Privy Council, to refer to the judgment of said court, and in all matters so referred, the court shall proceed as in case of *prize of war*, and the judgment of the court shall be binding upon all parties concerned. It therefore appears that, although an English prize court, as such, has no jurisdiction of cases of booty, the High Court of Admiralty may decide such matters and questions concerning booty as shall be referred to it by the Crown with the advice of the Privy Council.²

¹ By s. 22 of this statute (2 and 3 Vict. c. 65) the High Court of Admiralty shall have jurisdiction to decide all matters and questions concerning booty of war or the distribution thereof, which it shall please Her Majesty, by the advice of her Privy Council, to refer to the judgment of the said court, and in all matters so referred the court *shall proceed as in cases of prize of war*, and the judgment of the court therein shall be binding upon all parties concerned, provided that nothing in this Act contained shall be deemed to preclude any of Her Majesty's courts of law or equity, having jurisdiction over the several subject-matters, from continuing to exercise such jurisdiction. See also *Banda and Kirwee Booty*, 1 *Law R. (Adm.)* 109.

² Sir James Scarlett, Attorney-General, 1 *Knapp Rep.*, p. 357; *Epiphonstone v. Bedbrechund*, 1 *Knapp Rep.*, pp. 360-1; *Case of the*

Buenos Aires, 1 *Dod. Rep.*, p. 29.

CHAPTER XXII.

ENEMY'S PROPERTY ON THE HIGH SEAS.

1. Distinction between enemy's property on land and on the high seas—2. Opinions of Mably and others—3. Unavailable attempts to change present rule—4. Difficulties in its application—5. Ownership at time of capture—6. Rule as to consignee—7. Contract and shipment made in contemplation of war—8. Contract made in peace and shipment in war—9. If both be made in time of peace—10. Shipment, with risk on neutral consignee—11. If neutral consignee become an enemy during voyage—12. Acceptance *in transitu* by neutral consignee—13. Change of ownership by stoppage *in transitu*—14. National character of goods—15. Transfer of enemy's ships to neutrals—16. Rules of such transfer—17. Character of ships and goods, how deduced—18. Effect of secret liens—19. Documentary proofs of ownership—20. Laws of different States—21. Decisions of French prize courts—22. Exemption of vessels of discovery—23. Of fishing boats—24. In cases of shipwreck, etc.

§ 1. WHILE 'the progress of civilisation has slowly but constantly tended to soften the extreme severity of the operations of war by land,' says Wheaton, 'it still remains unrelaxed in respect to maritime warfare, in which the private property of the enemy, taken at sea or afloat in port, is indiscriminately liable to capture and confiscation. This inequality in the operation of the laws of war, by land and by sea, has been justified by alleging the usage of considering private property, when captured in cities taken by storm, as *booty*; and the well-known fact that contributions are levied upon territories occupied by a hostile army, in lieu of a general confiscation of the property belonging to the inhabitants; and that the object of wars by land being conquest, or the acquisition of territory to be exchanged as an equivalent for other territory lost, the regard of the victor for those who are to be his subjects, naturally restrains him from the exercise of his extreme rights in this particular; whereas, the object of maritime war is the destruction of the enemy's commerce and navigation, the sources and sinews of his naval power—

which object can only be attained by the capture and confiscation of private property."

§ 2. Several of the ablest continental writers oppose this distinction on principle. The Abbé Mably advocated an entire freedom of commercial intercourse in war, even between the subjects of the belligerent powers; and Émerigon, yielding to the arguments of the Abbé, expresses an earnest desire that the laws of war may be modified or changed accordingly. Others, again, think that the change should extend only to the adoption of the principle that private property on the high seas should be subject to the same rules in war as private property on land; without any modification of the law of war respecting the commercial intercourse of subjects of the belligerent powers. Napoleon I. in his 'Memoirs,' dictated at St. Helena, says: 'Il est à désirer qu'un temps vienne, où les mêmes idées libérales s'étendent sur la guerre de mer, et que les armées navales de deux puissances puissent se battre sans donner lieu à la confiscation des navires marchands, et sans faire constituer prisonniers de guerre de simples matelots du commerce,' etc. The great advantages which England, by means of her naval superiority, has derived from the capture of private property upon the high seas, have tended very much to the maintenance of the rigour of the ancient rule of commercial warfare, while other nations have adopted more liberal principles and views in war upon land,—by which the interests and happiness of the human race have been greatly promoted.²

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 7. See also chap. xxx. post.

Property captured on land by a naval force of the United States is not a 'maritime prize,' even though it may have been a proper subject of capture generally. Alexander's Cotton (2 Wall, 404), and see act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. at L. 820; Act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. at L. 375.

² Mably, *Droit Public*, etc., ch. xii. p. 308; Napoleon, *Mémoires*, etc., tome iii. ch. vi.

This proposition can be well illustrated by assuming the accomplishment of the proposed change, the realisation of the ideal which the reformers have conceived; that is, contest between combatants alone, while all else in the State goes on as usual. A war is declared between two powerful maritime nations. It produces no direct change in the general avocations of life; agriculture, manufactures, commerce, flourish as before. The people are not hindered in their productions and exchanges, and are thus enabled to respond to the demands of the Government, and to furnish all the material supplies necessary to sustain the struggle. It is true that producers are withdrawn from time to time from

§ 3. The government of the United States proposed to add to the first article of the 'declaration concerning maritime law,' made by the conference of Paris, April 16, 1856 the following words: 'and the private property of the subjects or citizens of a belligerent on the high seas shall be exempted from seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerent, except it be contraband.' As already stated, this proposition, although favourably received, has not been adopted by a majority of the powers represented in that conference, and even if it had been, it would bind only those who adopted it, in their intercourse with each other, and could not affect the general rule of international law on that subject. It may therefore be stated as the existing and established law of nations, that, when two powers are at war, they have a right to make prize of the ships, goods, and effects of each other upon the high seas; and that this right of capture includes not only government property, but also the private property of all citizens and subjects of the belligerent powers, and of their allies. Whatever bears the character of enemy's property (with a few exceptions to be hereafter noticed), if found upon the ocean, or afloat in port, is liable to capture as a lawful prize by the opposite belligerent.¹

The orderly activities of life and are converted into military non-producers. But the vacancy thus made is not felt, because the articles which were before produced at home are now brought from abroad, by means of the free commerce which is thus quickened into extraordinary activity. Under these circumstances the war is reduced to a mere duel between hostile armies. The nation has only to furnish men, and the contest will be continued until one country has been swept of its able-bodied citizens. That nation will certainly be victorious which can bring forward and sacrifice the greatest number of soldiers. This is not an imaginary picture. The essential fact was shown to be true in the history of the Confederacy. Levy after levy was made, army after army took the field; but as soon as Sherman ravaged the sources of supply in Georgia and Carolina, the whole hostile array collapsed.—*North American Review*, No. 235, p. 405. See also the note to § 10, ch. xxviii. on the maxim, *free ships free goods*.

¹ *Pistoye et Duverdy, Des Prises*, tit. i. ch. i.; *Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres*, tit. vii. ch. i.; *Wheaton, On Captures*, App. p. 317; *Polson, Law of Nations*, § 6; *Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. ii. caps. xii., xiii.; *Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens*, § 28; *Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer*, liv. iii. ch. ii.; *Jouffroy, Droit Maritime*, p. 57, et seq.; *Pando, Derecho Pub. Int.*, p. 412; *Wildman, Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 118, et seq.; *Manning, Law of Nations*, p. 136; *Dalloz, Répertoire, verb. Prises Maritimes*; *Awami, Droit Maritime*, tome ii. ch. iv.; *Marcy, Lettre to Count Sartiges*, July 28, 1856; *De Cussy, Précis Historique*, ch. xi.; *Gardner, Institutes*, ch. xv.

In 1854, at the commencement of the Crimean war, it was proclaimed by an order in Council that all Russian vessels in British ports

much difficulty arise as to their legal import under the
of war, and the rules by which prize courts are, or ought

to be allowed six weeks for loading their cargoes and for departing
port, and further, that if met with at sea by any British ships of
they were to be permitted to continue their voyage, if from their
it was evident that their cargoes had been taken on board before
expiration of the above term. The French Government also issued
an order. The British Government on the same occasion ordered
His Majesty's subjects who might be resident in Russia to return to
their country within the term of six weeks.

In 1870, at the commencement of the Franco-German War, the
German Confederation declared, that French merchant vessels
should not be subject to be captured or seized as prizes of war, by vessels
of the Confederation, but that this rule should not apply to
vessels, which might be subject to capture or seizure, if they were
enemy vessels. The *Staats-Anzeiger*, July 19, announced that French mer-
chant vessels would be allowed six weeks, from the date of the declara-
tion of war, to clear out of German ports, and would be permitted, during
that period, to load or unload. The German Government, at the
solicitation of England, gave a formal recognition to the Declaration of
1856, respecting the right of navigation in time of war. The
British Government did the same, and added that, although Spain and
the United States did not adhere to the Declaration of Paris, the
British Government would not seize enemy's property on board a vessel of those
nations, unless such property was contraband of war; nor would the
British Government confiscate the property of the subjects of those nations
which might be found on board an enemy's vessel—(*Journal Officiel*,
1870, p. 5.) The French Government, moreover, directed that merchant
ships belonging to the enemy, which might actually be in the ports of
France, or which might enter such ports in ignorance of the state of
war, should have a delay of thirty days for leaving these ports; that
their cargoes should be delivered to them to enable them to return freely
to their ports of despatch, or to the port of their destination; that the
ships which might take in cargoes destined for France and on French

to be governed. War establishes very different relations between parties, from those which exist in the ordinary transactions of trade and pacific intercourse, and from those new relations arise new duties and new obligations. Hence the rules which govern the decisions of prize courts under the law of nations, with respect to the ownership of property, widely differ, in many respects, from those which obtain in time of peace in the courts of civil or common law. This renders necessary a special examination of the law of prize, and the investigation of many nice and refined distinctions in the application of that law.¹

§ 5. For example, the legality, or illegality of the capture of goods upon the high seas, will frequently turn upon the question of ownership at the time of capture; for when property is shipped from a neutral country to an enemy's, or from an enemy's country to a neutral, the question of its national character, whether it is neutral or hostile, can only be determined by ascertaining whether the right of property, at the time of shipment, was vested in the shipper or in the consignee. If, in order to determine this question, we were to refer only to the rules established by courts of civil and common law, we should be liable to form an erroneous conclusion, as these rules differ in some respects from those which govern courts of prize, while, in others, they are precisely the same in all courts.²

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 420, 421; Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 74; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. v. § 1; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 139; Merhin, *Répertoire, verb. Prise Maritime*; Massé, *Droit Commercial*, liv. ii.

² The 'Packet of Bilbao,' 2 Rob. 336; the 'Vrouw Margaretha,' 1 Rob. 336; the 'Danchebaar African,' 1 Rob. 107.

It was determined, by the Privy Council, in 1857, that the sale of a ship, absolutely and *bonâ fide*, by an enemy to a neutral *imminente bello*, or even *flagrante bello*, is not illegal. A Russian subject, immediately before the war between Russia and England, 1854, sold, absolutely and *bonâ fide*, a ship, the 'Ariel,' to a subject of a neutral State. Part only, of the purchase money, was paid at the time of the purchase, the remainder being agreed to be paid, out of the earnings of the ship. Before all the stipulated price was paid, the ship was seized, in a British port, as a prize; and was condemned, by the High Court of Admiralty, on the ground that the enemy's interest in the ship was not divested, as the residue of the purchase money was to be paid, out of the earnings. This condemnation was reversed by the Privy Council, because the non-payment of part of the purchase money did not create a lien on the freight and ship, in favour of the seller, so as to render the ship, in possession of a neutral owner, liable to seizure by a belligerent. Laens, whether in favour of a neutral or

§ 6. The general rule of law, both international and civil, or common, is, that goods in the course of transportation from one place to another, if they are shipped on account and at the risk of the consignee, in consequence of a prior order or purchase, are considered as his goods during the voyage. The master of a ship, who receives goods, that, by the bill of lading, are expressed to be, and, in fact, are, shipped on account of the consignee, becomes, by the very act, the agent of that consignee, so that the delivery to him has the same effect in vesting the property, as a delivery to his principal. Hence, goods *in transitu* from a neutral country to a belligerent, if they are to be delivered to, and to become the property of a belligerent immediately on their arrival, are considered as his goods during the voyage, *in itinere*, and subject to capture and confiscation.¹ This general

rule applies to an enemy's ship, or in favour of an enemy on a neutral ship, are equally to be disregarded in a British Prize Court.

There were six other vessels seized, all belonging to the same appellant. After the delivery of the above judgment, the Crown officers released these vessels, with the exception of one, the 'Bellica,' which they retained on the ground, that the sale of that ship was distinguishable from the others, her sale having taken place *in transitu*. On appeal, again, to the Privy Council, that court decided that the sale, though *in transitu*, was valid, as the *transitus* had ceased when the vessel had come into possession of the purchaser, which took place before the seizure, and that no distinction could be made between the case of that vessel and the case of the 'Ariel'—*Sorensen v. Reg.*, 11 Moore, *Privy Council Cas.* 119.

¹ In 1793 an American ship, the 'Sally,' shipped a cargo of corn of a firm at Baltimore, ostensibly for the account and risk of a firm of Philadelphia (but in reality for the use of the French Republic), and consigned to them or their assigns, and to be delivered at Havre. The form of contract was framed directly for the purpose of obviating the danger apprehended from approaching hostilities between France and England. On the ship being captured by the English, the master, instead of supporting the contents of his bill of lading, deposed 'that on arrival, the goods would become the property of the French Government,' and concealed papers strongly supported his testimony. It was held that as the corn was to become the property of the enemy on delivery, *capture* might be considered as *delivery*. Captors by the rights of war stand in the place of the enemy, and are entitled to a condemnation of goods passing under such a contract, as if they were enemy's property.—The 'Sally,' 3 Rob. 300, note. See, also, the 'Anna Catharina,' 4 Rob. 107; and the 'Carl Walter,' *Ibid.* 207.

Condemnation was also made in the case of the property of British merchants, shipped before the war with Spain, but in a Spanish character and in a trade so exclusively peculiar to Spanish subjects as that no foreign name could appear in it (the 'Princessa Zavala,' 2 Rob. 52), and further in that of an asserted American merchant, who, having gone to France to collect outstanding debts, had invested part of the money so received in sending a cargo of butter to Lisbon. The peculiar circum-

rule, as to the effect of a delivery of goods, to the master, for a foreign purchaser, may, both by the civil and common law, be varied by an express stipulation between the parties, or by the usage of a particular trade. If the parties agree that the payment for the goods shall be contingent upon their actual delivery at the foreign port, the whole risk of the voyage being cast upon the shipper, and the contract of sale, until a delivery, being incomplete and executory, the goods, during the voyage, in judgment of law, remain the property of the shipper. So if the prevailing usage of a particular trade casts the risk upon the consignor, the delivery to the master is not regarded, in law, as a delivery to the consignee; for such a usage pre-supposes the general agreement of the merchants engaged in the trade to which it refers. But neither of these exceptions to the general rule, that the delivery to the master, as the agent of the consignee, is a delivery to the principal, is admitted in courts of prize, for the very conclusive reason, that, to permit goods, in time of war, to be considered the property of the neutral consignor, instead of the enemy consignee, merely on the ground that the former had assumed the risk of transportation, would at once put an end to captures of enemy's property on the high seas. On every contemplation of a war, in the consignments of goods from neutral ports to an enemy's country, the risk of transportation would be laid on the consignor, and the right of capture would be completely frustrated. Hence, says Sir William Scott, that part of the contract laying the risk of transportation, in time of war, upon the neutral consignor, is invalid; or rather as the captor has all the rights which belong to the enemy, his taking possession is considered equivalent to an actual delivery to the enemy consignee. The foregoing rule of the prize courts of England, that property consigned to, and to become the property of an enemy, upon arrival, cannot be protected by the neutrality of the shipper, has been explicitly recognised and acted upon by the prize courts of the United States, and approved by American writers of the highest authority. No case directly

stances in each case were such as to invest the consignors with an enemy national character *pro hâc vice*.—The 'Drie Gelroeders,' 4 Rob. 232.

As against captors the ownership of property cannot be changed while it is *in transitu*.—The 'Sally Magee,' 3 Wall. 451.

in point has yet been decided by the supreme court of the United States, but the doctrine has been affirmed in analogous cases, resting substantially on the same grounds; and Mr. Justice Story, in the United States circuit court, says, 'that in time of war, property shall not be permitted to change character in its transit, nor shall property consigned to become the property of an enemy upon its arrival, be protected by the neutrality of the shipper. Such contracts, however valid in time of peace, are considered, if made in war, or in contemplation of war, as infringements of belligerent rights, and calculated to introduce the grossest frauds. In fact, if they could prevail, not a single bale of enemy's goods would ever be found upon the ocean.' Chancellor Kent, in his commentaries, says, that 'property shipped from a neutral to the enemy's country, under a contract to become the property of the enemy on arrival, may be taken, *in transitu*, as enemy's property; for capture is considered as delivery. The captor, by the rights of war, stands in the place of the enemy. The prize courts will not allow the neutral and belligerent, by a special agreement, to change the ordinary rule of peace, by which goods ordered and delivered to the master, are considered as delivered to the consignee. All such agreements are held to be constitutionally fraudulent, and, if they would operate, they would go to cover all belligerent property while passing between a belligerent and a neutral country; since the risk of capture would be laid alternately on the consignor or consignee, as the neutral factor should happen to stand in one or other of these relations.' A contrary doctrine has been held by the courts of the State of New York, but as the decisions of State courts are not of authority in questions of prize, the rule, as decided by Justice Story, must be regarded as established in the United States.¹

§ 7. This rule is not confined to cases where the contract and shipment are made in time of actual war. If they are

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. 1, pp. 86, 87; the 'Ann Green,' 1 *Gall's R.* 291; the 'Frances,' 1 *Gall's R.* 430; *Ludlow v. Bowne*, 1 *John R.* 1; *De Wolf v. N.Y. Ins. Co.*, 20 *John R.* 214; the 'Venus,' 8 *Cranch* 253, 275; the 'Merrimack,' 8 *Cranch* 317, 327; the 'Mary and Susan,' 1 *Wheaton R.* 25; the 'San José Indiano,' 1 *Wheaton R.* 208, 213; the 'Frances,' 3 *Cran. R.* 183; *Ilsey v. Stubbs*, 9 *Mass. R.*, 65; *Chandler v. Sprague*, 5 *Met. R.* 306.

made in time of peace, but in contemplation of war, and with the manifest intention of protecting the property from hostile capture, they are equally a fraud upon the belligerent power to which the right of capture belongs; and the reasons for the rule of the prize courts, in cases of contract made in time of actual war, given by Sir William Scott and Justice Story, in their decisions, and by Chancellor Kent, in his commentaries, are equally applicable to contracts made in time of peace, but in contemplation of war. We do not, however, find any decision directly on this point; but the view of this question taken by Mr. Duer seems to be fully sustained by the reasoning of the courts in the cases to which reference is made in the foregoing paragraph. If goods contracted for, and shipped in time of actual war, are liable to capture on the ground of *fraud* upon the rights of a belligerent, assuredly the same would, for the same reason, apply to the same transactions made with the same intention, in contemplation of war.¹

§ 8. And if the contract is made during a peace, and not in contemplation of war, but the shipment be made after hostilities have commenced, and with a knowledge of the war, the private agreement of the parties, by which the neutral consignor assumes the risk of delivery, will not be permitted to affect the rights of the capturing belligerent. For it was the duty of the consignor, and within his power in this case, equally as in the former, to guard himself from a contingent loss arising from capture, by requiring a proper security from the consignee. Without such security, he was not bound to make the shipment at all, since, as the contract was not made in expectation of a war, so material a change in its risks, as contemplated by the parties in making the contract, would absolve him from its execution.²

§ 9. But where the shipment of the goods, as well as the contract, laying the risk on the neutral consignor, are both made in time of peace, and not in contemplation of war, the legal ownership which was in the consignor, at the inception of the voyage, remains in him until its termination. The property of the consignor is not divested in favour of a belli-

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 478.

² Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 99; the 'Packet de Bilbao,' 2 Rob.

gerent, by the breaking out of the war, before the arrival of the goods, by which the foreign consignee becomes an enemy. The same rule applies where the consignor, at whose risk the shipment was made, is a subject of the belligerent captor, the reason of the exemption being equally applicable to his case. Again, if the contract and shipment be made in time of peace, and not in contemplation of war, and the risk be laid on the neutral consignee, the property being in the consignee, not only by the rules of the civil and common law, but also by the law of nations, the goods are exempt from capture. So, also, if the consignee be a subject of the belligerent captor, for the delivery to the carrier is regarded as the delivery to the consignee, and the goods are neither enemy's goods, nor goods in unlawful trade with the enemy. Both the contract and shipment were lawfully made, and no rule of war being violated by the subject in acquiring the ownership of the property, or in their removal from the country, then friendly but now hostile, the character of the goods is not changed during the voyage, and they are, therefore, not liable to condemnation.¹

§ 10. And, again, where the goods are shipped by an enemy consignor, during the war, and under a prior sale, or an unconditional contract of sale, the property so shipped vests absolutely in the neutral consignee, by delivery to the master, and, if otherwise innocent, and the title remains unchanged, it is exempted from capture during the voyage. The reason is obvious: the neutral violates no duties toward one belligerent by trade, otherwise lawful, with the opposing belligerent; and the only question is that of ownership, which, by the supposition, is in the neutral consignee. But, as a neutral cover is the common device by which belligerent interests are sought to be protected, shipments of this character are watched with peculiar jealousy, and the clearest evidence of ownership in the consignee is not unreasonably required. 'It is not sufficient,' says Mr. Duer, 'to establish the title, that the bills of lading and the invoice are in the name of the consignee, and express the shipment to be made on his account and risk; for these documents are indispensable to give even the *appearance* of neutral ownership. It must be shown by what means the title was acquired. If it

¹ Willman, *Int. Law*, vol. II. pp. 99, 100; the 'Atlas,' 3 *Rob.* 299.

is alleged that the goods had been paid for, the payment must be proved. If the goods are claimed under a contract of sale, containing provisions for future payment, or under an order for their shipment, the contract, or order, must be produced, and must appear to be absolute and unconditional, so as to bind the consignee positively to the acceptance of the goods, and to take from the consignor any right or power to reclaim them (unless in the sole event of the insolvency of the consignee), previous to their arrival. If any election is given to the consignee, or any power of direction or control is retained by the consignor, the goods continue, in the judgment of law, the property of the consignor, and, as such, are liable to capture during the voyage.' This doctrine has been clearly established by the British Courts of Admiralty, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. It may be well to illustrate this doctrine by particular cases. Thus, where an American merchant had ordered certain goods from Holland, then at war with England, and the Dutch merchant, instead of sending the goods to him directly, shipped them on his own account to a third person, and directed his correspondent not to deliver over the bill of lading unless payment was provided for in a satisfactory manner, it was held that the goods, which were captured on the voyage, remain the property of the consignor, and as such were liable to condemnation. So, where the goods were shipped under a positive order from the claimant, but the shippers, with a view to their own security, had the bill of lading altered so as to be transferable to their own order, Sir William Scott held that the goods, being still under the dominion of the shipper, and subject to his control, the ownership was not legally changed, and upon this ground condemned the cargo as the property of the enemy shipper.¹

§ 11. The same considerations apply where the shipment is made in time of peace by a neutral consignor who becomes an enemy before the completion of the voyage, although there does not, perhaps, exist the same grounds of suspicion as when the consignor is an enemy at the time of shipment. Nevertheless, the courts, even in this case, require the clearest

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 427, 428; the 'Aurora,' 4 Rob. 219; the 'Noydt Gedacht,' 2 Rob. 13, note; the 'Josephine,' 4 Rob. 35; the 'Carolina,' 1 Rob. 304; the 'Merrimack,' 8 Cranch. 328; the 'Venus,' 6 Cranch. 275.

evidence of neutral ownership. This is illustrated by the case of the 'Frances.'¹ Shortly previous to the breaking out of the war between Great Britain and the United States, in 1812, a merchant of Glasgow shipped several bales of goods to certain merchants in New York, and both the bill of lading and the invoice were in the names of the latter, and expressed the shipment to be on their *account and risk*. It appeared, however, by a letter found on board, that the consignor, in making the shipment, had exceeded the order, so that the consignees were in effect released from any obligation to accept the goods, and by this letter he gave them an election to take the whole of the shipment, or none, as they pleased. The goods were captured on the voyage, after war had been declared, by an American privateer, and were condemned as enemy's property. In another case of the same kind, during the same war, the bill of lading expressed the goods to be shipped by a house in Liverpool, unto and on account of certain merchants in New York, and the invoice, signed by a manufacturer in Manchester, described the goods to be consigned to the claimants, but did not specify on whose *account and risk*. And in a letter to the consignees enclosing the invoice, he said 'the goods are to be sold on joint account, or on mine alone.' The goods were accordingly condemned as the property of the shipper.

§ 12. Where goods are shipped by an enemy consignor to a neutral consignee, not under a prior order, but with the expectation that they will be received on the terms proposed, if they are in fact accepted by the consignee previous to the capture, it was held, by Sir William Scott, that his acceptance vests and perfects his title, and that, upon proof of the fact, the property will be restored. To exempt the property from capture, however, the acceptance must be absolute and unconditional. The transaction is then construed in the same manner as if the goods had been originally shipped on his account and at his risk. The same point had previously been raised in the Supreme Court of the United States, but as the acceptance in the case decided was partial and conditional, the Court expressly declined to consider what would have been the effect had the acceptance been absolute.²

¹ 5 *Cran. R.* 354.

² Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 87, the 'Cousine Marianne,' 1 *Edw. Rep.*, p. 346.

§ 13. Every consignor, not only at common law, but by a rule of the general mercantile law, has, in certain cases, a control over the shipment, which is technically called a *right of stoppage in transitu*; that is, a right to countermand the bill of lading, and repossess himself of the goods, at any time after their shipment and before their arrival at their destined port. The only case in which this right of stoppage *in transitu* can be legally exercised, under the laws of war, is, in the expectation, confirmed by the event, of the insolvency of the consignee. If the consignee, previous to the arrival of the goods, communicate to the consignor his determination not to receive or pay for the goods, these facts are deemed equivalent to actual insolvency. But a revocation of the consignment, from fears of the insolvency of the consignee, which are not confirmed by the event, is not deemed sufficient to change the ownership. The effect of this right, when duly exercised, is to save the property from its liability to capture, where the consignment is made from a neutral to an enemy, and to incur that liability, where the consignment is made from an enemy to a neutral.¹

§ 14. But these cases are properly exceptions to the general and well settled rule of the English Admiralty, that, in time of war, the national character of property cannot be changed by a transfer to a neutral during the transportation. That which was enemy's property at the commencement of the voyage, remains liable to capture, until its arrival at the port of destination. Nor, is the application of the rule confined to a transfer in actual war. If it appear that the immediate motive of the transfer, although made in time of peace, was the expectation of war, and that this fact was known to the purchaser, the contract is held to be equally invalid, as against the belligerent whose right of capture was meant to be evaded. 'These rights, however,' says Mr. Duer, 'are an apparent difference in the mode of applying the rule in these cases. In the latter, positive evidence of the intentions of the parties is plainly required; but, in the first, the fact of a transfer is regarded as conclusive proof of the intended

¹ Emerigon, *Traité des Assurances*, ch. xi. § 3; the 'Constancia,' 6 Rob. 324, 333; 'Twende Venner,' 6 Rob. 329, note; Ellis v. Hunt, 3 Term R. 469; Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 Bos. and Pull. 484; Dutton v. Solomon, 3 Bos. and Pull. 582; Cox v. Harden, 4 East, 211.

fraud.' This doctrine seems to have been adopted in its full extent, by the Supreme Court of the United States. The rule of Admiralty, in these and other cases which we have mentioned, is different from that of common law, and its vindication is rested on the ground that its adoption is necessary to the prevention of fraud. A change in the national character of the owner, during the voyage, is not allowed to change the hostile character of property *in transitu*. If he was an enemy at the commencement of the voyage, the property is condemned, notwithstanding he may have become a subject of the capturing power previous to the capture. A Dutch ship, owned and claimed by merchants residing at the Cape of Good Hope, was captured on a voyage from Batavia to Holland, nearly two months after the inhabitants of the Cape of Good Hope, under the capitulation, had sworn allegiance to the British Crown, and had become British subjects. Their ship was condemned, on the sole ground that, 'having sailed as a Dutch ship, her character during the voyage could not be changed.' The propriety of this decision has been seriously questioned. Although the character of property is not permitted to be varied *in transitu*, from hostile to friendly, or neutral, so as to exempt it from capture and confiscation, nevertheless, if it be neutral or friendly at the commencement of the voyage, its character may be so effectually altered before its termination as to ensure its condemnation. As a general rule, no matter what its character at the commencement of the voyage, if its owner is an enemy at the time of the capture, the seizure is lawful and confiscation a necessary consequence. Its fate is determined by the real or constructive character of its ownership at the time of seizure; by its real character, if hostile at the time of capture, and by its constructive character, if neutral or friendly when seized, but hostile at the commencement of the voyage. The rights of the captors are vested at the time of the seizure, and cannot be divested by any subsequent change in the national character of the owner. Previous to adjudication, the owner may have become a neutral, an ally, or a subject, but in neither capacity can he claim exemption from confiscation of property seized while he was an enemy. Nor, to warrant a condemnation, is it in all cases necessary that the owner should be an actual enemy at the time of capture. If the

seizure is provisionally made in contemplation of hostilities, a subsequent declaration of war has a retroactive effect, converting the neutral or friendly owner into a public enemy, and the precautionary seizure into an act of war. The seizure is at first regarded as provisional, or rather an act of an equivocal character, to be determined by subsequent events. If, in the language of Sir William Scott, the dispute terminates in a reconciliation, the seizure is regarded as a mere civil embargo; but if war follow, it impresses upon the original seizure a direct hostile character. But this particular point has been discussed in another chapter.¹

§ 15. The transfer, in time of war, of the vessel of an enemy to a neutral, is a transaction, from its very nature, liable to strong suspicion, and consequently is examined with a jealous and sharp vigilance, and subjected to rules of a peculiar strictness in the prize court of the opposite belligerent. Nevertheless, neutrals have a right to make such purchases of merchant vessels, when they act with good faith, and, consequently, the belligerent powers are not justified, by the law of nations, in attempting to prohibit such transfers by a sweeping interdiction, as was done in former years by both the French and English governments. Ordinances of this character form no part of the law of nations, and, consequently, are not binding upon the prize courts, even of the country by which they are issued. Nevertheless, where the sale is claimed to have been made by an enemy to a neutral, in time of war, it is not unreasonable that its motives, nature, and terms should be an object of the most searching inquiry. The temptation to fraud, in such cases, is so great that the entire transaction should be most strictly examined, otherwise the opposing belligerent might be deprived of his just rights of capture. Hence courts of admiralty have established very severe rules respecting such transfers.²

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 441-444; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 21; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. l. § 4, the 'Boston' case, 5 Rob. 233-250; the 'Diana,' 5 Rob. 60; Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. pp. 101, 102.

The interest or expectancy of creditors in enemy property arrested as prize, even though amounting to a lien upon it, does not exempt it from capture as prize. The 'Mary Clifton,' *Blanchf. Pr. Cas.* 556.

² Abreu, *Treatado de las Presas*, cap. v. § 3; Pouget, *Droit Maritime*, tome i. p. 459; Wheaton, *On Captures*, appen., p. 386; Hautefeuille, *Droit des Nations Neutres*, tit. xi. ch. ii.; Cushing, *Opinions U.S. Att. Genl.*, vol. vi. p. 638.

§ 16. These rules may be briefly stated as follows: the sale of an enemy's vessel to a neutral purchaser, to be valid, must, in all cases, be absolute and unconditional. The title and interest of the vendor must be completely and absolutely divested. If there is any covenant, condition, agreement, or even tacit understanding, by which he retains any portion of his interest, the entire contract is vitiated, and, in international law, regarded as void. Thus, if the vendee is bound by a condition to restore the vessel at the conclusion of the war; or, if the vendor retains a lien upon the vessel, for the whole or a part of the purchase money, the transfer is held

An enemy's vessel ostensibly transferred to a neutral, but continuing in the enemy's trade, manned by subjects of the enemy, and sailing from and to an enemy's port, was condemned. The 'Embsden,' 1 Rob. 13. The sale of a ship of the enemy's to a neutral must be absolute and *bond fide*. Any equity of redemption or other defeasance will be considered to keep the title still in the enemy. The 'Sechs Geschwistern,' 4 Rob. 100. A vessel purchased in the enemy's country continually employed in the trade of that country during war, and evidently on account of the war, was deemed to be a ship of that country. The 'Vigilantia,' 1 Rob. 13.

In the case of the purchase of an enemy's vessel by a neutral, it appearing that the asserted neutral was a person then resident in the enemy's country, it was held that the presumption was that he was there *in rebus inveniendi*, and that the proof lay on the claimant to explain it. The 'Bernon,' 1 Rob. 102.

A vessel, sold in a blockaded port by a neutral, who had himself purchased of the enemy since the commencement of hostilities, was taken coming out of that port, and was condemned. The 'Vigilantia,' Keyl., 5 Rob. 122.

A British ship was fictitiously transferred to Russian merchants, to prevent her seizure by the Russian authorities, while lying icebound in a Russian port, at the outbreak of the Crimean war, 1854. She was seized as Russian property, by the customs officers, on her arrival at Leith. The Prize Court was of opinion, that the case presented very considerable difficulties, of a perfectly novel character, for if the vessel was not restored to the claimants, there was no alternative but to condemn her to the Crown. And how? not as taken by a non-commissioned captor, but—following the case of the 'Etrusco' (Lords of Appeal, 11 August, 1803—to the Crown, for a violation of the British law. This, the Court could not do; 1st, because there was no proof of a violation of British law, which, by British law, would entail a condemnation; 2ndly, because there had been no intention to commit a *matul fide* act, in violation of British law; lastly, because the whole transaction was a deception on the British Customs for the purpose of protecting British property, not for the purpose of deceiving British authorities, nor with the intention of violating British law, but for rescuing property supposed to be in the grasp of the enemy. The Court, however, expressed considerable doubt whether this course of proceeding on the part of the claimant, even for a laudable purpose, was quite correct. The 'Ocean Bride,' Spinks, Pri. Cas., 66.

See also the 'Benedict,' Spinks, Pri. Cas., 314, a case of the *bond fide* transfer from an enemy to a neutral, and Sorensen v. Reg., *supra*, p. 128.

to be colourable and void. Even where the sale is ostensibly absolute, if the vessel continues under the control and management of her former owner, and in the same trade and navigation in which she was previously employed, these circumstances are deemed conclusive evidence of a fraudulent intent to cover, under the name of a neutral, the property of an enemy and the contract is necessarily adjudged to be invalid.¹ So, also, if the neutral vendee, although residing himself in a neutral country, continues to employ the vessel constantly in the trade of the country to which she belonged, she is as thoroughly incorporated in a hostile commerce, as if she had never been transferred. The inference from these circumstances is not to be resisted, that the sole object of the transfer was to enable the vessel to carry on the enemy's trade without a liability, and, consequently, that the sale was collusive, and a meditated fraud upon belligerent rights. But, in these cases, condemnation would follow from the hostile character impressed upon the vessel by the trade in which she is employed, even if the transfer were to be considered as in itself valid. If, says Sir William Scott, a neutral chooses to engage himself in the trade of a belligerent nation, he must be content to bear all the consequences of the speculation;

¹ A vessel belonging to a Russian, sailed from Cronstadt with a cargo of wheat on May 17, 1854, bound to Lenth, where she arrived in June, and was there seized by the customs officers. She was said to have been transferred, by virtue of a power of attorney, to a Dane at Messina, then resold by virtue of another power of attorney to her master while at Copenhagen, in the course of her voyage. She was condemned by the English Prize Court as never having been *bond fide* transferred. It was held, that the Court looks rather for the natural evidence of a transaction, such as correspondence, than for formal documents, and that the Court can restore to the claimant, only in the character in which he claims, and that the onus of full and complete proof lies upon such claimant. 'The master had made an affidavit, after the capture, stating that he had taken on board his cargo on May 14: thus he had done, with the evident intention of bringing his vessel within the protection of a certain Order in Council, which would not have protected him had he named the real date. Dr. Lushington observed that, not only had the claimant failed to prove his claim, but that even if the proof of ownership had been more stringent, he was not satisfied that he could have restored the property to the master, as entitled to a Danish character. If a man chooses to clothe himself illicitly with a Danish character, and attempts to get restitution under that pretence, and is detected by the Court, it is not very consistent with law or justice, that he should then be entitled to turn round, and say, 'I played the rogue—I tried to persuade you I was a Dane, but I am in reality a Russian; give me the benefit of that Order in Council which I should have been entitled to, if I had acted as an honest man.' The 'Poglasie,' 2 Spinks, 101.

if he confines himself exclusively to the trade and navigation of an enemy's country, he is liable to be considered an enemy, in respect to the vessel so employed. If a merchant vessel of an enemy shelters itself from hostile pursuit in a neutral port, and on account of the difficulty or impossibility of escape, is there sold, it has been contended that such sale is a violation of belligerent rights; but the purchase of a neutral, under such circumstances, if *bonâ fide*, is considered valid, and sustained by courts of prize. But not so with respect to the purchase of an enemy's ship-of-war, under like circumstances, for it is held that neutrals cannot purchase ships-of-war from either of the belligerents. It has been held by the British courts of prize, that a ship cannot change her character *in transitu*, and that a transfer to a neutral, notwithstanding the *bonâ fides* of the transaction, will not exempt her from capture and condemnation. This doctrine is sustained by the *dicta* of Mr. Justice Story, in the 'Ann Green' and the 'Francis,' but the question has not been directly decided in our courts. It, therefore, remains a debatable point with us. Such is a summary of the rules adopted by the British prize courts with respect to the transfer of ships during the war, from one of the belligerents to a neutral. So far as they conform to the rules of evidence and logical proof, established by the practice and consent of the nations of Christendom, they are obligatory, and can neither be resisted nor disputed. But, beyond this, they have no force as rules of international law. For no belligerent nation can impose upon a neutral its regulations, or dictate to such neutral unusual rules of evidence, or arbitrary means of proof. In other words, if a neutral, who has purchased a vessel from a belligerent, holds such vessel by a title valid by the law of nations, he cannot be deprived of it by a prize court, because he does not prove his ownership according to the arbitrary and unusual rules of evidence which that court may adopt. If the sale be valid, it cannot be annulled by any rules which a belligerent nation may see fit to prescribe for itself, but which, by the law of nations, are not obligatory upon neutrals.¹

¹ The 'Ann Green,' 1 *Gal.* 289; Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. pp. 84, et seq.; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. p. 448; Duver, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 446-448; Klüber, *Droit des Gens*, § 234; Rayneval, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, liv. iii. chs. xiv. xv.; the 'Noydt Gedacht,' 2 *Rob.* 137, note; the 'Sechs Geschwistern,' 4 *Rob.* 100; the 'Vigilantia,' 1 *Rob.*

§ 17. It follows, from the rules of decision heretofore announced, that the character of property on the high seas, whether vessels or goods, results, as a general rule, from the character of their owners, or those who are regarded in international law as the owners. If such owners are hostile, friendly or neutral, according to the particular rules of law applicable to the state of war, their property is, in general, to be considered hostile, friendly or neutral, and as such, subject to, or exempt from, capture.¹ The laws of war applicable to ownership are, as before remarked, different from those which apply in time of peace, and hence what, by the latter, would be considered the property of a neutral, will not unfrequently, by the former, be regarded as the property of an enemy. But there are numerous exceptions to this general rule, that the character of property on the high seas results from that of its owner, for the property of neutrals, subjects and allies, is not unfrequently impressed with a hostile character from the circumstances of its locality, use, etc. Thus ships are deemed to belong to the country under whose *flag* and *pass* they sail; at least, this circumstance is conclusive as against the party who takes the benefit of them, although they do not bind *other parties*, as against him. So, a ship belonging to a neutral owner may acquire a hostile character from the trade in which she engages, or some particular act which she may do. The same may be said with respect to proprietary interests in cargoes, although, in general, goods have the same national character as their owners; yet they

1; the 'Embliden,' 1 *Rob.* 16; the 'Jemmy,' 4 *Rob.* 31; the 'Argo,' 1 *Rob.* 163; the 'Vrouw Hermina,' 1 *Rob.* 163; the 'Endraught,' 1 *Rob.* 18, 19; the 'Minerva,' 6 *Rob.* 396, 399; the 'Omnibus,' 6 *Rob.* 71; the 'Packet de Bilbao,' 2 *Rob.* 133.

¹ A cargo was purchased and shipped in Holland when at war with Great Britain, on board a neutral vessel; on it being proved by the bill of lading and other papers to be the property of a merchant in Hamburg, then in neutrality, it was held not liable to condemnation as prize. *O'Neale v. Cordes and Gronemeyer* (1805), 13 *F.* c. 221.

If a British ship, captured by an enemy, is afterwards purchased by a British subject, she is still, in the contemplation of the law of England, the property of the person from whom she was captured. *Woodward v. Larking*, 3 *Esp.* 286; the 'Reward,' *Hay and Mar.* 197. The 55 *Gen.* c. 160, § 5, now expired, enacted that if any British ship, taken as prize by the enemy, be set forth for war by the enemy, it shall, on being recaptured by British subjects, be condemned as prize to the recaptors. See cases, the 'Horatio,' 6 *Rob.* 320; 'L'Actif,' *Edwards*, 185; the 'Ceylon,' 1 *Dods.* 114; the 'Georgiana,' *Ibid.* 401.

sometimes have impressed on them a hostile character while their owners are friendly or neutral, sometimes from their origin, character, or use, and sometimes from the acts of their owners, of the ship in which they are carried, or of the master in charge of them. These questions will be more particularly discussed in the following chapters, and more especially in that on the determination of national character.¹

§ 18. In determining the national character of property, courts of prize generally look only to the legal title; and when, from the papers, the right of property in a captured ship or cargo appears to be vested in an enemy, no equitable or secret liens of a neutral or a subject can be made the foundation of a claim to defeat or vary the rights of the captors. The only exception to this rule, is where the lien is immediately and visibly incumbent upon the property, and consequently, is one which the party claiming its benefit has the means of enforcing without resort to legal process. Of such a nature is the freight due to the owner of the ship, for the ship-owner has the cargo in his possession, subject to his demand of freight money, by the general law, independent of any contract. The distinction between the two classes of liens is properly expressed in the language of the civil law, by regarding one as a *jus ad rem*, and the other as a *jus in re*.²

§ 19. It is stated by Mr. Wheaton that, in addition to the *certificate of registry*, which is the proof naturally to be looked

¹ The 'Vrouw Anna Catharina,' 5 Rob. 161; the 'Magnus,' 1 Rob. 31; the 'Fortuna,' 1 Dod. R. 67; the 'Success,' 1 Dod. R. 131; the 'Princessa,' 2 Rob. 47; the 'Anna Catharina,' 4 Rob. 107; the 'Rendsborg,' 4 Rob. 121; the 'Commercen,' 1 Wheaton R. 382; the 'Phoenix,' 5 Rob. 20; the 'Drie Gebroeders,' 4 Rob. 232; the 'Industrie,' Spinks R. 444.

² A great distinction has always been made, by the nations of Europe, between ships and goods. Some countries have gone so far as to make the flag and pass of a ship conclusive on the cargo also, but the Courts of Great Britain have never carried the principle to that extent. They hold the ship to be bound by the character imposed on it, by the authority of that Government from which all the documents issue, but that goods, which have no such dependence upon the authority of the State, may be differently considered. As to the further question, whether the Courts will make the separation, it may be said, that in time of peace such separations will generally be made, but that in time of war a more strict principle may become necessary. See the 'Elizabeth' (5 Rob. 2.), and *post*, ch. xiii. § 19, the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court of the U.S. between that case and the 'Julia' (8 Cranch, 181).

³ The 'San José Indano,' 2 Gallis. R. 284; the 'Francesca,' 18 Cranch. 118; the 'Tobago,' 5 Rob. 218; the 'Marianna,' 6 Rob. 24.

to for the national character of the ship, the following proof of property in a vessel and cargo are usually required : ' 1st, the *Passport*, or *Sea-Letter*. This is a permission from the neutral State to the master of the vessel to proceed on the intended voyage, and usually contains his name and residence, the name, description, and destination of the vessel, with such other matter as the local law and practice require.' ' 2nd, the *Muster Roll*, or *Rôle d'Equipage*, containing the names, age, quality, and national character of every one of the ship's company.' ' 3rd, the *Charter Party*; if the vessel has been let to hire.' ' 4th, the *Bills of Lading*, by which the master acknowledges the receipt of the goods specified therein, and promises to deliver to the consignee or his order.' ' 5th, the *Invoyes*, which contain the particulars and prices of each parcel of the goods, with a statement of the charges thereon.' ' 6th, the *Log-book*, or ship's *Journal*, which contains an accurate account of the vessel's course, with a short history of the occurrences during the voyage.' ' As the whole of these papers may be fabricated,' says Mr. Wheaton, their 'presence does not necessarily imply a fair case; neither does the absence of any of them furnish a conclusive ground of condemnation, as has been most unjustly provided by the ordinances of certain belligerent powers. As they furnish presumptive evidence only of the property in the vessel and cargo belonging to those to whom it purports to belong; so, on the other hand, their absence affords only presumptive evidence of the existence of enemy interests, which may be rebutted by other proof of a positive nature, accounting for the want of them, and supplying their place, according to the circumstances of each particular case.' At one period it was customary for the government of the United States to issue sea-letters and certificates of ownership to vessels owned by American citizens, whether entitled or not to registry and enrolment. But, since the Acts of March 26 and June 30, 1810, these particular documents are not often issued. With respect to ships which have been transferred abroad, a bill of sale is the proper evidence of ownership. 'A bill of sale,' says Lord Stowell, 'is the proper title to which the maritime courts of all countries would look. It is the universal instrument of the transfer of ships in the usage of all maritime countries.'

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 130; Wheaton, *On Captures*, pp.

120 There seems to be some difference in the laws of different states, as well as in the decisions of their courts and in the opinions of their text-writers, with respect to the character of the documents requisite to prove the neutrality of a vessel, and with respect to the effect of those documents even when their genuineness is unimpeached. Bello is of opinion that the passport, or sea-letter, is absolutely indispensable for the security of the vessel. Article 2 of the French Ordonnance of July 26, 1778, requires that neutral vessels shall prove their neutral character by '*passes-ports, connaissements, factures et autres pièces d'abord, l'une desquelles au moins constatera la propriété neutre*,' etc. And Article 6 of the Ordonnance of 1861, says: '*Seront encore de bonne prise les vaisseaux, avec leur chargement, dans lesquels il ne sera trouvé chartes-parties, connaissements, ni factures*.' Abreu was of opinion that these words were to be taken collectively and not distributively. But this is evidently erroneous, for another provision of the Ordonnance is (Article 13) that no friendly or neutral vessel is to be made prize, if the captain produces the '*charte-partie ou police de chargement*,' which latter word signifies the same as *connaissement*. Massé seems to think that the absence of a passport is a necessary cause of confiscation, and that it cannot be replaced by any other document. But Hautefeuille, Pistoye and Duverdy, and others, do not

65, 66, Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. 1, pp. 550, 551; the '*Sisters*,' 5 *Rob.* 155, the '*Pizaro*,' 2 *Whiston R.* 227; the '*Amiable Isabella*,' 6 *Whiston R.* 1, the '*Nereide*,' 9 *Comach.* 388.

A Bill of Health, or certificate properly authenticated, that the ship comes from a place where no contagious distemper prevails, and that none of the crew at the time of her departure, were infected with such distemper, is to be found among the papers of the ships of many nations.

It is a master's duty to produce all his papers, and least of all to withhold his Instructions, which are very important papers. The '*Concordia*,' 1 *Rob.* 120.

To make a voyage fairly alternative it should appear on the papers to be so, for otherwise it must mislead the cruisers of the belligerent countries.—The '*Juffrau Anna*,' 1 *Rob.* 124.

If it be clearly evident that a vessel, although without papers, is neutral, her detention by a ship of war is not justifiable, but in the absence of that clear evidence, a ship of war is justified in detaining a ship when the more important papers of the latter are wanting; the same, if those papers are irregular or inconsistent with each other, or with the statements of the master. The '*Sarah*,' 3 *Rob.* 330, the '*Anna*,' 5 *Rob.* 384. *Nuestra Señora de Piedade*, 6 *Rob.* 43. As to regularity of papers, false papers, and spoliation, see *post*, cc. 23 and 27; as to endorsement of a ship's papers, see the '*Hendrick and Maria*,' 1 *Rob.* 82, and 4 *Rob.* 53; as to marks on British ships, see 39 & 40 *Vict. c.* 80.

consider it as indispensable, and such has been the decision of the French courts. According to English and American decisions, the neutral character of a vessel may be sustained without her having on board either register, or passport, although in the absence of both, the presumption would be against her. *Si aliquid ex solemnibus deficiat, cum acquit possit, subveniendum est.* As already stated, the presence of the usual documents would not be conclusive in her favour.

§ 21. As the French decisions on this subject have differed in some respects, from our own, we will give a synopsis of a few of the most important. In the case of 'Le Nisus' c. 'Le Mansouré et Le Rouge,' it was held that a merchant coasting-vessel, without documents aboard, was not a good prize where not required by the laws and usages of its own government; but, in the 'Mistick Grec' c. 'La Junon,' where such vessel was armed, it was condemned as good prize. In the case of 'La Notre-Dame du Pilier,' it was held that the evidence of the crew, as to the hostile character of the vessel, must prevail over the neutral character of the papers found aboard. The same decision was confirmed in 'Le Munster' c. 'Le Brave' and 'La Nancy' c. 'L'Enjoleur.' In 'Le Saint-Antoine, et al c. 'L'Audacieux,' where the vessels were furnished with double documents, French and belligerent, further evidence was resorted to, which evidence established their hostile character and they were condemned. In 'La Molly' c. 'L'Ecole,' notwithstanding the neutral and regular character of the documents found aboard, the vessel was condemned as hostile on other evidence. In the case of 'Le Winyan' c. 'L'Ariège,' regular neutral papers were shown, but others showing the hostile character of the vessel were also found aboard, and she was condemned. In the case of 'Le Reysiger' c. 'Le Courageux,' two neutral passports were found aboard, one for coasting, and the other for a certain destination; it being shown that the second was to be used only on the expiration of the first, the vessel was restored. In the case of 'La Fredricka,' it was held, that the effect of documents was not to be determined by their title, but by their contents, and that, where the *instruction du propriétaire* to the captain contained everything

¹ Massé, *Droit Commercial*, liv. ii. tit. 1. § 342; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. xii.; Merlin, *Répertoire*, verb. *Prises Maritimes*, § 3; Abreu, *Traité des Prises*, pt. i. ch. ii. § 17.

that the charter-party, invoice, bill of lading and manifest, usually contain, it would serve as a substitute for them all. The character of the vessel, as friendly or neutral, must, as a general rule, be determined by the documents found aboard and the testimony of the captors, but in case of French vessels having simulated enemy papers aboard for the purpose of deceiving the enemy, papers not on board have been admitted as evidence to exempt such vessel from confiscation, as was decided in the cases of 'Le Censor' c. 'L'Entreprise' and 'Les Deux Charlottes' c. 'Le Filibustier.' In the case of 'Le Jonge Cornelis' c. 'L'Actif et al.,' the vessel of an ally was allowed to prove her nationality by documents not on board at the time of capture. In the case of the Swedish vessel 'L'Eleonora,' it was held that *Lettres de franchise* were a good substitute for the passport; and in the case of 'La Carolina Wilhelmina' c. 'Le Dragon,' it was held that, in the Baltic, a certificate of ownership would serve the same purpose. In 'Le Christiern-Svenn' and 'La Paix' c. 'Le Général Moreau,' it was held that a neutral passport, to be available, must be renewed as often as the vessel returns to ports of her own country; but (in 'Le Quintus' c. 'L'Epervier' and 'La Bagatelle' c. 'Le Basque') this rule does not apply to coasting-vessels or Levant traders. In the case of 'La Constance' c. 'Les Deux Amis,' where the passport was found to be null and void, the neutrality of the vessel was determined by other documents found aboard. Passports to vessels absent from the country at the time of their issue, are not in general available; vide 'Le Haabet' c. 'L'Heureux,' 'Le Munster Doris' c. 'Le Brave,' 'La Constance' c. 'Les Deux Amis,' 'La Famille,' 'Le Zenodore' c. 'La Charitas'; but vessels purchased by one neutral, in the ports of another neutral power, are exceptions to this rule, vide 'L'Engel-Elisabeth' c. 'Le Bon Ordre, et al.' and 'L'Attention' c. 'Le Deucalion'; other special exceptions were made in the cases of 'La Notre-Dame de Bon-Conseil' c. 'Le Coureur,' and 'L'Amitié' c. 'Le Camus.' A passport issued by a public officer of a neutral state, residing in an enemy country, he being part owner, was held, in 'Le Wikilladge' c. 'L'Emilie,' to be null, and the vessel a good prize. A passport from America to Africa and back, is not available for trading voyages between Africa and Europe, and a passport for a neutral port is not good for an enemy's port; vide 'Le

Frederic' c. 'L'Ariège,' and 'L'Ami de Boston' c. 'La Bel-lone.' A neutral vessel with a neutral passport, but com-manded by a captain born in the enemy's country, is a good prize, although he has been naturalised a neutral after the declaration of war; this is especially so when he has not been domiciled in neutral country, but when he has long resided in neutral country, he is regarded as neutral and the ship is safe; vide 'L'Actéon' c. 'Le Friendship,' 'L'Arms' c. 'La Mar-carade,' and 'Le Ruby' c. 'Le Bougainville.' Bills of lading signed by the shippers, but not by the captain, are available to prove the neutral character of goods, if the captain has signed the duplicate, delivered to the shippers; vide 'La Constance' c. 'Les Deux Amis,' 'La Louise-Auguste' c. 'Le Bonaparte,' and 'L'Anna'; it was, also, held, in the same cases, that the want of the captain's signature to the duplicates in his own hands, was no cause of capture, as he could have signed them at any time. Where the charter-party does not contain a manifest of the cargo, the bills of lading are necessary to prove its neutral character; vide 'L'Anna.' Where there is no par-ticular bill of lading for a part of the cargo, but the manifest has all the formalities required for bills of lading, it is to be regarded as a general bill of lading, and is sufficient to cover the whole cargo; vide 'Le Wilhelm' c. 'Le Juste.'

¹ Pistoye et Duverdy, *Des Prises*, tit. vi. ch. ii. § 4; Dallaz, *Répertoire*, verb. *Prises Maritimes*, § 3; Pouget, *Droit Maritime*, tome i. pp. 423, et seq.

The following list, extracted from Mr. Godfrey Lushington's excel-lent little 'Manual of Naval Prize Law,' specifies what are the various papers in addition to the Custom House clearance, the manifest of cargo, and the bills of lading which may usually be found on board the vessels of the principal Maritime States, viz. —

Austria.

- Secontrino ministeriale (certificate of registry).
- Patente sovrana (royal license).
- Giornale di navigazione (official log-book).
- Scartafaccio, giornale di navigazione cotidiano (ship's log-book).
- Charter-party, if vessel is chartered.
- Ruolo dell' equipaggio (list of crew).
- Bill of health.

Denmark.

- Royal passport, in Latin, with translation (available only for the voyage for which it is issued, unless renewed by attestation).
- Certificate of ownership.
- Build-brief.
- Admeasurement-brief.
- Burgher-brief (certificate that the master is a Danish subject).
- Charter-party (if vessel is chartered).
- Muster-roll.

§ 22. Vessels of *discovery*, or of expeditions of exploration and survey, sent for the examination of unknown seas, islands, and coasts, are, by general consent, exempt from the

Finland.

Materbref (certificate of measurement).
 Belbref (certificate of build).
 Journalen (ship's log-book).
 Charter-party (if vessel is chartered).
 Folkpass (crew list).

France.

L'acte de francisation (*i.e.*, certificate of nationality).
 Le congé (sailing license).
 Le journal timbré (stamped log-book signed by consul on clearance of vessel).
 Le journal du bord (ship's log-book).
 National flag.
 Charter-party (if vessel is chartered).
 Le rôle d'équipage (list of crew).
 Bill of health.

Germany.

Messbrief (certificate of measurement).
 Beilbrief (builder's certificate).
 Seepass (sailing license).
 Journall (ship's log-book).
 Charter-party (if vessel is chartered).
 Musterrolle (muster-roll).

Great Britain.

Certificate registry.
 Official log-book.
 Ship's log-book.
 National flag and code of signals.
 Code of signals and numeral flags.
 Charter-party (if vessel is chartered).
 Shipping articles.
 Muster-roll.
 Bill of health.

Where a vessel, not on the register, becomes at a foreign port the property of persons qualified to be owners of a British vessel, the British consular officer there may grant a provisional certificate, to be in force for six months or until she arrives at some port where there is a British registrar; and this certificate is to contain the name of the vessel, the time and place of her purchase, and the names of her purchasers, the name of her master, and the best particulars as to her tonnage, build, and description that he is able to obtain. 17 and 18 Vict. c. 104, sec. 54.

A pass with the force of a certificate within the time and limits mentioned therein, may be granted in the case of a British vessel before registry to proceed from any one port or place to any other, both being in Her Majesty's dominions. *Ibid.*, sec. 98.

Holland.

Meetbrief (certificate of tonnage).
 Bijlbrief (certificate of ownership).
 Zeebrief (sailing license).
 Journal (ship's log-book).
 National flag.
 Charter-party (if vessel is chartered).
 Monster-rol (Muster-roll).
 Bill of health.

contingencies of war, and therefore not liable to capture. Like the sacred vessel which the Athenians sent with their annual offerings to the temple of Delos, they are respected by

Italy.

Scontrino ministeriale (certificate of registry).
 Patente sovrana (royal license).
 Giornale di navigazione (official log-book).
 Scartafaccio, giornale di navigazione cotidiano (ship's log-book).
 Charter-party (if vessel is chartered).
 Ruolo dell'equipaggio (list of crew).
 Bill of health.

Norway.

Bulbrev (certificate of build).
 Maalebrev (certificate of measurement).
 Nationalitetsbrevs (certificate of nationality).
 Journale (ship's log-book).
 Charter-party (if the vessel is chartered).
 Muster-roll or mandskabsliste, or volkelist (list of crew).
 Vessels purchased by Norwegian subjects in foreign ports are permitted for two years to sail without a bulbrev or maalebrev.

Russia.

L'acte de construction ou d'acquisition du navire (builder's certificate).
 La patente portant autorisation d'arborer le pavillon marchand Russe (certificate of nationality).
 Journal du capitaine (ship's log-book).
 Charter-party (if vessel is chartered).
 Le rôle d'équipage (crew list).

Spain.

La patente real (royal license).
 El diario de navegacion (ship's log-book).
 National flag.
 Charter-party (if vessel is chartered).
 El rol (list of crew).
 Bill of health.

Sweden.

A passport from a chief magistrate or Commissioner of Customs.
 Bulbref (builder's certificate).
 Matebref (certificate of measurement).
 Fribref (certificate of registry).
 Journalen (ship's log-book).
 Charter-party (if vessel is chartered).
 Folkpass or s'emansruba (muster-roll).
 Vessels purchased by Swedish subjects in foreign ports are permitted on application to the Board of Commerce, to sail for one year without a fribref.

United States.

Certificate of registry.
 Sea-letter, or certificate of ownership.
 Ship's log-book.
 National flag.
 Charter-party (if the vessel is chartered).
 Shipping articles.
 Muster-roll.
 Bill of health.

all nations, because their labours are intended for the benefit of all mankind.¹ Thus, when Captain Cook sailed from Plymouth, in 1776, in the ship 'Resolution,' accompanied by the 'Discovery,' M. de Sartine, the French Minister of Marine, dispatched a letter to the Admiralties and chambers of commerce throughout the kingdom, to be communicated to the owners and captains of vessels cruising as privateers or otherwise, directing them, in case they met at sea, to treat him and his vessels as neutrals and friends, provided that he, on his side, abstained from all hostility. This praiseworthy example has since been followed by all civilised powers toward vessels similarly employed. It is, however, usual and proper for the government sending out such expeditions, to give formal notice to other powers, describing the character and object of the expedition, the number of vessels employed, the nature of their armament, etc., in order that they may issue the proper instructions to their own vessels on the high seas. Such expeditions must confine themselves most strictly to the object in view; if they commit any act of hostility they forfeit their exemption from capture.²

§ 23. Fishing-boats have, also, as a general rule, been exempted from the effects of hostilities. As early as 1521, while war was raging between Charles V. and Francis, ambassadors from these two sovereigns met at Calais, then English, and agreed, that, whereas the herring fishery was about to commence, the subjects of both belligerents engaged in this pursuit, should be safe and unmolested by the other party,

¹ It has been the invariable practice of European powers to grant safe conducts to ships sent to explore the Arctic regions against being captured by ships of war on their return, in the event of war breaking out during such absence.

And on the same principle the Vice-Admiralty Court of Halifax restored to the Academy of Arts in Philadelphia a case of Italian paintings and prints, captured on their passage to the United States by a British ship of war in 1812, 'in conformity to the law of nations, as practised by all civilised countries, and because the arts and sciences are admitted to form an exception to the severe rights of warfare.'—(Stewart, *The Id.* R. 482.)

A case of books taken on board a prize vessel was restored by the United States to a literary institution of the hostile State, on the ground that it was not the subject of a commercial adventure. (The 'Amelia,' 4 Phil. 412.)

Lord Howe considered that the custom of nations at war with each other did not justify an officer in wantonly throwing a casket of public money into the sea.—Lord Howe's *Life*, p. 479.

² Emergon, *Traité des Assurances*, ch. xii. § 19.

and should have leave to fish as in time of peace. In the war of 1800, the British and French Governments issued formal instructions exempting the fishing-boats of each other's subjects from seizure. This order was subsequently rescinded by the British Government, on the alleged ground that some French fishing-boats were equipped as gun-boats, and that some French fishermen, who had been prisoners in England, had violated their parole not to serve, and had gone to join the French fleet at Brest. Such excuses were evidently mere pretexts; and after some angry discussions had taken place on the subject, the British restriction was withdrawn, and the freedom of fishing was again allowed on both sides. French writers consider this exemption as an established principle of the modern law of war, and it has been so recognised in the French courts, which have restored such vessels when captured by French cruisers.¹

§ 24. Some have contended that the rule of exemption ought to extend to cases of shipwreck on a belligerent coast, to cases of forced refuge in a belligerent harbour by stress of weather, or want of provisions, and even to cases of entering such ports from ignorance of the war. There are exceptional cases where such exemption has been granted. Thus, when the English man-of-war, the 'Elizabeth,' had been forced by stress of weather, in 1746, to take refuge in the belligerent port of Havana, the captain offered to surrender himself to the Spanish governor as prisoner, and his vessel as a prize; but the latter refused to take advantage of his distress, on the contrary, he offered him every facility for repairing his

¹ Wildman, *Law of Nations*, p. 152; Martens, *Recueil*, etc., tome 8, pp. 503, 515; De Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. i. tit. iii. § 36; liv. ii. c. 19; Massé, *Droit Commercial*, liv. ii. tit. i. § 333.

Henry VI. issued orders on the subject of fishing vessels in 1403 and 1406. Emerigon (c. iv § 9), refers to ordinances of France and Holland in favour of the protection of fishermen during war. Fishermen were included in the treaty between the United States and Prussia, in 1783, as a class of non-combatants not to be molested by either side.

But such exceptions form a rule of comity only, and not of legal decision. Fishing vessels fall under the description of ships employed in the enemy's trade, and as such may be condemned as prize. (The 'Young Jacob,' *Kob.* 20.)

The British Government, in 1810 (then at war with Denmark), having been informed that the inhabitants of the *Feroe* Islands and *Island*, part of the dominions of Denmark, were reduced to extreme misery, in consequence of the want of their accustomed supplies, ordered that they should not be disturbed by hostilities, but that they should be treated as neutrals. Moreover, a British Consul was appointed to Iceland.

vessel, and, on leaving, gave him a safe-conduct as far as the Bermudas. Again, in 1780, an English captain entered the Spanish port of San Fernando de Omoa, in Honduras, without knowing that it was belligerent. The Spanish commandant refused to take advantage of his ignorance, but permitted him to provision his ship and to sail unmolested to Jamaica. On the other hand, the French squadron which entered Louisburg, in the Island of Cape Breton, in 1745, ignorant of its hostile character, was captured as prize, and its officers and crews retained as prisoners of war. The French captain Nalin entered the port of Granada, in the Antilles, in the war 1780, ignorant of its hostile character. He was immediately seized as prisoner of war, and his vessel as a good prize. In 1799 a Prussian vessel, 'La Diana,' forced to take refuge in the port of Dunkirk, was restored by the French Tribunal on the principle of *res sacra miser*; but in the analogous case of 'Maria Arendz,' in 1800, the Court condemned, in strict conformity with the French ordonnances. A court may be compelled by a sense of duty to condemn in such cases, but the sovereign power of the State might well exercise its sense of humanity and generosity by restoring even after condemnation. Notwithstanding the plea raised by French writers in such cases that, *le malheur opère de plein droit une trêve*, the principle is neither admitted by the general law of nations, nor by the maritime ordonnances of France.¹

¹ Nor by the practice of France during the Revolution. Pistoye et Duverdy, *Des Prises*, vol. i. pp. 114, 122; Ordonnance de 1681; Ordonnance de 1696, May 12; Règlement de 1778, July 26, Arts. 14, 15; Arrêté de 1800, March 27, Arts. 19, 20; Déclaration de 1854, March 29.

CHAPTER XXIII.

TRADE WITH THE ENEMY.

1. Property of subjects and allies engaged in trade with the enemy liable to confiscation—2. Exceptions—3. Rule rigorously enforced—4. Cases of attempt to evade it—5. Withdrawal from enemy's country at beginning of war—6. Distinction between cases of domicile and mere residence—7. Necessity of a licence discussed—8. Decisions in the United States—9. Where order of shipment cannot be countermanded—10. Good faith or mistake no defence—11. Different kinds of trade—12. Vessels liable to capture during continuous voyage—13. When offence is completed—14. Share of partner in neutral house—15. Transfer of ships—16. Regularity of papers not conclusive—17. Trade by resident or domiciled stranger—18. Distinction between native subject and domiciled stranger—19. Effect of acceptance of a licence from the enemy—20. Possessions and colonies of the enemy—21. Rule of insurance.

§ 1. IT may be stated, as a general proposition, that the property of a subject found engaged in trade or intercourse with the ports, territories, or subjects of a public enemy, is liable to confiscation. This rule is not founded on any peculiar criminality in the intentions of the party, or on any direct loss or injury resulting to the State, but is the necessary consequence of a state of war, which places the citizens or subjects of the belligerent States in hostility to each other, and prohibits all intercourse between them. The protection of the interests and welfare of the State makes the application of this rule especially necessary to the merchant and trader, who, under the temptations of an unlimited intercourse with the enemy, by artifice or fraud, or from motives of cupidity, might be led to sacrifice those interests.¹ The same rule is

¹ See *United States v. Boxe of Arms* (1 *Bond*, 446) as to the application of this rule to the States which joined the Southern Confederacy during the American Civil War. See also *Gay's Gold* (13 *Wall*, 350), and *United States v. Homeyer* (2 *Bond*, 217) as to the effect of the Acts of Congress, Proclamations, &c., on the same rule.

No contract made with an alien enemy, in time of war, can be enforced in England, even though the plaintiff enemy does not sue till the return of peace (*Willison v. Patteson*, 7 *Taunt.* 439); but a contract between two English subjects, in an enemy's country, is legal (*Antoine v. Morshead*, 6 *Taunt.* 239); if an enemy be put in the King's peace, by

able to the subjects of an ally. Where two or more States are allied in a war, the relations of the subjects of the ally toward the common enemy are precisely the same as those of the subjects of the principal belligerent. In this respect, there is no distinction between the two; and if the laws of their own country do not enforce the rights and duties of war, those of the principal or co-belligerent may do so. The tribunals of all have an equal right to enforce the laws of war, and to punish any infractions, whether committed by the subjects of their own government, or of that of an ally.

As neither of the allies in a common war can relax its favour of its own subjects, without the consent of its co-belligerent, the general rule which prohibits all commercial intercourse with the common enemy, it is held that the subjects of one State cannot plead in the prize courts of its ally the permission of their own sovereign to engage in such prohibited trade, and that such permission will not exempt them from condemnation the property so employed. This rule is to be founded on good and substantial reasons. We quote the remarks of Sir William Scott on this point. 'It is of no importance,' he says, 'to other nations, how much a belligerent chooses to weaken and dilute his own rights. It is otherwise when *allied nations* are pursuing a common cause against a common enemy. Between them, it may be taken as an implied, if not an express contract, that each State shall not do anything to defeat the general object. If one State permits its subjects to carry on an interrupted intercourse with the enemy, the consequence may be that it will afford aid and comfort to the enemy, especially if it is

by a flag of truce, or other act of public authority, he is entitled to sue for it. (1 *Term R.* 86), and the modern *practice* has been to allow debts and actions to revive on the return of peace. It has been held in the United States that war does not confiscate debts or property for the benefit of debtors or agents, but only suspends the right of recovery.

After peace, the obligation of an agent, who has collected funds in the territory of one belligerent upon account of a resident in the other, to pay over to his principal, revives.—*Caldwell v. Harding*, 1 *Law*, 1. In the English courts *Wolfe v. Oxholm* (6 M. and Sel. 92) decides that private debts cannot be confiscated.

Where members of a partnership are belligerents, war dissolves the partnership as to future joint dealings, though not as to winding up the affairs of the firm. Thus, where a partner resided in a belligerent territory it was held that he could not after the breaking out of the rebellion act as an agent and give him partnership funds to purchase cotton for the South.—*Cramer v. United States*, 7 *Cl. of Cl.* 302.

an enemy depending very materially on the resources of foreign commerce, which may be very injurious to the prosecution of the common cause, and the interests of its ally. He therefore concludes, that it is not enough to say that our State has given its permission, but that it should also appear that the trade has the allowance of the *confederate State*, or that it can, in no manner, interfere with the common operations.

§ 2. There are but two exceptions to this general rule interdicting trade with the enemy: first, the mere exercise of the rights of humanity, and, second, the trade sanctioned by the license or authority of the government. The first of these exceptions would permit intercourse with the enemy, to such a limited extent, and of so rare an occurrence, as to require no particular discussion; the second results from the fact that on certain occasions it is highly expedient for the State to permit an intercourse with the enemy, by commerce or otherwise; but the State alone, and not individuals, must determine when it shall be permitted, and under what regulations. Without such direct permission of the State, no commercial intercourse with the enemy is allowed to subsist.¹

¹ Manning, *Law of Nations*, p. 122; Chitty, *Law of Nations*, pp. 276, 277; Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pub.*, lib. 1 caps. ix. and xv.; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. 4, ch. 1 §§ 13, 14; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. 1, §§ 69, et seq.; Heffter, *Probt International*, § 123. Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. 1, pp. 555, 579; Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 245; Jacobsen, *Seerecht*, §§ 719, 731; the 'Neptunus,' 6 Rob. 306; the 'Hoop,' Rob. 200; the 'Ceres,' 3 Rob. 79; the 'Nayade,' 4 Rob. 251.

During the Crimean War licences to trade were not issued by the British Government, but it was declared by Order in Council of the 15th April, 1854, that 'all vessels under a neutral or friendly flag, being neutral or friendly property, shall be permitted to import into any port or place in Her Majesty's dominions all goods and merchandise whatsoever, to whomsoever the same may belong; and to export from any port or place in Her Majesty's dominions, to any port not blockaded any cargo or goods, not being contraband of war, or not requiring a special permission, to whomsoever the same may belong; and save and except or is, as aforesaid, all the subjects of Her Majesty, and the subjects or citizens of any neutral or friendly State shall and may, during and notwithstanding the present hostilities with Russia, freely trade with all ports and places wheresoever situate, which shall not be in a state of blockade, save and except that no British vessel shall under any circumstances whatsoever, either under or by virtue of this order or otherwise, be permitted or empowered to enter or communicate with any port or place which shall belong to, or be in possession or occupation of, Her Majesty's enemies.'

An Ionian subject was held to be in the same position as a British subject, and his vessel was condemned by an English Prize Court, for trading with Russia during the above-mentioned war.—The 'San Spirito'

§ 3. The rule which prohibits every form of commercial intercourse or trade with the enemy, whether by the subjects of the belligerent or of his allies, is enforced in courts of prize with a stern and inflexible rigour. 'No motives of compassion or indulgence,' says Mr. Duer, 'prompted by the hardship of the particular case, nor any views of public utility, derived from the innocent or beneficial nature of the particular traffic, are ever allowed to suspend or mitigate its application. Such considerations are not regarded as legal distinctions that can operate to create an exception from the general rule. They may influence properly the discretion of the executive power, but must be rejected by the judicial

tribunal.' 2 *Jur.* N.S. 1238. See *Exposito v. Bowden* (7 L. and B. 763), and the '*Odessa*' (*Spinks v. R.* 208), as to the effect of the above Order in Council, and of other similar proclamations, on the trade of a British subject with the enemy, also the '*Teutonia*' (1 *Aspin. Mar. Cas.* 32).

A voyage from an enemy to a neutral port, but with directions to put into a British port to obtain a licence, the proof of such directions and consequent intention being clear, was held not to be illegal, or a breach of a certain prohibitive Order in Council of January, 1807, restitution accordingly, with captors' expenses. The '*Mercurius*' (*Edwards*, 431) and the '*Minna*' therein cited.

The conveyance of passengers for hire held equivalent to the conveyance of goods for freight, and therefore to be a trading within the prohibitions prescribed by the Orders in Council of April 26, 1809, prohibiting all trade by neutrals with France.—The '*Rose in Bloom*,' 1 *Dodson*, 58.

A resident in England cannot enter into an engagement to raise money by way of loan to assist subjects of a foreign State to prosecute a war against a Government in alliance with England, without the licence of the Crown.—*Demetrius de Wutz v. Hendricks*, 9 *Moore C. P. Rep.* 580.

By Art. 77 of the French Penal Code, anyone who may engage in schemes or enter into communication to supply the enemy with money is punishable with death. For the opinion of the English Courts see *R. v. Hensley*, 1 *Burr. R.* 650.

As to the punishment of holding correspondence with the Confederates by subjects of the United States, during the last Civil War, see Act of February 25, 1863, 12 Stat. at L. 696.

A British subject resident in a neutral country may engage in trade with the enemy of his own country, but not in articles of a contraband nature, the duties of allegiance travelling with him so as to restrain him in that extent.—The '*Neptunus*,' 6 *Rob.* 409; the '*Ann*,' 1 *Dodson*, 223; the '*Franchet*,' 1 *Rob.* 302.

A British born subject domiciled in a neutral country is not prevented from trading with a country inimical to his own.—*Bell v. Reid*, and *Bell v. Buller*, 1 *W. and S.* 726; *Marryatt v. Wilson*, 1 *B. and P.* 430.

Commerce by a person resident in an enemy's country, even as representative of the Crown of England, is illegal and the subject of prize, however beneficial to his country, unless authorised by licence.—*Ex parte Englande*, 13 *Fer. jun.* 528; 1 *How.* 271. But a supply of articles for the use of the British fleet was held to be an exception to the rule.—The '*Madonna delle Grazie*,' 4 *Rob.* 195.

conscience.' No matter how, or under what circumstances such trade may be carried on, or attempted, (with the single exception already mentioned,) the same penalty of confiscation will attach. It, therefore, is not necessary that the ship in which the goods, engaged in such illegal traffic, are transported, should also belong to a subject of the belligerent whose rights are violated. The vessel may be neutral, and the neutrality of the flag, where the traffic is illegal, will afford no more protection to the goods of a subject than to those of an enemy. It is by means of neutral vessels that such illegal traffic is usually carried on, as appears in most cases in which condemnation has been pronounced. Any attempt by a subject to import goods from the enemy's country, without the licence of his own government, is a violation of duty on his part, and involves his property so employed in the penalty of confiscation. It is not necessary that these goods should be the fruits of any purchase, barter, contract, or negotiation, in the enemy's country after hostilities had commenced. The sailing of the vessel with the goods on board, after the party had a knowledge of the war, completes the offence, stamps the cargo with an illegal character, and subjects it, during its transportation, to a rightful seizure. The propriety of strictly adhering to this rule is vindicated by Judge Story, with his usual ability, in the case of the 'Rapid,' where the question is fully discussed.¹

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 556-559; the 'St. Philip,' 8 Term R. p. 556.

This rule has even been held to prohibit a remittance of supplies to a British colony, during its temporary subjection to an enemy. The 'Bella Gaudita,' 1 Rob. 207. Property devoted to illegal traffic with the enemy, becomes stamped as enemy's property, and the quality of hostilities does not depend exclusively upon the personal sentiments, or local allegiance of the party, but arises often from his actual or business residence; so that the produce of the soil of the hostile country, engaged in the commerce of the hostile power, is legitimate prize without regard to the domicile of the owner. By investing his means, and participating in the trade and mercantile concerns of a belligerent nation, a neutral is in effect, annexed to him the national character of the places, at which he carries on his commerce. The produce of the enemy's soil and country, owned by a neutral, while it remains in the enemy's country, partakes, if obtained therein by a resident agent of the neutral merchant, has imparted to it the stamp of enemy property, and the owner is *pro hac vice* an enemy. The 'Mary Clifton,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.* 356.

A vessel guilty of an unlawful trade with the enemy is liable to capture, at any time during the voyage in which the offence is committed.—The 'Memphis,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.* 260.

§ 4. Numerous attempts have been made to evade this rule by allegations of special exceptions. In cases of this kind it has been alleged that the property in the specific goods was acquired before the war, as in the cases of the 'Louisa Margaretha' and the 'Rapid,' or that the goods were actually shipped as well as purchased before hostilities commenced, as in the cases of the 'Eengiheid,' the 'Fortuna,' and the 'Mary;' or that the ship on which the goods were found had been forcibly detained, as in the case of the 'Alexander;' or that the goods were the produce of funds in the enemy's country which the party had no other means of withdrawing, as in the cases of the 'Lady Jane,' the 'William,' and the 'Rapid.' It was once decided by the English Court of common pleas, that goods might be lawfully exported from an enemy's country, although purchased during the war, where the sole object of the purchase was to enable the parties to remit to their own country their funds and effects, which were in the enemy's country when the war was declared; but this exception was subsequently overruled by the court of the King's Bench.¹

§ 5. Vattel and Burlamaqui concur in the doctrine, that both justice and humanity require that persons, who are surprised by a war in an enemy's country, should have a reasonable time to withdraw their persons and effects, and ought not to be treated as enemies, unless their departure should be unreasonably delayed. This view is countenanced by several eminent writers on public law, and the language of Sir William Scott, on several occasions, seems to justify the conclusion that a distinction in favour of persons thus circumstanced would be admitted in the English Admiralty.² 'It seems a necessary deduction,' says Mr. Duer, 'from these views, that, in the judgment of these writers, the property of persons thus withdrawing themselves from the enemy's coun-

¹ *Potts v. Bell*, 8 *Term. R.* 548; the 'Juffrow Louisa Margaretha,' 1 *Rob.* 203; the 'Rapid,' 1 *Gallis. R.* 295; 9 *Cran. h.* 132; the 'Eengiheid,' 1 *Pd.* 210; the 'Fortuna,' 1 *Rob.* 211; the 'Mary,' 1 *Gallis.* 620; the 'Alexander,' 8 *Cran. h.* 169; the 'Lady Jane,' 1 *Rob.* 202; the 'William,' 1 *Pd.* 214.

If an English subject employ a neutral to trade for him, in the country of the enemy, the neutral is considered to be a mere agent, and the transaction is illegal. The 'Samuel,' 4 *Rob.* 284.

² This seems to have been denied in *Potts v. Bell*, *supra*—overruling *Bell v. Gilson* (1 Bos. and Pull., 345); see, however, the 'Drie Gebroeders,' 4 *Rob.* 234.

try would, in the course of transportation, be entitled to the protection of their own government; since, otherwise, the very object of the lenity exercised toward them might be defeated, and that, which was granted as a favour, would be converted into a snare. If the peculiar hardships of confiscating the property of persons thus circumstanced should induce even the hostile government to relax, for their benefit, the ordinary rules of war, it is evident that the same consideration addresses itself still more directly, and with greater power, to the justice of their own government. It would indeed, be a strange assertion, that the very property, when the enemy is bound to release, their own government can be justified in seizing and condemning. * * * To protect its subjects who retain their allegiance, is the moral obligation that rests upon every government, and where the acts for which the protection is sought are not merely innocent but meritorious, the obligation presses with a peculiar force. To confiscate the property of subjects, in the act of returning to their allegiance, is the extreme of injustice, as well as of impolicy. It is to punish those whom their country should desire to reward.¹

§ 6. A distinction must be here noticed between the property of a citizen *resident* in a foreign country, and that of one *domiciled* in the belligerent State. The property of a citizen domiciled in a foreign country, when that country becomes involved in a war with that of his allegiance, is at

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 561-563; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. ii. ch. xviii. § 344; liv. iii. ch. iv. § 63; ch. v. §§ 73, 77; Durlamaqui, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, tome v. pt. 4. ch. 7; Brown v. the U. S., 8 *Cran. R.* 125; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. x.; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. ii. § 2.

Where the claimant left the enemy's port, with the intent to withdraw from the enemy's country with his effects, and had for that purpose converted his property into the vessel and cargo, and intending to give himself up to the blockading squadron, it was held that the vessel and cargo were not liable to capture as enemy's property.—The 'General Pinckney,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.* 668.

Again, during the civil war, some cotton which had been purchased by a loyal citizen of the United States in Texas, the enemy's country, was captured on a flat boat, in the act of being exported during a blockade. It was condemned by the District Court of New York, but sentence was reversed on appeal to the Circuit Court, on the ground that the claimant had gone to Texas, before the war, to collect debts due to him, and that this cotton was the proceeds; moreover, that he had used all diligence to collect his effects, with a view to leave the hostile country after the breaking out of the war.—'Fifty-two bales of Cotton,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.* 644.

be liable to be condemned as that of an *enemy*. But that a citizen simply resident in the belligerent State, if condemned on his attempt to withdraw it from the enemy's country, must be condemned as that of a citizen engaged in *unlawful trade with the enemy*. The Supreme Court of the United States have decided that the property of American citizens *domesticated* in an enemy's country, although shipped before a knowledge of the war, was, by that event, irredeemably stamped with a hostile character, and the goods were condemned as a lawful prize. But the case of a citizen, enemy resident in the enemy's country, presents a very different question.¹

17 If it be admitted that it is the duty of a government to facilitate the withdrawal of its own citizens and their property from an enemy's country, the question next to be considered is the propriety of requiring the citizens to procure licence from their own government for the transportation of such property. On this question Mr. Duer remarks: 'It is doubtless, right and necessary that a merchant, not resident in an enemy's country, who desires, at the commencement

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. 4, ch. i. § 17; the '*Venus*,' 8 *Cranf.*

Property belonging to a merchant residing and trading at an enemy's country, is captured, liable to condemnation as enemy's property.—The '*John Gilpin*,' 13 *Blachf. Pr. Cas.* 133.

A citizen, temporarily residing in an enemy's country, is, at the breaking out of war, entitled to a reasonable time to collect his effects, and convert them into available and manageable funds, so as to enable him to withdraw them from that country; and in such case his effects will not be treated as enemy's property.—The '*John Gilpin*,' *Blachf. Pr. Cas.*

Property captured at sea, and owned by persons resident in an enemy's country, is hostile, and subject to condemnation without any further proof. Notwithstanding the individual opinion or sympathies of the owner, and although he may be the subject of a neutral nation, or of the enemy's ally, and may have expressed no disloyal sentiments towards his native country, nevertheless his residence in the enemy's country impresses upon his property, engaged in commerce and found on the high seas, a hostile character, and subjects it to penalties as such. The property belonging to a permanent resident of the Confederate States, and captured on the ocean, was held to be a lawful prize. Condemnation is not the infliction of personal punishment, but the consequence of a belligerent policy for the destruction of the enemy's resources.—The '*Amey Warwick*,' 2 *Sprague*, 145.

A citizen of the United States was held to be disqualified from appearing as a prize court to question the legality of the seizure of his property during war in an enemy's country, by trade with the enemy. The '*Napoleon*,' *Blachf. Pr. Cas.* 296.

of a war, to withdraw his property and effects, should obtain a licence from his own government. He is guilty, otherwise, of a voluntary trading. The good faith of a person who has the power to apply for a licence, and neglects the duty is liable to just suspicions; and the express permission of the government is, in such cases, the only adequate security against abuse and fraud. But the propriety of requiring a person, who is seeking to escape from a hostile country, to continue a residence that exposes his person to imprisonment, and his property to seizure, until a licence from his own government can be obtained, so far from being evident, can by no means, be admitted. His ability to return—to save himself and his property—may depend upon measures, that, to be effectual, must be immediate; and the necessary delay in procuring a licence would operate, in most cases, to defeat the execution of the design.' Mr. Duer, therefore, adopts the conclusion that a licence is not in all cases necessary, and 'that the property of subjects withdrawing themselves, in good faith, from a hostile country, within a reasonable time after knowledge of the war, is not stamped with the illegal character of a trading with the enemy; but is to be considered, by a just exception from the general rule, as exempt from confiscation. Such would be the probable decision of the question in the English courts of prize; nor is it by any means certain that an opposite determination would be made in those of the United States. The exact question has not yet been determined by the supreme tribunal; nor is any decision involved as a necessary consequence in the cases that have hitherto occurred.'¹

§ 8. The language of Mr. Justice Story, in the cases of the 'Rapid' and the 'Mary,' in the Circuit Court, amounts to a clear denial of the existence of the right in question, under any circumstances; although in the case of the 'St. Lawrence,' subsequently decided in the Supreme Court, where the opinion of the court was given by the same distinguished judge, any direct decision of this question was studiously avoided, and that case was decided on the ground that the property had not been withdrawn from the enemy's country *within reasonable time* after the knowledge of the war. This exact

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. 1. pp. 564-566; the 'Madonna delle Grazie,' *ibid.* 1. 98.

question, as already remarked, has never been determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, nor is its decision involved, as a necessary consequence, in the cases which have been adjudicated before that tribunal. In a case decided in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, it was held that a citizen of one belligerent *may* withdraw his property from the country of the other belligerent, provided he does it within a reasonable time after the declaration of the war, and does not himself go to the enemy's country for that purpose. In delivering the opinion of the court in this case (*Armory v. McGregor*), Chief Justice Thompson remarks, that, from the guarded and cautious manner in which the Supreme Court of the United States had reserved itself upon this particular question, there was reason to conclude that when it should be distinctly presented, it would be considered as not coming within the policy of the rule that renders all trading or intercourse with the enemy illegal.¹

§ 9. The only well-established exception to the rule which confiscates all goods imported from the enemy's country, during the war, is where it is shown that the goods were purchased under an order given previous to the commencement of hostilities, and that it was not in the power of the owner, by any diligence, to countermand the order in time to prevent the shipment. It must, however, be clearly shown that all possible diligence was used, after the first notice of hostilities, to countermand the voyage.²

§ 10. The good faith or mistake of the party affords no protection to the ship or goods engaged in illegal trade with an enemy. The entire absence of any intention to violate the law, no matter how perfect the innocence of the intent may have been, nor whether the act resulted from mistake or ignorance, cannot avert the penalty of confiscation. In the celebrated case of the 'Hoop,' decided by Sir William Scott, the goods had been imported from an enemy's country with the express sanction of the commissioners of the customs, under an erroneous interpretation of a special provision of

¹ Phillips, *On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 84; the 'Rapid,' 1 *Gallis. R.* 304; the 'Mary,' 1 *Gallis. R.* 621; the 'St. Lawrence,' 9 *Cranch.* 121; *Amory v. McGregor*, 15 *Johns. R.* 24; Rush, *Opinions U. S. Atty Genl.*, vol. i. p. 175.

² The 'Juffrow Catharina,' 5 *Rob.* 141; the 'Fortuna,' 1 *Rob.* 211; the 'Freedon,' 1 *Rob.* 212.

an Act of Parliament; but, while admitting and lamenting the hardship of the case, the judge felt himself compelled to pronounce a condemnation. He referred, in his opinion, to numerous cases where the Lords of appeal had rigorously enforced the rule, notwithstanding the strongest mitigating circumstances.¹

§ 11. The ulterior destination of the goods determines the character of the trade, no matter how circuitous the route by which they are to reach that destination.² Even where the ship in which the goods are embarked is destined to a neutral port, and the goods are there to be unladen, yet, if they are to be transported thence, whatever may be the mode of conveyance, to an enemy's port or territory, they fall within the interdiction and penalty of the law. The converse of this is also undoubtedly true; that is, trade from an enemy country, through a neutral port, is unlawful, and the goods so shipped through a neutral territory, even though they may be unladen and transhipped, are liable to condemnation. It is an attempt to carry on trade with the enemy, by the circuitous route of a neutral port, and thus evade the penalty of the law. But the law will not countenance any such attempts to violate its principles by a resort to the shelter of neutral territory; any such voyage is illegal at its inception, and the goods shipped are liable to seizure at the instant it commences. A coasting, or colonial trade, limited to the ports of the enemy, so far from meriting any indulgence, is regarded as peculiarly noxious, and the ship and goods so

¹ The 'Hoop,' 1 *Rob.*, 196; the 'Angélique,' 3 *Rob.*, app. 9, the 'Nelly,' 1 *Rob.*, 219, note; the 'Franklin,' 6 *Rob.*, 127; *Griswold v. Waddington*, 16 *Johns. R.*, 438; *Scofield v. Eichelberger*, 7 *Peters R.*, 480.

In the case of the 'Hoop,' reference is made to an authority, in *Roles Abridgment*, 173, showing that it was anciently deemed illegal to trade with Scotland, when that country was at war with England. Sir W. Scott observes thereon, that the rule against trade with an enemy is just as weighty on land as on water, but that cases had more frequently happened upon water, in consequence of the insular situation of England.

² This doctrine is only settled in the American Courts. The 'Stephen Hart,' 2 *Marit. Cas.* 73. The 'Commercen,' 1 *Wheat.*, 388; *Hist. & Coll. Addit. Letters*, 43. The English Courts seem rather to have inclined to the doctrine that it is the destination of the vessel, which determines the character of the trade, and not the destination of the goods. The 'Heddie and Alida,' 1 *Hay and Marr*, 96; *Hobbs v. Henning*, 5 *New Rep.*, 106. The 'Diana,' *Lords of Appeal*, March 1, 1806. In the case of the 'Exchange' (*Edwards*, 39), a ship having been condemned for a deviation towards an enemy's port, the cargo was held to be involved, by such deviation, in the fate of the ship.

eyed, with a knowledge of the war, cannot escape the
ty of condemnation. 'The conduct of the citizen,'
Duer, 'who thus incorporates himself with the com-
and interests of the enemy, admits of no palliation or
e; it is not simply blameable, but highly criminal.'¹

12. A vessel engaged in unlawful trade with the enemy
de to capture and condemnation at any time during the
e, in which the offence is committed, but not after the
e is completed. If, however, the voyage is continuous
ntire, although consisting of separable parts, she is
to capture while any portion of it remains to be per-
d, even where the part in which the offence was com-
d has been completed. This point has been fully
sed and decided in the Supreme Court of the United

13. Actual trading with the enemy is not necessary to
a a ship or goods to confiscation. It is sufficient, as a
d rule, that they are engaged in a voyage with that
in order to complete the offence, and to incur the
ty. So also a ship belonging to a subject, and proceed-
an enemy's port in ballast, with no positive intention
acuring a cargo, or returning therefrom without any
would be liable to capture both on her outward and
voyage. It would be in vain to allege that there
to act or intention of trading. But the mere intention
de with the enemy is not punishable, if at the time
pture the execution of the intent is no longer prac-
e. Where, from fortuitous circumstances, whether known
known to the parties, the execution of the design can
nger be effected, the intent does not constitute the
for no crime could be committed. A criminal intent

ent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 81; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*,
ch. i. § 17; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 569, 570; the
'Galles. R. 98; the 'Wellington,' 2 *Galles. R.* 103; the 'Jonge
' 79; the 'William,' 5 *Rob.* 393.

trade, by a citizen, should not be confused with that carried on
neutral. Modern jurists consider that it is contrary to free trade that
ling or colonial trade should be denied the latter. The right of
ment to prohibit such trade unquestionably exists, but the present
ed disposition of the European Powers is such as to render it very
d whether, in case of war, this right would be again enforced
neutrals.—See also the note to § 2, *supra*.

aldman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. pp. 20-23; the 'Joseph,' *Cranch*,
§; the 'Memphis,' *Blakely Pr. Cas.* 260.

is never punishable, if, before the design can be executed, its execution becomes *impossible*. Thus, a British ship bound to a West India island—an enemy's country—but captured after the island had, in fact, surrendered to the British forces, was restored by Sir William Scott.¹ That particular case, however, was distinguished from the general rule as laid down by Duer, which requires the full sanction of judicial decisions.²

§ 14. Where the property seized for illegal traffic with the enemy belongs to a house of trade, established in a neutral country, but of which one of the partners is a resident subject of the belligerent country, his share, notwithstanding the neutrality of the house, is condemned. The rule is equally applicable, even where the belligerent party is strictly dormant, and takes no part whatever in the direction and management of the affairs of such trading house. If he is a party interested in the property so contaminated, he must suffer the penalty of the offence. He cannot engage as a partner in a transaction in which he could not lawfully engage if alone.³

§ 15. Courts of prize regard with extreme suspicion and jealousy the transfer of ships from subjects to neutrals, during the war. If such a ship is subsequently employed in a trade

¹ Sir W. Scott also restored a Dutch ship from Demerara (a Dutch colony), which had been captured, at sea, several days after that colony had capitulated to the British forces, one of the terms of the capitulation being that the inhabitants were to be permitted to export their own property, and to be treated in all respects like British subjects. (The '*Negotie en Zeevaart*,' 1 Rob. 3.) But on appeal the House of Lords reversed the decision on the ground that property sailing after a declaration of hostilities, and taken on a voyage, cannot be protected by an intermediate capitulation; Lord Camden observing, that 'the ship sailed as a Dutch ship, and could not change her character *in transitu*.'

² The '*Abbey*,' 5 Rob. 251; Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 22; the '*Imma*,' 3 Rob. 167; the '*Lisette*,' 6 Rob. 387; the '*Trende Sostre*,' 6 Rob. 390, in notes.

³ The '*Franklin*,' 6 Rob. 127; the '*Fortuna*,' 1 Rob. 211.

The liability of property (the product of an enemy's country, and coming from it during war, to seizure is irrespective of the *status domesticus*, guilt or innocence of the owner. These principles apply to property held, before the war, in partnership, as well as to that held in severalty. The war dissolves the partnership. The '*Dashwood*,' 3 Hall, 170; the '*Gray Jacket*,' *ibid.*, 342; the '*William Bagaley*,' *ibid.*, 377. But see '*Bales of Cotton*,' *supra*, p. 160.

The property of a commercial house, established in the enemy's country, is subject to seizure and condemnation as prize, though some of the partners may have a neutral domicile.—The '*Cheshire*,' 3 Hall, 256.

the enemy, very slight *indicia* of fraud would cause her condemnation. Thus, an English vessel, asserted to have been sold to a neutral, after hostilities had been commenced between England and Holland, was captured while engaged in trade between Guernsey and Amsterdam, under the command of her former master, who had also been the owner. It was held by Sir William Scott, that the transfer was null and void, and he condemned both ship and cargo. However, the transfer be *bonâ fide*, and the vessel becomes neutral property, it may be employed in all trade, in which neutrals may lawfully engage.¹

16. Regularity of papers, in such cases, is not conclusive evidence of ownership; for, as remarked by Sir William Scott, in the case of the 'Odin,' where there is an intention to defraud, the regularity of the paper documents is a necessary part of the apparatus and machinery of the fraud. Although paper documents, if duly verified and supported, are positive evidence, yet, if the circumstances and facts of the case lead justly to the conclusion that these papers, however regular, are themselves false, the court will not be bound by them.

Where the papers say one thing, and the facts of the case say another, the court will exercise a sound judgment as to which the preponderance is due. It has already been stated that although a vessel be documented as a neutral vessel, it cannot be protected by its documents, if the domicile of its owner is hostile. A government may grant the privilege of neutral character to vessels for the purpose of its own nation, but cannot change its national character, to the prejudice of third parties. Consequently, if the real owner of a vessel engaged in trade with the enemy be a subject of one of the belligerents, its apparent neutral character will not save it from condemnation.²

17. When the trading is from a port of the belligerent, denying the right of capture, the property is, as a general rule, liable to confiscation, if the owner at the inception of the voyage was a resident in the country, whether as a native

¹ Goldsmid, *Int. Law*, vol. II. p. 83; the 'Omnibus,' 6 Rob. 71; the 'Ammy,' 4 Rob. 31.

² The transfer, during war, of a ship of war, by an enemy to a neutral, is illegal. The 'Packet de Bilbao,' 2 Rob. 133; the 'Georgia,' 1 Lou. 90. The 'Odin,' 1 Rob. 252, 253; the 'President,' 5 Rob. 277; Toland, *8 Term. R.*, 434.

subject, a domiciled merchant, a mere stranger, or a sojourner. Every person in a country (with the limited exception of ambassadors, &c.), whether a native or stranger, owes obedience to its laws, and the rule of international jurisprudence, which forbids all intercourse and trade with the public enemy, is just as obligatory upon him as the municipal laws of revenue or regulations of police. We have already stated under what circumstances the property of a resident in an enemy's country is to be deemed hostile; the same circumstances, as a general rule, are sufficient to justify that enemy to treat it as the property of his own subjects, and to subject it to like penalties.¹

§ 18. There exists, however, an important distinction between the case of a native subject and that of a domiciled stranger or mere sojourner. 'The property of the subject' says Mr. Duer, 'where the trade was illegal in its origin and intent, cannot be redeemed from its guilt and penalty by any subsequent change of his own residence; but that of the domiciled merchant or stranger will be restored, if, previous to its capture, he had, in part, removed from the belligerent country, with the intention of returning to his own; for in this case, the illegality that arose solely from his local and temporary allegiance, by the removal of its cause, has ceased to exist.' This distinction has been established in a number of decisions, both in the United States and in England. In the case of the 'Indian Chief,' Mr. Johnson, one of the claimants, was an American citizen in his native character, but had resided and was engaged in trade in England, and was still living there, when the ship which he claimed as owner, and which was seized as engaged in a trade with the enemy, commenced her voyage. But as it was clearly proved that he had left England for the United States, and with the *bona fide* intention of resuming his native character, before the seizure, his claim was allowed and the ship restored. Again, in the case of the 'Eutrusco,' the claimant was a Swiss by birth, but had been impressed with a French hostile character, by trading under the protection of a French factory in China, and such was his character when the goods were shipped; but he had fortunately quitted China before the capture, and upon this ground the Lords of Admiralty decreed a restora-

¹ Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. ii. cap. xiv.

In the case of the 'Ocean,' the only act upon which Sir William Scott relied, as evidence of the intention of the party, was, that he had made arrangements for withdrawing himself as a partner from a house of trade in the hostile country, and if he is able to show that the evidence on which the captors rely, as fixing his character, had been changed in fact, or in judgment of law, previous to capture, his claim to restitution will be allowed. In the judgment of Chief Justice Marshall, dissolution of partnership, discontinuance of trade in the enemy's country, and other arrangements obviously preparatory to a change of residence, ought all to be considered overt acts, which, when performed in good faith, entitle the claimant to restitution. This seems an important exception to the general rule, that the national character of property in the ocean cannot be changed *in transitu* during the prosecution of the voyage.¹

§ 19. If a vessel belonging to one of the belligerents protects a voyage, even to a neutral port, under a licence from the government of the enemy, both ship and cargo, while they remain under the protection of such licence, are liable to capture and confiscation. Such condemnation results from the presumption, not to be resisted, that the licence is granted by the enemy for the furtherance of his own interests, and that the citizen or subject who lends himself to the promotion of this object, by accepting such licence, violates the plainest duties of his own allegiance. As has already been stated, individual members, composing the state or body politic, are prohibited from all commercial intercourse with the public enemy, unless sanctioned by the express authority of their government. In the words of Sir William Scott, no principle should be held more sacred than that an intercourse with the enemy ought not to be allowed to subsist on any other footing than that of the direct permission of the State. The reasons of this rule are fully set forth in the opinion of Chief Justice Story, in the case of the 'Julia,'² which opinion was

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 515, 517, 544, 545, 576: the 'Indian' 3 *Rob.* 18-21, the 'Ocean,' 5 *Rob.* 91, the 'Eutiusco,' 3 *Rob.* 31. In 1812, the brig 'Julia' and cargo, owned by American citizens, was captured by the United States' frigate 'Chesapeake.' The vessel had on board a licence, from the English Admiral at Halifax, directing all Her Majesty's ships to suffer her to proceed without unnecessary molestation, reciting that she was well inclined towards the British interest, and

adopted *in extenso* by the Supreme Court of the United States. At the threshold of his opinion, he lays down the fundamental proposition that, 'in war, all intercourse between the subjects and citizens of the belligerent countries is illegal, unless sanctioned by the authority of the government, or in the exercise of the rights of humanity.' That a personal licence from an enemy must be regarded as an implied agreement with such enemy, that the holder of such licence will conduct himself in a neutral manner, and avoid any hostile acts toward such enemy. That it is, therefore, a violation of the laws of war and of his duties to his own government. 'Can an American citizen,' he asks, 'be permitted, in this manner, to carve out for himself a neutrality on the ocean, when his country is at war? Can he justify himself in refusing to aid his countrymen, who have fallen into the hands of the enemy on the ocean, or decline their rescue? Can he withdraw his personal

was laden with provisions for the use of the allied armies in the Peninsula. She was captured on her return journey, having disposed of the provisions, and then bearing a cargo of salt. Two questions were raised: 1st, whether the use of an enemy's licence, or protection on a voyage to a neutral country in alliance with the enemy, be illegal, so as to affect the property with confiscation; 2nd, if not, whether the terms of the existing licence distinguish this case, unfavourably, from the general principle. The Supreme Court of the United States distinguished this case from that of the 'Elizabeth' (5 Rob. 2), inasmuch as the vessel and cargo were documented as American, and not as British property; further, it decided that the existence of a licence affords strong presumption of a concealed enemy's interest; that no argument in favour of a licence can be drawn from the safe conduct to enemies' fishing vessels in former times; that it is not universally true, that a destination to a neutral port gives a *bona fide* character to the voyage; that if the property be ultimately destined for an enemy's port, or an enemy's use, the interposition of a neutral port would not save it from condemnation; that if property be engaged in an illegal traffic with the enemy, or even in an attempt to trade, it is liable to confiscation as well on the return as on the outward voyage; and, that it may be assumed as a proposition liable to few, if any, exceptions, that the property which is rendered auxiliary, or subservient to enemy interests, becomes tainted with forfeiture.—The 'John', 8 Cranch 131, 134; *Gall R.* 601.

Sailing under an enemy's licence is legal cause for the forfeiture of a neutral vessel.—The 'Alliance', *Blatky, Pr. Cas.* 262. But the fact that a vessel carried a custom-house clearance and permit to pass fortifications, issued by the Confederate Government in 1860, was held in the courts of the United States not to be of itself a justifiable cause for capture; the papers did not profess to protect from arrest at sea, nor were they calculated to mislead the captors.—The 'Sarah Starr', *Blatky, Pr. Cas.* 69.

A neutral sailing under the flag of the enemy is considered as enemy property, and is liable to confiscation *jure belli*.—U. S. v. the 'Telegrafo', 1 Newb. 303.

services, when the necessities of the nation require them? Can an engagement be legal, which imposes upon him the temptation or necessity of deeming his personal interests at variance with the legitimate objects of his government? Incompleteness of a voyage, under licence from the enemy, is no defence, for the vessel is liable to capture at the instant the voyage under such licence is commenced. To say that the vessel could not be seized till the voyage was completed or abandoned, would be, in effect, saying that the right of capture only exists when the power of making it is at an end. In all cases where the object of the voyage is prohibited, its inception with the illegal intent completes the offence to which the legal penalty attaches. This case of illegal trading, under a licence from the enemy, is only a particular application of a universal rule. Nor is it any defence to allege or prove that the trade is not subservient to the enemy's interest. The condemnation of such licensed vessel and cargo rests upon the broad ground of the illegality of such voyage, and that the mere sailing under the enemy's licence subjects the property to confiscation. The acceptance of such hostile licence, by any individual of a belligerent country, is an act inconsistent with the duties of his allegiance; it is an attempt, on his part, to clothe himself with a neutral character by favour of the other belligerent, and thus to separate himself, without the sanction of his own government, from the common character of his country, and such act is in itself a sufficient ground of condemnation.¹

§ 20. The unlawfulness of trade with the enemy extends not only to every place within his dominions, and subject to his government, but also to all places in his possession or military occupation, even though such occupation has not ripened into a conquest, or changed the national character of the inhabitants. In each case there is the same hazard to the State, and, if the hostile occupation is known when the communication is attempted, there is the same breach of duty on the part of the subject. The reasons of public policy, which forbid such intercourse, apply as fully in the one case

¹ Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 259; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. ii. § 69; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 587; the 'Amora,' 8 *Cranch* 441; the 'Hiram,' 1 *Wheaton* R. 440; the 'Anadne,' 2 *Wheat.* R. 143; *Conquabon v. N. Y. F. Insurance Co.*, 15 *Johns. R.* 357; *Ogden v. Barker*, *Johns. R.* 87; *Craig v. U. S. Ins. Co.*, 1 *Peter. C. C. R.*, p. 410.

as in the other. The same rule holds even in the case of a revolted territory, or colony of the enemy, which is known to have been for years in the hands of the insurgents: courts of justice always regard such revolted territory as belonging to the enemy, until, by some public act of their own government, it is expressly recognised as an independent and friendly power. Until such express recognition, courts must regard the revolted territory as a subsisting part of the parent State, with its former relations unaltered.¹

§ 21. It may be stated, as a general rule, that any insurance, on either vessel or cargo, engaged in illegal trade with the enemy, is illegal, and whenever the goods or vessel are liable to condemnation, the policy of insurance will be declared void. Where the property insured is justly liable to belligerent capture, whether the *delictum*, that is, the substantive cause of condemnation, exists at the inception of the voyage, or occurs subsequently, but prior to the time the policy attaches, it is considered to be illegal, and is declared void. There are, however, on this question conflicting opinions and decisions, the examination of which does not come within the purpose and object of this work.²

¹ Phillips, *On Insurance*, vol. 2, p. 82; the 'Manilla,' 1 *Edw. Ad. Rep.*, 3; the 'Pelican,' 1 *Edw. Ad. Rep.*, Appen. D.; Johnson v. Greaves, 2 *Fount. Rep.* 344; Blackburne v. Thompson, 15 *East*, 81; Rose v. Hand, 4 *Cranch*, 272; Gelston v. Hoyt, 13 *7 Am. R.* 587; the 'Phoenix,' 5 *Am. R.* 21; the 'President,' *ibid.*, 277; the 'Indian Chief,' 3 *Rob.* 12; the 'Hercules,' 5 *Rob.* 106; the 'Boletta,' 1 *Edw. Rep.* 171; Hagedorn v. Bell, 1 *Mass. and Sel.* 450; Bromley v. Hesselcine, 1 *Camp.* 75; Benton v. Boyce, 2 *Cranch*, 191.

² Arnould, *On Insurance*, pt. iii. ch. i. sec. 7; Bedarride, *Droit Maritime*, §§ 1093 et seq.

CHAPTER XXIV.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS.

1. Neutrality in war—2. Qualified neutrality—3. Advantages and resulting duties of neutrality—4. Hostilities not allowed within neutral jurisdiction—5. Passage of troops through neutral territory—6. Pretended exception to inviolability of neutral territory—7. Opinions of European and American publicists—8. Case of the *Caroline*—9. Bel. gerent vessels in neutral ports—10. Right of asylum—11. Presumptive right of entry—12. Armed cruisers in neutral waters—13. Bed. gerent ships and troops in neutral ports and territory—14. Arming vessels and enlisting troops—15. Loans of money by neutrals—16. Pursuit of enemy from neutral port—17. Passage over neutral waters—18. Municipal laws in favour of neutrality—19. Laws of United States—20. Of Great Britain—21. Protection of neutral inviolability—22. Claim for restitution—23. If captured property be in possession of a neutral—24. Power and jurisdiction of federal courts—25. Purchasers in foreign ports—26. If condemned in captor's country—27. Illegal equipment.

§ 1. NEUTRALS in a war are those who take no part in it, but remain the common friends of the belligerents, favouring the arms of neither to the detriment of the others. 'The neutral,' says Phillimore, 'is justly and happily designated by the Latin expression *in bello medius*. It is of the essence of his character that he so retain this central position as to incline to neither belligerent. He has no *jus bellicum* himself, but he is entitled to the continuance of his ordinary *jus pacis*, with, as will presently be seen, certain curtailments and modifications which flow from the altered state of the general relations of all countries in time of war.' According to Bynkershoek, he has nothing to do with the justice or injustice of the war, and can show no favours to one party in preference to another. The error of Grotius, copied by Vattel, in this respect, has not been followed by subsequent writers. All independent sovereign States have right to remain neutral in a war, unless otherwise bound by treaties of alliance previously entered into. It is not necessary that they should make any proclamation or public declaration of

neutrality ; the legal presumption is, that their pacific *status* continues, unless they declare to the contrary.¹

§ 2. There is, however, a qualified neutrality which forms an exception to this definition ; it arises out of antecedent engagements, by which the neutral State has bound itself to one of the parties of the war, to furnish a limited succour, or to extend certain privileges. The fulfilment of such an engagement, entered into prior to the commencement of hostilities, does not necessarily forfeit the neutral character of a State, nor render it the enemy of the other belligerent party, because it does not render the neutral the general associate of the belligerent to whom the succour or privilege is due. For example, Switzerland has furnished troops to certain European Powers, in virtue of treaty stipulations, without herself being involved in the wars in which her troops were engaged.² Denmark, in consequence of a previous treaty, furnished limited succours in ships and troops to Russia, in 1788, against Sweden. By the treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and France, in 1778, the latter secured to herself the special privilege of the admission for her privateers, with their prizes, into American ports, to the exclusion of her enemies ; and the admission of her public ships of war, in case of urgent necessity, to refresh, victual, repair, etc., but not exclusively of other nations at war with her. The first of these privileges being exclusive, was complained of by Great Britain and Holland, and France was not satisfied with the interpretation of the latter, by which the public ships of her enemies were admitted into the American ports for the same purposes. To furnish succours, or auxiliaries, or to extend privileges to one belligerent, to the detriment of the other, is undoubtedly a violation of strict neutrality, and, as such, is a just cause of complaint, if not of war. The peculiarity of the position of Switzerland, hemmed in on all sides by States having a direct interest in maintaining her neutrality, has generally prevented complaints against her, for furnishing a limited number of troops to one or more of the parties to a war. If she had been a commercial or maritime State, says Massé, a different rule

¹ Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 136, 179 ; Grotius, *de Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. xvii. ; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. vii. § 113.

² As to Switzerland, see p. 60.

would undoubtedly have been applied to this singular state of things. She has recently passed regulations prohibiting her citizens from enlisting in foreign service. There can be no question, that her former conduct, in this respect, was a violation of her neutrality. So, also, are the minor acts of partiality mentioned in the preceding paragraph; but, as Philmore justly remarks, it would be pedantically rigid to consider, as a violation of neutrality, the allowing prizes captured by one belligerent to be brought into the neutral port,—especially in compliance with the provisions of a treaty made antecedently to the war. How far a neutrality, thus qualified and limited, may be tolerated by the belligerent against whom the partiality is shown, is a question of expediency rather than of right, and is generally governed by political circumstances.¹

13. States, not parties to a war, have not only the right to remain neutral during its continuance, but to do so conduces greatly to their advantage, as they thereby preserve to their citizens the blessings of peace and commerce. Moreover, the belligerents are interested in maintaining the just rights of neutrals, as the trade and intercourse kept up by them greatly contribute to mitigate the evils of war. It has, therefore, become an established principle of international law, that neutrals shall be permitted to carry on their accustomed trade, with such restrictions only as are necessary for the security of the established rights of the belligerents. Although the neutral State is considered as continuing to occupy toward the belligerents the same general position as before the war, its relations with them are very different; neutrality is not properly a continuation of the former state of peace (*'la continuation de l'état antérieur de paix'*); for, to neutrals, war brings certain advantages and disadvantages,

¹ Massé, *Droit Commercial*, liv. ii. tit. 1. ch. ii. § 2; Hefster, *Droit International*, §§ 144-146; Waite, *State Papers*, vol. i. pp. 140, 169, 172; *Revue de la Défense*, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. iv. ch. 1.; Eggers, *Leben von Bernburg*, 2 ed. pp. 118-195; Bynkershoek, *Quest. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. ix. On the commencement of the Franco-Prussian War, 1870, the Emperor Napoleon III. decided not to receive either at the Imperial headquarters or at the headquarters of the corps-d'armée any volunteer, sign officer, or person not belonging to the army—(*Journal Officiel*, 19. 1870)—and the British Government refused permission to an officer in Her Majesty's service to join the Prussian Army as correspondent to the *Times*.

and imposes upon them new and peculiar duties. While in some respects, their trade and commerce may be increased in extent and profit, it is restricted with respect to blockades and sieges, and the carrying of contraband, and their vessels are subjected to the inconvenience and annoyance of visit and search. Not only are they obliged to maintain strict impartiality toward the belligerents, but they are bound to prevent or punish any violation of their rights of neutrality, by either of the parties at war with each other. These duties of neutrality extend not only to preventing the arming of cruisers in neutral ports, and the enlistment of men in neutral territory, but also to the general sanctity of neutral jurisdiction, by redressing all injuries which one belligerent may commit upon the other within its limits.¹

¹ Hubner, *De la Saisie des Bâtimens neutres*, pt. ii. ch. ii. § 2. Armit, *Droit Maritime*, tome ii. pp. 53, 69; Tetens, *Considérations sur le Droit*, etc., p. 34; Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, tome ii. ch. vi.; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. ii. cap. xiv.

The carrying on trade with a blockaded port is not a breach of municipal law nor illegal, so as to prevent a court of the *loci contractus* from enforcing the contract of which the trade is the subject. A neutral State is not bound by the law of nations to impede or diminish its own trade by municipal restrictions. A neutral merchant may ship goods protected *jure belli*, and they may be rightfully seized and condemned. It is one of the cases where two 'conflicting rights' exist which either party may exercise without charging the other with doing wrong. As the transportation is not prohibited by the laws of the neutral sovereign, his subjects may lawfully be concerned in it, and as the right of war lawfully authorises a belligerent power to seize and condemn the goods, he may lawfully do it. Whatever is not prohibited by the positive law of a country is lawful. Although the law of nations is part of the municipal law of England, and it may be said that by that law contraband trade is prohibited to neutrals, and consequently unlawful, yet the law of nations does not declare the trade to be unlawful. It only authorises the seizure of the contraband articles by the belligerent powers.—The 'Helen,' 35 *Law R.* N.S. *Adm.* 2; compare with it the 'Santissima Trinidad,' 17 *Whist. Adm. R.* 284; Richardson v. Marine Insurance Co., 6 *Maria. R.* 111; Seton and others v. Low, 1 *Jurks. R.*, *Ex parte Characie*, 34 *Law R.* (N.S. *Chanc.* 17).

With respect to the rights of neutral individuals residing in a belligerent territory, it may be mentioned that in 1870, during the Franco-German War, the British law officers were of opinion that British subjects having property in France were not entitled to any special protection for their property, or to exemption from military contributions to which they might be liable in common with the inhabitants of the place in which they resided, or in which their property might be situated.

On complaint made to Lord Granville in 1870 by a family of British subjects, residing in the Commune of La Ferté Imbault, in France, and having suffered pillage, menaces, and ill-treatment at the hands of the Prussian troops, although they had hoisted the British flag over the gate of their château, trusting that a neutral flag would have protected them

14. The rights of war can be exercised only within the territory of the belligerent powers, upon the high seas, or in territory belonging to no one. Hostilities cannot be lawfully exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the neutral State which is the common friend of both parties. To grant any such right to one would be a detriment to the other, and to extend the privilege to both would necessarily make the neutral territory the theatre of hostile operations, and involve the State in the consequences of the war. Hence, every voluntary entrance into neutral territory, with hostile purposes, is absolutely unlawful, and the party so trespassing is liable to be treated as an enemy, unless full satisfaction is made for such violation of neutral rights.¹

persons and property, his lordship replied that much as Her Majesty's Government regretted the inconvenience and loss to which they had been subjected, it was out of their power to obtain for them any redress for reasons in conformity with the above opinion.

In the case of a complaint to Lord Granville by Lawrence Smith, of St. Owen, that though the English flag was flying over his house, Prussian soldiers were quartered on him, that he was robbed of all his provisions, that a volley was wantonly fired into a cellar where his family had taken refuge, his house set on fire, and his family driven away half dressed into a wood in the snow, his lordship replied that Her Majesty's Government did not consider in strict right they would be entitled to claim compensation from the Prussian Government, but that it appeared the destruction of the property was an act of wanton violence on the part of the Prussian troops resulting from lax discipline. In such case he was of opinion that the facts might be brought officially to the notice of the German Government, expressing the hope that they would think fit to direct an inquiry to be made by the military authorities, and that they would, as an act of justice, award compensation for the injuries wantonly inflicted. The British law officers were of opinion that British subjects residing in France had no just cause of complaint against the French authorities in the event of their property being destroyed by an invading army.

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 7; Wolfius, *Jus Gentium*, § 687; Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, §§ 310, 311; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. vi. ch. 1.

The Brussels Conference of 1874 declares.—Art. 53. The neutral State receiving in its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies will intern them, so far as it may be possible, away from the theatre of war. They may be kept in camps, or even confined in fortresses or in places appropriated to this purpose. It will decide whether the officers may be released on giving their parole not to quit the neutral territory without authority. Art. 54. In default of a special agreement, the neutral State which receives the belligerent troops will furnish the interned with provisions, clothing, and such aid as humanity demands. The expenses incurred by the internment will be made good at the conclusion of peace. Art. 55. The neutral State may authorise the transport across its territory of the wounded and sick belonging to the belligerent armies, provided that the trains which convey them do not carry either

§ 5. It was contended by some of the ancient publicists that a belligerent had an absolute right of passage for his troops through neutral territory, and that the neutral could not refuse it without injustice. But Vattel contends that such *innocent passage* through neutral territory may be granted or refused by the neutral power, at its discretion; that, if refused, the applicant has no cause of complaint, and if granted, the opposite party can only claim the same privilege for his own troops. Many modern writers, and the German publicists generally, have pronounced in favour of the view of Vattel. But Heffter, Hautefeuille, Manning, and others express the opinion, that to grant such passage is a violation of neutral duty, and affords just cause of complaint, if not a war, to the other belligerent. This opinion seems most consonant with the general principles of neutrality. But admitting the right of the neutral State to make such agreements it follows, that if it grant or refuse passage to one of the parties to the war, it is bound, in like manner, to grant or refuse it to all the other parties, unless the alteration of circumstances, or some special reason, should of itself form a justification for acting otherwise. Without solid and satisfactory reasons, to grant passage to one belligerent and refuse it to another, would be showing partiality, and receding from a position of strict neutrality. This is the reasonable and just rule deduced from the opinions of law writers, and the usage of nations. The grant of passage, says Vattel, includes all those things without which the passage would not be practicable, such as the liberty of carrying whatever may be necessary for the passing army, and that of maintaining discipline among the troops. Moreover, he who grants a passage is bound, so far as lies in his power to make it safe from attack; for, otherwise, it would be drawing those who pass into a snare, which would be a breach of good faith. Whether the troops are to pass with or without

the *personnel* or *matériel* of war. In this case the neutral State is bound to take the measures necessary for the safety and control of the operation. Art. 56. The Convention of Geneva is applicable to the sick and wounded interned on neutral territory.

During the Franco German War in 1870, between 60,000 and 70,000 French troops crossed into Switzerland. They were disarmed and interned by order of the Swiss Government. The sick and wounded among them were not sent back to the French army.

arms, and whether they are to be permitted to purchase supplies in the country passed over, or to carry their provisions with them, will, in general, be specified in the grant of passage, and if not specified, such permission will be presumed. Troops, to whom a passage is granted through a neutral territory, are bound to observe the most exact discipline, to occasion no damage to the country passed over, to keep the public roads, and not to enter the houses or lands of private persons, and to punctually pay for whatever is purchased of the inhabitants. The State to which the troops belong is held strictly accountable for any damage to public or private property. Moreover, they cannot make the neutral border a shelter for making preparations to attack the enemy, nor, when defeated, an asylum in which to lie by and watch their opportunity for further contest. This would be making the neutral country directly auxiliary to the war, and to the comfort and support of one of the belligerents. Such conduct would be a violation of the rights and duties of neutrality, and, so far from being justified by the grant of passage, it would be good cause for the neutral State to revoke the grant, and compel the offender to immediately leave its territory.¹

§ 6 Bynkershoek makes one exception to the general inviolability of neutral territory, and contends that if a belligerent should be attacked on hostile ground, or in the open sea, and should flee within the jurisdiction of a neutral State, the victor may pursue him *dum servet opus*, and seize his prize within the neutral State. He rests his opinion entirely on the authority and practice of the Dutch, and not on the usage of any other nation. Casaregis, in one part of his work, expresses the same opinion, and, relying on the practice or law observed in the chase of animals, maintains that if a naval fight has commenced on the high seas, a belligerent may pursue and capture the ship of his enemy, even under the cannon, and within the jurisdiction of a neutral power. But, in a subsequent discourse, he acknowledges his error, or rather forgets his former opinion, and adopts a contrary

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. vii. §§ 133, 134; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. vii. §§ 5, 6; Moser, *Vernunft*, etc. b. x. c. i. pp. 155, et seq.; Manning, *Law of Nations*, pp. 182-186; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 147; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, iii. v. ch. i.

one with respect to the protection afforded to belligerent vessels in neutral ports.¹

§ 7. But this opinion of Bynkershoek is not supported by the practice of nations, nor by writers on public law. Abreu, Valin, Emerigon, Vattel, Azuni, Sir William Scott, Martens, Phillimore, Manning, and other European writers maintain the sounder doctrine, that when the flying enemy has entered neutral territory, he is placed immediately under the protection of the neutral power, and that there is no exception to the rule that every voluntary entrance into neutral territory, with hostile purposes, is absolutely unlawful. Kent, Wheaton, Story, and other American writers, oppose the doctrine of Bynkershoek; and the government of the United States has invariably claimed the absolute inviolability of neutral territory.²

§ 8. This question was revived and elaborately discussed in the case of the steamboat 'Caroline,' which was captured and destroyed by British armed forces while in American territory, in the winter of 1838. This vessel had been employed by a body of Canadian insurgents, in conveying passengers and munitions of war from the frontier of the State of New York to the British ground of Navy Island. The command of the expedition, from the Canada side, sent to capture this vessel, expected to find her within British territory. On coming round the point of the island in the night, he discovered that the vessel was moored on the American shore. He nevertheless proceeded to make the capture and to destroy the vessel, although then within the neutral territory, and his conduct was approved by his Government. This led to remonstrance on the part of the United States. It was said that upon a full investigation of all the facts, it should appear that the owner of the vessel had been governed by a hostile intention or had made common cause with the occupants of Navy Island, the United States would prosecute no claim to indemnity for the destruction of this boat; but that the lawfulness

¹ Bynkershoek, *Q. J. Pub.*, lib. I. cap. viii.; Casaregis, *de Commer.* disc. xiv. n. ii. and disc. clxiv. n. xi.; the 'Anna,' 5 *Rob. R.*, p. 328.

² Abreu, *sobre las Presas*, pt. I. c. iv. § 15; Valin, *Traité de Pr.* ch. iv. § 3; Azuni, *Droit Maritime*, pt. I. c. iv. § 1; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. vii. §§ 132, 133; the 'Anna Catharina,' 5 *Rob. R.*, p. 328; Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, §§ 310, et seq.; Phillimore, *On the Law*, vol. iii. § 154; Manning, *Law of Nations*, pp. 186, 386.

or unlawfulness of the employment in which the 'Caroline' was engaged, however settled, in no manner involved the higher consideration of the violation of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction. In the discussion which followed, Mr. Webster, while claiming absolute immunity of neutral territory against aggression from either of the belligerents, admitted that the necessity of *self-defence* might justify hostility in the territory of a neutral power; but that it was required of the English Government, as the aggressor in this case, 'to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.' It will be for us to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorised them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.' Lord Ashburton agreed with Mr. Webster, on the inviolability of neutral or independent territory, and on the possible exception to which that principle was liable—the necessity of self-defence, as the first law of our nature—and that the suspension of that great principle 'must be for the shortest possible period, during the continuance of an admitted overruling necessity, and strictly confined within the narrowest limits imposed by that necessity.' He, however, contended that there was 'that necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation,' which preceded the destruction of the 'Caroline' while moored to the shore of the United States, that 'it must be admitted that there was, in the hurried execution of the necessary seizure, a violation of territory,' and that it was 'to be regretted that some explanation and apology for this occurrence was not immediately made' to the United States, by the British Government. These acknowledgments and assurances were received as satisfactory by the United States, and the subject was not further discussed by the two Governments.¹

§ 9. A neutral State, by virtue of its general right of police over its ports, harbours, and coasts, may impose such restrictions upon belligerent vessels, which come within its jurisdic-

¹ Webster, *Dip. and Off. Papers*, pp. 112-120.

tion, as may be deemed necessary for its own neutrality and peace, and so long as such restrictions are impartially imposed upon all the belligerent powers, neither can have any right to complain. This right is frequently exercised in prohibiting all armed cruisers with prizes to enter such neutral ports and waters, and, even without prizes, to obtain provisions and supplies. This usage is shown by marine ordinances and text-writers of different nations.¹

§ 10. This restriction, imposed by neutrals upon the vessels of belligerents which come into their ports, is never extended to deny the rights of hospitality in case of immediate danger and want. Armed cruisers may anchor within a neutral port as a shelter from the attacks of an enemy, to avoid the dangers of a storm, or to supply themselves with water, provisions, and other articles of pressing necessity. Asylum, to this extent, is required by the common law of humanity, to be afforded to belligerent vessels in neutral ports. But beyond this, there is no right of asylum which the neutral may not withhold equally from all belligerents. It may prevent any free communication with the land, and, as soon as such vessels have supplied their immediate wants, the neutral may compel them to depart from its jurisdiction. Such were the restrictions imposed by the King of the Two Sicilies in the wars of 1740 and 1756, and by Spain in the war of 1778, and they are supported by the authority of text-writers.²

¹ Heffter, *Droit International*, §§ 146-150; Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, tome ii. ch. viii.; Bello, *Droit International*, pt. ii. cap. vi. § 8. Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. vi. ch. ii.

² Kent, *Comm. on Am. Law*, vol. i. pp. 120, 121.

By the law of nations, belligerent ships of war, privateers, and the prizes of either, are entitled on the score of humanity to temporary refuge, and to enjoy asylum in neutral ports from casualties of the sea and land, and for the purpose of obtaining supplies or undergoing repairs, according to the discretion of the neutral Sovereign, who may refuse the asylum absolutely, or grant it under such conditions of duration, place, and other circumstances as he shall see fit; provided, however, that he must be strictly impartial in this respect towards all the belligerent Powers. And so long as the neutral State has not expressed its determination to refuse the privilege of asylum to belligerent ships of war, privateers, or their prizes, either belligerent has a right to assume its existence and enter upon its enjoyment subject to such regulations and limitations as the neutral State may please to prescribe for its own security. Therefore, although the United States may not have entered into any treaty with either of two belligerents, to accord asylum to its vessels, yet if they have not given any notice that they will not do

§ 11. But while the neutral State may, by proclamation or otherwise, prohibit belligerent vessels with prizes or prisoners of war from entering its ports, the absence of any such prohibition implies the right to enter for the purposes indicated, and any vessel so entering neutral waters, retains her right of territoriality, both with respect to her prisoners of war and prizes. This question was raised in the port of San Francisco, California, in the case of the Russian vessel, the *Albatross*, a prize of the British navy, during the Crimean

§ 12. The armed cruisers of belligerents, while within the jurisdiction of a neutral State, are bound to abstain from any act of hostility toward the subjects, vessels, or other property of their enemies; they cannot increase their guns or military stores, or augment their crews, not even by the enlistment of their own countrymen; they can employ neither force nor stratagem to recover prizes, or to rescue prisoners in the possession of the enemy; nor can they use a neutral port, or waters within neutral jurisdiction, either for the purpose of hindering the approach of vessels of any nation whatever, or for the purpose of attacking those which depart from the ports or shores of neutral powers. No proximate acts of war, such as a ship stationing herself within the neutral line, and sending out her boats on hostile enterprises, can, in any manner, be allowed to originate in neutral territory; nor can any measure be taken that will lead to immediate violence.²

§ 13. Publicists make a marked distinction between the duties of neutrals, with respect to the asylum which may be afforded to belligerent ships, and that which may be afforded

to the ports of the United States are to be deemed open to such ships. (*U. S. Att. Gen.*, 122.)

In May, 1865, the United States declared that, if after a reasonable time should have elapsed for the proclamation to become known in the ports of nations claiming to be neutral, the insurgent cruisers should continue to receive hospitality in such ports, the Government would deem itself justified in refusing hospitality to the public vessels of such nations in ports of the United States, and in adopting such other measures as might be deemed advisable for vindicating the national sovereignty.

¹ Cassing, *Opinion U. S. Attys Genl.*, vol. vii. p. 123; Loccenus, *de Jure Maritimo*, lib. ii. ch. iv. § 7.

² Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, § 312; Chitty's *Com. Law*, vol. pp. 41-44; the *Twee Gebroeders*, 3 *Rob. R.*, p. 103.

to belligerent forces on land. This difference, says Heffter, results from the immunity of the flag, and the principle that ships are considered as a portion of the territory of the nation to which they belong. Hence the allowable custom of asylum in neutral waters, and the want of power in the neutrals to interfere with internal organisation of such vessels, when not armed or equipped within its jurisdiction. On the other hand, troops are not a part of the territory of the nation to which they belong, nor has their flag any immunity on neutral soil. While, therefore, individuals, as such, are entitled by the laws of humanity, to the right of asylum in neutral territory, such asylum cannot be demanded by, nor can it be granted, without a violation of neutral duty, to an army as a body. It is, consequently, the duty of the neutral to order the immediate disarming of all belligerent troops which enter neutral territory as an asylum, to cause them to release all their prisoners, and to restore all booty which they may bring with them. If he neglect to do this, he makes his own territory the theatre of war, and justifies the other belligerent in attacking such refugees within such territory, which is no longer to be regarded as neutral.¹

§ 14. At the commencement of the European war, in 1793, the Government of the United States took strong grounds against the arming and equipping of vessels within the ports of the United States, by the respective belligerent powers, to cruise against each other, declaring such acts to be a violation of neutral rights, and positively unlawful; and that any vessel, so armed or equipped in our ports, for military service, was not entitled to the rights of asylum.² The authority of

¹ Heffter, *Droit International*, § 149; Klüber, *Droit des Gens*, § 208, note b; Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, liv. iii. ch. viii.; Pictet et Lüscher, *Des Prises Maritimes*, tit. i. ch. i. sec. 3; Haureteulle, *Des Nations Amies*, tit. vi. ch. ii.; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. ix. ch. iii. § 66; Pando, *Derecho Internacional*, p. 365; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, p. ii. ch. vii. § 5; Knapp, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. ii. cap. xiv.; De Steck, *Versuch, über Handel, etc.*, p. 173; Putman, *de Jure occupandi hostes, etc.*, and see ante, paragraph 4.

² It was decided by the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York in 1818, that it is no breach of neutrality on the part of a belligerent to equip vessels of war in a neutral port, unless the act be interdicted by a treaty. 2 Taylor, 2 *Pinne*, 655.

It was decided under the 29 Geo. 2, c. 16, s. 2, which prohibited the exportation of arms, &c. from Great Britain during time of war, except by licence, when such arms were destined for Africa, that the act of a neutral ship meeting by agreement a British vessel, in Africa, for the

Wolffius, Vattel, and other writers on the law and usage of nations, was appealed to, in support of these declarations

purpose of receiving gunpowder and arms, was illegal, though the latter a licence to export them for the purpose of trade. — *Gibson v. Mart*, 11 *Mass.* 32, 5 *P.* Gibson v. Leunc, 1 *Stark.* 119; S.C., 5 *Taunt.* 435.

A well known case of the 'Alabama,' and of other vessels of the Confederate Government, which preyed on the commerce of the Federal States during the late civil war in the United States, occasioned the latter Government to claim satisfaction from Great Britain on the ground of breaches of neutrality of that country in building, equipping, and arming, and assisting the progress of those vessels. To meet these claims, after many negotiations, on the conclusion of the civil war, the Treaty of Washington having a retrospective effect was signed at Washington, Dec. 8, 1861, between Great Britain and the United States, referring the questions to five arbitrators, one being chosen by each of the following Governments, viz. Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil. These arbitrators met at Geneva in Switzerland on Dec. 15, 1871.

It would far exceed the limits of this work to enlarge on the many important questions discussed at the Tribunal of Arbitration, or, as it is more correctly called, the Conference of Geneva; but the reader may gather the history of the whole matter and some of the more important subjects discussed, by a perusal of the following extracts.

It was stipulated by Art. 6 of the above Treaty as follows:—

In deciding the matters submitted to the arbitrators, they shall be guided by the following three rules, which are agreed upon by the contracting parties as rules to be taken as applicable to the case, and by such principles of international law not inconsistent therewith as the arbitrators shall determine to have been applicable to the case.

A neutral Government is bound—

First. To use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction of any vessel which it has reasonable cause to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace, and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use.

Secondly. Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.

Thirdly. To exercise due diligence in its waters, and as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.

Her Britannic Majesty has commanded her High Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries to declare that Her Majesty's Government cannot but regard the foregoing rules as a statement of principles of international law which were in force at the time when the claims mentioned in Art. i. were presented, but that Her Majesty's Government, in order to conciliate its desire to strengthen the friendly relations between the two countries, and of giving satisfactory provision for the future, agrees that in deciding the questions between the two countries arising out of those claims, the arbitrators should assume that Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to act upon the principles set forth in these rules.

And the high contracting parties agree to observe these rules as

and rules of neutrality. The ground then assumed by the United States is now generally admitted to be correct. The

between themselves in future, and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime Powers, and to invite them to accede to them'.

The following award was made on September 14, 1872, by the Tribunal of Arbitration held at Geneva, viz. :—

'The Tribunal having since fully taken into their consideration the Treaty, and also the cases, counter-cases, documents, evidence, arguments, and likewise all other communications made to them by the parties during the progress of their sittings, and having impartially and carefully examined the same, has arrived at the decision embodied in the present award.

'Whereas, having regard to the 6th and 7th Articles of the said Treaty, the arbitrators are bound under the terms of the said 6th Article in deciding the matters submitted to them, to be governed by the rules therein specified, and by such principles of International Law as inconsistent therewith, as the arbitrators shall determine to have been applicable to the case ;

'And whereas the "due diligence" referred to in the first and third of the said rules ought to be exercised by neutral Governments in exact proportion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed from a failure to fulfil the obligations of neutrality on their part ;

'And whereas the circumstances out of which the facts constituting the subject-matter of the present controversy arose, were of a nature to call for the exercise on the part of Her Britannic Majesty's Government of all possible solicitude for the observance of the rights and duties involved in the Proclamation of Neutrality issued by Her Majesty on the 13th day of May, 1861 ;

'And whereas the effects of a violation of Neutrality committed by means of the construction, equipment, and armament of a vessel are not done away with by any commission which the Government of the belligerent power, benefited by the violation of Neutrality, may afterwards have granted to that vessel ; and the ultimate step, by which the offence is completed, cannot be admissible as a ground for the absolution of the offender, nor can the consummation of his fraud become the means of establishing his innocence ;

'And whereas the privilege of extritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted into the law of nations, not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between different nations, and therefore can never be appealed to for the protection of acts done in violation of neutrality ;

'And whereas the absence of a previous notice cannot be regarded as a failure in any consideration required by the law of nations, in those cases in which a vessel carries with it its own condemnation ;

'And whereas, in order to impart to any supplies of coal a character inconsistent with the second rule, prohibiting the use of neutral ports and waters as a base of naval operations for a belligerent, it is necessary that the said supplies should be connected with special circumstances of time, of persons, or of place, which may combine to give them such character ;

'And whereas, with respect to the vessel called the *Alabama*, it clearly results from all the facts relative to the construction of the ship at the place designated by the Number 290 in the port of Liverpool, and its equipment and armament in the vicinity of Terceira through the agency of the vessels called the "*Agrippina*" and the "*Bahama*," despatched from Great Britain to that end, that the British Government failed to use due

objection was made by the United States, in the war of
against the enlisting of men by the respective belligerent

in the performance of its neutral obligations ; and especially
omitted, notwithstanding the warnings and official representations
by the diplomatic agents of the United States during the construc-
tion of the said Number 290, to take in due time any effective measures
thereon, and that those orders which it did give at last, for the
stop of the vessel, were issued so late that their execution was not
possible ;

and whereas, after the escape of that vessel, the measures taken for
pursuit and arrest were so imperfect as to lead to no result, and there-
fore cannot be considered sufficient to release Great Britain from the
liability already incurred ;

and whereas, in despite of the violations of the neutrality of Great
Britain committed by the "290," this same vessel, later known as the
private cruiser "Alabama," was on several occasions freely admitted
to the ports of Colonies of Great Britain, instead of being proceeded
against as it ought to have been in any and every port within British
jurisdiction in which it might have been found ;

and whereas the Government of Her Britannic Majesty cannot justify
its failure in due diligence on the plea of the insufficiency of the
means of action which it possessed : Four of the arbitrators for
reasons above assigned, and the fifth for reasons separately assigned
are of opinion That Great Britain has in this case failed, by
omission, to fulfil the duties prescribed in the first and third of the rules
established by the 6th Article of the Treaty of Washington ;

and whereas, with respect to the vessel called the "Florida," it results
from the facts relative to the construction of the "Oreto" in the port of
London, and to its issue therefrom, which facts failed to induce the
Government of Great Britain to resort to measures adequate to prevent
the violation of the neutrality of that nation, notwithstanding the warn-
ings and repeated representations of the agents of the United States,
that Majesty's Government has failed to use due diligence to fulfil
its duties of neutrality ;

and whereas it likewise results from all the facts relative to the stay
of the "Oreto" at Nassau, to her issue from that port, to her enlistment
of men, to her supplies, and to her armament, with the co-operation of
the vessel "Prince Alfred," at Green Cay, that there was negligence
on the part of the British Colonial authorities ;

and whereas, notwithstanding the violation of the neutrality of Great
Britain committed by the "Oreto," this same vessel, later known as the
private cruiser "Florida," was, nevertheless, on several occasions,
admitted into the ports of British Colonies ;

and whereas the judicial acquittal of the "Oreto" at Nassau cannot
release Great Britain from the responsibility incurred by her under the
law of International Law ; nor can the fact of the entry of the
vessel into the Confederate port of Mobile, and of its stay there
four months, extinguish the responsibility previously to that time
incurred by Great Britain. For these reasons :—The Tribunal, by a
majority of four voices to one, is of opinion—That Great Britain has in
this case failed, by omission, to fulfil the duties prescribed in the first, in
the second, and in the third of the rules established by Article 6 of the
Treaty of Washington.

and whereas, with respect to the vessel called the Shenandoah, it
results from the facts relative to the departure from London of the
vessel the "Sea King," and to the transformation of that ship

powers within our ports, and it was declared that if a neutral State might not, consistently with its neutrality,

into a Confederate cruiser, under the name of the "Shenandoah," the Island of Madeira, that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty was not chargeable with any failure, down to that date, in the diligence to fulfil the duties of neutrality :

'But whereas it results from all the facts connected with the case of the "Shenandoah" at Melbourne, and especially with the facts which the British Government itself admits to have been effected of her force, by the enlistment of men within that port, there was negligence on the part of the authorities at that port, for these reasons, the Tribunal is unanimously of opinion - That Great Britain has not failed, by any act or omission, to fulfil any of the duties prescribed by the three rules of Article 6 in the Treaty of Washington, or by the principles of International Law, not inconsistent therewith, in respect to the vessel called "Shenandoah," during the period of her detention prior to her entry into the port of Melbourne ;

'And, by a majority of three to two voices, the Tribunal declares that Great Britain has failed, by omission, to fulfil the duties prescribed by the second and third of the rules aforesaid, in the case of the vessel, from and after her entry into Hobson's Bay, and is responsible for all acts committed by that vessel after her departure from Melbourne, on the 18th day of February, 1865 ;

'And so far as relates to the vessel called the "Tuscaloosa," the "Alabama," the "Clarence," the "Tacony," and the "Arcturion," the Tribunal is unanimously of opinion - That the tenders or auxiliary vessels, being properly regarded as accessories, necessarily follow the lot of their principals, and be submitted to the same decision which applies to them respectively. And so far as relates to the vessel called "Retribution," the Tribunal, by a majority of two voices, is of opinion -

'That Great Britain has not failed by any act or omission to fulfil the duties prescribed by the three rules of Article 6 in the Treaty of Washington, or by the principles of International Law, not inconsistent therewith. And so far as relates to the vessels called the "Georgetown," the "Sumter," the "Nashville," the "Tallahassee," and the "Chickasaw," respectively, the Tribunal is unanimously of opinion - That Great Britain has not failed, by any act or omission, to fulfil the duties prescribed by the three rules of Article 6 in the Treaty of Washington, or by the principles of International Law, not inconsistent therewith ; and so far as relates to the vessels called the "Jefferson Davis," the "Masa," the "Boston," and the "Vicksburg," respectively, the Tribunal is unanimously of opinion - That they be excluded from consideration for want of evidence.

'And whereas, so far as relates to the privateers of the United States, the costs of pursuit of the Confederate cruisers are not, in the judgment of the Tribunal, properly distinct from the general expenses of the war carried on by the United States, the Tribunal is, therefore, of opinion, by a majority of three voices -

'That there is no ground for awarding to the United States by way of indemnity under this head.

'And whereas prospective earnings cannot properly be made a subject of compensation, inasmuch as they depend in their nature on future and uncertain contingencies, the Tribunal is unanimously of opinion - That there is no ground for awarding to the United States by way of indemnity under this head.

to either party for their aid in war, it was equally unlawful for either belligerent to enroll them in the neutral territory.

And whereas, in order to arrive at an equitable compensation for the losses which have been sustained, it is necessary to set aside all double claims for the same losses, and all claims for "gross freights," so far as they exceed "nett freights ;"

And whereas it is just and reasonable to allow interest at a reasonable rate ;

And whereas, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Washington, it is preferable to adopt the form of adjudication of a Tribunal rather than to refer the subject of compensation for further discussion and deliberation to a Board of Assessors, as provided by Article 10 of the said Treaty :

The Tribunal, making use of the authority conferred upon it by Article 7 of the said Treaty, by a majority of four voices to one, awards to the United States a sum of 15,500,000 dollars in gold as the sum to be paid by Great Britain to the United States for the satisfaction of all the claims referred to the consideration of the Tribunal, in conformity to the provisions contained in Article 6 of the aforesaid Treaty.

And, in accordance with the terms of Article 11 of the said Treaty, the Tribunal declares that "all the claims referred to in the Treaty, as submitted to the Tribunal, are hereby fully, perfectly, and finally settled."

Furthermore, it declares that "each and every one of the said claims, whether the same may or may not have been presented to the notice of, or made preferred, or laid before the Tribunal, shall henceforth be considered and treated as finally settled, barred, and inadmissible."

Considerable difference of opinion prevails among jurists as to the wisdom of the decision of the Arbitrators has made on the general principles of International Law. It should be remembered that Austria, Prussia, Germany, Russia, Spain, and other States, were not represented at the Conference, and both in Great Britain and on the Continent, the better opinion seems to be that oppressive and impracticable decisions, hitherto unknown to International Law, would be imposed on the nations if the principles set forth as the basis of the award, and the interpretation placed on the three rules of the 6th Art. of the above Treaty by the majority of the arbitrators, were acceded to in future cases. In reply to Mr Hardy, on March 21, 1873, Mr Gladstone, as Prime Minister, stated in the House of Commons, that in bringing these rules to the knowledge of other Maritime Powers, and inviting them to accede to the same, "you have a right to expect that we should take care that the recommendation of the three rules does not carry with it, in whole or in part, in substance or even in shadow, so far as we (the British Government) are concerned, the recitals of the Arbitrators as being of any authority in this matter."

Further, some considerable correspondence passed between the British Government and the Government of the United States during the years 1871-74, with respect to communicating to other maritime Governments the above rules, but it was not found possible to draft a note which would express the respective views of the two Governments.

Mr Alexander Lockhart, the arbitrator appointed by Great Britain, dissented from the above award, and published his reasons for dissenting from it. After recapitulating the three rules of Art. 6, he proceeds to remark -

"With these rules before it, the Tribunal is directed to deter-

tory. Wolfius says that 'it is not permitted to raise soldiers on the territory of another, without the consent of its sovereign

to each vessel, whether Great Britain has, by any act or omission failed to fulfil any of the duties set forth in such rules, or recognised by the principles of International Law not inconsistent with such rules.

'The effect of this part of the Treaty is to place this Tribunal in a position of some difficulty. Every obligation, for the non-fulfilment of which redress can be claimed, presupposes a prior existing law, by which a right has been created on the one side, and a corresponding obligation on the other. But here we have to deal with obligations assumed that existed prior to the Treaty, yet arising out of a supposed law created the first time by the Treaty. For we have the one party denying the prior existence of the rules to which it now consents to submit as a measure of its past obligations, while the other virtually admits the same thing, for it "agrees to observe the rules as between itself and Great Britain in future," and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime Powers, and invite them to accede to them, all of which would plainly be superfluous and vain if these rules already formed part of the existing law recognised as obtaining among nations.

'It is, I cannot but think, to be regretted that the whole subject matter of this great contest, in respect of law as well as of fact, was not left to us, to be decided according to the true principles and rules of International Law in force and binding among nations, and the duties and obligations arising out of them, at the time when these alleged causes of complaint are said to have arisen.

'From the history of the Treaty of Washington, we know that was proposed by the British Commissioners to submit the question, both as to law and fact, to arbitration, but the Commissioners of the United States refused to "consent to submit the question of the liability of Great Britain to arbitration unless the principles which should govern the arbitrators in the consideration of the facts were first agreed upon." In vain the British Commissioners replied that they "should be willing to consider what principles should be adopted for observance in future, but that they were of opinion that the mode of conducting an arbitration was to submit the facts to an arbitrator, and leave him free to decide upon them after hearing the arguments as might be necessary." The American Commissioners replied that they should be willing to consider what principles should be laid down for observance in similar cases in future, but only on the understanding that "any principles which should be agreed upon should be held to be applicable to the facts in respect to the *Alabama* claims." The British Commissioners and Government gave way, partly without fully appreciating the extent to which the principles, of which they were thus admitting the application, would be attempted to be carried in fixing them with liability.

'If, however, the differences which have unhappily arisen between the United States and Great Britain were to be determined, not according to the rules of International Law, which the arbitrators to be agreed upon should determine to be applicable to the case, but according to rules to be settled by the contending parties themselves, then I cannot but say that the framers of this Treaty had been able to accomplish the difficult task, now left to us, of defining more precisely what is meant by the vague and uncertain term "due diligence," and had also set forth further "principles of International Law, not inconsistent with the law laid down," to which reference is made as possibly affecting the liability of Great Britain.

right.' Vattel says that, 'As the right of levying soldiers belongs solely to the nation or the sovereign, no person must

'To some of the heads of complaint herein before referred to, this observation does not indeed apply. Whether vessels which might have been seized, should have been so dealt with when they returned to British ports or whether they were protected by the commissions then had in the meanwhile received from the Confederate Government; whether Confederate ships of war were permitted to make British ports the base of naval operations against the United States; whether the accommodation afforded to them in British ports constituted a violation of neutrality, for which Great Britain can be held liable, are questions which are left to be decided and must be decided according to the rules of International Law alone. But when we have to deal with the far more important question of the liability of Great Britain by reason of the omission to use "due diligence" to prevent the equipment of vessels of war in her ports, as required by the Treaty, we find nothing in the Treaty which directs us as to the meaning of that term, especially as regards the degree of diligence which is to be understood to be required by it.

Let in this difficulty, we must endeavour to determine for ourselves the extent and meaning of the "due diligence" by which we are to test the alleged shortcomings of the Government of Great Britain. For it is plain that the standard of "due diligence" ought not to be left to the unguided discretion of each individual arbitrator. The municipal law of every country, wherever diligence is required by the law, whether in respect of obligations arising out of contract, or in regard to the due care which every one is bound to exercise to avoid doing harm to the persons or property of others, *ne adunum ledat*, prescribes some standard by which the necessary degree of diligence may be tested.

Dealing here with a matter appertaining to law, it is to juridical science that we must look for a solution of the difficulty. And since we have to do with a question of International Law, although, it is true, of an exceptional character, it seems to me that it will be highly useful to endeavour to form a clear view of the reciprocal rights and duties between belligerents and neutrals, created by International Law generally, and the diligence necessary to satisfy the obligations which that law imposes. I cannot concur with Mr. Staempfli, that, because the practice of nations has at times undergone great changes, and the views of jurists on points of International Law have often been and still are conflicting, therefore there is no such thing as International Law, and that, consequently, we are to proceed independently of any such law—for such is the effect of his reasoning, if I understand it rightly—according to some subjective perception of right and wrong, or speculative notions of what the rules as to the duties of neutrals ought to be. It seems to me that when we shall have ascertained the extent to which a neutral State is responsible, according to the general law of nations, for breaches of neutrality committed by its subjects, and the degree of diligence it would be called upon to exercise under that law, in order to avoid liability, we shall be better able to solve the question of what constitutes due diligence for the terms of the Treaty of Washington. That Treaty may have created a liability in respect of the equipment of ships, where none existed by International Law before, as I certainly think it has; but the degree of diligence required of a neutral Government to prevent breaches of neutrality by its subjects must be determined by the same principles, whatever may be the nature of the particular obligation. Besides the necessity of thus considering the relation of belligerents and neutrals with reference to the subject of "due diligence," we have further, in order

attempt to enlist soldiers in a foreign country, without the permission of the sovereign. . . . The man who undertakes

to satisfy the exigency of the articles of the treaty, to consider, what besides in the omission of "due diligence," Great Britain has to fulfil any duty imposed by any principle of International Law not consistent with the rules laid down. It is clear also, that, with reference to the other heads of complaint, our decision must necessarily depend entirely on the rules of International Law applicable thereto.

Referring to the question of the Confederate vessels, he says:—'When the Government of the Confederate States had armed certain vessels and had placed them under the command of officers duly commissioned by it, and those vessels put into ports of the neutral Powers, the Government of the United States protested loudly against their being treated as vessels of war, on the ground that the insurgent States still formed an integral portion of the Union; that they were to be looked upon as rebels; and that commissions from a Government, the independence of which had not been acknowledged, could not give to its ships the character of ships of war. They insisted, therefore, on these vessels being looked upon as pirates, to which all entry into the ports of nations, and all assistance of every kind, should be denied. The Federal Government even went farther, and threatened to hold neutral Governments responsible for any assistance or supplies afforded to Confederate ships. But the neutral Governments were unanimous in refusing to accede to these demands, and persisted in conceding to the Confederate ships the same privileges as were afforded to those of the United States. And again, 'In January 1862, after the war had been going on for some months, circumstances arose which made further regulations as to the admission of the armed vessels of the two belligerents into British ports necessary. Instructions bearing date January 31, 1862, were accordingly issued by the Government. One of these had reference to the ports of the Bahamas in particular, the other to the ports and waters of Her Majesty's dominions in general.'

On the question of coal, he observes:—'The general regulations applicable to all Her Majesty's ports, which, as we have seen, were in conformity with the wishes of the United States Government, though not intended by the British Government to have any operation more favourable to one belligerent than the other, nevertheless, could not be proved very prejudicial to the Confederates, the strict blockade of whose ports left their ships of war without any ports to which they could resort for repairs or supplies, or into which they could take their prizes. The rule forbidding them a greater supply of coal than would suffice to take them to their nearest port, and prohibiting also a renewal of the supply within three months, was obviously calculated to place them at the greatest possible disadvantage. Compelled, from having no ports of their own, to keep the sea, their means of doing so were necessarily lessened, and the regulation in itself, so unfavourable to the Confederate vessels, was rendered still more so by the strict construction put on it by Her Majesty's Government, by whom the Governors of the different Colonies were instructed that, in case of any special application for leave to coal at a British port within the three months, if it appeared that any part of the former supply had been consumed otherwise than in gaining the nearest port, not even stress of weather should form a ground of exception. As no Confederate vessel could seek its nearest port so as to be practically to prevent the possibility of a renewed supply under the circumstances within the three months.'

As to ships obtained from Great Britain he says:—'Next as to the

takes to enlist soldiers in a foreign country, without the sovereign's permission,—and, in general, whoever entices away the

British having been, as it is said, “the navy yard of the insurgents,” it was of course impossible to prevent the Confederate Government, reduced to desperate straits by the blockade, and in want of ships of war, from resorting to the ship-builders yards of Great Britain. It was impossible to prevent the ship-builders, who looked upon the furnishing of such vessels as purely commercial transactions, the Messrs. Laird who built the “Alabama,” having been perfectly willing, as appears from their correspondence with a Mr. Howard, who professed to have authority to enter into a contract with them to build vessels for the Federal Government, to supply ships to the latter as well as to the insurgents,—and who appear to have thought that, so long as the ships were not armed in British waters, such transaction would not be within the Foreign Enlistment Act,—from entering into such contracts. All the Government could do was to use reasonable care to see that the Act was not violated.

Two vessels of war, and two only, the “Florida” and the “Alabama,” equipped in British waters, found their way into the hands of the Confederates. Whether, in respect of them, the British authorities were wanting in due diligence will be matter for future consideration, when these vessels come specifically under review. The most unjustifiable charge that the Government were wilfully wanting in the discharge of their duty from motives of partiality has, I hope, been already disposed of. Every other vessel built or equipped in British waters for the war service of the Confederate Government was prevented by the act of the British Government from coming into their hands. Immediate and constant attention was paid to the frequent applications of Mr. Adams, which, for the most part, turned out to have proceeded on erroneous information. It may have been that, in the cases of the “Florida” and the “Alabama,” the local officers may have been somewhat too much disposed to leave it to the United States’ officers to make out the case against the vessels. But such, as we have seen, had been the traditional mode of the matter, not only in England but in the United States. These officers may have attached too much importance to the fact that the vessels, though equipped for receiving arms, were not actually armed before leaving the port. In that they only shared the opinion of two distinguished judges in the Court of Exchequer. But when the authorities had become thoroughly alive to what was going on, no vessel of war to which the notice of the Government was called, and which proved to be intended for war, was suffered to escape. An enumeration of the instances on which inquiry was instituted by Her Majesty’s Government, with the results, will set this part of the case in its true light, and show the flagrant injustice of the wholesale accusations which have been so unwarrantably made.

It thus concludes this exhaustive and lucid investigation on the laws

of neutrality. I have now gone through the cases of all the different vessels in which of which claims have been preferred for losses sustained through alleged want of due diligence on the part of the British Government. All that has been said and written, it is only in respect of two vessels—both equipped, at the very outset of the civil war, and before the instances resorted to had become known by experience, that this tribunal which has not shown a disposition to take too indulgent a view of the Government of neutral obligations, has been able to find any default in British authorities at home, while in respect of a third, the tribunal, by a majority one voice only, has fixed the Government with liability for an alleged

subjects of another State, violates one of the most sacred rights of the prince and the nation. This crime is distinguished by the name of kidnapping, or man-stealing, and is punished with the utmost severity in every well-regulated

error in judgment of the Governor of a distant Colony in respect of allowance of coal, and for the want of vigilance of the police in preventing men from joining a Confederate vessel at night. We have here the best practical answer to the sweeping charges so perseveringly brought against the British Government and people.

'I concur entirely with the rest of the tribunal, in holding that the cost for cost of pursuit and capture must be recited. This item of expense formed part of the general expense of the war. The cruisers employed on this service would, probably, have been kept in commission had the three vessels in question never left the British shores.'

In 1870, during the Franco-German War, the British Government directed the seizure of a steamer about to leave England for the purpose of laying down a deep sea telegraphic cable between certain ports of the belligerents. On application under the 23rd section of the 33 and 34 Vict. c. 90, by the owners of the ship and her cargo for the release of the same, it was held by the Court of Admiralty that *prima facie* the transaction was a commercial one between subjects of Great Britain and of a Government in friendly relations with her; that it was not a case to consider whether the vessel might have been seized by a French cruiser as being employed in the service of France, or as carrying contraband of war of a novel kind, but falling under the old principle, the carrier of contraband may violate the proclamation of the neutral State of which he is a member, and deprive himself of the right to protection from her, but the punishment of his offence is, by the general law of nations, left to the belligerent who has the right of capture. The offence is not cognisable by the municipal law of Great Britain. The only bearing of the law of contraband on the case would arise from the analogies furnished by that law, namely, that as 'circumstances arising out of a particular situation of the war and condition of the parties engaged in it' the '*Jonge Margaretha*' 1 Rob. 193 might clothe an article *ancipitis usus*, with the character of contraband, so it might be argued that the character of the 'International' might bring her within the category of a ship despatched for the naval service of France. The statute, by specifying 'military telegraphy,' had not excluded the possibility of showing, that in the particular circumstances of the case postal telegraphy must be considered, as the telegraphy employed in the military service of the State. The Company was formed to furnish military postal telegraphy: the contract with the French Government was for military telegraphy of this kind only. No other kind was furnished. It was probable that this telegraphic line would be partially used for effecting communication between the French army and that Government, but neither could appear to be the main object of the line, nor could it, without additions and adaptations, with which this Company had no concern, be made to partially to subserve this end. The probability that the line might be occasionally used for military, among other, purposes, was not sufficient to divest the line of its primary and paramount commercial character, and to subject the Company to the very severe penalty imposed by the statute. There was a 'reasonable and probable cause' for the detention of the ship and cargo, and for putting the applicants on their defence. Release of the vessel decreed, but without costs or damages.—The 'International,' 3 Mar. Law. Cas., 523.

State Foreign recruiters are hanged without mercy, and with great justice. It is not presumed that their sovereign has ordered them to commit a crime, and, even supposing that they had received such an order, they ought not to have obeyed it, —their sovereign having no right to command what is contrary to the law of nature. . . . If it appear that they acted by order, such a proceeding in a foreign sovereign is justly considered as an injury, and as sufficient cause for declaring war against him, unless he make a suitable reparation.

§ 15. The next question to be considered is, whether neutrals may assist a belligerent by money, in the shape of a loan or otherwise, without violating the duties or departing from the position of neutrality? It seems to be universally conceded, that if such loan be made for the manifest purpose of enabling the belligerent to carry on the war, it would be a virtual concurrence in the war, and consequently a just cause of complaint by the opposite party. But Vattel contends that the loaning of money to one belligerent, by the subjects of a neutral State, is not such a breach of neutrality as to be either a cause of war or of complaint, provided the loan is made for the purpose of getting good interest, and not for the purpose of enabling one belligerent to attack the other. Phillimore very properly regards this as a manifest frittering away of the important duties of the neutral; and that it is as much a violation of neutral duty to furnish the one as the other of the

‘ — two main nerves, iron and gold,’

for the equipage and conduct of the war. The English courts have decided that such loans are in violation of international law, and that they will take no notice of, nor render any assistance in, any transactions growing out of such loans, unless raised with the special licence of the crown.²

¹ Wolfius, *Jus Gentium*, § 754; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. ii.

² Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 151; De Wurtz v. Hendricks, 9 Mart. R., p. 586; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. vii. § 3.

It is contrary to the law of nations for persons residing in Great Britain to enter into engagements to raise money, by way of loan, for the purpose of supporting subjects of a foreign State in arms against a Government in alliance with Great Britain.—De Wurtz v. Hendricks, 9 Mart. R. 586.

In the judgment in this case, Mr Justice Best observed that the Court

§ 16. Armed cruisers, in neutral ports, are not only bound not to violate the peace while within neutral jurisdiction, but

of Chancery had decided, under circumstances of a precisely similar nature, in the same manner. British Courts of Justice will not take notice of, or afford any assistance to, persons who set about raising loans for subjects of a foreign Government, to enable them to prosecute war against that Government. At all events such loans cannot be raised without the licence of the Crown. See also *Josephs v. Pebrer*, 1 *Car.*, and *Pat. N. Pri. C.*, 341.

The two following opinions of the British law officers relate to the above question :—

'To the Right Hon. George Canning, M.P. &c.

'DOCTORS COMMONS, June 17, 1853.

'SIR,—We have been honoured with your commands, signified in Mr. Planta's letter of the 12th inst., stating that you were desirous that we should report our opinion upon the following questions :—

'1. Whether subscriptions for the use of one of two belligerent States by individual subjects of a nation professing and maintaining a strict neutrality between them be contrary to the law of nations, and constitute such an offence as the other belligerent would have a right to consider as an act of hostility on the part of the neutral Government?

'2. If such individual voluntary subscriptions in favour of one belligerent would give such just cause of offence to the other, whether loans for the same purpose would give the like cause of offence?

'3. And, if not, where is the line to be drawn between a loan at an easy or mere nominal rate of interest, or a loan with a previous understanding that interest would never be exacted, and a gratuitous voluntary subscription?

'In obedience to your commands, we beg leave to report that we have taken the same into our consideration, and we are of opinion that subscriptions of the nature above alluded to, for the use and avowedly for the support of one of two belligerent States against the other, entered into by individual subjects of a Government professing and maintaining neutrality, are inconsistent with that neutrality, and contrary to the law of nations; but we conceive that the other belligerent would not have a right to consider such subscriptions as constituting an act of hostility on the part of the Government, although they might afford just ground of complaint, if carried to any considerable extent. With respect to loans, if entered into merely with commercial views, we think, according to the opinions of writers on the law of nations and the practice which has prevailed, they would not be an infringement of neutrality; but if, under colour of a loan, a gratuitous contribution was afforded without interest, or with mere nominal interest, we think such a transaction would fall within the opinion given in answer to the first question. We have the honour to be, &c., CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON (King's Advocate), R. GIFFORD (Attorney-General); J. S. COPLBY (Solicitor-General).

'LINCOLN'S INN, June 21, 1853.

'SIR, We have been honoured with your commands, signified to us by Mr. Planta in his letter dated 18th inst., in which he states, with reference to the queries proposed to His Majesty's law officers in his letter of the 13th inst., he was directed by you further to ask for our opinion whether, having regard to the municipal law of this country, there exists any, and what, means of proceeding legally against individuals and corporations engaged in such subscriptions as were described in those queries.

they cannot use the asylum as a shelter from which to make an attack upon the enemy. Hence, if an armed vessel of one belligerent should depart from a neutral port, no armed vessel, being within the same, and belonging to an adverse belligerent power, can depart until twenty-four hours after the former, without being deemed to have violated the law of nations. And if any attempt at pursuit be made, the neutral is justified in resorting to force, to compel respect to the sanctity of its neutrality.¹

§ 17. If a belligerent cruiser, in acting offensively, passes over a portion of water within neutral jurisdiction, that fact is not usually considered such a violation of the territory as to invalidate an ulterior capture made beyond it. Permission to pass over territorial portions of the sea is not usually

We have accordingly taken the same into consideration, and beg leave to report that, reasoning upon general principles, we should be inclined to say that such subscriptions in favour of one of two belligerent powers, being inconsistent with the neutrality declared by the Government of the country and with the law of nations, would be illegal, and subject the persons concerned in them to prosecution for a misdemeanor, on account of the obvious tendency to interrupt the friendship subsisting between the country and the other belligerent, and to involve the State in dispute, and possibly in the calamities of war. It is proper, however, to add that persons of a similar nature have formerly been entered into (particularly the subscription in favour of the people of Poland in 1792 and without any notice having been taken of them by the public authorities of the country, and without any complaint having, as far as we can learn, been made by the Powers whose interests might be supposed to have been affected by such subscriptions. Neither can we find any trace of a prosecution having been instituted for an offence of this kind, or any hint at such a proceeding in any period of our history. We think, therefore, even if it could be proved that the money had been actually sent in pursuance of the subscription, it is not likely that a prosecution against the individuals concerned in such a measure would be successful.

But, until the money be actually sent, the only mode of proceeding, if we suppose, would be for counseling or conspiring to assist with the other of the belligerents in the contest with the other, a prosecution which would be attended with still greater difficulty.

We beg leave further to report that no criminal proceeding can be brought against a corporation for contributing its funds to such a subscription, but that the individual members who may be proved to have been concerned in the transaction can alone be made criminally responsible.

We have the honour to be, &c.

R. GIFFORD.

J. S. COPLEY.

¹ *Vent. Cours en Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 122; Azuni, *Droit Maritime*, tome ii. p. 107; *Correan, Diplomatique de la Mer*, tome ii. ch. viii.; Hautefeuille, *Manuel de Droit*, tit. vi. ch. i.; Pistoye et Duverdy, *Des Prises Maritimes*, tit. 2. ch. 1. sec. 3.

required or asked, because not supposed to result in any inconvenience to the neutral power. For example, in a war between England and Russia, belligerent vessels must pass the *sound* over which Denmark claims and exercises imperial rights. So in a war between France and Russia, armed vessels might be obliged to pass through the neutral waters of the *Dardanelles*; but in neither of these cases would the passage be deemed a violation of neutral rights, nor would a capture by either power be invalidated by the fact of such passage, *animo capiendi*, to the place where the right of capture could be exercised. 'Where a free passage,' says Sir William Scott, 'is generally enjoyed, notwithstanding a claim of territory may exist for certain purposes, no violation of territory is committed, if the party after an inoffensive passage, conducted in the usual manner, begins an act of hostility in open ground. In order to have an invalidating effect it must at least be either an *unpermitted* passage over territory where permission is regularly requested, or a passage under permission obtained under false representation and suggestions of the purpose designed. In either of these cases there might be an original malfeasance and trespass that travels throughout and contaminated the whole, but if nothing of this sort can be objected, I am of opinion that a capture otherwise legal, is in no degree affected by a passage over territory in itself otherwise legal and permitted.'¹

§ 18. Such are the general prohibitions, recognised and established by the laws of nations, against any positive or even approximate acts of war in neutral territory. We are not aware that any modern writer on international law has questioned the soundness of the principle upon which they are founded. Moreover, the extent of a nation's sovereign rights depends, in some measure, upon its municipal laws, and other powers are bound, not only to abstain from violating such laws, but to respect the policy of them. The municipal laws of a State, for the protection of the integrity of its soil and the sanctity of its neutrality, are sometimes even more stringent than the general laws of war; the right of a sovereign State to impose such restrictions and prohibitions, consistent with the general policy of neutrality, as

¹ The 'Twee Gebroeders,' 3 Rob. 354.

may see fit, is undeniable. And all acts of the officers of a belligerent power against the municipal law of a neutral State, or in violation of its policy, involve that government in responsibility for their conduct.¹

§ 19. The Congress of the United States have, by statutes, made suitable provision for the support and due observance of the rules of strict neutrality within American territorial jurisdiction. By the law of June 5, 1794, revised April 20, 1818,² it is declared to be a misdemeanor for any citizen

¹ *Marcy's Correspondence, etc., on Recruiting*, p. 50; Valin, *Com. sur l'Ordonn. m. c.*, t. ii. p. 274.

² In 1816, the United States considered the expediency of extending the provisions of this statute, but eventually did not do so. In that year a case was brought before the District Court at New York, in which this statute was enforced by that court against a vessel, alleged to be intended for the Cuban service in the war between Chili and Spain. This vessel, the 'Mercer,' had been built as a ship of war for sale to the United States Government, but the civil war having terminated, the sale was not effected. It was acknowledged to have been built to carry eleven or twelve guns, and the negotiations of the agent of the owners for her sale to the Cuban Government were shown by conclusive evidence. The vessel was libelled in the District Court in February, 1860, but Judge Betts' decision in the case was not formally given until November.

In the elaborate judgment then delivered, the standard decisions of the Supreme Court are reviewed at length.

The following are some of the more important passages:—

The crime denounced is fitting-out and arming.—It was strenuously urged by the counsel for the claimant, on the hearing, that the crime created by the third section of the Act of 1818 is the crime of fitting-out and arming a vessel with the intent named in the statute, and that, although the attempt to commit that crime, or the procuring that crime to be committed, or the being knowingly concerned in committing that crime, is punishable under the statute, yet the *actus reus* of the crime is the fitting-out and arming, and nothing short of that is punishable under the statute, either against the wrong-doer personally, or against the offending *res*; and the interpretation sought to be put by the counsel upon these words of the statute, "or shall knowingly be concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any ship or vessel with arms, &c.," is that it is not necessary to the criminality of the individual that he should have performed every part of the crime, but it is enough if he was knowingly concerned in any one step in the chain of conduct which completed the criminality, or would have completed it if carried out but that the crime must be the crime of fitting out and arming, either attempted or completed. But the court cannot adopt this interpretation of the statute. The mischief against which the statute intended to guard was not merely preventing the departure from the United States of an armed vessel, but the departure of any vessel intended to be employed in the service of any foreign power, to cruise or commit hostilities against any other foreign power with whom the United States are at peace. The neutrality of the Government of the United States, in a war between two foreign powers, would be violated quite as much by allowing the departure from its ports of an unarmed vessel with the clear intent to cruise or

of the United States, within the territory or jurisdiction thereof, to accept and exercise a commission to serve a foreign

commit hostilities against one of the belligerents, as it would be by permitting the departure from its ports of an armed vessel with such armament. If the intent to cruise or commit hostilities exists when the vessel departs, and the vessel is one adapted to the purpose, subsequent arming is an easy matter. The facility with which this can be done was made manifest in the case of the "*Shenandoah*," and other vessels, which during the late rebellion left England unarmed, but with the full intent on the part of those who sent them forth that they should be used to cruise and commit hostilities against the United States, and were subsequently armed in neutral waters. It would be a very forced interpretation of the statute to say that it was not an offence against it to knowingly fit out a vessel with everything necessary to make her an effective cruiser, except her armament, and with the intent that she should become such a cruiser, because it should not be shown that there was any intent that she should be armed within the United States. The evil consequences which would flow from interpreting the statute to mean that the crime must include the arming of the vessel within the United States, become especially apparent on reference to that part of the third section which forbids the issuing or delivering a commission within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, for any ship or vessel, to the intent that she may be employed to the purpose named in the section. Under such an interpretation of the statute it would be no offence to issue or deliver a commission within the United States for any vessel, unless such vessel were actually armed at the time, or perhaps were intended to be armed prior to her departure from the United States; and it would be no offence to issue a commission within the United States for a vessel fitted and equipped to cruise and commit hostilities, and intended to cruise and commit hostilities, so long as such vessel was not armed at the time, and was not intended to be armed within the United States, although it could be shown that a commission existed on the part of the person issuing or delivering the commission, that the vessel should receive her armament the moment she should be beyond the jurisdiction of the United States.

The "Santissima Trinidad" case.—Much reliance was placed by the counsel for the claim, in his summing up, upon the doctrine supposed by him to have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of the "*Santissima Trinidad*." That doctrine was stated by the court in various forms, but the principle contended for was, that freedom of commerce is allowed to a neutral to furnish to a belligerent warlike materials, or warlike vessels, as articles of merchandise or traffic; that while the principle of the law of nations is recognised, which prohibits neutral territory from being used by either belligerent as a vantage ground, from which he may sally forth to commit hostilities upon the other belligerent, yet the right of citizens of the neutral country to sell all that their industry produces for purposes of war, as fair matter of trade, to any belligerent, cannot be interfered with; that it is no offence and no violation of neutrality to sell a vessel of war, armed or not armed, in our ports to a belligerent power; and that there is the same right, under the law of nations, to sell in our ports an armed vessel, under such circumstances that there is to sell guns or ammunition or any other raw material. At another stage of his argument the counsel maintained the proposition that unless it appeared affirmatively that the vessel was to sail out from the port of New York as an enlisted hostile ship of one belligerent, there was no criminality, although it should be made to appear by in-

prince, State, colony, district, or people, in war, by land or by sea, against any prince, State, colony, district, or people, with whom

possible proof that she had been built, fitted, armed, and equipped as a ship of war, complete and ready for action."

The views thus pressed upon the court have, in its judgment, no foundation in public law, or in any decision that has been made by the judicial tribunal of the United States. The case of the "San-
ta Fe" was decided by the Supreme Court at the February

Judge Betts then gives an account of the facts of the case, and continues:—"In the course of his opinion, Mr. Justice Story discusses the point taken, that the "Independencia" was originally armed and fitted for the United States contrary to law, and says, "It is apparent that she was equipped as a vessel of war, she was sent to Buenos Ayres on a commercial adventure," &c. These views of Mr. Justice Story were, as appears from the statement which has been made of the case, *obiter dicta*, and not necessary to the decision of the cause, restitution of the vessel being decreed upon the ground of the illegal augmentation of the force of the capturing vessel in our ports prior to the capture. The point in regard to the commercial adventure of the "Independencia," pressed by Mr. Justice Story, as they appear in the report of the case, is that that vessel, having been a privateer during the war between the United States and Great Britain, was, after the peace, sold by her original owners, and loaded by her new ones at Baltimore, in January, with a cargo of munitions of war; that she sailed from Baltimore for Buenos Ayres, and armed with twelve guns, part of her original armament, under written instructions from her owners to her supercargo, authorising him to sell the vessel to the Government of Buenos Ayres, if he could obtain a suitable price; and that she was sold at Buenos Ayres to parties who again sold her, so that she became a public-armed vessel of the Government of Buenos Ayres. It was on these facts that Judge Story remarked that the vessel, though equipped as a ship of war, was sent to Buenos Ayres on a commercial adventure, in violation of our laws or our national neutrality, and that there is nothing in our laws or in the law of nations that forbids our citizens sending armed vessels to foreign ports for sale. If the "Meteor" was sent out to Panama on a purely commercial adventure, to be sold at a suitable price could be obtained, and if it appeared that there was no content on the part of the owners or any other person that the vessel should be used to violate the neutrality of the United States, there would be some pretence that this case was within the principle thus laid down by Mr. Justice Story. But the whole testimony points in a different direction. The transaction with the agents of Chili at New York in regard to the "Meteor" was, it is true, a commercial adventure, in so far as the vessel was sold, and that such sale was a matter of trade or commerce at New York between her owners and the agents of the Government of Chili. But in the sense in which Mr. Justice Story speaks of the case of the "Independencia" to Buenos Ayres on a commercial adventure, there was no commercial adventure in the case of the "Meteor."

The doctrines laid down in this case are the result of the legislative, executive, and judicial action of the United States:—The importance of this case, not merely in view of the pecuniary value of the vessel concerned against, but also in respect to the principles of public law involved in it, have led the Court to a more extended discussion of the principles than would otherwise have been necessary. The

the United States are at peace, or to enlist, or enter himself, or hire or retain another person to enlist, or enter himself, or go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of a foreign prince, State, &c. ; or to fit out and arm, or to increase and augment, the force of any armed vessel, with the intent that such vessel be employed in the service of any foreign

court, however, entertains no doubt as to the correctness of the doctrines of public law which it has applied to the present case. These doctrines are the result of the legislative, executive, and judicial action of the public authorities and courts of the United States in a great variety of cases, and the court has nowhere found a more excellent summary of them than in Wheaton's *International Law* 8th Edition, with notes, 2d Dana, pp. 562, 563, note 215 : "As to the preparing of vessels for our jurisdiction for subsequent hostile operations, the test we have applied has not been the extent with which the particular acts are done. If a person does any act, or attempts to do any act, towards such preparation with the intent that the vessel shall be employed in hostile operations, he is guilty without reference to the completion of the preparations, or the extent to which they may have gone, and although his attempt may have resulted in no definite progress towards the completion of the preparations. The procuring of materials to be used knowingly and with intent, &c. is an offence. Accordingly, it is not necessary to show that the vessel was armed, or was in any way or at any time before or after the act charged, in a condition to commit acts of hostility. Our courts do not interfere with *bona fide* commercial dealings in contraband of war. An American merchant may build and fully arm a vessel, and provide her with stores, and offer her for sale in our own market. If he does so as an agent or servant of a belligerent, or in pursuance of an arrangement or understanding with a belligerent, that she shall be employed in hostilities when sold, he is guilty. He may, without violation of our law, send out such a vessel so equipped under the flag and papers of his own country, with no more force of crew than is suitable for navigation, with no right to resist search or seizure, and to take the chance of capture as contraband merchandise, of blockade, and of a market, in a belligerent port. In such cases, the extent and character of the equipments is as immaterial as in the other class of cases. The intent is all. The act is open to great suspicions and abuse, and the line may often be scarcely traceable ; yet the principle is clear enough. 'Is the intent to prepare an article of contraband merchandise, to be sent to the market of a belligerent, subject to the chances of capture and of the market? As, on the other hand, is it to fit out a vessel which shall leave our ports to cruise immediately or ultimately against the commerce of a nation? The latter we are bound to prevent, the former the belligerent must prevent.'"

The judgment was given against the vessel, but she was even then restored to her owners under bond, and what became of her afterwards does not appear.

It must be remembered that this opinion of Judge Betts was reviewed by the Supreme Court, and is therefore of inferior authority.

The United States Foreign Enlistment Act arose from the prohibition put on the terms of the Treaty with France of 1778 ; the British Foreign Enlistment Act may be said to have arisen from the provision of a treaty with Spain of August 28, 1814.

power at war with another power, with whom we are at peace; or to begin, set on foot, or provide or prepare the means for any military expedition or enterprise, against the territory of any foreign prince or State, or of any colony, district, or people, with whom we are at peace. And any vessel or vessels fitted out for such purpose are made subject to forfeiture. The President of the United States is also authorised to employ force to compel any foreign vessel to depart, which, by the law of nations, or by treaty, ought not to remain within the United States, and to employ the public force generally in enforcing the observance of the duties of neutrality prescribed by law.¹

§ 20. The example of the United States was followed by Great Britain, and the Act of 59 George III., chap. 99, commonly called the Foreign Enlistment Act, was passed;² sup-

¹ *U. S. Statutes at Large*, vol. i. p. 381; vol. iii. p. 447; Dunlop, *Laws of the United States*, pp. 580, 583; the 'Gran Para,' 7 *Wheaton R.* 489; the 'United States' v. Quincy, 6 *Peters R.* 445, 467; the 'Alerta,' 9 *Cranch R.* 564; the 'Forelli,' 4 *Wheaton R.* 309; Legare, *Opinions U. S. Att. Gen.*, vol. iii. pp. 738, 741; Johnson, *id.*, vol. v. p. 92.

² Upon the breaking out of war between the United States and the Republic of Mexico, in 1845, the province or department of Yucatan, belonging to Mexico, having assumed a flag of her own, and having manifested a determination to remain neutral, a special order was issued by the President of the United States exempting her citizens from the operation of the laws of war. Under such circumstances, no citizen or subject of Yucatan could with impunity violate her neutrality, by assuming the flag of the enemy. — *United States Telegraph*, 1 *Nevada*, 383.

This is repealed, but the provisions contained in it are re-enacted and amplified in the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vic. c. 90.

§ 2. Order in Council, August 30, 1862, the British Foreign Enlistment Act was suspended so far as to enable Captain Osborn and Mr. Lay to employ the service of the Emperor of China, to fit out, equip, purchase, and arm ships or vessels of war for the use of the said Emperor, and to engage and enlist British subjects to enter the military and naval service of the said Emperor. This permission was to remain in force till September 1, 1864. This licence, with the same limitation, was extended to all military officers in Her Majesty's service.

The last American Civil War introduced a new series of cases in which the then Foreign Enlistment Act was called into operation; they were — The 'Creto,' tried at Nassau, released August, 1862; the 'Alexandria,' tried in England, the ironclads 'El Toussoun' and 'Mounassir,' the 'Lorado,' the cases of the 'Alabama,' 'Shenandoah,' and 'Georgia.' There were five prosecutions for enlisting men for the Confederate navy.

For representations addressed to the British Government by Mr. Adams during the last American Civil War, see Memorandum annexed to Lord Russell's letter to Mr. Adams, November 3, 1865. — *Parl. Pap. Amer. Affairs*, No. 1, 1866, p. 139.

The property in a prize of war may pass to the captors — without such prize being taken into a port belonging to the country of the captors, or

plying the defect of former laws, and extending the protection to those who entered the service of unacknowledged, as acknowledged, States. The previous statutes of George II., which were enacted for the purpose of preventing the formation of Jacobite armies in France and annexed capital punishment as for a felony to the offence of entering the service of a foreign State. The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 provided a less severe punishment introduced after the words 'King, Prince, State, or Possession' the words, 'colony or district assuming the powers of government.' This Act was thoroughly discussed in Parliament in 1823, on a motion for its repeal.

§ 21. It is not only the right of the neutral State to protect the property of the belligerents when within the jurisdiction, but it is a part of the duty of neutrality to protect such property while under neutral protection, and to punish any and every offence against the rights of neutrality if necessary, by resort to force. Livy relates that Scipio enforced peace between the Carthaginian and Roman galleys while lying in a neutral port. The Venetians prevented the Greeks from attacking the Turks in the neutral port of *cocondylas*. The same may be said of the Venetians preventing the Turks at Tunis, of the Pisans and Genoese in Sicily, and numerous other cases mentioned in history. The English East India fleet having put into Bergen, in Norway, to avoid the English, were attacked by them; but the Government of Bergen fired on the assailants, and the Danish Government complained to the English Government of a violation of its sovereignty. England having declared neutrality between Don Miguel and Donna Maria, sent a naval force to intercept the Portuguese armada on its destination to the Island Terceira, because it had disguised itself in disguise, and had sailed from Plymouth

being condemned by a prize court. A prize of war (a merchantman with a prize crew on board, is not a ship of war. A neutral steam tugboat, such a vessel—from neutral waters—to the waters of her captor—on the ordinary course of her employment, does not complete the capture, if not employed in the naval service of a belligerent within the meaning of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, s. 8, subs. 4. The 'Gauntlet,' *all's Mor. Law* *Int.* 86. See also *ex parte* Ferguson and *Hobbs*, *ibid.* 8; the 'Heinrich and Maria,' 4 *Rob.* 43; The 'Polka,'

a well-established principle of the law of nations that if the property of belligerents, when within the neutral jurisdiction, be attacked, or any capture made, the neutral is bound to redress the injury and effect restitution. In the year 1793 the British ship 'Grange' was captured in Delaware bay by a French frigate, and, upon due complaint, the American Government caused the British ship to be promptly restored. So, in the case of the 'Anna,' captured by a British cruiser in 1805, near the mouth of the Mississippi, and within the jurisdiction of the United States, the British Court of Admiralty not only restored the captured property, but fully asserted and vindicated the sanctity of neutral territory by a decree of costs and damages against the captor. If a neutral State neglects to make such restitution, and to enforce the sanctity of its territory, but tamely submits to the outrages of one of the belligerents, it forfeits the immunities of its neutral character with respect to the other, and may be treated by it as an enemy.'

Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 155, 157; the 'Vrouw Anna,' 5 *Rob.* 15; the 'Anna,' 5 *Rob.* 348; Heffter, *Droit International*, §§ 146-150; Bello, *Droit International*, pt. ii. cap. vii. § 6; Guilme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. ii. cap. xvii.

DECLARATION issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Military District of Odessa, and published in the *London Gazette* by order of the British Foreign Office, May 17, 1877.

(Translation.)

The Commander of the troops of the Military District of Odessa, of the Coast Defences of the District, General Aide-de-camp Séméka, has the honour of notifying that, in consequence of the laying of torpedoes, neutral States, requested to withdraw in view of a bombardment, do so except on condition of being piloted by Russian officers through the passages left between the torpedoes; but as this operation, carried out in the face of the enemy, might point out to them the post on these passages and enable them to make use of them, thereby depriving them of its most important line of defence, General Aide-de-camp Séméka, in view of a state of affairs new in maritime warfare, and consequently not foreseen by international law, has the honour to request the neutral ships of war to withdraw out of sight for the time necessary for removal of neutral ships (namely, for — hours), warning them that if they do not agree to this demand, neutral ships will not be allowed out, the Imperial Russian Government declines all responsibility for the consequences.'

He sent to Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Taganrog by the Governor of that place, with the assurance that every assistance would be afforded to foreign vessels of friendly neutral powers on their passage at the respective ports, in order that trade might not be impeded, published in the *London Gazette* by order of the British Foreign Office, May 17, 1877 :—

§ 22. Although it is the duty of a belligerent State to make restitution of the property captured within the territorial jurisdiction of a neutral State, yet it is a technical rule of prize court to restore to the individual claimant, in such cases, only on the application of the neutral Government, if its territory was violated in effecting the capture. This is founded upon the principle, that the neutral State alone has been injured by the capture, and that the hostile claimant has no right to appear, for the purpose of suggesting the legality of the capture. He must look to the neutral Government for redress of the violation of the right of asylum; that government is bound to effect a restitution, or an indemnity for the injury suffered. This claim is usually transferred by the ambassador of the neutral State in the enemy's country, to the prize court before which the captured property is brought for adjudication.¹

(Translation.)

¹ Approved by the Commander of the Odessa Military Department, April 12, 1877.

¹ From the time of the declaration of war, 12 24 April 1877, the entrance of and the departure of vessels from the port of Odessa, from the Dnieper, and from the Bough, the Straits of Kertch, and the Strait of Sebastopol, are only permitted subject to the following conditions:—
are not provided for by maritime international law, but which necessarily arise, now that harbours are protected by barring them with mines, the passage through which is kept absolutely secret. —

'1. Every vessel, on arriving, must stop outside the line of the Russian officers with a crew will go and meet her; they will assume command of the said vessel, and navigate her in the harbour, after having satisfied themselves that the ship's papers are in regular order.

'2. The captain of the said vessel shall engage, in writing, on behalf of himself and his crew and passengers, that, while passing through the line of torpedoes, no person shall remain on the bridge, or watch the port-holes or other openings, the course followed by the ship.

'3. The same rule shall be enforced when merchantmen call at the harbour, that is to say, a Russian officer and crew shall, in conformity with Articles 1 and 2, take command of the said vessels.

'4. If a man of war should make its appearance at a spot where it would be possible to watch the entry and departure of vessels, the authorities will insist upon its retiring to a certain distance during the time sufficient to navigate a vessel in or out. Until this has been complied with, no vessel will be allowed to enter or leave.'

This declaration and notice are of such recent date that time has not yet permitted any legal or official opinion to emanate on the legal effect of the same. However, it is submitted that the Russian Government is not bound by the law of nations to require the voluntary withdrawal of a hostile man of war, nor in the case of the non-withdrawal of the same, to assume immunity from all responsibility.

¹ The 'Etrusco,' 3 Rob. 31, note; the 'Anne,' 3 Wharton

123 But if the property captured in violation of neutral rights comes into the possession of the neutral State, it is the right and duty of such State to restore it to its original owners. This restitution is generally made through the agency of the Courts of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Traces of the exercise of such a jurisdiction are found in the history of English jurisprudence as early as the reigns of Charles II. and James II., and are now matters of ordinary occurrence in English and American Courts of Admiralty. Such restitution is not confined to captures within neutral jurisdiction, but extends to all captures made in violation of neutral rights, such as by vessels which had been armed and equipped, or had received military munitions, or had enlisted men, or in any other way had violated the sanctity of neutral territorial jurisdiction.¹

§ 24. The power and duty of the United States to restore captures made in violation of our neutral rights and brought into American ports, have never been matters of question; but, in the constitutional arrangement of the different authorities of the American federal union, doubts were at first entertained, whether it belonged to the executive government, or to the judiciary, to perform the duty of inquiry into captures made in violation of American sovereignty, and of making restitution to the injured party. But it has long

the 'Gen. Armstrong,' *Ex Doc* No 50, H. R. 32nd Cong., 1st Sess.; No. 24, Senate, 2nd Sess., *Revue Etr. et Fr.*, tome vii. p. 751.

No private person can interpose in a case of prize and make claim for the restoration of the captured property, on the ground that the capture was made within neutral waters. Whatever claim is made must be presented by the neutral nation, whose rights have been infringed. Even a consul, by virtue of his office merely, cannot interpose.—The 'Albatross,' *Sprague*, 177.

During the war, in 1812, French frigates plundered not only English merchant vessels, but also those of Spain, Portugal, and of the United States.—James, *Nat. Hist.* vol. vi. 48.

Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 12; *Life and Works of Wheaton*, vol. ii. p. 727; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 158; *Regulation, Persecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. ii. cap. xvii.

A neutral ship captured on her return from a whaling voyage, and proceeded against under the Order in Council respecting whaling voyages from ports from which the British flag had been excluded, was declared to be restored, the voyage having been commenced before the Order was issued, and the ship having received no notice thereof.—The 'Albatross,' *Ex Doc*, 275.

A British subject cannot come before a Court of Prize to claim property taken in a course of trade forbidden by the laws of his country. Compensation in such a case.—The 'Etrusca,' 4 Rob., 462, n.

since been settled that this duty appropriately belongs to the federal tribunals, acting as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. It, however, has been judicially determined that this peculiar jurisdiction of the courts of the neutral government to inquire into the validity of captures made in violation of the neutral immunity, will be exercised only for the purpose of restoring the specific property, when unintentionally brought within the territory, and does not extend to the infliction of vindictive damages, as in ordinary cases of maritime injuries, and as is done by the courts of the captor's own country. The punishment to be imposed upon the party violating the municipal statutes of the neutral State, is a matter to be determined in a separate and distinct proceeding. The court will exercise jurisdiction, and decree restitution to the original owner, in case of capture from a belligerent power, by a citizen of the United States, under a commission from another belligerent power, such capture being a violation of neutral duty; but they have no jurisdiction on a libel for damages for the capture of a vessel as prize by the commissioned cruiser of a belligerent power, although the vessel belong to citizens of the United States, and the capturing vessel and her commander be found and proceeded against within the jurisdiction of the court.¹

§ 25. In the case of capture by an armed vessel, fitted out in the ports of the United States, in violation of neutrality, the claim by an alleged *bond fide* purchaser in a foreign port was rejected, and restitution decreed to the original owner. It, however, was decided that a *bond fide* purchaser, with notice, in such a case is entitled to be reimbursed the freight.

¹ The *United States v. Peters*, 3 *Dallas R.*, 121-131; the '*Don Pastor*,' 4 *Wheaton R.*, 65, note; the '*Amistad de Rues*,' 5 *Wheaton R.*, 385; the '*Arrogante Barcelones*,' 7 *Wheaton R.*, 519; '*La Nereida*,' *Wheaton R.*, 108; *Glass v. the 'Betsey'*, 3 *Dallas R.*, 65, note; *McDonough v. the 'Mary Ford'*, 3 *Dallas R.*, 188; Waite, *State Papers*, vol. vi. p. 195.

The Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction to redress any supposed torts committed on the high seas, upon the property of its citizens, by a cruiser regularly commissioned by a foreign and friendly power, even where such cruiser has been fitted out in violation of its neutrality. The courts of the captors are open for redress, and an injured neutral may there obtain indemnity for a wanton or illicit capture. Nor is the jurisdiction of the neutral court enlarged by the fact, that the corpus no longer continues under the control of the capturing power.—*The 'Estrella'*, 4 *Wheat.*, 298.

he may have paid upon the captured goods; and that innocent neutral carrier of such goods, the same having shipped in a foreign port, is entitled to freight out of goods.¹

6. If such property, captured in violation of neutrality, be carried *infra presidia* of the captor's country, it is regularly condemned in a competent court of prize. The question arises whether the courts of the neutral State exercise jurisdiction, and restore such property to the original owners. If the property be found in the hands of the original wrong-doer, it will be restored by the court, notwithstanding a valid sentence of condemnation, properly executed. The offender's touch is said to restore the property from which the condemnation may have purified the property, and it is not for him to claim a right springing out of his wrong.²

7. Illegal equipment and outfit, in violation of neutrality, will not affect the validity of captures made after the time to which the outfit had been applied is actually

¹ 'Santissima Trinidad,' 7 *Wheaton R.*, 283; the 'Fanny,' 9 *R.*, 658.

² 'Arrogante Barcelones,' 7 *Wheaton R.*, 496; the 'Amistad de Mexico,' 7 *Wheaton R.*, 390.

Neither an enemy, nor a neutral acting the part of an enemy, can justify the restitution of captured property on the sole ground of capture in violation of neutrality. The 'Sir William Peel,' 5 *Walt.*, 517.

Prizes by belligerent vessels, lawfully commissioned, are alone valid in prize by neutral courts; and if the capturing vessel claims exemption, the court should inquire and have proof of the exemption. The 'Jansen,' 3 *Dall.*, 133.

In the case of prize, where a neutral has a *jus in re*, namely, where he has possession with a right of retention until a certain amount is paid to the captor takes *eum onere*, and should allow the amount of such amount, where the neutral has merely a *jus ad rem*, which he cannot enforce without the aid of a court of justice, his claim will not be recognized. The 'Amy Warwick,' 2 *Sprague*, 150.

It may occur in which a neutral ship may be authorised by the rights of self-preservation to defend herself from extreme violence offered by a cruiser grossly abusing its commission; but in all cases it is her duty to submit to the captor, and rely on her government for costs and damages against it.—The 'Maria,' 1 *Rob.*, 374.

A neutral ship, which had been rescued by her crew from the hands of a belligerent cruiser, was condemned on the ground of such resistance. The 'Dispatch,' 3 *Rob.*, 278.

A neutral cannot be permitted to aver compulsion and duress of one belligerent in justification of a departure from neutrality, to the prejudice of the other belligerent. If he sustains a loss from yielding to such duress, he must seek his remedy from the belligerent government imposing it. The 'Carolina,' 4 *Rob.*, 260.

terminated. The offence is deemed to be deposited at the termination of the voyage, and does not affect future transactions. This rule would result from analogy to other cases of violation of public law, and has been directly announced by the United States Supreme Court.¹

 ¹ The 'Santissima Trinidad,' 7 *Wheaton R.*, 348.

CHAPTER XXV.

LAW OF SIEGES AND BLOCKADES.

Interdiction of intercourse with places besieged or blockaded—2. Authority to institute sieges and blockades—3. Distinction between them—4. Actual presence of an adequate blockading force—5. Temporary absence produced by accident—6. Constructive or paper blockades—7. Ancient text-writers and treaties—8. Course of England and France in the wars of Napoleon—9. Their declarations in 1804 and 1856—10. *De facto* and public blockades—11. If blockading vessels be driven away by superior force—12. If removed for other cause—13. If blockade be irregularly maintained—14. A maritime blockade does not affect interior communications—15. Effect of a siege upon communications by sea—16. Breach of blockade a crime of war—17. Public notification charges parties with knowledge—18. What constitutes a public notification—19. Effect of general treaties—20. Cases which preclude a denial of knowledge—21. When presumption of knowledge may be rebutted—22. Proof of actual knowledge or warning—23. An attempt to enter—24. Inception of voyage—25. Exception in case of distant voyages—26. In case of *de facto* blockades—27. Where presumption of intention must be repelled—28. Neutral vessel entering in ballast—29. Declarations of master—30. Delay in obeying warning—31. Disregard of warning—32. When ingress is excused—33. Violation of blockade by egress—34. When egress is allowed—35. Penalty of breach of blockade—36. When cargo is excepted from condemnation—37. Duration of offence—38. Insurance, how affected by violation of a blockade—39. Haatefeuille's theory of the law of blockades.

THE same law which confers upon belligerents the right to capture and destroy each other's property imposes on neutrals the obligation not to interfere with the proper exercise of this right. Although as a general rule, neutrals may continue their accustomed trade and intercourse with either, or both of the parties to a war, there are, as already stated, certain exceptions to this rule, established by the positive law of nations, one of which is, that the neutral shall not communicate or carry on trade with a place or post which is besieged or blockaded. Grotius considers the carrying of supplies to a besieged town or a blockaded port, as an offence exceedingly aggravated and injurious; Bynkershoek thinks the prohibition is founded on natural reason as well as esta-

lished usage, both agree that a neutral so offending may be severely dealt with. Vattel says that he may be treated as a public enemy. The views of these distinguished founders of international law are fully concurred in by the opinions of modern publicists, and by the prize courts of all countries. The right of a belligerent to invest the places and ports of an enemy so as to entirely exclude the commerce (otherwise lawful) of neutrals, during the continuance of the investment, is undoubted, and, however serious the grievance, it is one to which neutral governments and their subjects are bound to submit. But as this right of the belligerent is an exception to the general rights of neutrals, and bears with great severity upon their interests, its exercise is always watched with peculiar jealousy in order to prevent its necessary evils from being aggravated by a lax construction of the laws which regulate its application.¹

§ 2. The institution of a siege, or blockade, is a high act of sovereignty, and must proceed, either directly from the

¹ Grotius, *de Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. i. § 5; Bynkershoek, *Quest. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. xi.; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. x. § 217; the 'Juffrow Maria Schroeder,' 3 Rob., 147; the 'Halea,' 6 Rob., 58.

The Brussels Conference, 1874, directs that fortified places are alone liable to be besieged. Towns, agglomerations of houses, or villages which are open or undefended, cannot be attacked or bombarded. Art. 15. But if a town or fortress, agglomeration of houses, or village be defended, the commander of the attacking forces should, before commencing a bombardment, and except in the case of surprise, do all in his power to warn the authorities. Art. 16. In the like case, all necessary steps should be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings devoted to religion, arts, sciences, and charity hospitals, and places where sick and wounded are collected, on condition that they are not used at the same time for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to mark these buildings by special visible signs, to be notified beforehand by the besieged. Art. 17. A town taken by storm shall not be given up to the victorious troops to plunder. Art. 18.

The French military law (Art. 218) 'condemns to capital punishment every commandant who gives up his place without having forced the besiegers to pass by the slow and successive stages of a siege, and before having repulsed at least one assault on the body of the place by practicable breaches.' General Ulrich, although in defending Strasbourg he had made such a defence as no other general had done throughout the Franco-German war of 1870, could not obey this article. He could not repel, or even await an assault, for it was a physical impossibility for his men to remain on the ramparts in presence of the hurricane of fire kept up by the Prussians. Nor did any other French general observe the article. A telegraphic communication ran through the trenches at Strasbourg, and also between the batteries at Kehl, and a church tower close by, whence an artillery officer watched each shot and corrected or approved the gunners' aim.—Edwards's *Germans in France*.

government of the State or from some officer to whom the authority has been expressly or impliedly delegated. The general of an army, or the commander of a fleet, in a foreign country, or on a distant station, may be reasonably presumed to carry with him this authority, as the exigencies of the service on which he is employed, under the varying circumstances of the war, would often seem to require its exercise. His authority in such cases is, therefore, implied from the nature of the service. But where the station of the army or fleet is so near the government of the belligerent State as to enable the commander to receive direct and special instructions, it would seem that the necessity of presuming power in the officer does not exist, and it has been suggested by some, that it is the duty of the commander, in such a case, if his authority should be questioned, to justify his acts by express proof of the instructions of his government. The weight of authority, however, is in favour of the rule that a neutral individual is never at liberty to impeach the regularity of a siege or blockade, otherwise valid, by questioning the authority of the officer by whom it was established or is enforced. The officer is undoubtedly answerable to his own government for any irregular or unauthorised acts, but so long as they are acts of legitimate hostility, it is not open to a neutral State or its subjects, under any circumstance, to dispute their validity. The orders of his government are known only to that government and the officer, and cannot be inquired into by third parties. If he has acted without orders, and his acts are subsequently adopted and ratified, such ratification supplies the want of an original authority, and precludes all further inquiry. But if the act is disavowed by the government of the belligerent State, or if it can be proved that the officer exceeded his actual authority, such disavowal or excess may be urged as a valid defence. Where a blockade has been declared by the government, the commander of the blockading squadron has no discretionary power to extend its limits; and if he prohibits neutral ships from entering ports not embraced in the terms of the blockade he was appointed to enforce, the warning is illegal, and no penalty is incurred by the neutral master by whom it is disregarded.¹

¹ *Der, On Insurance*, vol. 1 p. 646; the 'Henrick and Mary' *Kob.*, 136; the 'Kella,' 6 *Kob.*, 366; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. II.

§ 3. A *siege* is a military investment of a place, so as to intercept, or render dangerous, all communications between the occupants and persons outside of the besieging army, and the place is said to be *blockaded*, when such communication, by water, is either entirely cut off or rendered dangerous by the presence of the blockading squadron. A place may be both besieged and blockaded at the same time, or its communications by water may be intercepted, while those by land may be left open, and *vice versa*. Both are instituted by the rights of war, and for the purpose of injuring the enemy, and both impose upon neutrals the duty of not interfering with the operations of the belligerents. But there is an important distinction, with respect to neutral commerce, between a maritime blockade and a military siege. The object of a blockade is solely to distress the enemy, intercepting his commerce with neutral States. It does not, generally, look to the surrender or reduction of the blockaded port, nor does it necessarily imply the commission of hostilities against the inhabitants of the place. The object of a military siege is, on the other hand, to reduce the place by capitulation, or otherwise, into the possession of the besiegers. It is by the direct application of force, that this object is sought to be attained, and it is only by forcible resistance that it can be defeated. Hence, every besieged place is, for the time, a military post; for even when it is not defended by a military garrison, its inhabitants are converted into soldiers by the necessities of self-defence. This distinction is not merely nominal, but, as will be shown hereafter, leads to important consequences in determining the rights of neutral commerce, and in deciding questions of capture.

§ 288; the 'Juffrow Mana Schroeder,' 3 Rob., 154; Cameron v. Knight, 3 Knapp, R., 342; Chitty, *Law of Nations*, p. 259; Riquelme, *Int. Pub. Int.*, lib. 1. tit. ii. cap. xviii.; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. 2. lib. viii. § 5.

To create the right of blockade and other belligerent rights against neutrals, it is not necessary that the party claiming them should be at war with a separate and independent power. The parties to a civil war are in the same predicament as two nations who engage in a contest and have recourse to arms. See *Prize Cases* determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, 1862; 2 Black, 635.—The 'Brillante' v. United States, 11 Am. Law Rep., N.S., 334.

¹ The 'Stert,' 4 Rob., 66; Klüber, *Droit des Gens Modernes*, § 297; Heffter, *Dr. int. International*, § 154.

General Le Boiss, in his work *Fortifications en presence of the Sea*

§ 4. It is now a well-settled principle of international jurisprudence, that a lawful maritime blockade of a port requires the actual presence of the blockading force. A mere proclamation or notification of one belligerent, that such port of the other belligerent will be blockaded at such a time, and thus closed to neutral commerce, is not sufficient to constitute a legal blockade; the force must be actually present at the entrance to the port, or sufficiently near to prevent communication. Nor is the mere presence of a hostile force sufficient, of itself, to make the blockade a legal one; it must not only be actually present, but it must be large enough to prevent communication, or, at least, to render it dangerous to attempt to enter the port.¹

§ 5. The only exception to the general rule which requires the actual presence of an adequate force to constitute a legal blockade, is the temporary absence of the blockading squad-

May 1865 strongly recommends that hollow projectiles be thrown at all points of the interior of a fortified place. 'Shell the dwellings,' says he, 'when the shells fall in the various quarters the catastrophes are in proportion to the density of the population. Death hovers over the heads of all. Each individual feels threatened as to his own life and that of all he holds dear in the world, while at any moment property may be destroyed by fire. . . . The Governor is made responsible for all the disasters that occur; the people rise against him, his own troops seek to compel him to an immediate capitulation.'

Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 144; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, 2d ed. ch. iii. § 28; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 289, the 'Betsey', 1 Rob. 92; the 'Mercurius', 1 Rob. 82, 83; the 'Vrouw Judith', 1 Rob. 101; Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, tome ii. ch. ix.; Hautefeuille, *Des Lois Neutres*, tit. ix. ch. i.; De Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. i. tit. iii.

A legal blockade cannot exist where no actual blockade can be applied.

If the besieging force cannot apply its power to every point of the blockaded State, it is no blockade of that quarter where its power cannot be brought to bear. An internal canal navigation, where no blockade could exist, was held exempt from all consequences of blockade. *The 'Stern'*, 43 Rob. 66.

Under particular circumstances, a single vessel may be adequate to sustain the blockade of one port, and co-operate with other vessels at the same time in the blockade of another neighbouring port. Condemnation of ships reversing the decision of the Vice-Admiralty Court, for breach of a blockade so maintained.—The 'Nancy', 1 Addm. 63.

Blockading ships are at liberty to take a prize if it comes in the way, and are not to chase to a distance; for that would be a desertion of duty of blockade.—'La Mésange', 2 Dodm. 130.

There are two sorts of blockade—one by the simple fact only, the other by a notification accompanied with the fact.—The 'Neptunus', 1 Rob. 171.

A proclamation by a Commander, without an actual investment, will constitute a legal blockade. The 'Betsey', 1 Rob. 93.

ron produced by accident, as in the case of a storm. Such accidental removal of blockading force, if it be only for a very short time, does not suspend the legal operation of the blockade, and an attempt to take advantage of such an accidental removal is regarded as a fraudulent attempt to break the blockade. But if the blockading forces should be scattered or injured by the storm, as to be unable to resume their stations without repairs, and within a reasonable time, the blockade will be considered as terminated, in the same manner as if the blockading squadron had been driven away by a superior force of the enemy. Some ports are subject to such periodical storms during one or more months of the year, that any blockading squadron is obliged to leave its station, and seek refuge in some other harbour till the season of storms is passed. In such cases the legal operation of the blockade is suspended. It should be remembered, however, that some text-writers do not admit this exception of the temporary and accidental absence of the blockading force. They say that the blockade is not mere theory, but the material result of a material fact (*résultat matériel d'un fait matériel*), and, consequently, cannot exist in the absence of that fact. That, therefore, the blockade must be regarded as raised the moment the blockading force is removed, no matter whether the absence is for a long or short period, or whether produced by accident, by storm, or by an opposing force.¹

§ 6. A *constructive*, or, as it is sometimes called, a *paper blockade*, is one established by proclamation, without the actual presence of an adequate force to prevent the entrance of neutral vessels into the port or ports so pretended to be blockaded. In other words, it is an attempt on the part of one belligerent, by mere proclamation and without possessing or if possessing, without using the means of establishing a real blockade, to close the port or ports of the opposing belligerent to neutral commerce. Can such fictitious or paper blockades render criminal the entrance of neutral vessels into ports so proclaimed to be, but not actually, blockaded? If so,

¹ The 'Columbia,' 1 Rob., 154; the 'Trhетен,' 6 Rob., 65; the 'Hannover,' 6 Rob., 116; the 'Frederick Moller,' 1 Rob., 73; the 'Julien Maria Schmeder,' 1 Rob., 155; *Radehoff v. U. Ins. Co.*, 7 Johns., 30; *Lang v. U. Ins. Co.*, 2 Johns., 178.

a mere paper proclamation is equally as efficacious in war as the largest and most powerful fleets.¹

§ 7. The ancient text-writers all agree, that a blockade, which does not really exist, but is merely declared by proclamation, is not sufficient to render commercial intercourse unlawful on the part of neutrals. Grotius forbids the carrying of anything to 'a town actually invested, or a port closely blockaded;' and Bynkershoek evidently concurred with Grotius, in requiring a strict and actual siege or blockade, such as where a town is actually invested with troops or a port closely blockaded by ships of war (*oppidum obsessum, portus clausos*). This is shown from his remarks upon the various decrees of the States-General. The general practice of the Continental powers accorded with the opinions of these writers. In the convention of 1801, between Great Britain and Russia, intended as a final adjustment of the disputed points of maritime law which had given rise to the armed neutrality of 1780 and 1801, the general law of nations as to what constitutes a blockade is very correctly expressed. The third article, section fourth, of that convention, declares: 'That in order to determine what characterises a blockaded port, that denomination is given *only where there is*, by the disposition of the power which attacks it with ships stationary and sufficiently near, *an evident danger in entering*.' The same definition of a blockade is implied in the previous treaties between Great Britain and the Baltic powers, and in that of 1794, with the United States. In 1804, instructions were sent by the Board of Admiralty to the naval commanders

¹ The 'Betsey,' 1 *Rob.* 92; the 'Mercurius,' 1 *Rob.* 84; Reddie, *Researches, Historical, etc.*, vol. ii. p. 16; Pistolet et Duveroy, *Traité des Prises*, iii. vi. ch. ii. § 2; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 157.

With respect to blockade, though the law remains unaltered, the application of it to practice has been very much altered by the introduction of steam power. A port must be strictly blockaded; but for the purposes of blockade two or three steam vessels might now be as effective as twenty sailing vessels were formerly. (See Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, May 16, 1861.)

A blockade is not to be extended by construction. The mouth of the St. Lawrence was not included in the blockade of the ports of the Southern States, set on foot by the Federal Government, during the late American Civil War, and neutral commerce with Matanzas, a neutral town on the Mexican side of the river, except in contraband destined to the enemy, was entirely free. *See* *Smith*, a belligerent cannot blockade the mouth of a river, occupied on one bank by neutrals with complete rights of navigation. — The 'Peterhoff,' 5 *Wall.* 28.

and judges of the Vice-Admiralty Courts, not to consider any blockade of the French West India islands as existing unless in respect to particular ports which were actually invested.¹

§ 8. But in the course pursued by the belligerents in the wars of the French revolution and empire, and in the British Orders in Council, and Napoleon's retaliatory decrees, an attempt was made by England and France to annul the well-established rule of blockades, and to close the ports and coasts of a whole State to neutral commerce, by simple proclamations, and without the slightest pretence of an actual blockading force. The United States constantly protested against this proceeding, and contended for the rule of international law as laid down by text-writers, that no port or coast could be regarded as blockaded without the actual presence of a sufficient force to prevent, or at least to render dangerous, any attempt of the neutral to enter. It is not necessary to here repeat the various discussions which grew out of these events, as the powers which then attempted to establish this new and absurd rule of international law have now entirely abandoned such pretensions.²

¹ De Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. i. ch. vii.; Wheaton, *Hist. Law of Nations*, pp. 138-143; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. vi. § 1. Grotius, *de Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. ii. cap. i § 5; Bynkershoek, *de Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. xi.; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, t. i. ch. v. § 1.

The President of the United States, in time of war, has the power, by virtue of the constitutional authority conferred upon him as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, to institute and declare a blockade.—The 'Tropic Wind,' 14 *Law Rep. N.S.*, 144.

The proclamation of the President of May 12, 1862, not only relaxed the blockade so far as to let in vessels duly licensed, but entirely removed the blockade of the ports therein named, as respected neutrals. The proviso respecting the licence was construed to be a regulation of trade with places in the military possession of the Government.—The 'Amazilia,' 15 *Law Rep. N.S.*, 663.

² In 1804 Napoleon issued directions, framed by himself, for the improvement of his fleet in Brest water. He began by complaining that the enemy should be permitted, with so few ships, to blockade so large a fleet as the one in the port. He ordered the ships to get under weigh every day, as well to exercise the crews as to harass the British, and hinder the passage of the flotilla coming from Audierne; that 200 soldiers should be placed on board each ship of the line, and who, besides being employed at the guns and about the rigging and sails, were to row in the night launch. Premiums were to be given to those who excelled in the matters; and nothing that could excite the emulation of either soldiers or sailors appears to have been overlooked. Every ship of the line was to be provided with a quantity of 36-pound shells for her lower battery.

4. At the commencement of the war between the Allies and Russia, in 1854, France and England declared their intention to 'maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent the enemy from breaking any *effective* blockade which may be established with an *adequate force* against the enemy's ports, harbours, or coasts.' This declaration was a virtual concession on the part of these powerful maritime nations of the utility of constructive or paper blockades, for which they had formerly contended; but it was regarded as defective, in not defining what should constitute an *effective* blockade, or an *adequate* blockading force. Moreover, the declaration was in form a mere temporary order, and not as a permanent and subsisting law of nations. But the declaration of the plenipotentiaries of France, Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey, on April 16, 1856, at the Conference of Paris, removed all doubt on this point, announcing in the fourth proposition or principle, that 'blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.' This proposition was approved by the United States, and has been adopted by the other nations of Europe. There is, therefore, very little danger of its ever being disputed as an established principle of international jurisprudence.¹

5. Blockades are divided, by English and American writers, into two kinds: 1. A simple or *de facto* blockade, 2. A public or governmental blockade. This is by no means a mere nominal distinction, but one that leads to important consequences of much importance. In cases of blockade, the rules of evidence which are applicable to one kind of blockade, are entirely inapplicable to the other; and what a neutral vessel might lawfully do in case of a simple blockade, would be sufficient cause for condemnation in case of a governmental blockade. A simple or *de facto* blockade

¹ were to be taught how to fire them off with effect. The captains were ordered not to quit their vessels to go on shore, and even the commander-in-chief was not allowed to lodge elsewhere than on board his flag-ship. *Nav. Hist.* vol. iii. p. 216.

² Whimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii., appendix, pp. 850, 851; Ortolan, *Le Droit de la Mer*, tome ii., appendice special, Pistoye et Duverdy, *Des Prises*, tit. vi. ch. v. § 2; Hentzer, *Droit International*, § 157; *op. cit.*, *Précis Historique*, ch. xii.

is constituted merely by the fact of an investment, and without any necessity of a public notification. As it arises from facts, it ceases when they terminate; its existence must therefore, in all cases, be established by clear and *express* evidence. The burthen of proof is thrown upon the captors, and they are bound to show that there was an actual blockade at the time of the capture. If the blockading ships were absent from their stations at the time the alleged breach occurred, the captors must prove that it was accidental, and not such an absence as would dissolve the blockade. A *public*, or governmental blockade, is one where the investment is not only actually established, but where also a public notification of the fact is made to neutral powers by the government, or officers of State, declaring the blockade. Such notice to a neutral State is presumed to extend to all its subjects; and a blockade established by public edict is presumed to continue till a public notification of its expiration. Hence the burthen of proof is changed, and the captured party is now bound to repel the legal presumptions against him by unequivocal evidence. It would, probably, not be sufficient for the neutral claimant to prove that the blockading squadron was absent, and there was no actual investment at the time the alleged breach took place, he must also prove that it was not an accidental and temporary absence, occasioned by storms, but that it arose from cause, which, by their necessary and legal operation, raised the blockade.¹

§ 11. Where the blockading squadron is driven away from its station by a superior force of the enemy, the interruption operates as a legal discontinuance of the blockade, and on its renewal, the same measures are necessary to bring it to the knowledge of neutrals, either by public declaration or by the notoriety of the fact, as were legally requisite when it was first established. It is, in effect, a new blockade, and not the continuance of the old one. The reason of this is obvious.

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 28; the 'Neptunus', 1 *Rob.*, 170; the 'Tetsey', 1 *Rob.*, 331; the 'Christina Margaretha', 6 *Rob.*, 62; the 'Vrouw Johanna', 2 *Rob.*, 109; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 146, 160; Hallimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 200; the 'Menenius', 1 *Rob.*, 81; the 'Neptunus', II., 2 *Rob.*, 110; the 'Wellington', 1 *Rob.*, 131; Ottoboni, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, tome ii. ch. ix. Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. ix. ch. v. § 2.

The raising of the blockade by a superior force of the enemy effects a material change in the relative circumstances of the war, and a new course of events arises which may lead the government to make a very different disposition of its blockading force. It, therefore, introduces a new and different train of presumptions, in favour of the ordinary freedom of commercial intercourse.¹

§ 12. A blockade is dissolved by the removal of the blockading force for a different service, although the removal should be a temporary one. Even where only a portion of the force is ordered away, the legal effect is the same, unless the force that is left is competent, by itself, to maintain and enforce the blockade, by its ability to prevent all communications. But the blockade is not considered as raised where some of the passes of communications are left unguarded and open by the temporary absence of some of the ships in cruising suspicious vessels which had approached the blockaded port; for the service in which such ships are employed is a necessary part of the duty they are appointed to perform, and their absence is justly regarded as accidental. The time produced by stress of weather; they, however, are bound to resume their station with due diligence, as otherwise their prolonged absence would lead to the inference that they had been detached as cruisers, and the blockade be considered as suspended.²

§ 13. A blockade is also dissolved by repeated instances of improper relaxation of the application of the blockading force to the purposes intended. The mere presence of an adequate force is not sufficient to constitute and maintain a blockade, but its application must be constant and uniform.

Prevent all communication with the port, & maintain it through motives of civility, or other considerations, & maintain

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 3. The *Prize* 6 Rob., 65; the *Hoffnung*, 6 Rob., 112; Williams 2 Marsh. 20.

² The *'Nancy'*, 1 Act. R., 57; the *'Espe'*, 1 Act. R., 58; *Prize de la Mer*, tome ii. ch. ix.; Phillimore, *Int. Law* 7. 12.

³ The *'Rolla'*, 6 Rob., 372; the *'Fox'* and others, 1 Act. R., 59. Every vessel of a blockading squadron is bound to perform the service to be performed, and the law presumes that the duty is fulfilled unless the contrary be proved. The duty is fulfilled with respect to joint associations, or enterprises undertaken, or performed by cruisers owned by individuals.—The *'Angia'*, 1 Blatchf. 20.

allow ships, not privileged by law, to enter or depart, the regularity may be justly held to vitiate the blockade, and necessarily tends to deceive other parties. Where some suffered to pass, others will have a right to infer that blockade is raised. To justify this presumption, however, there must be repeated instances of an improper relaxation; for one or two cases would hardly be deemed sufficient to warrant the belief that the legal restraint on neutral commerce had been wholly removed.¹

§ 14. A legal blockade can only exist where its force can be applied; hence the legal effect of a maritime blockade, not accompanied by a military investment on land, applies only to a direct communication by sea, and to vessels sailing from, or immediately destined to, the blockaded port, and cannot be construed to prohibit the conveyance of articles not contraband of war, to or from the blockaded port, or interior communications. A blockade can never be a complete investment of a place unless its force can be applied at every point by which a communication may be carried. It is true that, by this construction, a maritime blockade is usually imperfect, as a complete investment, but this imperfection arises from the nature of the force applied; it is universally conceded that the extent of legal pretensions to blockade is unavoidably limited by the physical impossibility of applying ships to obstruct communications by land, or the conveyance of goods through the mouth of a river. If a blockade, for the purpose of being shipped for export, is regarded as a breach of blockade, it being perfectly insignificant whether this was effected in large or small vessels. Thus, goods shipped in a river, having been previously in lighters along the coast from the blockaded port, with a ship under charter-party proceeding also from the blockaded port in ballast to take them on board, were held liable to confiscation.²

§ 15. It might be inferred, by parity of reasoning, that, if a port is under a military siege, neutral commerce might

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 654; Jacobsen, *Seerecht*, p. 625.

² Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 28; the 'Steri,' 4 Rob. 65; the 'Jonge Pieter,' 4 Rob. 83; the 'Ocean,' 3 Rob. 29; the 'Maria,' 6 Rob. 201; the 'Charlotte Sophia,' 6 Rob. 204, note; 1 *Droit International*, § 155.

be lawfully carried on by sea, through channels of communication which could not be obstructed by the forces of the besieging army. But such inference would not be strictly correct, for the difference between a blockade and a siege, in their character and object, have led to a difference in the rules applicable, in the two cases, to neutral commerce. Although the legal effect of a siege on land, that is, a purely military investment of a naval or commercial port, may not be an entire prohibition of neutral commerce, yet it does not leave the ordinary communications by sea open and unrestricted, as a purely maritime blockade leaves the interior communications by land. The primary object of a blockade is, as we have already said, to prohibit commerce; but the primary object of a siege is the reduction of the place. All writers on international law impose upon neutrals the duty of not interfering with this object. To supply the inhabitants of the place besieged with anything required for immediate use, such as provisions and clothing, might be giving them aid to prolong their resistance. It is, therefore, a clear departure from neutral duty to furnish supplies, even of possible utility, to a port in a state of siege, although the communication by sea may be open. It would be a direct interference in the war, tending to the relief of one belligerent, and to the prejudice of the other; and such supplies are justly deemed contraband of war, to the same extent as if destined to the immediate use of the army or navy of the enemy. Hence, although the prohibition of neutral commerce with a port besieged be not entire, yet it will extend to all supplies of even possible utility in prolonging the siege.¹

¹ Dyer, *On Insurance*, vol. 1., pp. 656-658; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii., ch. vi., § 117.

The permission of the English king, granted to the city of Bremen, for a ship to navigate between the rivers Jade and Weser with innocent cargo, notwithstanding the blockade, was held to justify the particular case in which the ship was engaged. Restitution of ship and cargo was ordered, on payment of captor's expenses. The 'Maria,' 6 Rob., 201; the 'Matie Sophia,' *ibid.*, 204, n.; the 'Lazette,' *ibid.*, 394.

A vessel destined for a neutral port, with no ulterior destination for her cargo, or none by sea for the cargo, to any blockaded place, violates the blockade. Hence trade, during the Civil War in the United States, between London and Matamoros, two neutral places, the latter an inland port of Mexico and close to the Federal boundary of Mexico, even with intent to supply, from Matamoros, goods to Texas, then an enemy of the United States, was not unlawful on the ground of such violation.

16. The breach of a blockade is viewed, in all cases, as a criminal act; this necessarily implies a criminal intent and to constitute such intent a knowledge of the existence of the blockade, and an intention to violate it, are indispensable. These are sometimes a presumption of law which the party is not permitted to repel, in others, an inference more or less probable, but in many cases they must be shown by positive evidence. Sometimes one will be presumed, while the other will require positive proof. Although both knowledge and intention must be combined to complete a criminal intent, it is evident that the questions themselves are perfectly distinct and, in any particular case, may be governed by different rules of evidence. The judicial decisions in England and in the United States have given great precision to the rules of law applicable to a breach of blockade, by the clearness of their reasoning and the equity of their illustrations. They are distinguished, likewise, for general coincidence and harmony in their principles.¹

§ 17. It has been held by the English Courts of Admiralty that the notification of a blockade to a neutral government is, by construction of law, a direct personal notice to each inhabitant of that country, and that he cannot be allowed to aver his own ignorance of the blockade, or otherwise contradict the legal presumption of knowledge. To allow individuals to plead ignorance of a blockade which had been notified to their government, would wholly defeat the object of the notification. It is true that the exclusion of this evidence may operate with severity in particular cases; but an opposite construction would render a notification, in the words of Sir William Scott, 'the most nugatory thing in the world.'

¹ For cases of a vessel condemned as enemy's property and for attempt to violate a blockade, see 'The Advocate,' *Bligh's, Pr. Cas.*, 142. For a vessel ~~not~~ ^{also} condemned for the same cause, see the 'Shark,' *Bligh's, Pr. Cas.*, 215; the 'General C. C. Pinckney,' *ib.*, 278. For a cargo condemned for attempt to violate blockade and as enemy's property, see the 'Edward Barnard,' *Bligh's, Pr. Cas.*, 322. For a cargo condemned for attempt to violate blockade ~~and as enemy's property~~, see the 'Richard O Bryan,' 2 *Sprague's, Pr. Cas.*, 107. For a cargo condemned for an actual or attempted violation of blockade, see the 'Schoel Case,' *Bligh's, Pr. Cas.*, 94, the 'Abasco,' *ib.*, 107, the 'Foxglove,' *ib.*, 108.

A vessel, *et al.*, detained to Port Royal, then in the possession of the United States, ~~was~~ ^{was} condemned for an attempt to break the blockade of that port. The *Phoenix Island*, 2 *Sprague*, 201.

the neutral government should fail to communicate the information to its subjects, by a prompt and authoritative publication of the notice which it receives, those subjects who suffer from such neglect cannot complain of the belligerent State, but must address their complaints, and demand for compensation, to their own government.¹

§ 18. A question may here arise as to what constitutes a public notification. This is usually in the form of an official communication from the belligerent to the authorities of neutral States. It may be a notice that a certain port will be blockaded on and after a certain date, or that it is the intention of the belligerent to proceed to blockade certain ports or harbours. The latter form, being indefinite as to time, would require a subsequent notice of the commencement or time of the actual blockade. Sometimes several notifications are given, such as a notice of intention, a subsequent notice of the sailing of the naval forces for the purpose of carrying that intention into execution, and finally a notice of the actual commencement of the blockade. The two former are given, as a matter of courtesy, for the information of neutrals. The French have held that a general *diplomatic* notice is not sufficient to charge parties with a knowledge of a blockade, but there must be an actual notice by the blockading force. This doctrine was distinctly announced by Count Molé, in his letter of October 20, 1838, to the French Minister of Marine, in relation to the French blockade of Vera Cruz, Mexico, and is strenuously advocated by Ortolan and other French writers on international law. As already remarked, British writers and British Courts of Admiralty

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. vi., pp. 147, 148; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii., § 290; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 659; the 'Jonge Petronella,' 2 Rob., 131; the 'Spes and Irene,' 5 Rob., 79; the 'Welvaart,' 2 Rob., 128.

Under the proclamation of blockade by the United States, April 19, 1861, it was not necessary for the lawful capture of a vessel seized for violating the blockade, that a warning should have been previously endorsed on her register, when at the time of capture she possessed knowledge of the blockade.—The 'Hiawatha,' *Blatchf. P. C.*, 1.

Although a notification of blockade does not, *proprio vigore*, bind any country but that to which it is addressed, yet in a reasonable time it must affect neighbouring States with knowledge as a reasonable ground of evidence. A vessel seized for breach of blockade by egress was condemned, the court holding the master to have been cognisant of the blockade, although his government had received no notification thereof, and he and his crew swore to ignorance of the fact.—The 'Adelaide,' 2 Rob., 111.

regard a public or diplomatic notice of a blockade as the construction of law, a direct, personal notice, to each inhabitant of the State so notified.¹

§ 19. Instead of a direct official notification to a neutral government of the establishment of, or intention to institute, a blockade of a particular port, a general notice to that effect is sometimes given by official publication in the newspapers. By this means information is distributed among the mercantile community more generally and expeditiously than through the ordinary channels of official communication with the neutral government. Thus, where the vessel intercepted is destined to a blockaded port, and there is clear and positive proof that the existence of the blockade was generally known at her port of departure when she sailed, neither the master nor his owners, nor the shippers of the goods, will be permitted to aver their personal ignorance of that which is scarcely possible they should not have known, or, at any rate, by due inquiry might have ascertained. To allow proof of personal ignorance in such a case, by admitting the affidavits of the master or his crew, would be a direct invitation to perjury and fraud.²

§ 20. Where a neutral vessel is intercepted on her passage with a cargo *from* a blockaded port, and the cargo is proved to have been shipped after the blockade had commenced, and was known at the port, the party is precluded from denying his knowledge of its existence. The personal ignorance of the master, in such a case, could only have arisen from fraudulent determination not to know,—an obstinate exclusion of knowledge it was his duty to have acquired; and his personal ignorance could be proved, it would not form even an equitable defence. He is, therefore, very justly precluded from denying his knowledge of what is morally impossible he should have been ignorant of, except for a fraudulent intent.³

¹ Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, ut. ix. ch. v. §§ 1, 2; Deerp, *Insurance*, vol. i. p. 659; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 291.

² The 'Adelaide,' 2 Rob. 111, the 'Frederick Molke,' 1 Rob. 86; the 'Hare,' 1 *Ad. Ap. Ca.*, 261.

A notice of blockade to the officials of a neutral government is sufficient notice to the subjects of such government.—The 'Hawallah,' *British P. C.*, 1.

On notice of blockade a neutral vessel has a right to withdraw from the blockade port, with all the cargo honestly laden on board, before the commencement of the blockade. *Id.*

³ The 'Frederick Molke,' 1 Rob. 86; the 'Vrouw Judith,' 1 Rob. 125.

§ 21. There are many cases where the inference of a knowledge of the blockade is so probable as to create a strong presumption, but a presumption not entirely conclusive, and which may be repelled by unimpeached and positive proof. Thus a public notification to one neutral State will be presumed, in due time, to reach the inhabitants of a neighbouring power not officially notified of the blockade, as such information, generally circulated in one country, must of necessity in time reach the knowledge of the inhabitants of an adjoining country. But as such notification does not, *ipso jure*, bind the inhabitants of any State but that to which it is addressed, the presumption of such knowledge, in a reasonable time, may be repelled by positive evidence. So, where a blockade has lasted for such a considerable time as to render it highly probable that its existence must have been known at the port of departure, a knowledge of it will be presumed, and it will rest upon the party to show by satisfactory proof that he was not apprised of the blockade. Again, where the neutral vessel is intercepted on her egress from a blockaded port, with a cargo shipped immediately after the blockade had commenced, and while it might have been unknown to the inhabitants of the port when the vessel sailed, the party will be allowed to rebut the presumption by satisfactory proof of his ignorance of the establishment of the blockade. In all cases of this kind, where the presumption of knowledge is not absolute and conclusive, the neutral claimant is allowed to prove his own innocence. And the captor can judge from the nature and circumstances of each particular case, whether the neutral vessel is acting in good faith, and is really ignorant of the existence of the blockade, or whether the pretended ignorance is a mere fraudulent attempt to deceive.¹

§ 22. Where there are no legal or probable grounds for imputing to the master of a neutral vessel the knowledge of the existence of a blockade which he is charged to have related, it rests upon the captor to establish the fact of this knowledge by positive evidence. To warrant a condemnation, the proof must be clear and definite that such vessel had been duly notified of the blockade, and had undertaken or

¹ The 'Calypso,' 2 Rob., 298; the 'Hurtigr Hane,' 3 Rob., 328; Eschsché et Duverdy, *Traité des Prises*, tit. vi. ch. ii. § 2.

prosecuted the voyage in defiance of the notice or warning. To be binding, the notice or warning must be clear, and not so ambiguous or insidious as to be calculated to mislead the neutral master, otherwise it is illegal and void. Where it is expressed in such general terms as to embrace other ports not blockaded, it is not even valid as to the blockaded port although included in the general language. Where the notice is irregular and insufficient, no penalty is incurred by its contravention. Proof of the actual knowledge of the party at the inception of the voyage, supersedes, in all cases, the necessity of a warning, nor is it of any importance by what means or in what form he received the information, if the information was credible in its nature, and came in such a form and from such a source as to leave no reasonable doubt on his mind as to its authenticity; he is not permitted to aver that he placed no confidence in a communication that had just claims to his belief. Again, if the voyage was commenced without a knowledge of the blockade, but he was afterward notified of its existence by a cruiser, or officer of the blockading State, and he continue his voyage with the evident intention of entering the blockaded port, he is liable to condemnation.¹

§ 23. An actual entrance into a blockaded port is by the means necessary to render a neutral ship guilty of a violation of the blockade. Indeed, such a construction would essentially defeat the very object of a blockade, by rendering the capture of a ship lawful only after such capture had ceased to be possible. Hence it is universally held that an attempt to enter the port, knowing it to be blockaded, completes the offence to which the penalty of the law is attached. It is the attempt to commit the offence which, in the judgment of the

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. pp. 147, 148; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 663; the 'Henrick and Maria,' 1 Rob., 146; the 'Vincennes,' 1 Rob., 150; the 'Apollo,' 5 Rob., 286; the 'Columbia,' 1 Rob., 301; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 302; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 155.

A vessel sailing ignorantly to a blockaded port is not liable to capture. Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335.

The prize courts look with disfavour on the excuse that the purpose of a vessel, in attempting to enter a blockaded port, was to obtain necessary supplies. The 'Argonaut,' *Blutht. Pr. Cts.*, 62.

Upon a question of breach of blockade, the owners of a vessel are deemed in a prize court conclusively bound in all cases by the act of the master, and so, as a general rule, are persons interested in the cargo. The 'Aries,' 2 Sprague, 198. But this is qualified by the case of the 'Springbok,' 5 Wall., 1.

institutes the crime, and is as much a breach of neutrality as an actual entrance into the prohibited port. It would be absurd to say that the penalty is not incurred till the lawful design is fully accomplished, for the offender, in most cases, is placed, by its accomplishment, beyond the reach of the law. Nor is the word 'attempt' to be understood in a literal and narrow sense. It is not limited to the conduct of the ship at the mouth of the blockaded port, but is applicable to her whole conduct from the moment she acquires knowledge of the existence of the blockade, and the constant prohibition of neutral commerce. If she has this knowledge before she begins her voyage, the offence is committed the moment she quits her port of departure; if that knowledge is communicated to her during the voyage, its discovery and prosecution involves the crime, and justifies the seizure; if it is not given to her till she reaches the blockaded squadron, she must immediately retire, or she is made liable to confiscation. It is not the mere mental intention which the law punishes, but it is the overt act by which the execution of an unlawful intent is begun. This overt act is the starting for, or proceeding toward, the prohibited port, with the knowledge that it is blockaded. The same rules apply in all analogous cases of unlawful voyages.¹

4. Several continental writers of authority contend that the reception of a voyage for a blockaded port, with a knowledge of the existence of the blockade, is not such an offence as renders the vessel subject to seizure upon the high seas.

¹ See *Beaton, Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 28; the 'Vrouw Johanna,' 1 Cox, the 'Spes' and the 'Trene,' 5 Rob., 76; the 'Shepherdess,' 202; the 'James Cook,' *Fidm. R.*, 261; the 'Betsy,' 1 Rob., 332; the 'Mermaid,' 9 *Cranch. R.*, 440; *Vos and Graves v. N. Ins. Co.*, 12 *Cas.*, 7; 2 *Johns.*, 180; *Yeaton v. Fry*, 5 *Cranch. R.*, 335; *Monroe v. N. Ins. Co.*, 4 *Cranch. R.*, 185.

² A vessel may sail for a blockaded port after a notification of the blockade, for the purpose of inquiry whether the blockade continues.—*See supra* 185.

³ A vessel approaching a blockaded port with intent to violate the blockade is not entitled to be warned off.—The 'Halie Jackson,' *Blatchf.*, 2.

⁴ Entry into a blockaded port to obtain necessary supplies excused.—*See* *Forest King*, *ibid.* 45, and see *post*, § 32.

⁵ Captors of a vessel taken off a blockaded coast are not entitled to the intention of her crew to violate the blockade, if such intention does not appear from the ship's papers and the depositions.—The 'Almeida,' 2 *Jur. N. S.*, 142; the 'Fortuna,' *ibid.* 71.

Indeed, they regard such seizure as a violation of the liberty of the seas and of the independence of the sovereign State which the vessel belongs. But English and American publicists have generally held, and the decisions of British and American Courts of Admiralty seem to sustain, the opinion, that the inception of the voyage, with a knowledge of the blockade, and the *intention* to enter is sufficient in law to constitute the offence and incur penalty, and that the *intention* will be presumed from the fact of commencing the voyage with the knowledge of the existence of the blockade. They say that the vessel had no right to commence the voyage with such knowledge, and that the act of inception is, in itself, a general rule, illegal and punishable as a breach of neutrality, and, therefore, that the master or owners are not permitted to aver that they merely intended to proceed to the blockaded port to ascertain, by due inquiry, whether the blockade still continued, and to enter it only in case the blockade had ceased.¹

§ 25. But this general rule is subject to some important exceptions, or rather the inference, from the inception of the voyage with knowledge of the blockade, of *intention* to violate it, may, in some cases, be removed by proof to the contrary. Thus, where the vessel sails from a distant country, she may clear with a provisional destination to the blockaded port, without incurring the penalty of a breach of the blockade provided it be clearly and positively proved that she intended to proceed to the blockaded port only in case she ascertained, by due inquiry during the voyage, that the blockade had been raised. This may be shown by instructions to the master not to pursue the voyage unless, by inquiry at a port of the blockading power, or of some neutral State, he found that the blockade had ceased. These instructions to the master must clearly set forth the necessity of the previous inquiry, and the mode in which it has to be made, in order to furnish satisfac-

¹ *Oliver v. Union Insurance Co.*, 3 *Wheaton R.*, 196, note. 1. See also, cases referred to *ante*, § 23.

A vessel sailing from a neutral port with intent to violate a blockade is liable to capture and condemnation as a prize from the time of sailing, and the intent to violate the blockade is not disproved by evidence of a purpose to call at another neutral port, not reached at time of capture, with an ulterior destination to the blockaded port. The *Circassian*, 2 *Hall*, 135. And see the *'Nayade,'* 1 *Newb.*, 316.

by proof of the intentions of the parties. The presumption against them, and to repel the presumption the equivocal evidence of ambiguous instructions will not be sufficient. But no matter how distant the country from which the vessel sails, she has no right to proceed to the entrance of the blockaded port with a view to ascertain from the blockading force whether she can be permitted to enter. An inquiry from the blockading force is only justified when the master finds himself in its presence was ignorant that the blockade existed. In other cases, a vessel found in a situation to make the inquiry, if destined to the blockaded port, is liable, from her previous knowledge, to instant capture. A neutral merchant, says Sir William Scott, has no right to speculate on the greater or less probability of the termination of a blockade, and, on such speculation, to send his vessel to the very mouth of the blockaded river or port, with instructions to the master to enter, if no blockading force appeared, otherwise to demand a warning, and proceed to a different port. A rule that would permit this would be introductory of the greatest frauds.¹

126. 'It seems a just inference from the decisions,' says Mr. Duer, 'that where the blockade has been constituted simply by the fact of an investment, although its existence was known at the port of departure, previous to the sailing of the neutral ship, she may clear out, provisionally, for the blockaded port; but that, in this, as in former cases, the inquiry upon the result of which the right to complete the voyage must depend, must be made at a port of the blockading State, or of a neutral power. I see no reason to doubt that the prohibition to proceed to the mouth of the blockaded port embraces all cases of a previous knowledge, from whatever source the knowledge may have been derived; and that, in all, its violation is subject to the same penalty.'²

127. There are other cases where the criminal intent to violate a blockade is deduced from the facts existing at the time of capture, and forming a presumption which the party is not permitted to repel by his own denial. Thus, vessels,

¹ *See, On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 303; the 'Spes' and 'Irene,' *supra*, the 'Eisen,' 1 *Rob.*, 536, note, the 'Little William,' 1 *Adm.* 21.

² *See, On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 669, 670.

though not ostensibly destined to the blockaded port, cannot innocently place themselves in a situation that would enable them to violate the blockade at their pleasure. Even when they are bound, by their papers, to different ports, their suspicious approximation to that under blockade will subject them to condemnation. Were they permitted, on the pretence of an intention to proceed to another port, to approach so close to that blockaded as to be able to ship in without obstruction, whenever they choose, it would be impossible that any blockade could be long maintained. Hence, it is not unfair to hold, that the intention of the party, in such cases, to violate the blockade, is a necessary and absolute presumption; although the excuse of necessity, when established, is doubtless to be admitted. The proof, however, must be clear and satisfactory, to remove the inference of guilt.¹

§ 28. For a neutral ship to *enter* a blockaded port, is altogether unlawful. If she entered with a cargo, the legal presumption is, that she went in with the fraudulent intention of delivering it, and if she come out again without delivering it, that fact will not remove the presumption, because some change of circumstance may have altered that intention. If she entered in ballast, it is to be presumed that she went in for the purpose of bringing away property, and, for the same reason as above, her egress, still in ballast, will not oust the presumption. On this point, we quote the remarks of Duer. 'A neutral ship,' he says, 'is not permitted to enter a blockaded port, even in ballast, for, although an exception of this kind is allowed in the case of an egress, the reasons of which it is founded are not applicable to an inward voyage. The egress is necessary to restore the ship to the beneficial use of the owners, and can tend, in no degree, to aid the commerce that is meant to be prohibited; but there can be no necessity for sending a ship to a blockaded port, and the intention of procuring a freight is the only assignable motive of the voyage. It is a fair presumption that it is intended that she shall return with a cargo, purchased or prepared in the blockaded port, not that she shall return in ballast, thus rendering the entire expedition a fruitless expense; nor the

¹ The '*Gute Erwartung*,' 6 Rob. 182; the '*Arthur*,' 1 Edw. R., 30; the '*Charlotte*,' 21 L. J., 5 Rob., 193.

will remain useless in port during the uncertain period of the blockade may continue. Nor is it admitted, in such case as an adequate excuse, that the object of the voyage was to bring away property that was absolutely locked up by the blockade, and which there was no other mode of treating. It can rarely happen that other channels of communication are not open, and, in all cases, the property can be sold, and its value remitted in money or in bills. The only adequate excuse, is that of physical necessity.'¹

129. We have already stated that any *attempt* to enter a blockaded port, after due information or warning, subjects a party to the penalty of the law; 'but, whether the mere declaration of the master, when detained and warned by a ship of the blockading force, of his *intention* to persist in the voyage, notwithstanding the warning, is to be considered as evidence of an actual attempt, justifying an immediate capture is exceedingly doubtful.' The mere hasty expressions of the master, resulting from resentment and surprise, certainly ought not to produce the condemnation of property entrusted to his care. But where the declaration of the master is proved to be deliberate and is accompanied by other facts as induce the court to believe that he *really* intended to carry it into effect, Sir William Scott was of opinion that it superseded the necessity of proving further facts, and was of itself a sufficient ground of condemnation. Chief Justice Marshall, in enumerating several general acts that might be justly regarded as evidence of such an attempt, said: 'Possibly the obstinate, determined declarations of the master, of his resolution to break the blockade, might bear

¹ See *On Intermittence*, vol. i. pp. 671, 672, the 'Comet,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 252; the 'Christine,' 6 *Rob.*, 103, the 'Charlotta,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 252. A vessel professing to be engaged in trade with a neutral port, and being under circumstances which warrant close observation by a blockading force, must keep his vessel, while discharging or receiving cargo, so near the neutral side of the blockading line as to repel, as far as possible, all imputation of intent to break the blockade. Neglect of this duty may well justify capture and sending in for adjudication; but in the absence of positive evidence that the neglect was wilful, it is not a condemnation. The 'Dashing Wave,' 5 *Hall*, 170. The admission of neutral ships of war with a blockaded port is permitted, and such ships should on no account embark any property intended for passing the blockade, except official despatches of the government of their own nation or of consuls of nations in amity with the blockading power.

the same interpretation.' The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have clearly decided that the declarations of the master, however positive and unequivocal, are evidence merely of intention, which, unless followed by some voluntary act of his release, can never constitute the offence to which all the penalty attaches.¹

§ 30. Although the declarations of the master, during detention, will not constitute in itself sufficient cause of condemnation, his subsequent conduct, either with or without such declarations, may determine the lawfulness of his capture. It is his duty, on being duly warned, to alter the course of his voyage, as soon as he is at liberty to resume it, and to depart at once from the vicinity of the blockaded port. He has no right to linger in its neighbourhood, on the pretence of a deliberation as to the course he shall pursue, thus compelling the belligerent ship, either to leave him, or to enter the blockaded port without obstruction, or to wait an indefinite time to watch his motions. He is bound to manifest, by his immediate acts, his determination to obey the warning he had received. Hence a very short delay, an interval probably of less than an hour, will enable the belligerent to determine whether the master is pursuing the course he is bound to observe, or whether the temporary detention may not lawfully be followed by a final capture. It is scarcely possible that a neutral ship, thus circumstanced, shall escape, otherwise than by an abandonment in the faith of the voyage, that the warning she had received is rendered illegal.

§ 31. If the master persist in his voyage to a blockaded port, in defiance of a sufficient and legal warning, no excuse is ever admitted for his conduct, and the ship and cargo

¹ The 'Apollo,' 5 Rob., 289; Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 4 Cran. Ch. R., 185; Calhoun v. Ins. Co. of Penn., 1 Binns R., 293.

Intoxication of the master is no excuse for a breach of blockade. Sir William Scott remarked on this subject, that if such excuse were permitted, 'there would be eternal carousings in every instance of violation of blockade.' The 'Shepherdess,' 5 Rob., 262.

A vessel and cargo were condemned for breach of blockade, in defiance showing an actual hostile destination.—The 'Alma,' 2 Sprag., 203.

The case of the 'Revere' (2 Sprague, 107) shows what circumstances were considered sufficient to warrant the condemnation of a vessel for an attempt to violate the blockade of Beaufort, N.C., during the American Civil War, 1861.

invariably condemned. His misconduct may, in no degree, be imputable to his owners, yet their innocence affords no protection to their property. His acts may be in direct violation of their express instructions, may even amount to fraud or barratry: yet his owners will continue to be bound by their legal consequences, to the same extent, as if they had been performed under their previous sanction and authority. Indeed the rule, so far as relates to the ship, and the property of its owners, is universal, that they are concluded by the acts of the master. He is their agent, and the property they have entrusted to his care is, in all cases, responsible for his just observance of the duties of neutrality.

§ 32. There are but few cases where the entrance of a vessel into a blockaded port, or an attempt to enter, is ever justified or excused. A licence from the government of the blockading State to enter the blockaded port is always a sufficient justification, and, as will be shown hereafter, all such licences are to be liberally construed. But a general licence to enter the port before the blockade would not be available after it had commenced; to constitute a sufficient protection it must authorise the vessel to enter the port as one blockaded. Again, a physical necessity, arising from the immediate need of water, or provisions, or repairs, produced by stress of weather, which leave no other alternative for safety. 'But as, in order to cover a real design to dispose of a cargo,' says Mr. Duer, 'the pretext of a necessity is easily framed, the excuse is necessarily liable to great suspicion, and in all cases as justly subject to a rigid scrutiny. Hence, it is established that the evidence relied on must clearly show an imperative and overruling compulsion to enter the particular port under blockade. It is not enough that it appears that there were existing and adequate causes to justify the ship in deviating from her voyage, to an intermediate port of necessity. It must also appear that she could not have proceeded, without hazard, to any other port than that blockaded, and that in no other port to which she could have proceeded could her necessary wants have been supplied. In short, the necessity that alone can save her, when captured, from condemnation, must be evident, immediate, pressing, and, from its nature, not capable of

removal by any other means than by the course she had adopted.'¹

§ 33. As a general rule the egress of a ship, during blockade, is regarded as a violation of the blockade, and renders her liable, in the first instance, to seizure, and to exemption from condemnation the most satisfactory proof is required to be given. There are, however, many cases where the egress is innocent, although the knowledge of the blockade, by the master, is admitted or proved. But the taking on board a cargo, with a knowledge of the blockade, is considered a fraudulent act, and the sailing of the ship, with such a cargo, a violation of the blockade. Nor is it necessary that the whole of the cargo should be thus laden; where even a portion of the goods are taken on board after the existence of the blockade is known, the act is considered as a fraud that justifies a general condemnation. The ground of these decisions is, that after the commencement of a blockade the interposition of a neutral to assist in any way the exportation of the property of the enemy, tends directly to relieve her from the distress that the blockade was meant to create. It would defeat a principal object of the hostile proceeding; consequently, after the commencement of the blockade,

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. 1. pp. 678, 679; the 'Harrise Har-
2 Rob., 124; the 'Elizabeth,' 1 Edw., 198; the 'Arthur,' 1 Edw., 122;
the 'Charlotta,' 1 Edw., 252; the 'Hoffnung,' 2 Rob., 103, *see also*
Derecho Internacional, pt. II. cap. viii. § 5.

A Spanish owned vessel, in distress, on her way from New York to Havannah, by leave of the Admiral commanding the squadron, put into Port Royal, S. C. (then in rebellion and blockaded by a fleet of the United States), and was there seized and made use of by the Government of the United States. She was afterwards condemned as a prize. The Supreme Court decided that she was not a lawful prize or subject to capture, and that her owners were entitled to fair indemnity, though it may be well doubted whether the case was not more properly a subject of diplomatic adjustment.—The 'Nuestra Señora de Regla,' 17 B. Monr., 17.

Excuse of distress set up as a justification for entering a blockaded port admitted, the deviation into such a port having been proved to have been necessary under the circumstances. Resitution decreed.—The 'Charlotta,' 1 Edw., 252.

The permission, by a blockading force, to some unprivileged ships to go in and others to come out, would vitiate even a blockade by a violation; but such permission accorded to certain slave ships, from motives of humanity, was held not to work such a result. The liberation of certain vessels, after seizure and detention for breaking the blockade, was held not to amount to a renunciation of the rights of blockade.—The 'Fox,' 6 Rob., 374.

Particular licences will not vitiate a blockade.—The 'Fox,' and others, 1 Edw., 320.

ship is no longer at liberty to make any purchase in the port with a view to exportation.

134. There are a number of cases in which the egress of a neutral vessel, during a blockade, is justified or excused :

First, If the ship is proved to have been in the blockaded port when the blockade was laid, she may retire in ballast, as such egress affords no aid to the commerce of the enemy.

Second, If the ingress has no tendency to defeat any legitimate purpose for which the blockade was established.

Third, If the ingress is from physical necessity, arising from stress of weather, or the immediate need of water, or provisions, or repairs.

Fourth, Where the entrance with a cargo was authorised by licence, such licence is construed to authorise the return of the ship with a cargo.

Fifth, Where a neutral ship, arriving at the entrance of a blockaded port, in ignorance of the blockade, is suffered to pass, there is an implied permission to return, which fully protects her egress.

But this implied permission does not, of necessary consequence, protect the ship, for its owners may be guilty of a criminal violation of the blockade even where the ship is innocent.

Sixth, A neutral ship, whose entry into the blockaded port was lawfully permitted to return with her original cargo that has been found unsaleable, and re-shipped during the blockade.

Seventh, Another, and a very equitable exception,' says Duer, is allowed in favour of a neutral ship that leaves the port in the just expectation of a war between her own country and the country to which the blockaded port belongs.

In this case, she is permitted to depart, even with a cargo purchased from the enemy during the blockade, if the purchase was made with the funds of neutral owners, and the investment and shipment were probably necessary to save the property, in the event of a war, from a seizure and confiscation by the enemy.

It is not the mere apprehension of a remote and possible war that will entitle a neutral ship to this exemption.

To save the vessel and cargo from condemnation, it must appear that there was a well-founded expectation of an immediate war, and consequently, that the danger of the seizure and confiscation of the property was imminent and pressing.

Philimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii § 313; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. 682, 683, the 'Maria Schroeder,' 4 Rob., 89, note, the 'Drie

§ 35. 'No rule in the law of nations,' says Duer, 'is certainly and absolutely established, than that the breach of a blockade subjects all the property, so employed, to confiscation by the belligerent power whose rights are violated. Among all the contradictory positions that have been advanced on the law of nations, this principle has never been disputed. It is to be found in all the writings on public law; is frequently admitted, and never denied in treaties; is universally acknowledged by all governments that have attained a degree of civil instruction; and is known to all their subjects who have any interest to possess the knowledge.'

The confiscation of the ship, where a violation of blockade is justly imputed to the owners, or to the master acting with or without the authority of the owners, is in all cases, a necessary consequence. . . . The goods that compose the cargo, so far as they are the property of the owners of the ship, upon the principle stated, necessarily share its fate; and even where they are the property of other shippers, as a general rule, they are involved in the same condemnation. It is only in a few cases, where the innocence of the owner is apparent and undeniable, that

Vrienden, 1 *Dod. R.*, 269; the '*Wasser Hundt*,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 270, and the '*Potsdam*,' 4 *Rob.*, 89.

It may be questioned how far the Declaration of Paris, 1856, 'free ships make free goods,' can be extended to the carrying of enemy property out of a blockaded port. A similar question arose under the Treaty of 1654 between Great Britain and Portugal, and being documented as the property of Portuguese neutral merchants, though claimed generally, and not verified in the depositions. Result was decreed, the Court declining, under the circumstances, to require further proof of the property.—The '*Nostra Senhora da Ajuda*,' 3 *Rob.*

A neutral ship coming out of a blockaded port, laden with cargo, in consequence of a rumour that hostilities were likely to take place between the enemy and the country to which the vessel belonged, the regulations of the enemy not permitting a departure in ballast, was held not liable to condemnation, and was decreed to be restored.—The '*Drie Vrienden*,' 1 *Dodson*, 264.

A neutral is not justified in violating a blockade under any pretext, whether well or ill founded, of seizure of his property by the enemy. He is to rely on his neutrality, and to look to his own Government for protection.—The '*Wasser Hundt*,' 1 *Dodson*, 272, n.

In an English court it is no excuse for breach of blockade by cargo, that the cargo was intended to be brought to Great Britain.—The '*Byneld*,' 1 *Edwards*, 189.

The cargo may be condemned for an attempt by the vessel to violate the blockade, although the vessel has not been taken on process in suit.—The '*Joseph H. Toone*,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 641.

apt. The *presumption* of law, founded on very reasoning, is, that the violation of a blockade is intended for the benefit of the cargo, as well as of the ship, and consequently, that it is made with the sanction and under the directions of its owners; and, in all cases, where the innocence of the owners is not manifested by the papers on board, the presumption prevails to exclude the proof. Thus the presumption prevails, even where the apparent destination of the ship, from her papers, was to a different port, and the intention to enter that under blockade was a deviation from the regular course of the voyage. Where the only assignable motive for such a deviation is an intention to dispose of the cargo in the blockaded port, and, by such a disposition, to sacrifice the interests of its owners, they are not allowed to rebut the presumption that the master, thus visibly acting for their benefit, was not also acting under their secret authority.¹

But if it be clearly established, by proofs found on board at the time of the capture, that, at the inception of the voyage, the owners of the cargo stood clear, even from a possibility of fraud, their property will be excepted from the legal consequences of the breach of the blockade. Thus, the illegality consists in the misconduct of the master in attempting to enter a blockaded port, if it be certain that, at the voyage commenced, the existence of the blockade was, nor could have been, known at her port of departure. The owners of the cargo could not possibly have contracted a breach of the blockade. In such cases, the act of the master, although it prevail to condemn the ship, will condemn the cargo also, for there is no general or necessary relation of principal and agent between its owners and master. So, also, in case of egress, the ship may be subject to condemnation, and yet the cargo may be restored, if laden during the blockade, if the innocence of its owners be certain and indisputable. Thus, if their orders for the shipment of the goods were given to their agents in the open port before the blockade existed, or was known to exist, and they could not, by any diligence, after the blockade was known to them, countermand their orders in time to pre-

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. 1. pp. 683-685.

vent their execution, the owners are deemed innocent. In such cases, the agents and owners do not stand in the same relative situation of ordinary agents and principals, for the interests of the former are not only distinct from, but actually opposed to, those of the latter. It must be remarked, however, that, in all cases, whether of ingress or egress, in which an exception is allowed in favour of the cargo, the evidence of the innocence of its owners must be so clear and certain as to exclude any possible imposition on the mind of the court. Another exception, in this relation, deserves notice. A neutral, domiciled in an enemy's country, *in itinere*, on his way home to reside, was a passenger, with his family, in a neutral vessel, which was guilty of a breach of blockade. The property which he had with him, for the support and comfort of self and family, was taken as prize. But the supreme court decreed restitution, on the ground that he had a right to carry with him such property, which was not a mere mercantile adventure, and that, being personally in no fault, such property was not forfeited by a breach of blockade by the vessel in which he had taken passage.¹

§ 37 'To justify a capture for the violation of a blockade,' says Duer, 'or the attempt to violate it, the offence must continue to exist at the time of seizure. In technical language, the ship must be then *in delicto*. In cases where the ship has violated the blockade by egress, the *delictum* continues during her whole voyage, till she has reached her port of destination. Until then, as the offence consists in the mere attempt, but in an actual breach, no change of circumstances, or subsequent repentance, can efface the

¹ The 'Exchange,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 43; the 'Alexander,' 4 *Rob.*, 9; the 'Mercurius,' 1 *Rob.*, 80; the 'Neptunus,' 3 *Rob.*, 173; the 'Andromeda,' 3 *Rob.*, 281; the 'Manchester,' 2 *Alt. R.*, 687, the 'United States,' 11 *Howard R.*, 62.

The acts of a master in breach of a blockade affect the cargo as well as the vessel if the cargo is laden on board after the blockade becomes effective as to the vessel. The 'Kinawatha,' *Blutckf. Pr. C.*, 1674, 23.

Where a vessel and cargo were owned by unnaturalised foreigners residing in the enemy's country, who came in her, out of a blockaded port of the enemy, with the sole purpose of escaping to the British squadron, and to the authority of the United States, it was held by the District Court of New York that they should be restored, but with costs, there being probable cause for the seizure.—The 'Everett,' *Blutckf. Pr. Cas.*, 582.

is not cancelled by a mere interruption of the voyage, such as the stopping of the ship at an intermediate port, either on necessity or design ; when she resumes her voyage, she becomes again subject to the penalty of the law. But when a ship sails for a blockaded port, with a knowledge of the blockade, and the intention to violate it, the offence is so far complete as to justify her immediate capture ; yet, as it exists only in an attempt, the *delictum* does not necessarily continue during the whole of her subsequent voyage. If, previous to her capture, the blockade had ceased to exist, or the master, on the information of a ship of war of the blockading State, had just grounds for believing that such was the fact, or had altered his destination, with the intention of not proceeding at all to the blockaded port, the offence no longer exists, and what which had existed is no longer punishable. To constitute the offence, three circumstances must be found to co-exist : the fact of a blockade, the party's knowledge of its existence, and his intention to violate it ; and in each of the above an indispensable circumstance is wanting. The *delictum*, therefore, at the time of capture, had wholly ceased, and both ship and cargo will be restored.'

§ 18. It may be stated, in general terms, that an insurance effected in the country of the blockading State, is necessarily void from the time the property insured becomes liable to capture by the violation, or attempted violation, of a blockade, and that the invalidity continues so long as the offence exists. 'Where the ship is insured upon time,' says Lord Ellenborough, 'although the contract may not be void in its origin, it may be rendered so, by the contravention of a blockade, for a particular voyage to which the legal penalty attaches ; and where the voyage has been terminated, and the liability to capture no longer exists, it seems probable that the obligation of the contract would be held to revive. The effect of a menacing war, by which the property insured is rendered that of an enemy, according to Lord Ellenborough, is to terminate the insurers from all the risks of the policy during the continuance of the hostilities. This language plainly implies that the contract is not annulled, but merely suspended by the operation of the war, and that the return of peace should the policy not have expired by its own terms, restore its life and obligatory force. The doctrine seems,

in itself, just and reasonable, and, in cases where the rule is not so entire as to preclude any separation of its parts, it may be applied, with equal justice, to every case of such illegality; that is, an illegality arising after the payment of the risks.' Such seems to be the rule established by the most recent decisions of the courts of common law in England, although the opposite rule has been assumed in the United States.¹

§ 39. It is deemed proper, before concluding this chapter, to allude to Hautefeuille's theory of blockades, as it differs from those of the generality of writers on international law, and especially from the decisions of English and American jurists. M. Hautefeuille considers the right of blockade to result from the right of conquest, by the successful belligerent's getting military possession of an enemy's port or of a belt of territorial sea surrounding or communicating with it, precisely as he would of a belt of land around a fortification or of a siege. The conqueror, being thus in possession of an enemy's territory, may, so long as he remains in possession, extend over it his own laws and jurisdiction, and may prohibit foreigners from entering such territory for commerce or any other purpose, or he may permit them to enter on such terms as he may see fit to impose, as he might do if it were a part of his most ancient territory. The right of blockade, therefore, extends over only that part of the sea as is, in international law, regarded as subject to conquest, and liable to conquest, although the blockading force is stationed outside of the territorial limit, and consequently over the high sea, which can never be subjected to local jurisdiction. In order to blockade a maritime port, or territorial sea, it is necessary that the blockading force acquire the sovereignty of it, and actually hold it in possession. This definition of blockade gives rise to very few questions with respect to its establishment or continuance, nor can there be much doubt about what is to be regarded as a violation of it. It is a visible, material fact, and any notification of that fact is unnecessary and superfluous, for neutrals can see the conqueror's possession, and readily ascertain from him

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 688, 690, and note ii; *Brandon v. Carling*, 4 *East*, 410; *Harratt v. Wise*, 9 *B. & C.* 718; *Medeiros v. Hill*, 8 *King*

or not they are permitted to enter, and if so, upon what terms. So long as they remain without the line of territorial jurisdiction they violate no rights of blockade. If they pass, or attempt to pass, against the will of the new sovereign, this magic line, they become liable to capture ; but they must be seized while within the territorial limits, for they cannot be pursued upon the high seas, as no rights of blockade can extend beyond the sovereignty which was acquired by conquest and is continued by actual possession. We think Haute-feuille has confounded the rights of blockade with the rights of military occupation, which are not only distinct in their nature, but essentially different in their legal consequences. Nevertheless, his views are worthy of attention, and he has maintained them with marked ability. It is not so much our object in this work to discuss theories, or to determine what the law of blockades *ought to be*, as to ascertain what that law *now is*, according to the decisions of prize courts, and the opinions of the best writers on international jurisprudence. The rules of maritime war, as now practised, undoubtedly present some anomalies which cannot be easily reconciled with any abstract theory.¹

¹ Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. ix. ; Hautefeuille, *Hist. du Droit Mar. Int.*, pt. iii. ch. i. § 1 ; Cocceius, *De Jure Belli in Amicos*, § 788 ; Lampredi, *Commerce des Neutres*, pt. i. § 5 ; Galiani, *Dei Doveri*, etc., cap. ix. ; Massé, *Droit Commercial*, liv. ii. ch. ii. ; Luchesi-Palli, *Droit Maritime*, p. 180.

CHAPTER XXVI.

CONTRABAND OF WAR.

1. General law of contraband—2. All contraband articles to be captured—3. Ancient rule that cargo affects the ship—4. Modern cases—5. Cases where ship also is condemned—6. Ordinary penalties, not averted by ignorance or force—7. Inception of voyage, complete offence—8. Return voyage—9. If not contraband at time of seizure—10. Transfer of such goods from one port to another—11. Destination need not be immediate to enemy's port—12. Case of the 'Commodore'—13. Differences of opinion among text writers—14. Views of Lictorius and others—15. Of modern publicists—16. Ancient treaties and ordinances—17. Modern treaties and ordinances—18. Contraband decisions of prize courts—19. There is no fixed universal rule—20. Implements and munitions of war—21. Manufactured articles—22. Unwrought articles—23. Intended use deduced from destination—24. Provisions—25. Pre-emption—26. British rule of pre-emption—27. Contested by other nations—28. Insurance on articles contraband of war.

§ 1. HAVING already discussed the general rights and duties of neutrals, and the liability of neutral property to capture and condemnation for violation of the law of sieges and blockades, we will now consider the rules of international law with respect to goods contraband of war. The term *contraband* (*contrabandum*, or *contra bannum*) has been used from time immemorial to express a prohibition of certain kinds of commerce. Such prohibitions are found in the laws of Justinian, in the decrees of the Popes and Councils in the time of the Crusades, and more especially in those issued by different powers during the wars of the Hanseatic League. The theory of the present law of contraband, however, has its origin in the school of Bologna, but its complete development was coincident with the development of the modern laws of commerce. By this term we now understand a class of articles of commerce which neutrals are prohibited from furnishing to either one of the belligerents, for the reason that, by so doing, injury is done to the other belligerent.

any on this class of commerce is deemed a violation of neutral duty, inasmuch as it necessarily interferes with the operations of the war by furnishing assistance to the belligerent to whom such prohibited articles are supplied.¹

12. There is no difference of opinion with respect to the general rule which prohibits trade in articles contraband of war, whatever may be the extent of disagreement with respect to what articles may properly be regarded as contraband. The noxious articles themselves (if decided to be *contraband*) are invariably condemned, and no defence or plea can save them from confiscation, when their character as contraband, and their destination to a hostile port or country, are admitted or established. But the extent of the penalty, for the carriage of such articles, does not seem to be fixed by any positive or uniform rule; or, at least, the decisions seem to vary with the special circumstances of each case. Nevertheless it may be possible to deduce from these apparently conflicting decisions of Courts of Admiralty, some general principle which may form the basis of the rule of international law with respect to the carriage of such prohibited articles.²

13. By the ancient laws of war, as established by the usages of European nations, the contraband cargo affected the ship, and involved it in the sentence of condemnation. The justice of this rule is vindicated by Bynkershoek and Heineccius, and it cannot be said that the penalty was unjust in itself, or unsupported by the analogies of the law. Grotius does not particularly discuss the case of the ship carrying contraband, but alludes to the subject in very general terms. Soon after

The trade of neutrals with belligerents, in articles not contraband is perfectly free, unless interrupted by blockade; the conveyance by neutrals of contraband articles, is always unlawful, and such articles may always be seized, during transit by sea.—The *Peterhoff*, 11 B. & C. 23.

¹ *Wheaton, Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. pp. 135-143; *Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law*, ch. iii. § 24; *Duer, On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 624; *Phillimore, Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 237; *Wildman, Int. Law*, vol. ii. pp. 216, et seq.; *Law of Nations*, p. 305; *Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer*, liv. viii. ch. i.; *Garden, De la Diplomatie*, liv. vii. § 4; *Heffter, Droit International*, § 161; *Nau, Völkerrecht*, §§ 193, et seq.; *Jacobson, Seerecht*, p. 62, 623; *Pando, Derecho Internacional*, p. 496; *Hauteville, Les Neutres*, title viii. § 1; *Bello, Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. § 34; *Foehls, Seerecht, etc.*, b. iv. p. 1104; *Kaltenborn, Seerecht*, p. 140; *Lampredi, Commerce des Neutres*, pt. i. § 7.

his time a relaxation began to be introduced into treaties but this relaxation, at first, applied only to cases in which the owner of the vessel might be supposed to be a stranger to the transaction. Subsequently, the stipulation in treaties became more general, although the relaxation was directed, in its particular application, as well as in its origin, only to such cases as afford a presumption that the owner was innocent, or the master deceived.¹

§ 4. By the modern practice of the prize courts of England and the United States, and not opposed, it is believed, by other nations, a milder rule has been adopted, and the carrying of articles contraband of war is now attended only with the loss of freight and expenses, except where the ships belong to the owner of the contraband cargo, or where the simple misconduct of carrying contraband articles is connected with other circumstances which extend the offence to the ship also. Sir William Scott says, 'Anciently, the carrying of contraband did, in ordinary cases, affect the ship, and although a relaxation has taken place, it is a relaxation, the benefit of which can only be claimed by fair cases. The aggravation of fraud justifies additional penalties.'²

§ 5. Where the transportation of the contraband articles is prohibited by the stipulations of a treaty, to which the government of the neutral shipowner is a party, the forfeiture of the freight is extended to the ship, on the ground that the criminality of the act is enhanced by the violation of the additional duty imposed by the treaty. An attempt to conce

¹ Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. x.; Heineccius, *Novæ*, etc., cap. ii. § 6; Grotius, *De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. i. 'Franklin,' 3 *Rob.*, 221, note; the 'Ringende Jacob,' 1 *Rob.*, 90; 'Mercurius,' 1 *Rob.*, 288, note.

² Polson, *Law of Nations*, p. 64; the 'Jonge Tobias,' 1 *Rob.*, 320; 'Neptunus,' 3 *Rob.*, 108; the 'Jonge Margaretha,' 1 *Rob.*, 189; the 'Santa Christina,' 1 *Rob.*, 242.

Formerly, conveyance of contraband subjected the ship to forfeiture but, in more modern times, that consequence in ordinary cases attaches only to the freight of the contraband merchandise. But, in determining the question of costs and expenses, the fact of such conveyance may be properly taken into consideration, with other circumstances, such as want of frankness in a neutral captain, engaged in a commerce open to great suspicion, and his destruction of some kind of papers in the moment of capture, and this, although it seemed almost certain that the ship was destined to a port really neutral, and with a cargo for the most part neutral in character and destination.—The 'Peterhoff,' 5 *Adm.*, 28, the 'Springbok,' *Ibid.* 1.

the destination of the ship, by false papers, will lead to the same result. 'I desire it to be considered as the settled rule of law received by this Court,' says Sir William Scott, in the case of the '*Franklin*,' 'that the carriage of contraband with a false destination, will work a condemnation of the ship as well as the cargo.' There are other cases of misconduct which are held by the courts to involve the confiscation of the ship carrying contraband; as the privity of the owner of the ship to the contraband; the concealment of the contraband in the outward voyage; the misconduct of the supercargo—the agent of the owner; the contraband traffic of the officer placed in command of a private vessel by the Board of Admiralty, and where the owner of the contraband is also owner, or part owner of the ship. But these cases will be more particularly discussed in the chapter on violation of neutral duties.¹

§ 6. The ordinary penalty of carrying articles contraband of war, is the confiscation of the goods and the loss of the freight and expenses to the ship. This penalty is not to be averted by the allegation that the owners or master were ignorant of the true nature of the articles, or that, by the threat or violence of the enemy, they were compelled to receive and transport them. Such excuses, if allowed, would be constantly urged, and by robbing the prohibition of contraband of its penal character, would convert it into a mere nugatory threat. Where the cargo does not wholly consist of contraband goods, the innocent articles of innocent shippers are restored; but all the goods of the owner of the contraband articles, even those which are innocent, share the same fate.²

§ 7. The inception of the voyage is held to complete the offence; and from the moment that the vessel, with the contraband articles on board, quits her port on a hostile destination, the capture may be legally made. It is by no means necessary to wait till the ship and goods are actually endeavouring to enter the enemy's port. The voyage being

¹ *Thet*, *On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 625; the '*Baltic*,' 1 *Acton*, 25; *Blewitt v. Hull*, 13 *Fast*, 13; the '*Floreat Commercium*,' 3 *Rob.*, 178; the '*Neutromet*,' 3 *Rob.*, 295; the '*Entrom*,' 2 *Rob.*, 6; the '*Ranger*,' 6 *Rob.*, 125; the '*Edward*,' 2 *Rob.*, 68; and see note at p. 248.

² *Thet*, *On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 625; the '*Oster Resoer*,' 4 *Rob.*, 199; the '*Carline*,' *Ibid.*, 260; the '*Richmond*,' 5 *Rob.*, 325; the '*Charlotte*,' *Ibid.*, 273.

illegal at its commencement, the penalty immediately attaches and continues to the end of the voyage, or at least so long as the illegality exists.¹

§ 8. Where the contraband goods are not taken *in delicto*—the actual prosecution of the outward voyage, and the return voyage is distinct and independent, the penalty is not generally held to attach, either upon the proceeds of the goods or on the ship upon her return voyage. But where they are both inseparably connected in their original plan, so as to

¹ The 'Imina,' 3 Rob., 168; the 'Trende Sostre,' 6 Rob., 379. Where the papers of a ship, sailing under a charter-party, are genuine and regular, and show a voyage between ports, neutral in the meaning of international law; where there has been no concealment or spoliation of them; where the stipulations of the charter-party, on the part of the owners, are apparently in good faith; where the owners are neutrals, have no interest in the cargo, and have not previously in any way violated neutral obligations, and there is no sufficient proof that there is any knowledge of the unlawful destination of the cargo—in such a case, in no aspect being otherwise fair, the vessel will not be condemned, though the neutral port, to which it is sailing, has been constantly and exclusively used as a port of call and trans-shipment, by persons engaged in a systematic violation of blockade, and in the conveyance of contraband of war. It was meant, by the owners of the cargo carried on the ship, to be so used in regard to it.

The fact, that the master declared himself ignorant as to what part of his cargo, of which invoices were not on board having been sent by mail to the port of destination, consisted—such part being contraband—and that he also declared himself ignorant of the cause of capture, when his mate, boatswain, and steward, all testified that they understood that the vessel's having contraband on board, was held to be imputation of itself to infer guilt to the owners of the vessel, which was in no way compromised with the cargo. But the misrepresentation of the master, as to his knowledge of the ground of capture, was held to deprive the owners of the costs on restoration.

The cargo was condemned for intent to run a blockade; the vessel was sailing to a port such as that above described, the bill of lading disclosed the contents of 619 out of 2,007 packages, which made the cargo, the contents of the remaining 1,388 being not disclosed by both they, and the manifest, made the cargo deliverable by order of the master being directed by his letter of instructions to report himself on arrival at the neutral port, to H., who 'would give him orders as to the delivery of his cargo;' a certain portion of the cargo, whose contents were undisclosed, was specially fitted for the enemy's military use, and a larger part was capable of being adapted to it; other vessels owned by the owners of the cargo, and by the charterer, and sailing ostensibly for neutral ports, were, on invocation, shown to have been engaged in blockade running, many packages on one of the vessels, and run by in a broken series of numbers, finding many of their complementary parts on the vessel under adjudication. The 'Springbok,' 5 Hall., 11. The district court—following the cases of the 'Neutralitet' (3 Rob., 296), the 'Franklin' (Ibid. 217; the 'Ranger' 6 Rob., 126; the 'Baltic' 11 Rob., 25)—had decided that the vessel was a good prize, but this was reversed by the Supreme Court following the case of the 'Bermuda' (3 Hall., 34).

is of a continuous voyage, the penalty is generally held as attaching in every stage till its final completion. The doctrine established by the decisions of the English courts, and seemingly admitted by the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Wheaton has questioned its correctness, but his objection, that it extends the offence indefinitely, is completely answered by the decisions themselves, which expressly limit the offence and its penal consequences to the duration of the *entire* voyage. Ortolan contests this rule of continuation of the offence during the return voyage, and holds that the ship should, in all cases, be exempted from the penalty, and the confiscation confined to the contraband articles. He has supported his doctrine by strong legal arguments, but, however correct it may be in theory, it is not supported by the practice of the great maritime powers. The general rule of exemption is, undoubtedly, established, but the exceptions indicated are supported by authorities, and generally admitted in practice.¹

It must be observed that the offence does not necessarily continue during the entire outward voyage, even where completed by the mere inception with contraband on board. 'Where there is positive evidence,' says Lord Stowell, 'that, previous to the capture, the voyage had been changed from the original port, by capitulation or otherwise, to a port to be hostile, as the goods were not contraband for that port, the capture is invalid, and restitution is decreed.'

The penalty is not averted by the possibility that the vessel may be prosecuted for an illegal voyage, which is in the progress of execution, will be changed before its completion, or the intention, when the capture was made, had, in good faith, been abandoned, or was no longer capable of execution, *delicti* is extinguished, and the penalty cannot be

¹ *Diplomatie de la Mer*, liv. iii. ch. vi.; Hubner, *De la Contrabande*, liv. ii. ch. iv. § 4; Zouch, *Juris et Jur. Feudalis*, lib. i. Wheaton, *On Captures*, p. 183; the 'Nancy,' 3 Rob., 304; the 'Betty,' 2 K., 348; the 'Baltic,' 1 Add., 25; the 'Cramak,' 451; the 'Caledonia,' 1 Wheat., 100; 'Christiansburg,' 351; Carrington v. the M. Ins. Co., 8 Peters., 521; the 'Solke,' 1 Rob., 87; the 'Charlotte,' *Ibid.* 386; the 'Margaret,' 3

² *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 629, 571, 572.

§ 10. The illegality of the transportation of contraband goods is not confined to an original importation into the enemy's country. The transportation of such articles from one port of the enemy to another is equally unlawful, and is subject to be treated in the same manner as an original importation. It may equally and as directly tend to assist the enemy in the prosecution of the war. 'The transfer of contraband from one port of a country to another,' says William Scott, 'is subject to be treated in the same manner as an original importation into the country itself.'¹

§ 11. In order to constitute the unlawfulness of the transportation of contraband, it is not necessary that the immediate destination of the ship and cargo should be to an enemy's country or port. If the goods are contraband and destined for the direct use of the enemy's army or navy, the transportation is illegal, and subject to the ordinary penalty. Thus, if an enemy's fleet be lying, in time of war, in a neutral port, and a neutral vessel should carry contraband goods to that port, not intended for sale in the neutral market, but destined for the exclusive supply of the hostile forces, such conduct would be a direct interposition in the war by furnishing material aid in its prosecution, and consequently would be a flagrant departure from the duties of neutrality.

§ 12. In the case of the 'Commercen,' a Swedish vessel captured by an American cruiser in the act of carrying a cargo of barley and oats for the supply of the allied armies in the Spanish peninsula, the United States being at war with Great Britain, but at peace with Sweden and the other powers against France, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the voyage was illegal, the cargo was condemned, and the neutral carrier denied his freight. The cargo, in this case, was enemy's property, but all the members of the court concurred in the principle that a neutral carrying supplies for an enemy's naval or military forces, was engaged in an enterprise inconsistent with the duties of neutrality, and that it was a very lenient administration of justice to confine the penalty to a mere denial of freight. Some doubts have been expressed as to the propriety of the decision in the particular case, but none as to the truth of the general principles upon which

¹ The 'Edward,' 4 Rob., 70.

it was founded. Chief Justice Marshall dissented from the majority of the court, but his dissent was founded on the special circumstances of the case: first, that the war in the Spanish peninsula was so distinct from that between England and the United States, that the latter could not be prejudiced by the aid furnished; and, second, that Sweden being an ally with England in the war against France, her subjects might lawfully aid the British forces engaged in that war, and without violating their neutrality toward the United States.¹

§ 13. All writers on international law are agreed, that implements and munitions of war, and articles, which, in their actual condition, are of immediate use for warlike purposes, are to be deemed contraband, whenever they are destined to an enemy's country, or to an enemy's use; but, beyond this, there is such a diversity of opinion among text-writers that it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to deduce from such works any well-established and satisfactory principles to guide our decision on the points in dispute. We will proceed to refer to the discussions of publicists of the highest authority on these questions, without attempting, however, to reconcile their differences of opinion.

§ 14. Grotius divides all articles of trade into three classes: 1. Implements and materials which, by their nature, are suitable to be used in war. 2. Articles of taste and luxury, useful only for civil purposes, as books, paintings, etc. 3. Articles which are of indiscriminate use in peace and war, as provisions, naval stores, etc. Articles of the *first* class are always contraband; those of the *second* class never; those of the *third* class may or may not be contraband, according to the particular circumstances of the war. But little objection can be made to this classification, but it leaves the entire difficulty unsettled, as the question immediately arises with respect to what articles are to be assigned to each class, and under what particular circumstances articles of the third class are subject to capture as contraband of war. Loccenius is of opinion that provisions are universally contraband, and refers to many instances in which different nations had enforced the prohibition. Heineccius includes in the list of contraband articles of promiscuous use in peace or war, such as provi-

¹ The 'Commercen,' 1 *Wheat R.*, p. 322.

sions, naval stores, etc. Vattel makes a similar distinction that of Grotius, though he includes timber or naval stores among articles which are liable to capture as contraband; he considers provisions as such only under certain circumstances as 'when there are hopes of reducing the enemy by famine.' Valin and Pothier wholly exclude provisions, but admit that by general usage, when they wrote, naval stores were prohibited. Bynkershoek strenuously contends against admitting into the list of contraband articles of promiscuous use in peace and war, and denies that any other than those which, in the actual state, are immediately applicable to warlike purposes can properly be enumerated as prohibited. Sir Leslie Jenkins, in a letter to Charles II., says: 'I am humbly of opinion that nothing ought to be judged contraband by the general law of nations, but what is directly and immediately subservient to the uses of war, except it be in the case of beleaguered places.'¹

§ 15. The more modern treaties on the law of nations present an almost equal diversity of sentiment on this subject. Kent, Wheaton, and Duer have generally limited their remarks to stating the opinions of the older text-writers, and the decisions of English and American courts of prize. Wheaton is evidently disposed to exclude entirely, from the list of contraband, provisions and other articles of promiscuous use. Kent and Duer are of opinion that such articles may, or may not, be contraband, according to the circumstances of the case.

¹ Grotius, *De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. i. § 5; Loccenius, *For. Jur. Marit.*, lib. i. cap. 4. § 9; Heineccius, *De Navibus*, cap. x. § 2; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. vi. § 112; Valin, *Com. sur l'Ord.*, liv. iii. tit. ix. art. xi.; Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Bel.*, liv. i. cap. x.

A strictly accurate and satisfactory classification is perhaps impracticable, but that which is best supported by English and American decisions divides all merchandise into three classes:—

1st. Articles manufactured and primarily or ordinarily used for military purposes in time of war, destined to a belligerent country or places occupied by the army and navy of a belligerent, are always contraband and liable to condemnation.

2nd. Articles which may be and are used for purposes of war or peace, according to circumstances, are contraband only when actually destined to the military or naval use of a belligerent.

3rd. Articles exclusively used for peaceful purposes are not contraband at all, though liable to seizure and condemnation for violation of blockade or siege.

Contraband articles contaminate the parts not contraband of a cargo if belonging to the same owner; and the non-contraband must share the fate of the contraband—viz., confiscation.—The '*Peterhoff*,' 5 *Wall.*, 22.

English authors have generally favoured the views of their Government in its extension of the list of contraband to all articles of promiscuous use in peace and war. One of their latest text-writers, Reddie, defines contraband to be: '1. Articles which have been constructed, fabricated, or compounded into actual instruments of war. 2. Articles which from their nature, qualities, and quantities, are applicable and useful for the purposes of war. 3. Articles which, although not subservient generally to the purposes of war, such as grain, flour, provisions, naval stores, become so by their special and direct destination for such purposes, namely, by their destination for the supply of armies, garrisons, or fleets, naval arsenals, and posts of military equipment.' The continental writers, generally, contend against the English extension of contraband. Among the most recent are Hautefeuille and Ortolan. The former admits but one class of contraband, and confines it to objects of first necessity for war, which are exclusively useful in war, and which can be directly employed for that purpose, without undergoing any change. The latter declares his opinion to be, that, on principle, under ordinary circumstances, arms and munitions of war, which serve directly and exclusively for belligerent purposes, are alone contraband. He admits that in special cases certain determinate articles, whose usefulness is greater in war than in peace, are, from circumstances, in their character contraband, without being actually arms and munitions of war, such as timber, evidently intended for the construction of ships of war, or for gun-carriages, boilers or machinery for the enemy's steam-vessels, sulphur, saltpetre, or other materials for arms or munitions of war. Phillimore reviews the whole question, and considers that provisions may or may not be contraband, according to their destination and probable use. Heffter is of opinion that certain articles, as provisions, not in their nature contraband, may, in certain cases, from their destination and intended use, be regarded as such.¹

§ 16. And the same discordancy in the definition of con-

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 26; Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. 1. pp. 135 143; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. 1. pp. 622 644; Reddie, *Researches Hist. and Crit. in Mart. Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 456; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, iii. 8, § 2; Ortolan, *Dép. de la Mer*, tome ii. ch. vi.; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 245, et seq.; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 160.

traband is to be found in the conventional law of nations, as established by treaties, the provisions of which are various and contradictory,—even of those made, at different periods, between the same nations. The same may be said of marine ordinances and diplomatic discussions. The marine ordinances of Louis XIV., 1681, limits contraband to munitions of war. So, also, the treaties between England and Sweden in 1656, 1661, 1664, and 1665. Bynkershoek refers to other treaties of the seventeenth century, as containing the same limitation. But Valin says that in the treaty of commerce between France and Denmark, in 1742, pitch, tar, resin, sail-cloth, hemp, cordage, masts and ship-timber, were declared to be contraband. By the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, and the subsequent treaties of 1748, 1763, 1783, and 1786, between Great Britain and France, contraband was strictly confined to munitions of war; all other goods not worked into the form of any instrument or furniture for warlike use, by land or sea, are expressly excluded from this list. But the contraband character of naval stores continued a vexed question between Great Britain and the Baltic powers. By the treaty of 1801, between Great Britain and Russia, to which Denmark and Sweden subsequently acceded, saltpetre, sulphur, saddles and bridles, were enumerated as contraband; and by the convention of July 25, 1803, the list was augmented by the addition of coined money, horses, equipments for cavalry, and all manufactured articles serving immediately for the equipment of ships of war. In the treaty of 1794, between Great Britain and the United States it was stipulated (article 18) that under the denomination of contraband should be comprised all arms and implements serving for the purposes of war, 'and also timber for ship-building, tar or rosin, copper in sheets, sails, hemp and cordage, and generally whatever may serve directly to the equipment of vessels, unwrought iron and fir planks only excepted.' The article then goes on to provide, that '*whereas the difficulty of agreeing on the precise cases, in which alone provisions and other articles, not generally contraband, may be regarded as such, renders it expedient to provide against the inconveniences and misunderstandings which might thence arise, it is further agreed that whenever any such articles, so becoming contraband, according to the*

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¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv, ch. iii, § 26; Kent, *Comm. on Am. Law*, vol. 1, pp. 135, 143; Doer, *On Insurance*, vol. 1, pp. 622-644; Reddie, *Kantar's Hist. and Crit. in Mart. Int. Law*, vol. ii, p. 456; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. 8, § 2; Ortolan, *Disp. de la Mer*, tome ii, ch. vi. 1. Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii, § 245, et seq.; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 160.

regarded as articles *ancipitis usus*, not necessarily contraband but liable to be considered so, if they were to be applied to the military or naval uses of the enemy. A Swedish ordinance, of April 8, 1854, section fifth, enumerates as contraband of war, all kinds of arms, munitions of war, military stores, saddles, bridles, and other manufactured articles immediately applicable to warlike purposes.

§ 18. Again, if we recur to the decisions of prize courts although we shall find less discordancy, perhaps, than in other sources of international law, we nevertheless still encounter a diversity of sentiment, on some points, which would be vain to attempt to reconcile. Even in the same country, at different periods, the decisions have been various and contradictory. Thus, in England, Sir Leoline Jenkins, the judge of admiralty in the reign of Charles II., 1672, in the case of a Swedish vessel, laden with naval stores, and referred to, decided that such commodities as pitch, tar, and naval stores, except in case of besieged places, ought not to be judged contraband; while Sir William Scott condemned naval stores as contraband, even when bound to a mercantile port only, as 'they may then be applied to immediate use in the equipment of privateers, or may be conveyed from the mercantile to the naval port, and there become subservient to every purpose to which they could have been applied, if sent directly to a port of naval equipment.' The same authority sustained the orders and instructions to English cruisers to seize all neutral vessels laden with corn, flour, meat, and other provisions, bound to ports of France, upon the ground that by the modern law of nations, all provisions are to be considered contraband, and, as such, liable to confiscation, whenever the depriving the enemy of these supplies is one of the means to be employed in reducing him to terms.¹

§ 19. As already stated, it is not our present intention to attempt to reconcile conflicting opinions and decisions, or to deduce, from any process of reasoning, the rules of a universal law applicable to contraband of war. But we will endeavour to state what has been decided to be contraband by the prize courts of Europe and of the United States, wherein the courts are generally agreed, and wherein they have differed.

¹ *Life and Cor. of Sir L. Jenkins*, vol. ii. p. 751; the *Richmond Rob.*, 325.

opinion. It is, perhaps, of as much importance to know what has been, and is likely to be, administered as the law, by the courts of the principal commercial States, as to know what ought, in theory, to be established as the conventional law of nations. The liability to capture can only be determined by the rules of international law, *as interpreted and applied by the tribunals of the belligerent State*, to the operations in whose cruisers the neutral merchant is exposed.

§ 20. It is universally admitted, as already remarked, that instruments and munitions of war are to be deemed contraband, and subject to condemnation. This rule embraces, in its terms, and by fair construction, all ordnance and arms of every description, balls, shells, shot, gunpowder, and pieces of military pyrotechny, gun-carriages, ammunition-boxes, belts, scabbards, holsters, all military equipments and military clothing. Any vessel, evidently built for warlike purposes, as gun and mortar boats, and destined to be used for such use, is clearly liable to confiscation under the same rule. To this list are to be added all articles, manufactured or unmanufactured, which are almost exclusively adapted for military purposes, as machinery for manufacturing gunpowder, and saltpetre, and sulphur for making gunpowder.¹

§ 21. It is an established doctrine of the English Admiralty, that all manufactured articles that in their natural state are adapted for military use, or for building and equipping ships of war, such as masts, spars, rudders, wheels, tillers, sails, rigging, cordage, and anchors, are contraband in their own nature, to the same extent as munitions of war, and that no exception is admitted in their favour, unless sanctioned by express provisions of a treaty. Since the introduction of steam, as a motive power, in ships of war, the prize courts would probably, upon the same principle, deem as contraband all marine engines, screw propellers, pistons, shafts, boilers, boiler plates, tubes, fire bars, and every important part of a marine engine or boiler, and every article suitable for the manufacture of marine machinery.²

¹ *Philimore, On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 229; *Duer, On Insurance*, vol. i.

² *Wharton, Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 24. Torpedoes, and every gear connected with them or with artillery, would be included.

³ *Philimore, On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 234; *Edinburgh Review*, No. 110, 1154.

§ 22. Articles in a rough state, which may be used for military and naval purposes, may, or may not, be contraband.

After the declaration of war in 1870 between France and Germany, the British Government lost no time in announcing the determination of Great Britain to maintain a position of neutrality between the contending parties, and this position was faithfully observed. No facilities were given, or restrictions imposed, which were not equally applicable to both belligerents. The steps taken by the British Government were such in accordance with precedent, and with the principles by which civilized nations, including Germany, had been guided in recent wars. But Herr Bismarck, on behalf of Germany, appeared to wish that Great Britain should go further, and that she should not only enjoin upon British subjects the obligations of neutrality, but that she should take it upon herself to enforce those obligations in a manner and to an extent which was unusual. He complained that England had provisioned the French army with coal by direct communication of English vessels with the French coast; there was an export of horses in large quantities to France, and that contracts had been entered into with English houses at Birmingham to supply the French Government with cartridges. He demanded that England should not only forbid, but should absolutely prevent the exportation of articles contraband of war; that is to say, that she should decide herself what articles were to be considered as contraband of war, and that she should keep such a watch upon her ports as to make it impossible for such articles to be exported from them. It requires little consideration to be convinced that this is a task which a neutral power can hardly be called upon to perform. Different nations take different views at different times as to what articles are to be ranked as contraband of war, and no general decision has been come to on the subject. Strong remonstrances, for instance, were made by Prince Bismarck against the export of coal to France, but it has been held by Prussian authorities of high reputation that coal is not contraband, and that no one Power, neutral or belligerent, can pronounce it to be so. But even if this point were clearly defined, it is beyond dispute that the contraband character would depend upon the destination; the neutral power could hardly be called upon to prevent the exportation of such cargoes to a neutral port, and if this be the case, how could it be decided at the time of departure of a vessel, whether the alleged neutral destination were real or conceivable? The question of the destination of the cargo must be decided by the prize court of a belligerent, and Germany could hardly seriously propose to hold the British Government responsible, whenever a French ship, carrying a contraband cargo, should be captured while attempting to enter a French port.

When Prussia was in the same position as that in which Great Britain then found herself, her line of conduct was similar, and she found herself equally unable to enforce upon her subjects stringent obligations against the exportation even of unquestionable munitions of war. During the Crimean war arms and munitions were freely exported from Prussia to Russia, and arms of Belgian manufacture found their way to the same quarter through Prussian territory, in spite of a decree issued by the Prussian Government, prohibiting the transport of arms coming from foreign States.

It may not be irrelevant to quote the views expressed, in 1870, by a foreign Minister at Washington by the Secretary of State of the United States, respecting the duties of neutrals in regard to trade in articles contraband of war. He is reported to have said that arms and ammunition had always been considered to be articles of legitimate com-

according to their nature and destined use, as inferred from their immediate destination. Thus, pitch, tar, and hemp, destined to the enemy's use, are generally held to be contraband in their nature, but when they are the produce of the neutral country from which they are exported, and are the property of its subjects or citizens, they are exempt from confiscation, except when they are exclusively and immediately destined to warlike use. Ship-timber, in a rough state, is not *in se* contraband, but it may become so from its particular character, as masts and spars, or from the character of its port of destination. Copper is not generally contraband, but if in sheets, adapted to the sheathing of vessels, it is condemned. Hemp is more favourably considered than cordage. Rosin is not generally contraband, but is condemned if going to a port of naval equipment. Iron itself is treated with indulgence, but if of such a form as to make it suitable for military or naval purposes, and its immediate destination is for such use, it cannot claim the benefit of exemption. The same rule would probably be applied to all unwrought materials for ship-building, and for the construction of marine machinery. Since the introduction of steam as the motive power in ships of war, the question has been much discussed in Europe, whether coals are to be considered as contraband. They would seem now to properly belong to the same class as ship-timber, tar, pitch, and other unwrought materials for ship-building and naval stores. In the recent war between the Allies and Russia, the English cruisers stopped coals on their way to an enemy's port on the Black sea, though it appears, from an answer already referred to, given in the House of Commons, by Sir James Graham, that they would be regarded by British cruisers as one of the articles *ancipitis belli*, not necessarily contraband, but liable to detention under circumstances that warrant suspicion of their being destined to the military or naval uses of the enemy. Ortolan first held by neutrals during war, and that the United States claimed the right to supply them to all belligerents without distinction, adding that during the Civil War in America, quantities of these articles had been exported from England, France, and Belgium.

The Belgian Government, while prohibiting the transit and exportation of arms and munitions of war in 1870, nevertheless excepted from its prohibition articles which could clearly be shown to be destined for neutral Government, and reserved formally the right of free exportation for the future.—(*Parl. Papers*, 1870.)

expressed the opinion that coals might, or might not, according to their intended use, be classed as prohibited articles, but he afterwards corrected this statement, and concluded that they never can, under any circumstances, become contraband of war. This view of the question is ably advocated by Hautefeuille.¹

¹ Polson, *Law of Nations*, p. 63; Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, iii. ch. vi.; the 'Stadt Embden,' 1 *Rob.*, 26; the 'Sarah Christina,' 1 *Rob.*, 241; the 'Maria,' 1 *Rob.*, 372; the 'Apollo,' 4 *Rob.*, 158; the 'Christina Maria,' 4 *Rob.*, 166; the 'Twee Jullowen,' 4 *Rob.*, 244; the 'Event,' 4 *Rob.*, 353; the 'Nostra Signora,' 5 *Rob.*, 97.

During the Franco-German War, 1870, some doubts having arisen on the question whether the transport of coal was a legitimate operation under the then existing circumstances, it was put on record in the 'Journal Officiel' of July 26 that the French Government did not consider that article contraband of war.

The best opinions on this subject seem to agree that the question of the destination of coal may render it liable to seizure. In such case it is obviously for the prize court of the captor to decide the question of contraband. See *The Jurist*, 1859, vol. v. part ii. p. 203. The determination of what is contraband must depend on the circumstances of each particular cargo. Provisions, though they may be safely sent under other circumstances, yet if sent to a port where an army of a State at war is in want of food, may become contraband. So with regard to coals. They may be sent for the purpose of manufacture, but if sent to a port where there are war steamers, with the view of supplying them with coals, then they become contraband. See *Parliamentary Debates*, F. of L., May 16, 1861.

By parity of reasoning the same remarks apply to horses. They are moreover mentioned as contraband in many treaties between belligerent States, Russia always excepted. A neutral vessel destined to be used by the enemy and to be used for purposes of war is contraband. See *Richmond*, 5 *Rob.*, 325.)

As to enemy's despatches and contraband persons, see chap. vi. §§ 17, 18, *post*.

The marine treaty between England and Holland, December 1674, comprehends as contraband of war, pieces of ordnance, and implements belonging to them, fire-balls, powder, matches, halberds, pikes, swords, lances, spears, halberts, guns, mortar-pieces, pistons, grand idoes, musket rests, bandoliers, saltpetre, muskets, muzzles, helmets, corslets, breast-plates, coats of mail, and the like kind of armature; also horses and other warlike instruments. And see the attempt made by John Burrough to trade with Sweden expressly against the interdiction of the King of Denmark. *Sir Walter Raleigh*, lib. v. c. 10.

The following list is given by Mr. Godfrey Lushington in his 'Manual of Naval Prize Law,' viz. —

'Goods absolutely contraband. Arms of all kinds and machines for manufacturing arms. Ammunition and materials for ammunition, including lead sulphate of potash, munate of potash, chloride of potassium, chlorate of potash, and nitrate of soda. Gunpowder and its ingredients, saltpetre and brimstone; also gun cotton. Military equipments and clothing. Military stores. Naval stores, such as masts (the *Twende Booder*, 4 *Rob.*, 33), hemp (the 'Apollo,' 4 *Rob.*, 158), and cordage, sail (the 'Neptunus,' 3 *Rob.*, 108), pitch and tar (the 'Jonge Tobias,' 1 *Rob.*, 177).

123 The probable use of articles is inferred from their known destination. This rule seems neither unjust nor unequal. The remarks of Chancellor Kent on this point are exceedingly clear and appropriate. 'The most important distinction,' he says, 'is whether the articles were intended for the ordinary uses of life, or even for mercantile ships' use, or whether they were going with a highly probable destination to military use. The nature and quality of the port to which the articles are going, is not an irrational test. If the port be a general commercial one, it is presumed the articles are intended for civil use, though occasionally a ship of war may be constructed in that port. But, if the great predominant character of that port, like Brest in France, or Portsmouth in England, be that of a port of naval military equipment, it will be presumed that the articles were going for military use, although it is possible that the articles might have been applied to civil consumption. As it is impossible to ascertain the final use of an article *auçipitis aris*, it is not an injurious rule, which deduces the final use from the immediate destination; and the presumption of a hostile use, founded on its destination to a military port, is very much inflamed, if at the time when the articles were going, a considerable armament was notoriously preparing, to which a supply of those articles would be eminently useful.'

supposed fit for sheathing vessels (the 'Charlotte,' 5 *Rob.*, 275). Marine engines, and the component parts thereof, including screw propellers, paddle wheels, cylinders, cranks, shafts, boilers, tubes for boilers, boiler plates, and tire bars, marine cement, and the materials used in the manufacture thereof, as blue lias and Portland cement; iron, in any of the following forms:—Anchors, rivet iron, angle iron, round bars of from $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ of an inch diameter, rivets, strips of iron, sheet plate iron exceeding $\frac{1}{4}$ of an inch, and low moor and bowling plates.

Goods conditionally contraband.—Provisions and liquors fit for the consumption of army or navy (the 'Haabet,' 2 *Rob.*, 182, money, telegraphic materials, such as wire, porous cups, platina, sulphuric acid, and the *Parl. Papers*, N. America, No. 14, 1863, materials for the construction of a railway, as iron bars, sleepers, &c.; coals, hay (*Hornet*, 45, timber, resin (the 'Nostra Signora de Begona,' 5 *Rob.*, 98), tallow (the 'Neptunus,' 3 *Rob.*, 108), timber (the 'Twende Brodre,' 4 *Rob.*, 37).'

Particular relaxations, or special articles of treaty, may protect certain contraband; thus, in 1802, hemp, the produce of Russia and the property of a Russian merchant, taken on its way to Amsterdam, was not confiscated by the British Court of Admiralty; it was not on board a Russian ship, but was taken in the vessel of another country. It was, however, liable to seizure and pre-emption. (The 'Apollo,' 4 *Rob.*, 158.) See also the treaty of July 25, 1803, between Great Britain and Sweden concerning pitch and tar.

The same principle is laid down by Sir William Scott, but does not seem to have been followed out in all his decisions. It applies equally to unwrought materials and ordinary manufactures. If, when they are destined to a *commercial* port, it is a just presumption that they are intended solely for civil use, it is evident that this presumption exists in all cases when such is their destination, from whatever country they may be exported, and hence, in all such cases, the presumption should be admitted for their protection, as it is for their condemnation when destined to a port of naval equipment. The distinction in favour of those which are the produce of the country from which they are imported, does not seem to be well founded.¹

§ 24. It is universally admitted, that provisions (*commodities belli*) are not, in their own nature, contraband. But while some contend that they never can become so under any circumstances, others hold, (and such is the uniform practice of the British Admiralty,) that they may become liable to condemnation by their special destination and intended use. When they are destined to the immediate supply of the military or naval forces of the enemy, the aid thus intended to be given for the prosecution of the war, is so direct and important that the act of transportation is peculiarly noxious and they are condemned without hesitation. It would seem from the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the 'Commercen,' that where the real object is the supply of the enemy's forces, the voyage is illegal, even where the port of destination is neutral in its character. Nor, by the established doctrine of the English Admiralty, is it in all cases necessary, in order to make provisions contraband, that the destination to the use of the enemy's military or naval forces should be certain. The rule of *ancipis usus* is here applied, which deduces the final use from the immediate destination. If destined to a general commercial port, they are presumed to be for civil use, but if to a port whose predominant character is that of naval construction and equipment, they are presumed to be for military use. But such destination alone is not, as a general rule, sufficient to produce a condemnation. It must further appear that

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 140; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.* lib. i. tit. ii. cap. xv.

the provisions were, from their nature and quality, adapted to military use; since, otherwise, there would be no basis for the presumption that they would have been applied to that use, had their arrival been permitted. Thus, where cheeses, intercepted as contraband, were destined to Brest, a port notoriously of naval equipment, evidence was required by Sir William Scott of their fitness for naval use.¹

§ 25. The ancient custom of *pre-emption*, by the belligerent, of the property of the subjects of another State, as practised about the middle of the seventeenth century, had a much milder operation and very different meaning than is now attributed to it. By the French ordonnance of 1584, article sixty-nine, contraband was subjected, not to *confiscation*, but to *pre-emption*. But, according to the modern use of this term, it is applied to articles not subject to confiscation, as *contraband* in themselves, but being *ambigui usûs* are made subject to seizure, and to be condemned to the use of the belligerent, by paying their value with a reasonable mercantile profit,—which, by the practice of the British prize courts, is usually fixed at ten per cent. If the goods so seized are contraband, the carrying of them is a criminal act, punishable by confiscation or any milder penalty which the belligerent may see fit to impose; but if not contraband, by the law of nations, they are not liable to pre-emption. The question, therefore, resolves itself into one of contraband, upon which opinions are somewhat divided.²

§ 26. But the British Admiralty, and especially Sir William Scott, went much further, and sustained the capture of provisions which were not even *probably* destined to military use, not, indeed, confiscating as *contraband of war* on the ground of their being *ambigui usûs*, but condemning them to the use of the British Government, on the payment of a price equivalent to their value, or rather, their cost, and the specified mercantile profit of ten per cent. A similar rule of *pre-emption* was applied by Great Britain to certain *native commodities* of neutral States, found in neutral vessels, and

¹ The 'Commercen,' 2 *Gallis. R.*, 264; the 'Jonge Margaretha,' 1 *Rob.*, 190; the 'Haabet,' 2 *Rob.*, 182; the 'Zelden Rust,' 6 *Rob.*, 93; the 'Langer,' 6 *Rob.*, 126; the 'Edward,' 4 *Rob.*, 68; *Maisonnette v. Keating*, 2 *Rob. R.*, 334.

² Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 267-270; the 'Sarah Christina,' 2 *Rob.*, 241; De Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. i. tit. iii. § 18.

required by her for naval purposes. In some cases, when this rule of pre-emption, or pretended right of purchase was exercised, it was not claimed that the goods so captured and condemned to a forced sale, were contraband, even on the ground of being *ambigui usus*; but the right to pre-emption was claimed, because 'the ancient practice of Europe, in at least of several maritime States of Europe, was to condemn them entirely; a century has not elapsed since this claim has been asserted by some of them.' It was not pretended, as, indeed, it could not have been, that the claim thus asserted by some of the maritime States of Europe a century before was generally admitted, and adopted as a rule of international law, or that the practice ever had received any such sanction as to make it binding upon neutrals.¹

§ 27. The arguments adduced in favour of the British right of pre-emption failed to convince its opponents of its justice or legality, and its enforcement was, at the time, most strenuously opposed by the Government of the United States and the neutral powers of Europe. Nor did this opposition cease with the war in which the rule had originated, or, at least, been called into operation. Since then, text-writers have most emphatically denied the legality of the rule, and successfully attacked the arguments by which it was attempted to be defended. Some British writers still advocate it as a principle of law, but there is little probability that in any future war the British Government will attempt to exercise the right of pre-emption, except upon goods manifestly contraband of war.²

§ 28. Arnould lays down the rule, that all insurances on

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 24; Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. 1. pp. 138, 139; Debrett's *State Papers*, p. 380; Manning's *Law of Nations*, pp. 287, 316.

² By 27 and 28 Vict., cap. 25, s. 38, passed in 1864, it is enacted that where a ship of a foreign nation passing the seas laden with naval or victualling stores intended to be carried to a port of any enemy of Great Britain, is taken and brought into a port of the United Kingdom, and the purchase for the service of Her Majesty of the stores on board the ship appears to the Lords of the Admiralty expedient, without the condemnation thereof in a prize court, in that case the Lords of the Admiralty may purchase on the account or for the service of Her Majesty, all or any of the stores on board the ship, and the Commissioners of Customs may permit the stores purchased to be entered and landed within any port. This is a very important enactment.

Des contraband of war are wholly void, and incapable of being enforced in the courts of the belligerent country. But effected by or for neutrals, and sought to be enforced in a court of a *neutral* State, the case would be different, for it is not deemed unlawful in a neutral, by its own government, to be engaged in a contraband trade. The insurance, therefore, by a neutral, of articles contraband of war, being *per se* a valid contract, may be enforced in the courts of the neutral country, *provided* the nature of the trade and of the goods was disclosed to the underwriter, *or provided* there be just ground, in the circumstances of the trade, or otherwise, to presume that he was duly informed thereof. Mr. Duer contends that the carrying of contraband, being contrary to the general law of nations, renders the voyage prohibited and illegal, and hence, that an insurance of the ship on such a voyage cannot be sustained. We copy a portion of his remarks: 'An insurance,' he says, 'upon goods liable to confiscation, as contraband of war, if made in the belligerent country whose laws are violated, it is admitted, by all writers, is wholly void; nor do I perceive any reason for doubting that an insurance upon every other subject or interest, liable to be seized in the same penalty, is equally invalid. Hence, a policy upon the freight of the contraband articles, upon other goods, the property of the same owner, and upon the ship, is subject to condemnation, is, in all cases, an illegal contract; for, although the penalty to which the subject is liable may not always be enforced in a court of Admiralty, that court alone seems competent to judge of the special circumstances that may warrant a discretionary relaxation of the general rules. Nor to avoid a policy upon the ship, does it seem to be necessary that she should be placed in circumstances to justify her condemnation. The transportation of contraband, as viewed by the law of nations, is universally an unlawful act; and it is for this reason that it subjects the ship to the penalty of the loss of freight. The imposition of this penalty, it seems to me, renders the voyage prohibited and illegal; and hence, if we are governed by analogy, an insurance of the ship, on such a voyage, cannot be sustained. Arguments of a sound policy lead us to the same conclusion. It is impossible to deny that a belligerent country has a real, and, in some cases, a deep interest in preventing

the transportation of contraband articles to the use of the enemy. To permit the vehicle of transportation to be insured, is to encourage the act. These reasons do not apply to an insurance upon the innocent goods of an innocent shipper which is, doubtless, valid. He was no party to the illegal transaction, had no power to prevent it, and, it must be presumed, had no knowledge of its existence. It is, however, doubtful whether the insurer is liable even to the owner of innocent goods, for a loss arising from condemnation or detention, by his own government, of the carrier's ship. These views are contested by some of the Continental publicists.¹

¹ Arnould, *On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 740; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 642, 643; Bedarride, *Droit Maritime*, § 1095, et seq.

The English law seems to have omitted to enact that contraband must be specified in the policy of insurance. But the insurer would not be liable unless aware of the risk.

According to the French law, contraband of war must be stated and specifically described in the policy of insurance, unless the insurer be ignorant of the nature of the goods. *Ord. de la marine*, liv. vi. art. 31.

An insurance in contraband cannot be enforced in the country of the hostile belligerent (*Gibson v. Service*, 5 *Taunt.* 433), but if made by a neutral, it is valid in the neutral country. The '*Santissima Trinità*', 7 *Went.* 283; *Ex parte Chavasse*, in *re Grazebrook*, 34 *L. J. Chanc.*

Although it was not, nor is a breach of neutrality to carry ~~enemy~~ goods, not contraband, from a neutral to an enemy's country, an insurance could be effected in the belligerent country, but since the Declaration of Paris, 1856, it is questionable whether such an insurance might not be valid in the belligerent country.

CHAPTER XXVII.

RIGHT OF VISITATION AND SEARCH.

General exemption of merchant vessels on the high seas—2. Right of search a belligerent right only—3. British claim of a right of visit in time of peace—4. Denied by the United States—5. Opinions of American publicists—6. Of Continental writers—7. Of Lord Stowell and Mr. Phillimore—8. Distinction between pirates and slavers—9. Great Britain finally renounces her claim of right of visit—10. Visitation and search in time of war—11. English views as to extent of this right—12. Views of American writers—13. Limitations imposed by Continental publicists—14. Force may be used in the exercise of this right—15. But must be exercised in a lawful manner—16. Penalty for contravention of this right—17. English decision as to effect of convoy—18. Ships of war exempt from search—19. Merchant ships under their convoy—20. Treaties respecting neutral convoy—21. Opinions of publicists—22. Neutral vessels under enemy's convoy—23. Resistance of master on cargo—24. Neutral property in armed enemy vessel—25. Documents requisite to prove neutral character—26. Concealment of papers—27. Spoilation of papers—28. Use of false papers—29. Impressment of seamen from neutral vessels—30. American rule as defined by Webster.

It has been stated in a preceding chapter that every merchant vessel on the high seas is regarded, in international law, as a part of the territory of the State to which it belongs. To enter into such vessel, or to interrupt its course, by a belligerent power in time of peace, or (it being neutral) by a belligerent in time of war, 'is an act of force, and is, *prima facie*, a wrong, a trespass, which can be justified only when, for some purpose, allowed to form a sufficient justification by the law of nations.' The right of a vessel of one State to visit and search a vessel of another State on the high seas, in time of war, is therefore an exception to the general rights of equality, jurisdiction, equality and independence of sovereign States, and to justify such an act it must be shown that the particular case comes clearly within the exceptions to this general rule which have been established by the positive law of nations, or by treaty stipulations between the parties.¹

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 18; Webster, *Dip. and*

§ 2. The right of *search* upon the high seas is now universally regarded as simply a belligerent right, and one which cannot be exercised in time of peace, except when it has been conceded by treaty. Whatever difference of opinion may formerly have existed on this point, this right of *search* in time of peace has more recently been entirely and utterly disclaimed by the British Government—the only maritime power which was supposed to advocate it as a principle of the law of nations. This general rule, with respect to *search* on the high seas, does not, of course, apply to the exercise of revenue laws or other municipal regulations in the ports and bays, or within one marine league of the coast.¹

§ 3. That government, however, at one time attempted to draw a distinction between the right of *visit* and the right of *search*, and while it distinctly disavowed any claim to exercise the latter in time of peace, it insisted upon the right of *visit* for the purpose of ascertaining whether a merchant vessel was justly entitled to the protection of the flag which she may happen to have hoisted, such vessel being in circumstances which render her liable to suspicion; the right 'to know whether the vessel pretending to be American, and hoisting the American flag, be *bonâ fide* American;' and yet, says Lord Aberdeen, 'if, in the exercise of this right, either from involuntary error, or in spite of every precaution, loss or injury should be sustained, a prompt reparation would be afforded.'²

§ 4. 'The government of the United States, on the other hand, said Mr. Webster, 'maintains that there is no such well-known and acknowledged, nor, indeed, any broad and generic difference between what has been usually called *visit* and what has been usually called *search*; that the right to *visit*, to be effectual, must come, in the end, to include *search*.'

Off. Papers, p. 143; Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 40; Lawrence, *Visitations and Search*, p. 4; Hubner, *Saisie de Bâtimens*, pt. ii. ch. ii.; Klüber, *Droit des Gens Mod.*, § 293, a; Jouffroy, *Droit Maritime*, p. 211; Heister, *Droit International*, § 167; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Américaines*, tit. xi. ch. i.; the 'Antelope,' 10 Wheaton R., 66.

¹ Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, tome ii., ch. vii.; Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Everett, December 20, 1841; Webster, *Works*, vol. vi. pp. 324, seq.

Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 326; Lawrence, *Visitations and Search*, p. 4; Esquiéme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. ii. cap. vii., *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xxx. p. 1105.

thus to exercise, in peace, an authority which the law of nations only allows in time of war. If such well-known distinction exists, where are the proofs of it? What writers of authority on public law, what adjudications in courts of admiralty, what public treaties, recognise it? No such recognition has presented itself to the Government of the United States; but, on the contrary, it understands that public writers, courts of law, and solemn treaties have, for two centuries, used the words "visit" and "search" in the same sense. What Great Britain and the United States mean by the "right of search," in its broadest sense, is called by Continental writers and jurists by no other name than the "right of visit." Visit, therefore, as it has been understood, implies not only a right to inquire into the national character, but to detain the vessel, to stop the progress of the voyage, to examine papers, to decide on their regularity and authenticity, and to make inquisition on board for enemy's property, and into the business which the vessel is engaged in. In other words, it describes the entire right of belligerent visitation and search. Such a right is justly disclaimed by the British Government, in time of peace. They, nevertheless, insist on a right which they denominate a right of visit, and by that word describe the claim which they assert.' Mr. Webster thus describes the views of the United States on the means which a vessel at war may use in time of peace, to ascertain the character of any other vessel on the high seas. 'As we understand the general and settled rules of public law, in respect to ships at war sailing under the authority of their Government, "to visit pirates and other public offenders," there is no reason why they may not approach any vessel descried at sea, for the purpose of ascertaining their real characters. Such a mode of approach seems indispensable for the fair and discreet exercise of their authority; and the use of it cannot be justly deemed indicative of any design to insult or injure the vessel they approach, or to impede them in their lawful commerce. On the other hand, it is clear that no ship is, under any circumstances, bound to lie by, or wait the approach of another ship. She is at full liberty to pursue her voyage, in her own way, and to use all necessary precautions to avoid any suspected sinister enterprise or hostile attack. Her right to the free use of the ocean is as perfect as that of any other

ship. An entire equality is presumed to exist. She has a right to consult her own safety, but, at the same time, she must take care not to violate the rights of others. She may use any precautions dictated by the prudence or fears of her officers, either as to delay, or the progress or course of her voyage, but she is not at liberty to inflict injuries upon other innocent parties, simply because of her conjectured dangers. But if the vessel thus approached attempts to avoid the vessel approaching, or does not comply with her commander's order to send him her papers for his inspection, nor consent to be visited or detained, what is next to be done? Is force to be used? And if force be used, may that force be lawfully repelled? * * * Suppose that force be met by force, gun returned for gun, and the commander of the cruiser, or one of his seamen, be killed, what description of offence will have been committed? It may be said, on behalf of the commander of the cruiser, that he mistook the vessel for a vessel of England, Brazil, or Portugal; but does this mistake of his take away from the American vessel the right of self-defence? The writers of authority declare it to be a principle of natural law, that the principle of self-defence exists against an assailant who mistakes the object of his attack for another whom he had the right to assail. He also discussed the consequences of admitting the claim as a matter of *right*, for, if a *right*, it had its correlative *duties*.¹

§ 5. The views of Mr. Webster on this question are fully sustained by the best writers on public law in America and Europe. Chancellor Kent says most emphatically that the right of visitation and search 'is strictly and exclusively a war right, and does not rightfully exist in time of peace, unless conceded by treaty.' He, however, concedes the *right of approach* (as described by the Supreme Court of the United States in the '*Marianna Flora*') for the sole purpose of ascertaining the real national character of the vessel sailing under suspicious circumstances.' With respect to the right of *visit in time of peace*, claimed by the English government, Mr. Wheaton defied the British Admiralty lawyers 'to show a

¹ Webster, *Dip. and Off. Papers*, pp. 164, 165, 166, 167; Webster, *Works*, vol. vi. pp. 335, 336, 338, 339; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. viii. § 10; Wheaton, *Hist. Law of Nations*, pp. 706 et seq.

passage of any institutional writer on public law, or judgment of any court by which that law is administered, in Europe or America, which will justify the exercise of a right on the high seas in time of peace.' * * * distinction now set up, between a right of *visitation* and that of *search*, is nowhere alluded to by any public jurist, being founded on the law of nations. The technical term *visitation and search*, used by the English civilians, is only synonymous with the *droit de visite* of the Continental jurists. The right of seizure for a breach of the revenue laws or laws of trade and navigation, of a particular nation, is different. The utmost length to which the exercise of a right on the high seas has ever been carried, in respect of vessels of another nation, has been to justify seizing them within the territorial jurisdiction of the State against the laws they offend, and pursuing them, in case of flight, bringing them upon the ocean, and bringing them in for adjudication before the tribunals of that State. 'This, however, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of *Marianna Flora*,' has never been supposed to draw after the right of visitation or search. The party, in such case, is at his peril. If he establishes the forfeiture, he is condemned.' Mr. Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, in the case of the '*Marianna Flora*,' says, 'the right of visitation and search does not belong, in time of peace, to the public ships of any nation. 'This right is strictly a belligerent right, allowed by the general consent of nations in time of war, and limited to those occasions.' In the ocean, then, in time of peace, all possess an entire liberty. It is the common highway of all, appropriated to none of all, and no one can vindicate to himself a superior prerogative there. Every ship sails there with the unquestionable right of pursuing her own lawful business without interruption.'¹

5. The older Continental publicists, as stated by Mr. Wheaton, do not distinguish between the right of *visit*, and the right of *search*, but discuss the general question under the terms *visit* and *visitation*, as a belligerent right, existing

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. 2, p. 153; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, section, by Lawrence, p. cxxiv.; the '*Marianna Flora*,' 11 Wheaton

only in time of war. Several, however, who have written since Mr. Wheaton made the statement alluded to, have discussed the claim of Great Britain to the right of *visit* in time of peace, as distinguished from the general right of *visit* and *search* in time of war. We refer particularly to the recent and able works of Massé, Ortolan, Hautefeuille, and Pictet et Duverdy. Massé says, 'Whatever may be the object of visit in time of peace, it is always an act of police which cannot be exercised by one nation over another, for this would imply, on the part of the visitor, a sovereignty incompatible with the reciprocal independence of nations (*peuple*). Ortolan distinguishes the right of ships of war to ascertain the nationality of a merchantman (*droit d'enquête du pavillon*) from the right of visitation or search (*droit de visite ou de recherche*). Signals, exchange of words, suffice with respect to the nationality of the flag, except on suspicion of piracy when all further proceedings must be taken at the risk of the man-of-war. He unites with Mr. Wheaton in declaring that the right of visitation or search does not exist except in time of war. If accorded in time of peace by special convention between particular States, such treaty stipulations do not bind those who are not parties to them, nor do they make it a part of the law of nations. Hautefeuille discusses the British pretensions at great length. He agrees with Ortolan with respect to the right of ships of war to ascertain the nationality of a merchantman by approaching them and requiring them to hoist their flag. But beyond this simple fact of showing colours, he denies any *droit d'enquête* in time of peace, except in the case of suspected piracy, which in modern times rarely occurs. Even then the visiting vessel proceeds at her peril, for if her suspicions are not verified, she becomes guilty of an illegal act toward the vessel visited. All three of the writers oppose the policy of granting this right in time of peace by treaty, as a measure most dangerous to maritime commerce; Hautefeuille and Ortolan do not hesitate to declare that such treaties are not in general binding even upon the subjects of the States making them, for the reason that they are virtually a surrender of sovereignty. Pictet et Duverdy regard the right of reciprocal visit (*droit de visite réciproque*) in time of peace, for the suppression of the slave trade, as one which results only from special convention.

treaty, and they refer to the treaties between France and England, of November 30, 1831; March 22, 1833; May 20, 1843; the convention between France and Sweden, and Norway, May 21, 1833; the treaty between France and Sardinia, December 8, 1834; between France and the Two Sicilies, February 14, 1838; France and Tuscany, November 17, 1847; and the convention between France and Hayti, August 9, 1840. We know of no Continental writer who advocates or admits a right of visit, in time of peace, except in the single case of vessels suspected of piracy.¹

17. The older English writers, and English judicial decisions, are directly opposed to the pretensions of Lord Aberdeen, and generally agree with the Continental writers on this question. Lord Stowell, than whom no greater authority can be found in British maritime jurisprudence, says: 'I can find no authority that gives a right to the interruption of the navigation of the vessels of States on the high seas except that which the rights of war give to both belligerents against neutrals.' Again he says: 'No one can exercise the right of visitation and search upon the high seas, except a belligerent power. No such right has ever been claimed, nor can it be exercised without the suppression, interruption and endangering of the relations with and the lawful navigation of other countries. If the right were to exist at all, it must be universal and extend equally to all countries. If I were to proceed to consider this question further, it would be necessary for me to state the gigantic mischiefs which such a right is likely to produce.' And, again: 'All nations being equal, all have an equal right to the uninterrupted use of the sea for their navigation. In places where no legal authority exists, where the subjects of all States meet upon the footing of entire equality and independence, no one State nor any of its subjects have a right to assume or to exercise any authority over the subjects of another.' But some recent English writers, and among them Mr. [now Sir R.] Phillimore, have attempted to sustain the views of Lord Aberdeen. Mr. Phillimore has argued the question at considerable length. He says, 'It is quite true that the right of *visit and search* is

¹ Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, liv. iii. ch. ii. § 15; Hautefeuille, *Nations Neutres*, tit. xi. ch. ii.; Pistoye et Duverdy, *Des Prises*, l. ch. iii.; Massé, *Droit Commercial*, liv. ii. tit. i. c. ii. § 2.

strictly a belligerent right. But the right of visit in time of peace for the *purpose of ascertaining the nationality of a vessel* is a part, indeed, but a very small part, of the belligerent right of visit and search.' He then quotes the words of Bynkershoek, 'Velim animadvertas, eatenus utique licet esse amicam navem sistere, ut non ex fallaci sorte ascripta ex ipsis instrumentis in navi repertis constet, non amicam esse,' and adds, 'Surely this reasoning applies to the right of ascertaining the national character of a suspected pirate in time of peace; and it may be added, that it appears to have been so considered by no less a jurist than Mr. Chancellor Kent.' The words of Bynkershoek are thus translated by Mr. Duponceau: 'But it ought to be observed that it is not lawful to detain a *neutral* vessel, in order to ascertain, not the flag merely, which may be fraudulently assumed, but the documents themselves which are on board, whether they are really *neutral*.' Not only the extract itself, but the whole chapter has reference to the *belligerent* right to search *neutral* vessels. Not a word here or elsewhere in Bynkershoek can be found in favour of the right of visitation and search in time of peace. Moreover, Mr. Phillimore is in error in stating that such a construction was put by Chancellor Kent on the passage quoted. The reference is not made by Kent, but by an annotator, since his death. The text of Kent's commentaries, which remains unchanged, declares emphatically, 'it (the right of visitation and search) is founded upon necessity, and is strictly a war right, and does not rightfully exist in time of peace, unless conceded by treaty.' Moreover, in a note to the recent editions of his work, in which Bynkershoek is erroneously quoted, refers only to intervisitation in case of suspected *piracy*, and even then it is doubtful whether anything more is intended than the *right of approach*, as decided by the Supreme Court in the case of 'Marianna Flora', which the note refers to. Surely, Mr. Phillimore will not base the right of visit in time of peace upon the authority of an anonymous and ambiguous note to Kent's commentaries when the text of the same work is so emphatically against such a claim. Mr. Phillimore also refers to that part of Webster's argument drawn from the consequences resulting from the admission of the right of visitation as a *right* in time of peace, and pronounces it to be 'extremely weak.' With

commentating upon the judgment thus summarily passed upon the soundness of Mr. Webster's reasoning, let us examine the grounds on which Mr. Phillimore himself bases this pretended right of visitation in time of peace. All the authorities which he has quoted have reference only to the *belligerent* right of visitation and search, which is not disputed. 'But,' he says, 'the right of visit in *time of peace* is a part, indeed, but a very small part of the *belligerent* right of visit and search.' In other words, the right of visit being 'but a *very small part* of a *belligerent* right, it may therefore be exercised in *time of peace*!' To justify the exercise, in time of peace, of *any* part of a *belligerent* right, no matter how 'very small' it may be, will require something more than bare assertion; but Mr. Phillimore has given no authorities whatever in support of this new and singular proposition. It is true that he also bases this right upon the same grounds as the right to visit and detain *pirates*; but the cases, as will be shown hereafter, are so manifestly different as to destroy all analogy of reasoning. Again, he confounds the right of visit with the *right of approach*, which is admitted by Mr. Webster and all American and European writers, who most strenuously deny the *right of visit* in time of peace. 'This right of mitigated visit in time of peace,' he says, 'is sometimes delicately described as the *right of approach*. It is called by the French, *droit d'enquête du pavillon*, as distinguished from the *droit de visite ou de recherche*; and it is said that this *nationality of the flag* may be ascertained by signals and hailing, and even when there is a suspicion of piracy, all proceedings beyond the exchange of hailing and signals must be taken at the risk of the man-of-war who visits. Whether these limitations be just or not, it is unquestionable that the *visit* for the purpose of ascertaining the nationality of the vessel must be exercised without the right of *search*, which is exclusively incident to a *belligerent*.' Mr. Phillimore's argument in favour of the right of visit in time of peace, drawn from the requirement of international law that every vessel must have some document proving her nationality and identity, is the same as that advanced by Lord Aberdeen, and which is referred to and answered in the foregoing extracts from the official letter of Mr. Webster.¹

¹ Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii., §§ 322-326; Duponceau *Trine*

§ 8. The remark of Mr. Phillimore, that the objection to the United States to the right to visit and search a suspected slaver bearing the American flag, applies equally to the suspected pirate sailing under the same flag, is fully answered by the American Government, which admits the right to visit and search any vessel 'reasonably suspected' of being engaged in piracy. The distinction is clearly pointed out in President Tyler's special message of February 27, 1843, as follows: 'The attempt to justify such a pretension [i.e. the right of visit for the purpose of suppressing the slave trade] from the right to visit and detain ships upon reasonable suspicion of piracy, would deservedly be exposed to universal condemnation; since it would be an attempt to convert an established rule of maritime law, incorporated as a principle into the international code by the consent of all nations, into a rule and principle adopted by a single nation, and enforced only by its assumed authority. To seize and detain a ship upon suspicion of piracy, with probable cause, and in good faith, affords no just ground either for complaint on the part of the nation whose flag she bears, or claim of indemnity on the part of the owner. The universal law sanctions and the common good requires the existence of such a rule. *The right under such circumstances, not only to visit and detain, but to search a ship, is a perfect right, and involves neither responsibility nor indemnity.* But, with this single exception, no nation has, in time of peace, any authority to detain the ships of another upon the high seas, on any pretext whatever beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction.' The argument of President Tyler, it will be seen, is founded on the admitted fact that the slave trade, not being piracy by the law of nations, cannot be held to carry with it the same liabilities attached to the latter. The pirate, as an enemy of the human race, may, by the common law of the world be seized and disposed of by whomsoever taken. Lawful commerce demands the extinction and suppression of maritime depredation; and hence, in consideration of this desirable end, President Tyler held that 'to seize and detain a ship

lation, &c., p. 110; Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 153; the 'Marianna Flora,' 11 *Wheaton R.*, 43; Coxe, *Brief Examination, &c.*, p. 2; Lawrence, *On Visitation and Search*, pp. 79-103; the 'Louis,' 7 *Ends R.*, 210; the 'San Juan Nepomuceno,' 1 *Hagg. R.*, 265.

upon suspicion of piracy, with probable cause and in good faith affords no just ground for any reclamations in the premises. If, then, by our laws the slave trade is placed in the same category with the crime of piracy, why should it not be subject to the same liabilities? For the reason assigned by President Tyler, in common with the consenting voice, not only of American statesmen, but of distinguished European publicists, that such an admission would involve the theoretical right of any maritime power, at its pleasure, to interpolate its municipal statutes into the law of nations. The slave trade is *not* piracy by the common law of the world, and therefore cannot be treated as piracy on the high seas where the sanctions of international law can alone assert their right to universal recognition. The British man-of-war which detains an American vessel on suspicion of piracy is acting, according to President Tyler's view, within the scope of public law; but to assert the same right as equally applicable to the suppression of the slave trade is to found, on a municipal statute, a claim which is derivable only from the common consent of all civilised nations. It would be giving an extra-territorial effect to a municipal law, and would be a recognition of the right once assumed by Great Britain to oppress her seamen from American vessels. It has been decided by the courts, both of England and America, that the slave trade is not contrary to the law of nations.¹

§ 9. This discussion between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States, or more properly speaking, between Lord Aberdeen and Mr. Webster, arose out of the extensions of British cruisers on the coast of Africa to visit American vessels suspected of being engaged in the slave trade. Neither party would admit the correctness of the rule of international law contended for by the other, but the difficulty in the particular case was amicably arranged by an agreement that each Government should maintain a specified naval force on the coast of Africa to prevent the fraudulent use of their respective flags. The discussion, however, proved that the ground taken by the United States was sustained by reason and the weight of authority. Such was the position

¹ Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.* lib. i. tit. ii. cap. viii.; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, iii. §§ 322-326; the 'Antelope,' 10 *Wheat. R.*, 66; the 'Diana,' 2 *Dods. R.*, 95; the 'Louis,' 2 *Dods. R.*, 238.

of this question until 1858, when the operations of British cruisers in visiting American vessels, in the gulf of Mexico suspected of being engaged in the slave trade, brought about a direct issue between the two Governments.¹ The United

¹ In that year, after considerable correspondence between the British, French, and United States' Governments, a code of instructions was agreed upon. This was issued, with immaterial variation, to the officers or vessels of war of each country, and may be said to express the views of each of the three countries on the subject. It is as follows:—

'1. The treaty with France for the suppression of the slave trade having been abrogated, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you that, under an arrangement which has been adopted provisionally between the British and French Governments, their lordships desire that all commanding officers of Her Majesty's ships will strictly attend to the following regulations with regard to visiting merchant vessels suspected of fraudulently assuming the French flag.

'2. In virtue of the immunity of national flags, no merchant vessel navigating the high seas is subject to any foreign jurisdiction. A vessel of war cannot therefore visit, detain, arrest, or seize, except under treaty, any merchant vessel not recognised as belonging to her own nation.

'3. The colours of a vessel being *prima facie* the distinctive mark of her nationality, and consequently, of the jurisdiction to which she is subject, it is natural that a merchant vessel on the high seas, on being herself in presence of a ship of war, should hoist her national flag in declaration of her nationality. So soon as the ship of war has made herself known by the display of her own colours, the merchant vessel, accordingly, hoist her proper national flag.

'4. Should the merchant vessel refuse to do so, it is admitted by both Governments that a warning may be given to her, first by firing a blank gun, and should that be without effect, it may be enforced by a second gun, shotted, but pointed in such a manner as to ensure that she is not struck by the shot.

'5. Immediately that the colours are hoisted, and that the merchant vessel has in this manner announced her nationality, the foreign vessel of war can no longer pretend to exercise a control over her. At times, in certain cases, she may claim the right to speak with her, and demand answers to questions addressed to her by a speaking trumpet or otherwise, but without obliging her to alter her course. When, however, the presumption of nationality resulting from the colours which may have been shown by a merchant vessel, may be seriously thrown in doubt by the questionable nature of positive information, or from indications of a nature to create a belief that the vessel does not belong to the nation whose colours she has assumed, the foreign vessel of war may have recourse to the verification of her assumed nationality.

'6. A boat may be detached for this purpose towards the suspected vessel, after having first hailed her to give notice of the intention. The verification will consist in an examination of the papers establishing the nationality of the vessel; nothing can be claimed beyond the examination of these documents.

'7. To inquire into the nature of the cargo, or the commercial operations of the vessel, or any other fact, in short, than that of the nationality of the vessel, is prohibited. Every other search, and every inspection whatever, is absolutely forbidden.

'8. The officer in charge of the verification should proceed with the greatest discretion, and with every possible consideration and care.

States regarded such visits as a violation of their flags, and protested against the acts of these cruisers. Before acting

and should quit the vessel immediately that the verification has been effected, and should offer to note on the ship's papers the circumstances of the verification, and the reasons which have led to it.

9. Except in the case of legitimate suspicion of fraud, it should never be necessary for the commander of a foreign ship of war to go on board, or to send on board a merchant vessel. Apart from the colours shown, the indications are numerous which should be sufficient to satisfy the commander of the nationality of a vessel.

10. In every case it is to be clearly understood that the captain of a ship of war, who determines to board a merchant vessel, must do so at his own risk and peril, and must remain responsible for all the consequences which may result from his own act.

11. The commander of a ship of war who may have recourse to such a proceeding should, in all cases, report the fact to his own government, and should explain the reason of his having so acted. A communication of this report, and of the reasons which may have led to the proceeding, will be given officially to the government to which the vessel may belong which shall have been subjected to inquiry as to her flag.

12. In all cases in which this inquiry shall not be justified by obvious reasons, or shall not have been made in a proper manner, a claim may arise for indemnity.

13. You will clearly understand that the foregoing instructions have reference only to vessels navigating under the French flag, and are intended mutually to prevent misunderstanding between the British and French governments, but cannot affect the vessels of other nations with whom Great Britain has treaties for the suppression of the slave trade, deprive Her Majesty of the right to seize and detain vessels engaged in the slave trade, when not entitled to the protection of any national flag.

Whilst the correspondence on this subject was pending, General Cass, without distinctly recognising the right of a vessel of war to compel a merchant vessel to display colours, said that the simple fact of refusing to exhibit colours was so high a ground of suspicion that it might seem to sanction boarding and further inquiry, and that even if such inquiry were not justified by the result, the Government of the United States could not demand redress for an act of visit executed under those circumstances.

The question may be considered as finally settled.

By the Treaty of Washington, signed the 7th April, 1862, between Great Britain and the United States, it was agreed that those ships of the respective navies of the two nations which should be provided with special instructions for that purpose, as hereinafter mentioned, might visit such merchant vessels of the two nations as might upon reasonable grounds be suspected of being engaged in the African slave trade, or of having been fitted out for that purpose, or of having, during the voyage on which they should be met by the cruisers, been engaged in the African slave trade, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty, and that such cruiser might detain and send or carry away such vessels, in order that they might be brought to trial in the manner hereinafter agreed upon; and it was by the said Treaty further stipulated and agreed that the reciprocal right of search and detention should be exercised only within the distance of two hundred miles from the coast of Africa, and to the southward of the thirty-second parallel of north latitude, and within thirty leagues from the

upon this direct issue the British Ministry referred the question to the law officers of the Crown, and the answer to this

coast of the Island of Cuba; by a Treaty of the 17th February 1825, it was further agreed between the two nations that the responsibility of visit and detention, as denoted in the article aforesaid, might be extended also within thirty leagues of the Island of Madagascar, within ten leagues of the Island of Puerto Rico, and within thirty leagues of the Island of San Domingo; and that the additional Article should have the same force and validity as if it had been inserted word for word in the Treaty of the 7th April, 1562, and should have the same duration as that Treaty.

By the 36 and 37 Vict. c. 58, it is enacted that where a vessel is, on reasonable grounds, suspected of being engaged in or fitted out for the slave trade, it shall, subject, in the case either of the vessel of a foreign State, or of the commander or officer of a cruiser of a foreign State, to the limitations, restrictions, and regulations, if any applicable thereto, contained in any existing slave trade Treaty made with such State be lawful: and if the vessel is a British vessel, or is engaged in the slave trade within British jurisdiction, or is not a vessel of a foreign State, for any commander or officer of any of Her Majesty's ships, for any officer bearing Her Majesty's commission in the army or navy, for any officer of Her Majesty's customs in the United Kingdom, Channel Islands, or Isle of Man, for the governor of a British possession, or any person authorised by any such governor, and for any commander or officer of any cruiser of a foreign State, authorised in pursuance of an existing slave trade Treaty; and *if* the vessel is the vessel of a foreign State, for any commander or officer of any of Her Majesty's ships, who may be authorised in that behalf, in pursuance of any treaty with that State, and for any commander or officer of any cruiser of that foreign State, to visit and seize and detain such vessel, and to seize and detain any person found detained or reasonably suspected of having been detained as a slave, for the purpose of the slave trade, on board any such vessel, and to carry away such vessel and person, together with the master and all persons, goods, and effects on board any such vessel, for the purpose of bringing in such vessel, person, goods, and effects for adjudication (s. 3).

The High Court of Admiralty of England and every Vice-Admiralty Court in Her Majesty's dominions out of the United Kingdom shall have jurisdiction to try and condemn or restore any vessel, slave, goods, and effects, alleged to be seized, detained, or forfeited, in pursuance of this act, and on restoring the same to award such damages in respect of the visitation, seizure, or detention of such vessel, goods and effects, and of any person on board such vessel, and in respect of any act or thing done in relation to such visitation, seizure, or detention, or in respect of any such matters, and in any case to make such order as to costs as, subject to the provisions of this Act and of any existing slave trade treaty, the court may think just.

Provided that nothing in this section shall give to any court any jurisdiction inconsistent with any existing slave trade treaty over a vessel which is shown to such court to be the vessel of any foreign State, and which has not been engaged within jurisdiction in the slave trade, but where any vessel of a foreign State is liable to be condemned by a British slave court, such court shall have the same jurisdiction as if she were a British vessel.

The regulations contained in any existing slave trade treaty for the time being in force, with respect to any mixed court or commission, shall

reference was, as predicted by Mr. Webster and Mr. Wheaton, that no authority could be found to support the pretensions of Lord Aberdeen; and the right of visit in time of peace, as distinguished from the belligerent right of visitation and search, was then distinctly and unequivocally disavowed by the British Government. The Earl of Malmesbury, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced in the House of Lords, on the 16th of July, 1858, that, on receiving the unanimous opinion of the law officers of the Crown, 'her Majesty's Government at once acted, and we frankly confessed that we had no legal claim to the right of visit and of search which has hitherto been assumed. Her Majesty's Government have therefore abandoned both these claims.' Lord Lyndhurst, on the same occasion, in answer to the charge that the Government had surrendered a most valuable and important right, said, 'We have surrendered *no right at all*; for, in point of fact, *no such right as that contended for has ever existed*. We have, my lords, abandoned that *assumption* of right, and, in doing so, I think that we have acted justly, prudently, and wisely.' After quoting several authorities, he continues, 'Your lordships will perceive that both on this side of the water, and in America, the highest authorities on the subject have pronounced against any such supposed right. For myself, I may say I have never been able to discover any principle of law or of reason upon which such a right could rest.' . . . Again, 'I will refer now only to the principle on which the question itself rests. What is the rule in respect to the high seas, and to the navigation on the high seas? All nations are equal on the high seas. Whether they be the most powerful or the weakest, their vessels on the high seas are placed upon a perfect footing of equality. What is the position of a merchant ship upon the high seas? Why, it is not of the dominion of the country to which it belongs,

the effect as if they were enacted in this Act, and such court or commission shall have all necessary jurisdiction for the purpose of carrying into effect any treaty referring to them, and in particular shall have jurisdiction to try, condemn, and restore British vessels seized in pursuance of such treaty on suspicion of being engaged in the slave trade, and all, for the purpose of their jurisdiction, have the same power as any Admiralty Court in Her Majesty's dominions has, and may accordingly take evidence, administer oaths, summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses, and acquire and enforce the production of documents in the same manner as any such court (&c. 8.)

What right has one nation, then, to interfere with another when their rights on the high seas are coequal? What right has one nation to interrupt or to interfere with the navigation of another nation? Why, the principle is so clear and so distinct that it will not admit of the smallest doubt' . . .

' Having stated this principle, the next question which arises is this: How are those difficulties to be met which arise out of frauds practised on the high seas? It may be said that the flag of America may be assumed by another power to cover the basest of purposes. But how can that affect the right? How can the conduct of a third power affect any right existing on the part of the United States? *By our treaty with Spain we have, no doubt, the right to visit and search Spanish vessels with the view to the suppression of the slave trade.* But how can the treaty between Spain and us affect the rights of America? Why, common reason is decisive on the subject. Well, but what other course can we take? I say that the course is quite clear and plain. If one of our cruisers see a vessel with the American flag, and has reason to believe it is assumed, he must examine and inquire into the facts as well as he can. If he ascertains, to the best of his judgment, that the vessel has no right to use the American flag, he may certainly visit and examine her papers, and if he finds his suspicions correct, he may deal with the vessel in a manner justified by the particular relation existing between England and that country to which the vessel belongs. America, in such a case, would have no right to interfere. The matter would simply be one between an English cruiser and the particular vessel seized. But, on the other hand, if it should turn out that the vessel after all was an American one, that was perfectly justified in using the flag suspected, our situation is this, that we should immediately apologise for the act that was committed, and make the most ample reparation for the injury that was committed.' The foregoing remarks of Lord Lyndhurst were adopted by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs as expressive of the opinions of his Government.¹

§ 10. Although it is universally conceded that the vessels

¹ Lawrence, *On Visitation and Search*, pp. 181, et seq.; *Monthly Law Reporter*, vol. xxi., p. 265; *London Times*, July 27, 1858, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, July 1, 1858.

of one State cannot search the duly documented vessel of another State in time of peace, and although the right of visitation, if it exists at all (and since its recent announcement by Great Britain, probably no respectable power will claim that it does exist, except in cases of piracy), must be limited, in time of peace, to the sole purpose of ascertaining the national character of a suspected vessel, it is, nevertheless, the incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of every belligerent, in time of war, to visit and search, on the high seas, the merchant ships of every nation, whatever may be their character, cargoes, or destination. This right of visitation and search in time of war springs directly from the right of maritime capture; for without the former we must abandon the latter, or so extend it as to authorise the indiscriminate seizure of all merchant vessels that may be found on the ocean; until they are visited and searched, it would be impossible to know whether or not they are liable to capture either from the ownership of the vessel, the nature of the cargo, or the character of the voyage. It will be shown hereafter, that while nearly all are agreed as to the general principle of visitation and search, there is great diversity of opinion with respect to the circumstances under which a neutral vessel is liable to search, and with respect to the character and extent of the search which the belligerent is licensed to make.¹

11. Sir William Scott, in the case of the 'Maria' (1 Rob., 25), said, that to visit and search merchant vessels on the high seas, whatever may be the ships, the cargoes, or the destinations, is the indubitable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation, because until they are visited and searched, it is impossible to know the character of a vessel or its destination. 'This right,' he says, 'is so clear in principle, that no

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 153; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 25; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 325; Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, §§ 317, 321; Galliani, *Des Dangers de P. Neu.*, p. 458; Lampredi, *Compendio de Popoli Neu.*, p. 185; Klüber, *Droit des Gens, Mod.*, p. 93; Hubner, *Saïs des Bâtimens Neutres*, tome i. pt. ii. p. 227; Azuni, *Le Droit Maritime*, tome ii. ch. iii. § 4; the 'Antelope,' 10 Wheat. R., 66; the 'Anna Maria,' 2 Wheat. R., 327; Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, pt. ii. ch. vii.; Potho et Duverdy, *Traité des Prises*, tit. v. ch. i.; R., *Recueil International*, pt. ii. ch. viii. § 10; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 168; Haatelcunle, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. xi. ch. i.; De Cussy, *Int. Maritime*, liv. i. tit. iii. § 15.

man can deny it who admits the right of maritime capture because if you are not at liberty to ascertain by sufficient inquiry whether there is property that can legally be captured, it is impossible to capture. . . . The right is equally clear in practice, for practice is uniform and universal on the subject. The many European treaties which refer to this right, refer to it as pre-existing, and merely regulate the exercise of it. All writers upon the law of nations unanimously acknowledge it, without the exception of even Hubner himself, the great champion of neutral privileges.¹

§ 12. The same view of this question is taken in the United States. Chancellor Kent says that the belligerent right of visitation and search is now 'considered incontrovertible;' and after giving a summary of the opinion of the English High Court of Admiralty in the case of the 'Maria,' he adds, the doctrine of the English Admiralty 'has been recognised, in its fullest extent, by the courts of justice in this country' (the United States). The opinion of Mr. Wheaton is equally decided. 'The right of visitation and search, he says, 'of neutral vessels at sea, is a belligerent right, essential to the exercise of the right of capturing enemy's property, contraband of war, and vessels committing a breach of blockade. . . . Indeed, it seems that the practice of maritime captures could not exist without it. Accordingly the text-writers generally concur in recognising the existence of this right.' Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the 'Anna Maria,' said that 'the right to visit *and detain for search* is a belligerent right which cannot be drawn into question.' Notwithstanding that the ship's papers in this case were perfectly satisfactory, the Supreme Court held that the right to search the ship in order to examine fully as to the character of her trade, was a complete right. The same court, in other cases, have fully sustained Sir William Scott's opinion with respect to the extent of search authorised by the rules of international law.¹

§ 13. The Continental publicists admit the general right of visitation and search, as a *belligerent* right authorised by the rules of international law, but they would restrict its exercise

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 154; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 29; the 'Anna Maria,' 2 *Wheat. R.*, 327.

very narrow limits. Hubner thinks it should be limited to the examination of the papers on board, in order to maintain the neutrality of the vessel. Rayneval says that it should be limited to the coasts of the belligerents, and ought not to be exercised upon the high seas, any further than may be necessary to ascertain the actual neutrality of the vessel. He says, because, he says, a neutral vessel on the high seas has no duty to perform toward a belligerent than that of proving that she does not belong to the enemy, and that she is not sailing under a false flag; any further examination he considers an act of hostility. Hautefeuille considers that the right of visit may be exercised wherever acts of hostility are committed; that is, in the territorial seas of the belligerents, and in the ocean, but not in neutral waters. Moreover, that its object is not merely to ascertain the character of the vessel, whether it be enemy or neutral, but also, if the latter, to ascertain whether it is not violating neutral duty, and thereby rendering itself subject to capture. He, however, limits the right of visitation to the papers produced, and will permit no investigation where the visiting officer doubts, or presumes to doubt, their genuineness or the truth of their statements. To search for other papers, to interrogate the captain, crew, or to investigate the character of the cargo, he deems an abuse of the right of visit,—acts entirely unauthorised, which neutrals may and ought to resist with force. Lamprédi, Azuni, and Ortolan, are of the opinion that the right cannot proceed beyond the examination of the papers, except where there is suspicion of fraud. Martens and Massé, in some respects differing in their views, limit the right of search to the single case where the papers are incorrect or irregular.¹

4. The exercise of this right, within its true limits, whether they may be, implies the right of using lawful force,

¹ Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. xii.; Rayneval, *De la Liberté de la Mer*, tome i. chs. 16-28; Hubner, *De la Saisie de Bâtimens*, tome i. ch. iii.; Ortolan, *Dép. de la Mer*, liv. iii. ch. vii.; Massé, *Droit Commercial*, liv. ii. tit. ii. ch. ii.; Martens, *Essai sur les Armateurs*, ch. ii.; *Droit Maritime*, ch. iii. art. iv.; Lamprédi, *Commerce des Neutres*, liv. i. tit. iii. § 15.

² A ship of war which after search captures a merchant vessel without reasonable grounds, and sends her in for adjudication as prize, is liable for the capture, not for the search.—'La jeune Eugénie,' *ibid.* 439.

if necessary, in its execution, the same as in the execution of a civil process on land. The *right* of search on the one side implies the *duty* of submission on the other; and as the belligerent may lawfully apply his force to the neutral property for the purpose of ascertaining its character and destination, it necessarily follows that the neutral may not lawfully resist the lawful exercise of the right of search. This duty of the neutral, says Sir William Scott, is founded on the soundest maxims of justice and humanity. There are no conflicting rights between nations at peace, and the right of search in the belligerent necessarily denies the right of resistance in the neutral. Any attempt, therefore, on the part of the neutral vessel, its owner, officers, or crew, to resist the lawful search of a duly commissioned cruiser of a belligerent power, is a violation of a duty imposed by the laws of war, and incurs a penalty proportioned to the nature of the offence.¹

§ 15 But, although it is the duty of the neutral to submit to the lawful search of the belligerent, and to all acts that are necessary to accomplish that object, it by no means follows that the belligerent is subject to no restraints in the exercise of this right. It is not sufficient that the right is lawful; it must be exercised in a lawful manner. The right is limited to such acts as are necessary to a thorough examination into the real character of the vessel, her cargo, and voyage, and all acts that transcend the limits of this necessity are unlawful. For any improper detention of the vessel, or any unnecessary, and therefore unlawful, violence to the master or crew, the belligerent court of Admiralty is pretty certain to award full compensation in damages; and if this should be denied to the neutral, his own government may demand and enforce the redress of his wrongs. 'Whatever,' says Phillimore, 'may be the injury that casually results to an individual from the act of another, while pursuing the reasonable exercise of an established right, it is his misfortune. The law pronounces it *damnum absque injuriâ*, and the individual from whose act it proceeds is liable neither at law, nor in the forum of conscience. The principal right necessarily carries with it also all the means essential to its exercise. A vessel must be pursued in order to be detained for examination. And if, in the

¹ The 'Maria,' 1 Rob. R., 340; the 'Eleanor,' 2 W'heat. R., 345.

she has been in any way injured (e.g. dismasted, stranded, or even run on shore and lost), it would be an unfortunate case, but the pursuing vessel would be ac-

The usual mode, adopted by most of the maritime powers of Europe, of summoning a neutral to undergo visitation, is the firing of a cannon on the part of the belligerent, called by the French *semence, coup d'assurance*, and by the English, *affirming gun*. It is, undoubtedly, the duty of a neutral to obey such a summons, but there is no positive law on the belligerent to fire such an *affirming gun*, for this is by no means universal. Moreover, any other mode, as hailing by signals, etc., of summoning a neutral vessel to an examination, may be equally as effective and as the *affirming gun*, if the summons is actually complied to, and understood by the neutral. The means are not essential, but the fact of a summons actually complied to, is necessary to acquit the visiting vessels of all blame, which may result to the neutral disobeying it.¹

The penalty for the violent contravention of this rule is the confiscation of the property so withheld from visitation and search. 'For the proof of this,' says Sir William Blackstone, 'I need only refer to Vattel, one of the most correct, and certainly not the least indulgent of modern professors of international law.' He then quotes § 114, ch. vii., liv. iii., of Vattel, *des Gens*, and continues: 'Vattel is here to be considered not as a lawyer delivering an opinion, but as a witness stating a fact—the fact that such is the existing practice in Europe.' After referring to other authorities, he concludes his remarks on this point with the following emphatic declaration: 'I stand with confidence upon all principles of international law—upon the distinct authority of Vattel—upon the practice of other great maritime countries, as well as those of my own country, when I venture to lay it down that, by the law of nations, as now understood, a deliberate and conscious resistance to search, on the part of a neutral vessel, to a belligerent cruiser, is followed by the legal consequence of con-

¹ Bluntschli, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, tome ii ch. vii.; Phillimore, *On International Law*, vol. iii. §§ 331–333; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 169; Hall, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. xi. ch. ii.; the '*Jeune Eugénie*,' 18 R., 439; the '*Mariana Flora*,' 11 *Wheat. R.* 48; the '*Nereide*,' 18 R., 392; Bello, *Derecho Internacional* pt. ii. cap. viii. § 10.

fiscation.' This penalty is not averted by the order of a neutral Sovereign to resist the visitation and search of a belligerent cruiser. 'The law of nations,' says Duguit, 'does not permit the sovereign power of a neutral State to use its authority for such a purpose, so as to vary the legal rights of the belligerent. . . . Hence, the obedience of the neutral subject to the unlawful orders of his Government, so as to be justifying his conduct, will impress him with the character of an enemy.' The resistance of the neutral cannot, therefore, be protected by any orders or instructions from his own Government, but the act must be judged of according to its own character.'

§ 17. Nor, according to the opinion of Sir William Stowell, can the interposition of the authority of the neutral Sovereign by the presence of an armed convoy, deprive the belligerent commissioned cruiser of the legal right of visitation and search. His language on this point is very clear and decisive. 'Two Sovereigns,' he says, 'may unquestionably agree as they think fit, as in some late instances they have agreed, in a special covenant, that the presence of one of their ships along with their merchant ships, shall be mutually understood to imply that nothing is to be found in that class of merchant ships inconsistent with amity or neutrality; if they consent to accept this pledge, no third party has a right to quarrel with it, any more than any pledge which two States may agree mutually to accept. But surely no Sovereign can legally compel the acceptance of such a security by force. The only security known to the law of nations on this subject, independently of all special covenant, is that of personal visitation and search, to be exercised by the belligerents who have the interest in making it.'

§ 18. This question leads to an examination of the duties, and exemptions of public armed vessels on the seas. The belligerent right of visitation and search, with its extent or limitation, is undoubtedly confined exclusively to private merchant vessels, and does not apply to a public war. The immunity of such vessels on the high seas from the exercise of any right of visitation and search, or of any other belligerent right, has been uniformly asserted as

* The 'Elsabe,' 4 Rob. R., 408.

coded. 'A contrary doctrine,' says Kent, 'is not to be found in any jurist or writer on the law of nations, or admitted in any treaty, and every act to the contrary has been promptly met and condemned.' 'A public vessel,' says Wheaton, 'belonging to an independent Sovereign, is exempt from every species of visitation and search, even within the territorial jurisdiction of another State; *a fortiori*, must it be exempt from the exercise of belligerent rights on the ocean, which belongs exclusively to no one nation.'

§ 19. One of the most common, as well as one of the most important duties of public ships of war, is the *convoy* or protection of merchant vessels on the high seas. Can such convoying ships exempt the merchant vessels, under their protection, from the exercise of the right of visitation and search, from which they themselves are exempt? If so, may neutral vessels place themselves under such protection, and lawfully resist any attempt on the part of belligerent cruisers, to subject them to such visitation and search? In other words, is the opinion of Sir William Scott, before referred to, a true exposition of the law of nations on this subject. If private merchant vessels, so convoyed, are exempt from visitation and search, there can be no doubt that no resistance on their part to an attempt to visit or search them can draw after it any penalty; for in doing so, they violate no duty. This question is properly divided into two parts: First, the case of convoy, by ships of war, of private vessels of the same State; and second, the case of convoy of merchant vessels of other

¹ Kent, *Comm. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 157; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. ii. ch. ii. § 18.

The right of search does not apply to vessels of war, Thurloe's *State Papers*, vol. ii. 503; *Mr. Canning to Mr. Munroe*, August 3, 1807: *American State Papers*, vol. vi. p. 89. nor to civil or criminal process in ports, although this exemption is not founded on any absolute right, but upon considerations of public convenience and the comity of nations. The 'Pinaud', 2 *Woods*, 451; the 'Exchange', 7 *Cranch* 116. Further, it would seem that this concession may be withdrawn by the local authorities, and that although the ship and equipage existing as a ship of war, remain exempt, persons not forming part of the crew, and prize or other property, may become subject to the local authority. *Opinions of the Attorney-General of the United States*, vol. i. 47; vol. vii. 131; vol. viii. 79.

The captain of a merchant steamer when brought to by a vessel of war, is not privileged by the fact that he has a government mail on board, from sending, if required, his papers on board the boarding vessel for examination: on the contrary, he is bound by that circumstance to the proper performance of neutral duties and to special respect of belligerent rights. — The 'Peterhoff', 5 *Wall.*, 28.

neutral States. The discussions of publicists have been mainly confined to the first class of cases, although some have claimed that the convoying ship extends its own exemption to all neutral merchant vessels under its protection. Before examining into this distinction, we will give a brief summary of the various treaties on the subject of convoy, and the opinions of text-writers.

§ 20. Whatever may have been the ancient practice with respect to the effect of neutral convoy on the exercise of the belligerent right of visitation and search, it was not till near the middle of the seventeenth century that the question assumed any considerable importance. In the war of 1658 between England and Holland, Queen Christina, of Sweden, directed her merchant vessels to take all possible advantage of the convoy of her ships of war, and ordered such convoying ships to resist, even by force, every attempt on the part of the belligerents to visit the merchant vessels placed under their protection. This ordinance, however, was never executed, and the war was terminated soon after its publication. In the succeeding war, between England and Spain, Holland, now a neutral, claimed the exemption of her merchant ships under convoy, and an English squadron was obliged to content itself with the word of De Ruyter, that the vessel and his convoy carried nothing belonging to the King of Spain. England, however, refused to acknowledge any such right of exemption, and Holland herself, whenever a belligerent always attempted to visit merchant vessels, under neutral convoy. Even when a neutral, she admitted the duty of convoying ships to exhibit the papers of the merchant vessel under its escort, and if found to be irregular, the right of the belligerent cruiser to visit the suspected vessel, and even to seize and conduct it into port for trial. Nevertheless, she applauded the conduct of Captain Deval, in 1762, and Admiral De Bylandt, in 1780, in forcibly resisting the attempts of English men-of-war to visit merchant vessels under the convoy. None of the treaties of 1780, alluded to this question, but the resistance by the Swedish vessel of war, 'Wasa,' in 1781, of an attempt of an English cruiser to visit a merchant vessel under convoy, revived the discussion. In the right of exemption was stipulated in a number of treaties made soon after by Russia and Sweden, with other powers.

and especially in the convention of armed neutrality, signed December 4-16th, 1800. But in the convention of June 17, 1801, Russia herself conceded the belligerent right of ships of war to visit merchant vessels under neutral convoy. This convention was annulled in 1807. Since the peace of 1815, European treaties have generally, except where England was a party, stipulated for the exemption of merchant vessels, under the convoy of public ships of the same State. The treaties which the United States have made with foreign powers, both before and since that period, have generally provided that in case of convoy, the declaration of the commander of the convoy, that the vessels under his protection belong to the nation whose flag he carries, and when bound to an enemy's port, that they have no contraband goods on board, shall be sufficient. Such are the stipulations contained in the treaty with Sweden, of April 3, 1783; with France, of September 30, 1800; with Columbia, made October 3, 1824; with Brazil, made December 12, 1828; with Mexico, made April 5, 1831; with Chile, made May, 16, 1832; with Peru-Bolivia, made November 13, 1836; with Venezuela, made January 20, 1836, &c. It is worthy of remark that the orders and decrees of the belligerents in the Crimean war were silent as to convoy; nor was it alluded to in the declaration of the Paris Conference, April 16, 1856.¹

121. Recent Continental publicists have generally contended that neutral convoy exempts the convoyed vessel from visitation and search. Some have stated this proposition in general terms, while others limit it to merchant vessels convoyed by ships of war of their own nation, and put it on the ground that the declaration of the commander is sufficient as to the character and cargoes of the vessels of his own country under his escort and protection. Such are the general views of Martens, Rayneval, Klüber, Heffter, Massé, and Ortolan. Rayneval, however, is of the opinion that if the belligerent vessel should inform the convoying commander that he has evidence that one or more of the vessels under his escort are liable to capture for being really enemy's vessels, or because they have on board contraband goods, destined to an enemy's port, the commander should immediately

¹ Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, liv. i. tit. ii. ch. xiv.; Heffter *Principes Internationaux*, § 170.

proceed, in concert with the belligerent cruiser, to verify the truth of these allegations. This opinion is concurred in by Ortolan; but Hautefeuille thinks that such examination, if made, should be by the neutral officer only, and that, in short, as to the character of his convoy, must suffice. The author has discussed the question of convoy at great length, and with marked ability. It must, however, be remembered that he attempts to represent what *ought to be* the rule of international law on this subject, rather than what that law *is* at the present time. English text-writers have expressed the opinion of Sir William Scott, with respect to the visit and search vessels under neutral convoy, and the effect of such convoy, when it tended to impede and defeat the belligerent right. Manning denies that neutrals, under such convoy, can claim, under the general law of nations, to be exempt from search, as a matter of right, but he deems it desirable that it should be accorded to them by agreement. The United States have uniformly favoured the rule of exemption, and have, whenever possible, introduced it into their treaties with other powers. It must, however, be stated that even our own publicists have generally admitted that the exemption cannot be claimed as a matter of law, and that an attempt in this way to impede search will incur a penalty. Chancellor Kent says that 'the very act of sailing under the protection of a belligerent or *neutral* convoy, *for the purpose of resisting search*, is a violation of neutrality.' Mr. Wheaton, in his discussion of the Danish captures under the order of 1810, referring to the English decisions respecting such convoys, says: 'Why was it that navigating under the protection of a *neutral* ship of war was deemed a conclusive ground of condemnation? It was because it tended to impede and defeat the belligerent right of search; to render every attempt to exercise this lawful right a contest of violence; to disturb the peace of the world, and to withdraw from the forum the determination of such controversies by preventing the exercise of its jurisdiction.' Mr. Story, in the case of the '*Nereide*,' says: 'It is a clear principle of national law that a neutral is bound to a perfect neutrality as to all the belligerents. If he incorporates himself into the measures or policy of either; if he becomes an auxiliary to the enterprises or acts of either, he forfeits his

character,—nor is this all. In relation to his commerce he is bound to submit to the belligerent right of search, and he cannot lawfully adopt any measures whose direct object is to withdraw that commerce from the most liberal and accurate search, without the application, on the part of the belligerent, of superior force. If he resists this exercise of lawful right, or if, with the view to resist it, he takes the protection of an armed neutral convoy, he is treated as an enemy, and his property is confiscated. Nor is it at all material whether the resistance be direct or constructive. The resistance of the convoy is the resistance of all the ships associated under the common protection without any distinction whether the convoy belong to the same or a foreign neutral sovereign; for upon the principles of natural justice, a neutral is justly chargeable with the acts of the party, which he voluntarily adopts, or of which he seeks the shelter and protection.¹

§ 22. The question, whether neutral vessels under enemy's convoy are liable to capture and condemnation, has been frequently raised and most elaborately discussed. The lords of appeal in England decided, in the case of the 'Sampson,' that sailing under enemy's convoy was a *conclusive* ground of condemnation. There has been no direct decision on this subject by the Supreme Court of the United States. The question was not directly involved in the case of the 'Nereide,' but Justice Story in his dissenting opinion said: 'My judgment is, that the act of sailing under belligerent convoy is a violation of neutrality, and the ship and cargo, if caught *in delicto*, are justly confiscable; and further, that if resistance is necessary, as in my opinion it is not, to perfect the offence, still the resistance of the convoy is, to all purposes, the resistance of the association.' Chancellor Kent is clear, that 'the very act of sailing under the protection of a belligerent convoy, for the purpose of resisting search, is a violation of neutrality.' Duer, in his able work on Insurance, fully coincides in this opinion. Wheaton limits himself to a statement of his own

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 157; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, iv. ch. iii. § 32; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 731, 732; the 'Nereide,' 9 Cranch. R., 438; the 'Catharine Elizabeth,' 5 Rob. R., 232; *Levi*, *De la Liberté des Mers*, t. i. ch. xviii.; Klüber, *Droit des Gens*, § 213; Massé, *Droit Commercial*, liv. ii. ch. ii. sec. ix.; Ostlön, *Droit Consulaire de la Mer*, liv. iii. ch. vii.; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 170; Martens, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. xi. ch. iii.; De Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. i. tit. iii. § 15.

arguments, as the advocate of the claims of American merchants against Denmark for condemnation, under the ordinance of 1810, for having made use of English convoy. The strongest point of his argument is, that being found in company with an enemy's convoy, even if *presumptive* evidence certainly should not be regarded as *conclusive* of an intent to resist the search of a duly commissioned belligerent cruiser. 'This presumption,' he says, 'is not of that class of presumptions called *presumptiones juris et de jure*, which are held to be conclusive upon the party, and which he is not at liberty to controvert. It is a slight presumption only, which must yield to countervailing proof. One of the proofs which, in the opinion of the American negotiator, ought to have been admitted by the prize tribunal to countervail this presumption, would have been evidence that the vessel had been compelled to join the convoy; or that she had joined it, not to protect herself from examination by Danish cruisers, but against others, whose notorious conduct and avowed principles render it certain, that capture by them would inevitably be followed by condemnation. It followed then, that the simple fact of having navigated under British convoy could be considered as a ground of suspicion only, warranting the captors in sending in the captured vessel for further examination, but not constituting in itself a conclusive ground of confiscation.' This argument of Mr. Wheaton was answered by the Danish authorities, who held that 'the point to be established is, whether the neutral was *voluntarily* under enemy's convoy.' If so, condemnation must inevitably follow. The negotiation finally terminated in a treaty to pay the American claimants, *generally*, a fixed sum, *blat*; but without any admission by either party of the correctness of the other's views on this question of international law. The English commentators on this discussion regard the Danish ordinance as in perfect conformity with the law of nations. Hautefeuille states the arguments of both parties without expressing his own opinion. Ortolan admits that the act of a neutral navigating under the convoy of a belligerent may be irregular and even illegal, and that such a convoy cannot always exempt from search. 'Mais,' he says, 'si le neutre se joint en pleine mer à un ou à plusieurs navires de guerre belligérants et navigue de concert avec

navires, sans prétendre à aucune protection de leur part, dans la seule esperance de pouvoir échapper pacifiquement et par la suite à la visite, à la faveur d'une rencontre et d'un combat possible entre les seuls belligérants, c'est là de sa part une mise innocente qui ne peut lui être imputée à délit, et qui ne peut pas, à elle seule, entraîner la confiscation.' Perhaps the foregoing remarks of Ortolan are too strongly expressed, for, in the very case he describes, the neutral merchant vessel uses the force of the belligerent convoy to escape search. It is not only a constructive but a virtual resistance. The case, however, is very different where the merchant vessel has left the convoy prior to the appearance of, or attempted search by, the belligerent cruiser; as, for example, where the convoy was used on the outward voyage, and the capture made during the return voyage. This distinction is forcibly presented by Mr. Wheaton, in his argument in favour of the American claimants for indemnity for Danish captures under the ordinance of 1810. We know of no judicial decision directly upon this question.¹

§ 23. 'The resistance of a neutral master,' says Sir Wm. Scott, in the '*Catharina Elizabeth*,'² before quoted, 'will undoubtedly reach the property of the owner; and it would, I think, extend also to the whole property entrusted to his care, and thus fraudulently attempted to be withdrawn from the operation of the rights of war.' 'Confiscation,' says Chancellor Kent, 'is applied, by way of penalty, for resistance to search, to all vessels without any discrimination as to the national character of the vessel or cargo, and without separating the fate of the cargo from that of the ship.' Mr. Decker holds that a forcible resistance to a lawful search is a distinct and substantial course of condemnation, and involves all the property under the charge of the neutral master; not merely that of its owners, but of the shippers, although between them and himself no relation of principal and agent can be said to exist. 'The goods may be wholly innocent, in their nature, and from their destination, and their true character, and that of the ship, as neutral may be undoubted,

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 32; Riquelme, *Derecho Internac.* lib. i. tit. ii. cap. xiv.; Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, tome viii. p. 350; Elliot, *American Diplomatic Code*, vol. i. p. 453; the '*Nereide*,' 9 C. & P. 42, 44.
² 5 Rob., 232.

but the unlawful resistance, from the time it is attempted, stamps on them all an illegal character, and involves all in its fatal penalty.' The offence being regarded as a greater criminality and more dangerous in its effect than the transportation of contraband or the violation of a blockade, the severity of the penalty is the greater. The resistance of an *enemy* master will not, in general, affect neutral property laden on board an enemy's merchant vessel. An attempt on his part to rescue his vessel from the possession of the captor is nothing more than the hostile act of a hostile person, who has a perfect right to make such an attempt.' 'If a *neutral* master,' says Sir William Stowell, 'attempts a rescue, or to withdraw himself from sea, he violates a *duty* which is imposed on him by the law of nations to submit to search, and to come in for inquiry as to the property of the ship or cargo; and if he violates this duty by a recurrence to force, the consequence will undoubtedly reach the property of his owner, and it would, I think, also to the whole property intrusted to his care, if fraudulently attempted to be withdrawn from the operation of the right of war. With an *enemy* master, the case is different; no duty is violated by such an act on his part, *in iure*, and if he can withdraw himself he has a right to do so.'

§ 24. The supreme court of the United States applied the same rule to *neutral* property in an armed vessel, and in the case of the 'Nereide,' decided in 1856, it was held that a neutral had a right to charter and transport goods on board a belligerent armed merchant ship, forfeiting his neutral character, unless he actually engaged in and participated in the enemy master's resistance to capture. This doctrine was re-affirmed in 1858, in the case of the 'Atalanta,' notwithstanding the contrary opinion of Justice William Scott in the case of the 'Fanny,' decided contemporaneously with that of the 'Nereide'; it may therefore be regarded as the settled opinion of our highest court on this question of international law. The reasoning of the supreme court most ably sustains its decision, notwithstanding the powerful arguments in the dissenting opinion of Justice Story, supported as it is by the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall and Duer, among American writers, and by the de-

Sir William Scott in the case of the 'Fanny' and the authority of English publicists generally. The question does not seem to have arisen in the Continental courts. Hautefeuille sustains, on principle, the American decision against that of Sir William Scott, while Ortolan merely states the contradiction between the English and American decisions on this question, without expressing any opinion of his own upon the particular question involved.¹

§ 25. The acknowledged belligerent right of visitation and search draws after it a right to the production and examination of the ship's papers. With respect, however, to the nature and character of the papers which the neutral is bound to have on board, there is some difference of opinion. Some Continental writers contend that the ordinary sea-letter or passport is all that is required, as that must establish the nationality of the vessel. If, however, it has been agreed between the belligerent and neutral, that certain papers executed in a particular form shall be carried, the absence of such papers, so executed, may be good ground of seizure. But English and American writers, as well as the decisions of the prize courts of the two countries, have held that the neutral vessel may be required to have on board, and to produce when visited, such other documentary evidence as is usually carried, and deemed necessary to establish the character of the ship and its cargo; and that the absence or non-production of such papers may, or may not, be good cause for capture and condemnation, according to the particular circumstances of the case. The rule is very clearly stated by Chancellor Kent. 'A neutral is bound,' he says, 'not only to submit to search, but to have his vessel duly furnished with the genuine documents requisite to support her neutral character. The most material of these documents are, the register, passport or sea-letter, muster-roll, log-book, charter-party, invoice, and bill of lading. The want of some of these papers is strong presumptive evidence

¹ The 'Nereide,' see p. 314; the 'Fanny,' 1 *Dod. Ad. R.*, 443; the 'Atalanta,' 3 *Wheat. R.*, 409; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, iii. n. ch. 420; Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, tome iii. ch. vii.

Two or three Danish ships of war were, during the war, seized by the Spaniards, carrying stores to Gibraltar. On the remonstrance of the Danish minister at Madrid, it was answered that they were not men-of-war that were stopped, but vessels which had made themselves merchantmen for the time. August 15, 1798.—*Nelson*, vol. ii. p. 241.

against the ship's neutrality, yet the want of any one of them is not absolutely conclusive. *Si aliquid ex solemnibus deficiat, quum equitas poscit, subveniendum est.*¹

§ 26. Sometimes the neutral vessel produces the principal papers necessary to show her neutrality and the innocent character of her cargo, but conceals others which might have a contrary effect, as, for example, secret instructions relating to her destination and the landing of goods, etc. Those who deny the right of search beyond the verification of her papers, letter, or manifest, justify such concealment. But English and American writers are of opinion that concealment is itself a serious offence against the belligerent right of visit and search. The rule of international law on this question is thus stated by Chancellor Kent: 'The concealment of papers,' he says, 'material for the preservation of the neutral character, justifies a capture, and carrying into a port for adjudication, though it does not absolutely require a condemnation. It is good ground to refuse costs and damages on restitution, or to refuse further proof to relieve the obscurity of the case, where the cause laboured under heavy doubts, and there was *prima facie* ground for condemnation independent of the concealment.'

§ 27. The spoliation of the papers of a ship, subjected to the visitation and search of a belligerent cruiser, is a still more aggravated circumstance of suspicion than that of the denial or concealment, and, in most countries, would be sufficient to infer guilt, and exclude further proof. 'But it does not in England,' says Kent, 'as it does by the maritime law of other countries, create an absolute presumption *pro et de jure*; and yet, a case that escapes with such a brand upon it, is saved so as by fire. The Supreme Court of the United States has followed the less rigorous English rule and held that the spoliation of papers was not, of itself, sufficient ground for condemnation, and that it was a circumstance open for explanation, for it may have arisen from accident, necessity, or superior force. If the explanation is not prompt and frank, or be weak and futile; if the ca-

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 157; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. ii. pp. 734, 735; Martens, *Essai sur les Armemens*, ch. ii. § 22; *Mémoires de Droit Commercial*, liv. ii. tit. i. ch. ii.; Pictet et Duverdy, *Des Prises de Mer*, ch. ii. sec. iv.; De Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. i. tit. iii. § 15.

labours under heavy suspicions, or there be a vehement presumption of bad faith, or gross prevarication, it is good cause for the denial of further proof; and the condemnation ensues from defects in the evidence, which the party is not permitted to supply. The observation of Lord Mansfield, in *Bernardi v. Motteaux*, was to the same effect. By the maritime law of all countries, he said, throwing papers overboard was considered as a strong presumption of enemy's property; but, in all his experience, he had never known a condemnation on that circumstance only.¹

§ 28. 'The use of false papers,' says Mr. Duer, 'although in all cases morally wrong, is not in all cases a subject of legal animadversion in a court of prize. Such a court has no right to consider the use of the papers as criminal, where the sole object is to evade the municipal regulations of a foreign country, or to avoid a capture by the opposite belligerent. The falsity is only noxious where it certainly appears, or is reasonably presumed, that the papers were framed with an express view to deceive the belligerent by whom the capture is made, so that, if admitted as genuine, they would operate as a fraud on the rights of the captors. It is not sufficient that the papers disclose the most disgusting preparations of fraud in relation to a different voyage or transaction. The fraud must certainly, or probably, relate to the voyage or transaction which is the immediate subject of investigation.'²

¹ *Kent, Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 158; *Bernardi v. Motteaux*, 10 Cranch, 381.

² Whenever the captors (and the rule holds in both countries, as the cases show) are justified in the capture, they are considered as having a bona fide possession, and are not responsible for any subsequent losses or injuries arising to the property from mere accident or casualty, as stress of weather, recapture by the enemy, shipwreck, &c. They are, however, in all cases, bound for fair and safe custody, and if the property be lost from the want of proper care, they are responsible to the owner of the damage: for subsequent misconduct may forfeit the fair use of a bona fide possessor, and make him a trespasser from the beginning. If, however, the capture is made without probable cause, the captors are liable for damages, costs, and expenses to the claimant. If the captors unjustifiably neglect to proceed to adjudication, the court will, in cases of restitution, decree demurrage against them, or if they agree to restitution but unreasonably delay it. And although a spoliation of papers be made yet if it be produced by the misconduct of captors, as in *Yang*, under false colours, it will not protect them from damages and costs. *Story on Prize*, p. 40.

³ *Duer, On Insurance*, vol. i. p. 738; the *Eliza and Katy*, 6

§ 29. In the wars immediately resulting from the French revolution, the British Government attempted to engraft upon the right of visitation and search the right of impressment of seamen by British cruisers from American merchant vessels. The deep feeling of opposition, in the United States, to this pretended right, as claimed by England, and to the practice exercised under it, co-operated most powerfully with other causes to produce the war of 1812 between the two countries. The war was terminated by the treaty of Ghent, on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*, leaving the questions of maritime law which led to the war still unsettled. It is not probable, however, after the discussions which have taken place on this subject, that the British Government will ever again attempt to enforce this alleged right of impressment; at any rate, not from American merchant vessels. The British Government seems to regard the right of impressment from neutral merchant vessels as incident to, rather than as a part of, the right of search. It is alleged that, by the English law, the subject owes a perpetual and indissoluble allegiance to the crown, and is under the obligation, in all circumstances, and for his whole life, to render military service to the crown, whenever required; and that it is a legal exercise of the prerogative of the crown to enforce this obligation of the subjects, wherever they may be found. That, the right of search being conceded by the laws of war, it gives the right of examining the crews of neutral vessels, and if, on such examination, British seamen be found among them, such seamen may be forcibly taken from the neutral vessels, and carried on board British cruisers. In reply, the American Government says that, whatever may be the obligations existing between the crown of England and its subjects, the English law cannot be enforced beyond the dominions and jurisdiction of that government; that every merchant vessel on the high seas being rightfully considered as a part of the territory of the country to which it belongs, to attempt to enforce the peculiar law of England on board such vessel, is to assert and exercise an extra-territorial authority for the law of British prerogative. 'If this notice

192; the 'St. Nicholas,' 1 Wheat. R., 417; *Blaze v. N. Y. Ins. Co.* 2 Carnes R., 565; *Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Pratt*, 2 Binney R., 308; the 'Mara,' 6 Rob. R., 79; the 'Phoenix,' 3 Rob. R., 186; the 'Zulema,' 1 Act. R., 14.

of perpetual allegiance,' says Mr. Webster, 'and the consequent power of the prerogative was the law of the world; if it formed part of the conventional code of nations, and was usually practised, like the right of visiting neutral vessels for the purpose of discovering and seizing enemy property, then impressment might be defended as a common right, and there would be no remedy for the evil, till the national code should be altered. But this is by no means the case. There is no such principle incorporated into the code of nations. The doctrine stands only as English law, not as national law; and English law cannot be of force beyond English dominion. Whatever duties and relations that law creates between the sovereign and his subjects, can be enforced and maintained only within the realm, or proper possessions, or territory of the sovereign. There may be quite as just a prerogative right to the property of subjects as to their personal services, in an exigency of the State; but no government thinks of controlling, by its own laws, property of its subjects situated abroad; much less does any government think of entering the territory of another power, for the purpose of seizing such property, and applying it to its own uses. As laws, the prerogatives of the crown of England have no obligations on persons or property domiciled or situated abroad.'¹

¹ Webster, *Works*, vol. v. p. 142; vol. vi. p. 329; Webster, *Dip. and Int. Papers*, p. 97. This announcement by Mr. Webster was incidentally introduced in a discussion with Lord Ashburton, concerning the boundary line of the State of Maine in 1842, but, nevertheless, the subject remained unaltered. Since the correspondence between Great Britain and the United States in 1853 relative to the right of visit and search, the claim of seizing British seamen out of the vessels of the United States, or of other nations, has virtually been abandoned by England.

But maritime States have always claimed a right of visitation and inquiry, within those parts of the ocean adjoining to their shores, which common courtesy of nations has, for their common convenience, allowed to be considered as parts of their dominions for various domestic purposes; this has nothing in common with a right of visitation and search upon the unappropriated parts of the ocean in time of peace.—*Le Louis*, 2. *Dods.*, 246.

In the message of the President of the United States in 1858, it is stated as unanimously resolved, that 'American vessels on the high seas, in time of peace, bearing the American flag, remain under jurisdiction of the country to which they belong, and therefore, any visitation, seizure, or detention of such vessels by force or by the exhibition of force on the part of a foreign power, is in derogation of the sovereignty of the United States.'

In 1794 the Minister of the United States in England so

§ 30. After a calm and dispassionate examination of the whole subject, the American Secretary of State announced

to Lord Granville that a large number of American vessels had been irregularly captured and as improperly condemned, and thereby the colour of His Majesty's authority great injury had been done to American merchants. Also that citizens of the United States had been impressed into the King's service. It was explained on behalf of the British Government that, although in a naval war extending over four quarters of the globe, some inconvenience must accrue to the commerce of neutral nations which no care could prevent, His Majesty would never desire that the fullest opportunity be given to all to prefer complaints and to obtain redress and compensation, that in most cases they could be redressed by the usual judicial procedure at a very small expense, and without other interposition; but if cases should be found where redress could not be obtained in the ordinary way, His Majesty would readily discuss measures to be established for that purpose. That if American seamen had been impressed, it was contrary to His Majesty's desire, but that there was great difficulty in discriminating between British and American seamen, especially when there so often existed an interest and intention to deceive.

James, referring to this subject, in 1826, says that the crew of a vessel, armed or unarmed, sailing under the flag of the United States, usually consists of one or more of the following classes:—1. Native American citizens; 2. American citizens, wherever born, who were such at the definitive treaty of peace in 1783; 3. Foreigners in general, who may or may not have become citizens of America subsequently to the treaty in question; 4. Deserters from the British army or navy, whether natives of Britain or of any other country. He considers that to the first class Great Britain cannot have the shadow of a right; and from such of the second as were British born, she barred herself by the treaty acknowledging the independence of the revolted colonies. Of the third class, the only portion which England can have any pretension to seize are the subjects of the Power or Powers with whom she may be at war, and her own native subjects. With respect to the former, the vessel entering on board a neutral implies that the foreigner has thrown off his belligerent character; he is a non-combatant of the most unequal description, and, as such, entitled to exemption from seizure. A passenger, especially if a military man, might be an exception.

When, by the maritime ascendancy of England, France could no longer trade for herself, America proffered her services, as a neutral, to trade for her; and American merchants and their agents, in the port that flowed in, soon found a compensation for all the pecuniary and political necessity to cheat the former out of her belligerent rights. Her commercial importance of the United States, thus acquired, coupled with a similarity in language, and to a superficial observer, a resemblance of person, between the natives of America and Great Britain, has induced the former to be the principal, if not the only, sufferers by the exercise of the right of search. Chiefly indebted for their growth and prosperity to emigration from Europe, the United States hold out every allurement to foreigners, particularly to British seamen, whom, by a process known to themselves, they can naturalise as quickly as a dollar can exchange into pence, and a blank form, ready signed and sworn to, can be filled up. It is the knowledge of this fact that makes British naval officers, when searching for deserters from their service, so harsh in their scrutiny, and so sceptical of American oaths and asseverations. *Nav. Hist.*, vol. iv. 376.

By Art. 45 of the British Regulations of 1787, it was ordered to demand English seamen out of foreign ships wherever met with

the rule which will be maintained by his government. 'The American Government,' says Mr. Webster, 'is prepared to

In 1798 not only merchantmen, but even vessels of war of the United States were searched by the British ships of war. His Majesty's ship 'Athene,' 74, boarded an American vessel of war off Havannah. The United States Government issued orders to their vessels never to fight when they had the means of resistance, and never to part with the men unless the vessel was taken.—Hrenton, vol. 1.

On the other hand, Americans seduced British seamen and even officers in their regimentals.

Mr R. Strahan insisted on searching French convoys in the East Indies.—*Ibid.*

In 1800 a British squadron fell in with a Danish convoy under the name 'Freya.' Capt. Baker, of the 'Nemesis,' the senior British officer, ordered the 'Freya' to say he should send his boat on board the convoy. Capt. Krabbe, of the 'Freya,' replied that if such an attempt were made he would fire into the boat. Both threats were put into execution, and a battle ensued which ended in the 'Freya's' submission. She was taken to the Downs, but still kept flying the Danish ensign and pendant under the order of the Vice-Admiral of the station. Lord Whitworth was immediately sent to Denmark to place the business on an amicable footing. On the 29th August Lord Whitworth terminated the negotiation with the Danish Minister, Count Bernstorff, and a convention was mutually signed providing that the 'Freya' and convoy should be repaired at English expense and then released; that the right of the British to search convoys should be discussed at a future date in London; that Danish vessels should only sail under convoy to the Mediterranean, to protect them from the Algerines, and should be searchable as formerly; and that the convention should be ratified by the two Courts in three weeks.—*Jas., Nav.* vol. iii. 63.

By the navy regulations of the United States, 1876, vessels of war are not to take under their convoy the vessels of any power at war with her, with which the United States are at peace, nor the vessels of a neutral, unless some very particular circumstances render it proper. The commanding officers are forbidden to permit the vessels under their protection to be searched or detained by any belligerent or cruiser.

The ancient right of Great Britain to impress seamen for the Royal Navy from her own merchantmen has been modified by various statutes. In 17 Geo. III. c. 75 (repealed by Stat. Law. Rev. Act 1871), 'in an unusual and difficult conjuncture,' suspended four statutes which modified the above right, viz.—the 2 and 3 Anne, c. vi. s. 8, the 13 Geo. II. c. xxxi., the 2 Geo. III. c. xv. s. 22, and the 17 Geo. III. c. xxxvii. for the space of five months, except as far as regarded coal vessels. By 19 Geo. II. c. xxx. 'no mariner or other person who shall serve aboard or be retained on board any privateer or trading ship or vessel shall be employed in any of the British sugar colonies in the West Indies, in America, nor any manner or other person being on shore in said British sugar colonies, nor any of them shall be liable to be seized or taken away, or shall be impressed or taken away, in or from any of the said British sugar colonies or any of them, or any of the ships thereof, or at sea in those parts, by any officer or officers of or belonging to any of His Majesty's ships of war empowered by the High Admiral of Great Britain or the Lords Commissioners, Sec., any other person whatsoever, unless such manner shall have before been directed from such ship of war belonging to His Majesty.'

This statute is discussed in *Spieries v. Parker* (1 Term R., 141), it is repealed by 27 & 28 Vict. c. 23, s. 1.

say that the practice of impressing seamen from American vessels cannot hereafter be allowed to take place. That practice is founded on principles which it does not recognise, and is invariably attended by consequences so unjust, so injurious, and of such formidable magnitude, as cannot be submitted to. In the early disputes between the two governments on this so long contested topic, the distinguished person to whose hands were first committed the seals of this department declared, that the simplest rule will be, that the vessel being American, shall be evidence that the seamen on board are such ! Fifty years' experience, the utter failure of many negotiations, and a careful reconsideration, now had of the whole subject, at a moment when the passions are laid, and no present interest or emergency exists to bias the judgment, have fully convinced this Government that this is not only the simplest and best, but the only rule, which can be adopted and observed consistently with the rights and honor of the United States, and the security of their citizens. That rule announces, therefore, what will hereafter be the principle maintained by their Government. *In every regularly documented American merchant vessel, the crew who navigate it will find their protection in the flag which is over them.*¹

¹ Webster to Lord Ashburton, Aug. 8, 1842; Webster, *Dip. and Papers*, p. 101.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

VIOLATION OF NEUTRAL DUTIES.

1. The rights and duties of neutrality are correlative—2. Violation of neutral duty by a State—3. By individuals—4. Criminal character of such violations—5. Neutral vessels transporting enemy's goods—6. Opinions of publicists—7. Neutral goods in enemy ships—8. Maxims of 'free ships free goods,' and 'enemy ships enemy goods'—9. These maxims in the U. S.—10. Treaties and ordinances—11. France and England in 1854—12. Congress of Paris in 1856—13. Rule of evidence with respect to neutral goods in enemy ships—14. Neutral ships under enemy's flag and pass—15. Neutral goods in such vessel—16. Neutral vessel in enemy's service—17. Transporting military persons—18. Conveying enemy's despatches—19. Engaging in enemy's commerce exclusively national—20. Rule of 1756 and rule of 1793—21. Distinction between them—22. Application of the rule of 1793 to continuity of voyage—23. Effect on American commerce—24. General result of discussions—25. Views of American government—26. Change of British colonial policy.

1. ANY act of positive hostility on the part of a neutral State toward one of the belligerents in a war, is deemed a breach of neutrality, and makes such State a party in the war. The rights and duties of neutrality are correlative, and the former cannot be claimed, unless the latter are faithfully performed. If the neutral State fail to fulfil the obligations of neutrality, it cannot claim the privileges and exemptions incident to that condition. The rule is equally applicable to the citizens and subjects of a neutral State. So long as they faithfully perform the duties of neutrality, they are entitled to the rights and immunities of that condition. But for every violation of neutral duties, they are liable to the punishment of being treated in their persons or property as public enemies of the offended belligerent.¹

§ 2. Having already discussed the mutual duties of States at times of peace, it will not be necessary here to make any

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. pp. 115-117; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. L.*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 1; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. vii. § 104; Melme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. xi.; De Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. i. tit. iii. § 9.

extended argument to enforce those duties on the part of the neutral State toward other States with which it remains at peace, while they are carrying on hostilities toward each other. Its duty is that of entire impartiality, as well as neutrality. 'Should a neutral government, without cause or provocation, complaint or warning, attack the possessions or capture the ships of a belligerent power, all would denounce the aggression as a flagrant outrage on the laws of justice as well as of humanity; yet it is precisely of this violation of justice, although in a milder form, that a neutral government is guilty, that, while it affects to maintain the relations of friendship with contending belligerent powers, furnishes to one effectual aid in the prosecution of the war, by a supply of ships, or arms, or munitions of war. With whatever pretext the government may veil its conduct, its acts are those of unprovoked and causeless, and, therefore, unjust hostility. A violation of neutrality is not limited to acts of positive hostility. If the neutral State assist one of the belligerents, if it grant favours to one to the detriment of the others; if it neglect or refuse to maintain the inviolability of its territory, or if it fail to restrain its own citizens and subjects from overstepping the just bounds of neutrality, as defined and established by the law of nations—it violates its duties toward the belligerent who is injured by such act or neglect, and is justly chargeable with hostility. Such conduct furnishes good cause for complaint, and, if persisted in, may become just cause of war. Sir Wm. Scott very justly remarked that *there are no conflicting rights between nations at peace*; which remark may be applied, with truth, to every case of a violation of neutral duty.¹

§ 3. But while the law of nations holds the government of the neutral State responsible for any act of positive hostility committed by its officers, or, in most cases, by its citizens and subjects, it is not in general held responsible for ordinary violations of neutral duty (not in themselves of positive hostility) by such citizens or subjects. The law in such cases imposes the duty upon the individual, and if it be

¹ Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. ch. vii. §§ 1-3; Harrat v. Watson, 9 B. and C., 712; Naylor v. Taylor, 9 B. and C., 715; Medeiros v. H. & B. 8 Bing. R., 231; the 'Maria,' 1 Rob., 360; Pitkin, *Civil and Pol. Stat. of U. S.*, vol. i. ch. x.

violated the penalty is imposed and enforced upon the individual by the capture and confiscation of his property. Thus, the neutral State is not bound to restrain its subjects from engaging in contraband trade, or from violating the right of visitation and search, or the law of sieges and blockades; the law imposes upon the individual the duty of abstaining from such illegal acts, and, if guilty of a violation of this duty, he is the one to suffer the punishment due to the offence. Nor do the courts of a neutral country, as a general rule, enforce penalties for violations of neutral duty.¹ As before remarked, there are certain obligations of neutrality, such as abstaining from acts of positive hostility, which the neutral State is bound to enforce with respect to its subjects; its own municipal laws in relation to such matters are, of course, administered by its own tribunals. But such courts do not enforce penalties for carrying contraband of war, for a breach of blockade, or for violating the belligerent right of visitation and search. All such cases are left to be adjusted by the prize tribunals of the belligerents.²

§ 4. It may be stated, as a general principle which lies at the foundation of the rules of international law relating to this subject, that the violation of neutral duties is neither innocent nor lawful. It is not simply the penalty incurred by such violation that makes it wrong, as some have asserted; it is correct to say that, if the neutral merchant is willing

The rights which the laws of war give to a belligerent for his protection do not involve as a consequence that the act of the neutral, in transporting munitions of war to the other belligerent, is either a personal offence against the belligerent captor, or an act which gives him any ground of complaint, either against the neutral trader or the Government of which he is a subject. All that international law does is to subject the neutral merchant who transports the contraband of war to the risk of having his ship and cargo captured and condemned by the belligerent for whose enemy the contraband is destined.

The object of a Royal proclamation is only to make known the existing law; it can neither make nor unmake the law. Hence the British proclamation of the 13th May, 1861, whereby the provisions of the then Foreign Commerce Act were enforced, and the subjects of the Crown were warned of the risks they incurred by sending contraband of war to either of the belligerent powers in America, had no effect upon the legality of an attempt for transporting munitions of war to the Confederate States.

Ex parte Chavasse, 21 Gr. & B. 197; 2 *Mar. Law Cas.* (Chan.), 197; *Duer, On Insurance*, vol. 1, p. 749; *Webster, Dip. and Off. Papers*, 302, 310; *Lee, Opinions U. S. Attys. Genl.*, vol. 1, p. 61; *Heiter, Int. International*, §§ 148, 172; *Ortolan, Diplomatique de la Mer*, tome II.

to incur the risk of capture and condemnation, he engages, with entire security of conscience, in a trade forbidden by the law of nations. The act is wrong in itself, and the penalty results from his violation of moral duty as well as of law. The duties imposed upon the citizens and subjects flow from exactly the same principle as those which attach to the Government of neutral States. 'Where he supplies to the enemy,' says Duer, 'munitions or other articles contraband of war, or relieves with provisions, or otherwise a blockaded port, although his motives may be different, his moral delinquency is precisely the same. By these acts he makes himself personally a party to a war, in which, as a neutral, he had no right to engage, and his property is justly treated as that of an enemy.' 'It appears, from recent decisions in the courts of common law in England, that the doctrine I have stated has been there explicitly recognised.'

§ 5. The first question which presents itself for consideration, as connected with neutral duties, is the transportation of goods of an enemy in a neutral vessel. 'Whatever may be the true original abstract principle of natural law on this subject,' says Mr. Wheaton, 'it is undeniable that the constant usage and practice of belligerent nations, from the earliest times, have subjected enemy's goods in neutral vessels to capture and condemnation as prizes of war. This constant and universal usage has only been interrupted by treaty stipulations, forming a temporary conventional law between the parties to such stipulations. The regulations and practice of certain maritime nations, at different periods, have not only considered the goods of an enemy laden in the ships of a friend liable to capture, but have doomed to confiscation the neutral vessel, on board of which these goods were laden. This practice has been sought to be justified upon a supposed analogy with that provision of the Roman law, which involved the vehicle of prohibited commodities in the confiscation pronounced against the prohibited goods themselves. Thus, by the marine ordinance of Louis XIV., of 1681, all vessels laden with enemy's goods are declared lawful prizes of war. The contrary rule had been adopted by the pre-

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 531, 754, 755, 772-773; the 'shepherdess,' 5 Rob. 264; Pistoye et Duverdy, *Traité des Prises*, tit. vi. §. 1. sec. iii.; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. 15.

prize ordinances of France, and was again revived by the règlement of 1744, by which it was declared that, in case there should be found on board of neutral vessels, of whatever nation, goods or effects belonging to his Majesty's enemies, the goods or effects shall be good prize, and the vessel shall be restored. Valin, in his commentary upon the ordinance, admits that the more rigid rule, which continued to prevail in the French prize tribunals from 1681 to 1744, was peculiar to the jurisprudence of France and Spain; but that the usage of other nations was only to confiscate the goods of the enemy. The concurring testimony of testifiers is that, by the usage of the world, *neutral vessels* are liable to condemnation for carrying *enemy goods*, whatever rule may be adopted or enforced with respect to the condemnation of the goods themselves. The transportation of enemy's goods in a neutral vessel cannot, therefore, be regarded in general, as a violation of any neutral duty, or as being subject to any punishment.¹

16. The rule of international law, as stated above by Mr. Wheaton, with respect to enemy goods in neutral vessels, is

Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. §§ 10, 20; Wheaton, *Hist. Nat. Nations*, pp. 111-119, 200-206; Albericus Gentilis, *III. p. Adm.*, lib. xiv. Valin, *Com. sur l'Ord.*, liv. iii. tit. ix.

17. It was asserted, on the authority of Sir H. Martin, that it has been the practice to condemn neutral ships for having enemy's goods on board, but the freight of the enemy's goods condemned was not paid. *Sydn. State Papers*, vol. xxi., p. 662.

18. In the Court books of the Admiralty show the case of the *Prussian*, in which a question was raised on the point concerning freight. The freight was decreed, although the cargo was condemned.

19. In the celebrated answer to the Prussian memorial, it is stated that in the case of ships restored freight was paid for such of the cargo as manifestly belonged to the enemy, and were condemned; but in the list of Prussian cases referred to, there is a class of ships restored with freight according to the bills of lading, the goods which were found to be the property of enemy, and condemned as prize. It was the invariable practice of the British Court of Admiralty during the wars of 1801, unless in cases where some circumstance of *force majeure* occurred, or where the ship was adjudged to have incurred the loss of freight as a penalty for some act which, as a departure from pure neutral conduct, has not, according to the law of nations, made her liable to condemnation.

20. Upon the seizure of a neutral vessel engaged in shipping coin, and on measures adopted to excite reasonable suspicion, there being evidence that it was enemy's property, a decree was made by the Supreme Court of the United States restoring the vessel and cargo, and awarding the costs and expenses consequent on the capture, and the freight between the vessel and coin, exempting from contribution the cargo. — *The Dashing Wave*, 5 *Wall*, 170.

neutral vessels the goods of one of the belligerents contraband of war. 2. That belligerents have in case, the right to seize the property of their enemy's vessels; in a word, that *free ships make free the goods which they carry, whatever may be the ownership.*'

§ 7. Another question, usually discussed in connection with the carrying of enemy's goods in neutral ships, is that of transporting neutral goods in enemy's ship. On this question we quote some of the remarks of Mr. Wheaton, who has discussed these questions at considerable length with marked ability. 'Although,' he says, 'by the general opinion of nations, independently of treaty stipulations, the capture of an enemy found on board the ships of a friend attracts capture and condemnation; yet the converse rule, which subjects to confiscation the goods of a friend on board the ships of an enemy, is manifestly contrary to reason and justice. It may, indeed, afford, as Grotius has stated, a presumption that the goods are enemy's property; but it is a presumption as will readily yield to contrary proof, and is not that class of presumptions which the civilians call *trunciones juris et de jure*, and which are conclusive against the party. But, however unreasonable and unjust this rule may be, it has been incorporated into the prize codes of all nations, and enforced by them at different periods. It cannot be defended on sound principles, and is now

only when established by special compact, as an equivalent for the converse maxim, that *free ships make free goods*. This relaxation of belligerent pretensions may be fairly coupled with a correspondent concession by the neutral, that *enemy ships should make enemy goods*.¹

§ 8. The same author then proceeds to show that these two maxims are not only not inseparable, but have no natural connection. 'The primitive law,' he says, 'independently of international compact, rests on the simple principle that war gives a right to capture the goods of an enemy, but gives no right to capture the goods of a friend. The right to capture an enemy's property has no limit but of the place where the goods are found, which, if neutral, will protect them from capture. We have already seen that a neutral vessel on the high seas is *not* such a place. The exemption of neutral property from capture has no other exceptions than those arising from the carrying of contraband, breach of blockade, and other analogous cases where the conduct of the neutral gives to the belligerent a right to treat his property as enemy's property. The neutral flag constitutes no protection to an enemy's property, and the belligerent flag communicates no hostile character to neutral property. States have changed this simple and neutral principle of the law of nations by mutual compact, in whole or in part, according as they believed it to be for their interest; but the one maxim, that *free ships make free goods*, does not necessarily imply the converse proposition, that *enemy ships make enemy goods*. The stipulation that neutral bottoms shall make neutral goods is a concession made by the belligerent to the neutral, and gives to the neutral a capacity not given to it by the primitive law of nations. On the other hand, the stipulation subjecting neutral property, found in the vessel of an enemy, to confiscation as prize of war, is a concession made by the neutral to the belligerent, and takes from the neutral a privilege he possessed under the pre-existing law of nations; but neither reason nor usage renders the two concessions so indissoluble, that the one cannot exist without the other. It was upon these grounds that the Supreme Court of the United States

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv., ch. iii. § 21; the '*Atalanta*,' 3 *Wheat. R.*, 409; The '*London Packet*,' 5 *Wheat. R.*, 132; the '*Annable*,' 6 *Wheat. R.*, 1.

determined that the Treaty of 1795, between them and Spain, which stipulates that free ships shall make free goods, did not necessarily imply the converse proposition that enemy ships make enemy goods, the treaty being silent as to the latter; and consequently that the goods of a Spanish subject found on board the vessel of an enemy of the United States, were not liable to confiscation as prize of war.¹

§ 9. Although the United States, by their judicial tribunals and executive department, have recognised the right of capturing enemy's goods in neutral vessels as a subsisting right under the law of nations, independently of conventional arrangements, they have always endeavoured to incorporate the privilege of *free ships, free goods*, in their treaties, and advocated its adoption as a rule of international jurisprudence. It was incorporated in their treaties with France in 1778 and 1800, with the United Provinces in 1782, with Sweden in 1783, 1816, and 1827, with Prussia in 1785 and 1828, and with Spain in 1795; this last was modified in 1819 to the effect that the flag of the neutral should cover the property of the enemy only when his own Government recognised the principle. The rule, thus modified, was applied to their treaties with Columbia in 1824, with Brazil in 1828, with Chili in 1832, with Mexico in 1831, etc. etc. In no case have they concluded any treaty sustaining a different principle, except that of 1794, with England. They have invariably opposed the rule that *enemy ships make enemy goods*, and their Supreme Court, as has already been stated, refused to admit it, even against a neutral whose law of prize would subject the property of American citizens to condemnation when found on board the vessels of her enemy.²

§ 10. Prior to the war between the allies and Russia, 1812, and the congress of Paris, 1856, the conventional law with respect to these two maxims has varied at different periods according to the fluctuating policy and interests of the different maritime powers of Europe. It has been much more flexible than the consuetudinary law, but there has been

¹ The 'Nereide,' 9 *Cranch. R.*, 388; Ortolan, *Diplomatie de la Mer*, tome ii. ch. v.; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. viii. § 2; Herber, *Droit International*, §§ 163, 164; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, tit. ii. cap. xiv.; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. xv; De Cassy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. i. tit. iii. § 10.

² *U. S. Statutes at Large*, vol. viii., pp. 262, 312, 393, 437, 472, 499.

reponderance of modern treaties in favour of the *free ships, free goods*, sometimes connected with *enemy ships, enemy goods*, although the constant tendency has been to exclude the latter. France is almost the only government which has maintained that the goods of an enemy on board of the ships of an enemy are good and lawful. This principle was incorporated into the French treaties of 1538, 1543, and 1584. The contrary was proclaimed by the declaration of 1650, but the former rule was revived in 1681. In the numerous French ordinances issued after that period, France generally contended for the principle, sometimes with, and sometimes without, the maxim of *free ships, free goods*. In her earlier history England adopted this last maxim, although she has strenuously opposed it, and her tribunals have condemned all enemy goods in neutral vessels, while neutral goods in enemy vessels have, as a general rule, been exempted from confiscation. While the other nations have adopted the same principle as the rule of international law, they have generally, both in their ordinances and treaties, shown a willingness to adopt the maxim of *free ships, free goods*.¹

At the beginning of the recent war between the United States and Russia, the different constructions put upon the provisions by England and France, with respect to the *free ships free goods*, and *enemy ships enemy goods*, served to aggravate the difficulties to which war always brings neutral commerce. Neutral property, which England would condemn for being found in an enemy's vessel, was a good prize to the French cruiser; while the neutral flag would protect, against France, enemy's property on board, might be sent by an English cruiser into an enemy's port, her voyage broken up, and her cargo condemned, with allowance for freight or damages. A compromise of the law was therefore necessary to the co-operation of their efforts, and a declaration was accordingly agreed upon by the two governments, in April, 1854, 'waiving the rights of seizing

¹ *De la Diplomatie*, tome ii., pt. cxxvi., tome iii., p. 451; tome iv., p. 183, 273; Dumont, *Corps Diplomatique*, tome vi., pt. i., p. 107; *Des Nations Neutres*, tome iii., p. 270; Martens, *Recueil*, tome v., p. 330; the 'Citade de Lisboa,' 6 *Ann.*, 358; the 'Dallas R.,' 34; the 'Mariana,' 5 *Reb.*, 28.

enemy's property laden on board a neutral vessel, unless it be contraband of war,' and of 'confiscating neutral property, not being contraband of war, found on board enemy's ships.' The obnoxious pretensions of England were thus abandoned, as a consideration for obtaining from France additional concessions on her part.¹ Nevertheless, the arrangement was upon its face, only for the war, and was declared to be a temporary waiving of belligerent rights recognised by the law of nations. Either party might, at the close of that war, have resumed the pretensions thus abandoned, and have claimed in any future war the belligerent rights, the exercise of which was thus merely 'waived.'²

¹ It was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1856, that the stipulation in a treaty 'that free ships shall make free goods' does not imply the converse proposition that 'enemy ships shall not carry enemy goods'; that the rule of retaliation is not a rule of the law of nations; it is true that States may resort to retaliation as a means of coercing justice from the other party, but it is an act of policy, not of law; that a neutral may lawfully employ an armed belligerent vessel to transport his goods, and such goods do not lose their neutral character by the armament, nor by the resistance made by such vessel, provided the neutral do not aid in such armament or resistance, although he equips the whole vessel, and be on board at the time of the resistance. Mr. Justice Story differed from the opinion of the Court, and declared that in his judgment the act of sailing under a belligerent or neutral colours was itself a violation of neutrality, and that the ship and cargo, if caught, were *delicto*, are justly confiscable; that it might with as much propriety be maintained that neutral goods, guarded by a hostile army in their passage through a country, for the avowed purpose of evading municipal regulations, should not in case of capture be lawful plunder.—The *Nereide*, 4 *Cranch*, 388.

² The following declaration was made by Great Britain at the commencement of the Crimean war, 1854. It ceased to have effect at the end of the same, but it indicates the possible line of conduct to be pursued by Great Britain on a future occasion:—

'Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, having been compelled to take up arms in support of an ally, is desirous of rendering the war as little onerous as possible to the powers with whom she remains at peace.

'To preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unnecessary obstruction, Her Majesty is willing, for the present, to waive a part of the belligerent rights appertaining to her by the law of nations.

'It is impossible for Her Majesty to forego the exercise of her right of seizing articles contraband of war, and of preventing neutrals from bearing the enemy's despatches, and she must maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent neutrals from breaking any effective blockade which may be established with an adequate force against the enemy's ports, harbours, or coasts.

'But Her Majesty will waive the right of seizing enemy's property laden on board a neutral vessel, unless it be contraband of war.

'It is not Her Majesty's intention to claim the confiscation of neutral property, not being contraband of war, found on board enemy's ships.

12. All fears of such a result, however, were removed by the declaration of the congress of Paris, April 16th, 1856, by the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey. The second and third articles of this declaration are as follows: '2nd. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war.' '3rd. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under an enemy's flag.' It was also provided in the final paragraph that, 'the present declaration is not, and shall not be binding, except between those powers which have acceded or shall accede to it.' More than a year after this declaration, the President of the United States had submitted, not only to the powers represented in the congress of Paris, but to all other maritime nations, two propositions which were substantially the same as those adopted, viz: '1. That free ships make free goods, that is to say, that the effects or goods belonging to subjects or citizens of a power or State at war are free from capture and confiscation when found on board of neutral vessels, with the exception of articles contraband of war.' '2. That the property of neutrals on board an enemy's vessel is not subject to confiscation, unless the same be contraband of war.' The second and third articles of the declaration of the congress of Paris have been formally approved by the President of the United States, and it is believed, also by most of the other maritime nations of Europe. Nevertheless, as the principle must be regarded as established by a conventional agreement, rather than by general law of nations, it is binding only upon those who have acceded or may accede to it. There is very little probability, however, that any nation will hereafter attempt to

Her Majesty further declares that, being anxious to lessen as much as possible the evils of war, and to restrict its operations to the regularly armed forces of the country, it is not her present intention to issue Letters of Marque for the commissioning of privateers.—Westminster, March 28, 1854.

The privilege of 'free ship free goods,' under the Dutch treaty, was held to protect the cargo of a Dutch ship going from one enemy port to another enemy port.—The 'Catherine Joanna,' 6 Rob., 42 n.

The treaty of Paris had been signed, and the powers of the ambassadors were at an end, when Count Walewski proposed to the Congress to conclude its work by a declaration which would constitute a remarkable advance in international law, and which would be received by the whole world with a sentiment of gratitude. The plenipotentiaries took upon themselves to abrogate a great maritime right.

enforce rules of maritime capture in conflict with the principle thus established by the great powers of Europe and America.¹

§ 13. It is an established rule of the law of prize, that the goods found in an enemy's ship are presumed to be enemy

¹ The declaration of Great Britain made at the commencement of the Crimean war clearly evinces that at that period Great Britain retained all her belligerent rights on this subject unimpaired. What will be her policy in a future war is a matter of conjecture; but she has no alternative so long as she adheres to the declaration of Paris.

Professor De Martens, writing to the *Russ. in Golos*, in November, 1876, concerning the suggestion that Russia should issue letters of marque, to enable privateers to act against British commerce in case of war, in defiance of the Declaration of Paris, says, that, while rendering tribute to the patriotic motives which inspire such counsels, he considers it his duty to point out their danger and injustice. He observes that the declaration is not an integral part of the treaty of Paris; that the treaty was signed by seven European powers, while the declaration bears the signature of forty-six countries of Europe and America; that the two have only one point in common—they were both made at the Congress of Commerce; that if we admit that war abolishes all treaty obligations, we should have to return to the primitive age when man's only thought was to harm his neighbour; that war would then only be a massacre, the exclusive domain of physical force, without respect for obligations contracted in time of peace; and that if such monstrous ideas were allowed to prevail, it would with equal force be said that the Geneva Convention is, indeed, abolished, in time of peace, and the same of the St. Petersburg Convention abolishing the explosive bullets. He concludes, then, that the declaration of Paris has absolutely nothing in common with the treaty of the same name; that it is independent, and should come into effect the moment war is declared between the signatory powers.

On the other hand, the argument is that the abolition of privateering has guaranteed England against the only danger she had to fear in the event of war—that is, the ruin of her commerce; that it is the only weapon that can be used by a Continental power against England, and that it is a terrible one, furnishing, to the antagonist of the United Kingdom, the means of injuring the latter far more than England, with whose maritime supremacy, could do on her side. As to the argument that the abrogation of the article of the declaration of 1856, abolishing privateering, would involve that of the other articles stipulating that the flag covers merchandise, that an enemy's property cannot be seized on neutral bottoms, and that a blockade must be effectual, and that England could, therefore, revert to her old policy of declaring on paper that the enemy's ports in a state of blockade, and of searching neutral vessels for enemy's goods—the answer is that under the existing maritime law, England has sufficient vessels at her command to blockade efficiently the ports, and could, therefore, practically ruin the commerce of any country with which she was at war, as was the case with Russia during the Crimean War.

From the earliest time Great Britain has claimed and exercised the right of seizing an enemy's goods under whatever flag they might be found, and that right has ever been unquestioned in England.

Lord Mansfield, when appealed to by that Government in 1759, laid down the following principles—

1. The goods of an enemy on board the ships of a friend might be

res in hostium navibus præsumuntur esse hostium, betur. The evidence required to repel this presump-

The lawful goods of a friend on board the ships of an enemy are restored. 3. Contraband goods going to an enemy, although by of a friend, might be taken as prize.

Government of that day would not waive their rights.

So, when the armed neutrality was formed by the Empress of Russia, England again declined to abandon these principles within fifteen years every nation who had joined it, as soon as its interests, abandoned it.

When there was the armed confederacy, England laid an embargo on the property of each of the countries forming that league. Embargoes were issued, and in six months the whole confederacy broke up.

Edon held that the right of searching neutral vessels originated in the law of nature, and that no convention or treaty could destroy that

Edon held that 'a war and a commercial peace is a state of peace yet seen in the world, there is no such thing as a war for peace for commerce; and the right of visiting and searching ships on the high seas, whatever be the cargoes, whatever the ships, is the incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned ships of a belligerent State.'

Edon, in the House of Lords in 1801, stigmatised the maxim, 'free ships, free goods,' as 'a proposition so monstrous in itself, so contrary to the interests of nations, so injurious to the maritime interests of this country had been persisted in we ought not to have concluded the war with powers while a single man, a single shilling, or even a single pound remained in the country.'

Edon, on the same subject, said 'the greatest blow that has been given to England would be to compel her to give up her maritime

maritime code *Consolato del Mare* became the law of Europe in the thirteenth century.

It was that a neutral should not be allowed to feed the resources of a belligerent as against another. Enemy's goods as well as contraband should be seized whenever found on a neutral vessel. The vessel was not seized, but was detained, and after adjudication in prize court was not only released, but the owners were paid the freight they would have been entitled had they taken the goods to the enemy, and in some instances demurrage was allowed as well. This was never disputed till Frederick the Great refused to satisfy the claims after the cession of Silesia, and then for the first time the principle, 'free ships free goods,' was put forward, but was resisted, and claims were paid.

The Prussian Commission was appointed to alter the old rules, and establish other rules more favourable to Prussia.

The memorials which were issued by this Commission were supported by the able letter of the Duke of Newcastle, and by the report of Mansfield assisted in drawing up, and nothing more was to be new doctrine until the armed neutrality of 1780.

Decree of the National Convention of May 9, 1793, 'enemy's goods on board neutral vessels' were declared good prize, the neutral ships were freed and freight paid by the captors.

January 8, 1793, Russia renounced her treaty of 1786 with France, that the principle, 'free ships free goods,' should be 'no longer

tion depends upon the particular character of the goods. If the character of the ship is certainly hostile, the character of the goods must be shown by documents at the time of capture. If these are insufficient, further proof is never allowed, and the penalty of forfeiture attaches as a matter of course. 'It has been truly observed,' says Duer, 'that any other course would subject the prize to endless impositions and frauds, and enable the captor, thus obtaining the benefit of other proof, to evade, by producing the documentary evidence, the just rights of the owner. Although it is the duty, in all cases, of a neutral claimant to establish his claim by positive evidence, it is only when the character of the ship is certainly hostile that the presumption of the hostility of the goods cannot be refuted by additional proof. In all cases, a reasonable time is allowed for the production of other proof, and it is only upon the failure to produce such proof, or its unsatisfactory nature when produced, that the prize proceeds to a condemnation.'

§ 14. Another violation of neutral duty is the use of a false flag and pass of the enemy. A neutral vessel is bound to conform to the character which she has thus assumed, and she is not allowed to contradict his own acts, and to render her liable to condemnation, by a disclaimer of the hostile character.

obligatory until the restoration of order in France.' In the Convention of 1801, Russia renewed with England her treaty of 1776, stipulating that commerce should be carried on 'according to the principles and the law of nations generally recognised,' and further, engaged the neutrals from giving, on that occasion of common concern to either party, any protection whatever, directly or indirectly, in consequence of neutrality, to the commerce or property of the French on the sea or in the ports of France.

A similar article was inserted in the treaty of the same year between Great Britain and Spain, between Great Britain and Russia, and between Great Britain and the Emperor. These powers all re-affirmed the rule. The new rule was abandoned by Sweden in 1788, and by France, Spain, Prussia, and by the Emperor. In 1809 Russia stipulated that ships laden in part with goods of the manufacture or growth of hostile countries should be stopped, and such merchandise should be sold by auction for the profit of the crown, and if the merchandise composed more than half the cargo, not only the cargo, but also the ship should be confiscated. (See *Parliamentary Debates*, 1870.)

The declaration of Paris cannot be said to affect the right of visitation and search, for it expressly excepts contraband of war, and contraband can only be ascertained by searching a vessel.

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 534, 535; the 'Flying Fish', *R.*, 373; the 'London Packet', 1 *Mason R.*, 14.

ter which, with a view to his own interests, or those of the enemy, he has elected she should bear. 'If a neutral vessel,' says Kent, 'enjoys the privileges of a foreign character, she must expect, at the same time, to be subject to the inconveniences attaching to that character.' But, as already stated, the foreign character thus assumed is conclusive only as *against* the owner, and not *in his favour*, for the real character of the vessel may always be pleaded against her, where the knowledge of that fact would justify a condemnation. The last branch of the rule is intended as a penalty for violation of neutral duty.'

§ 15. But while the belligerent flag and pass are, in all cases, decisive, as to the owners, of the character of the ship, a distinction is made by the English courts in favour of the cargo of such ships, if the shipment were made in time of peace and plainly not in contemplation of war. Even where the goods themselves, for purposes having no relation to a future war, are clothed with a foreign character, now become hostile, the owner is not concluded, but is permitted to disprove the colourable title, and, upon due proof of his neutral character and actual ownership, his property is restored. On this subject we copy the remarks of Chancellor Kent. 'Some countries have gone so far as to make the flag and pass of the ship conclusive on the cargo also; but the English courts have never carried the principle to that extent, as to cargoes taken before the war. The English rule is, to hold the ship bound by the character imposed upon it by the authority of the government from which all the documents issue. But goods which have no such dependence upon the authority of the State, may be differently considered; and if the cargo be taken in time of peace, though documented as foreign property in the same manner as the ship, the sailing under a belligerent flag and pass has not been held conclusive as to the cargo. The doctrine of the federal courts in this country has been very strict on this point, and it has been frequently decided, that sailing under the licence and passport of protection of the enemy, in furtherance of his views and interests, and without regard to the object of the voyage, or the port of destination, such an act of illegality as subjected both ship

The 'Francis,' 8 *Cranch. R.*, 418; the 'Success,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 131; the 'Fortuna,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 87.

and cargo to confiscation as prize of war.' The *A* decisions referred to in the above extract had referred to *American*, not *neutral*, goods in vessels sailing under an enemy's licence and pass. It is strange that a writer as accurate as Kent should have confounded two principles entirely distinct.¹

§ 16. If a neutral vessel is captured while in the service of the enemy or his officers, for purposes immediately or mediately connected with the operations of the war, the owner is never permitted to assert his claim. The fact that the service or employment is very justly deemed, in such a case, conclusive evidence of its hostile character. When a vessel employed in the service of the enemy is as truly a vessel of the enemy as if she were such by documentary title; and she is not allowed, for her own protection, to divest her of this character which she has thus assumed. Nor will the prize court listen to the plea that the vessel was impressed into the service by duress and violence. The answer of Sir Wm. Scott to such a defence, is most conclusive. When threats and force are employed for such a purpose by a belligerent, it is the duty of a neutral master, who has no means of resistance, to surrender his vessel, as a hostile seizure. He has no right of retaining his command, to navigate his vessel as a neutral in the service and subject to the orders of the enemy. If he surrenders his vessel as a hostile seizure, he may appeal to his government for redress; but if he retain the command, he will be treated as an enemy, and his vessel as the property of the belligerent.²

§ 17. So, also, if the owner of a neutral ship has employed his vessel to be employed in transporting military stores or military stores for the enemy, the vessel and cargo are condemned. Nor in such cases is it held necessary that the privity of the master, or his owners, be shown; it is sufficient that the employment be proven; no plea of ignorance or imposition is received. Where imposition is practised

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 85; the '*Broeders Lust*,' 13, note; the '*Vreede Sholtys*,' 5 *Rob.*, 12, note; the '*Julia*,' 1 *C. 605*; the '*Aurora*,' 8 *Cranch. R.*, 203, the '*Hiram*,' 8 *Cranch. R.*, 143; the '*Ariadne*,' 2 *Wheat R.*, 143; the '*Caledonia*,' 4 *Wheat R.*, 143. A neutral flag cannot protect an enemy's ship, although it carries cargo. - '*Cidade de Lisboa*,' 6 *Rob.*, 358.

² The '*Carolina*,' 4 *Rob. R.*, 256; the '*Orozembo*,' 6 *Rob. R.*, 143.

entrap a neutral vessel into a hostile service, it operates as force, and redress in the way of indemnification must be sought against those who, by imposition or deceit, exposed the property to capture. A different rule would afford impunity to such conveyance, as it would generally be impossible to prove the knowledge or privity of the master or owners. In the case of the transportation of ninety French mariners from Baltimore to Bordeaux, in a neutral vessel, it was contended that there was no proof that they were to be immediately employed in military service. This distinction was discarded by the prize court. It was enough, said Sir Wm. Scott, that they were military persons, and that their transportation was the act of their government. It was not the mere fact of carrying military persons, but the fact of the vessel letting herself out, in a distinct manner, under a contract, for that purpose. If a military officer were going merely as an ordinary passenger, or other passenger, and at his own expense, neither that, nor any other British tribunal, had ever laid down the principle to the extent of condemning a vessel for such transportation.¹

§ 18. A neutral vessel fraudulently carrying the despatches of an enemy, is, as a general rule, liable to condemnation.²

¹ *Onolan, Diplomatique de la Mer*, tome ii. ch. vi.; the 'Friendship,' 6 Rob., 420; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 272; the 'Caroline,' 4 Rob., 256; the 'Commercen,' 1 Wheat. R., 391.

² Sir William Scott decided that the fraudulent carrying of despatches of the enemy by a neutral is a criminal act which will lead to the condemnation of the neutral vessel. (The 'Atalanta,' 6 Rob., 458.) The essence of the offence appears to be the *fraudulent* carriage of despatches relating to a pending war by a neutral for the purpose of assisting a belligerent, but culpable negligence of the master has been held to constitute the offence. (The 'Susan,' 6 Rob., 461.) Papers may lawfully be carried by a neutral vessel from a hostile port to a consul of the enemy residing in a neutral country, or may be carried to a port which, during transit, has ceased to belong to the enemy (the 'Trende Sostre,' 6 Rob., 462); or they may be purely commercial. (The 'Hope,' 6 Rob., 390, n. a.); or they may have been practised on the neutral ship. (The 'Lisette,' 6 Rob., 457.) Wheaton, in his adoption of the doctrine laid down in the case of the 'Atalanta,' seems to limit its force to acts fraudulent and hostile in their nature. (Wheat. on Captures, ch. 6, § 10.) Sir W. Scott interprets 'despatches' as being treated of in the decisions as warlike or contraband communications, to be official communications of official persons, on the public affairs of the government. (The 'Caroline,' 6 Rob., 465.) The cases to which he refers and from which that definition was deduced were essentially of that character, and moreover generally contained some marked element of fraud, culpable concealment or duplicity, or evasive subterfuge. (See 461, note.) The 'Madison,' 12 Fed., 225, indicates clearly that the point only regards as criminal in a neutral vessel the carrying of letters or despatches of a public nature from or to a belligerent port. The

Public despatches are defined to embrace all official communications of public officers relating to public affairs. 'The carrying of two or three cargoes of stores,' says Kent, abbreviating the language of Sir Wm. Scott, 'is necessarily in assistance of a limited nature; but in the transmission of despatches may be conveyed the entire plan of campaign and it may lead to a defeat of all the projects of the other belligerent in that theatre of the war. The appropriate remedy for this offence is the confiscation of the ship; and in doing so, the courts make no innovation on the ancient law, but they only apply established principles to new combinations of circumstances. There would be no penalty in the mere confiscation of the despatches. The proper and efficient remedy is the confiscation of the vehicle employed to carry them and if any privity subsists between the owners of the cargo and the master, they are involved by implication in his delinquency. If the cargo be the property of the proprietor of the

like tone of sentiment prevails in like cases with the same eminent judge, and he manifests a strong disposition to exonerate a vessel from responsibility, for transporting private letters between individuals, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume they were of an innocent kind. (The '*Acteon*,' 2 *Dods*, 53.) A British ship and cargo were captured in Hampton Roads, near Fortress Monroe, by the United States during the Civil War, 1861. The libel alleged the transmission of despatches on board that ship to persons in Virginia, but the evidence supported by the sworn protest of the master, merely proved that a small box was put ashore, at the mouth of the Rappahannock, by the master, containing some newspapers and a letter directed to his wife who resided at Richmond. The court refused to presume that the letter was of a contraband nature or conduced to compromise the neutral character of the vessel, and ordered restitution of the vessel. - The '*Tropic Wind*,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 64.

In the '*Rapid*' (*Edw.*, 228), Sir W. Scott observes that he would certainly be extremely unwilling to incur the imputation of imposing any restrictions upon the correspondence which neutral nations are entitled to maintain with the enemy, or to lay down a rule which would necessarily deter masters of vessels from receiving on board any private letters, as they cannot know what they may contain. If a master is taking on board a departure from a hostile port in a hostile country, and still more so if the letters which are brought to him are addressed to persons resident in a hostile country, he is called upon to exercise the utmost jealousy. On the other hand, where the commencement of the voyage is in a neutral country, and is to terminate at a neutral port, or at a port to which, though not neutral, an open trade is allowed, in such a case there is no ground to excite his vigilance. With regard to an allegation against the American minister, Sir W. Scott also observes that he cannot bring himself to believe that the accredited minister of a country in amity with England would so far lend himself to the purposes of the enemy as to be the private instrument of conveying the despatches of the enemy's government to their agent.

p. then, by the general rule, *ob continentiam delicti*, the ship shares the same fate, and especially if there was an active interposition in the service of the enemy, concerted and continued in fraud.' The mere fact that such despatches are found on board a neutral vessel, is not sufficient to procure her condemnation; for the rule refers to a *fraudulent* carrying of the despatches of the enemy, and it is presumed that it would not apply to regular postal packets, whose mails, by international conventions, are distributed throughout the civilised world; nor even to merchant vessels which, in some countries, are obliged to receive letters and mail matter sent to them from the post-offices. The master must necessarily be ignorant of the contents of the letters so received, and, in the absence of all suspicion of *fraud*, or of interposition in the service of the enemy, the mere carrying of an enemy's despatches, under such circumstances, could hardly be regarded as a delinquency under the law of nations, and a violation of neutral duty. The case is very different where the neutral vessel is employed by the belligerent for that purpose, or carries them fraudulently, and in the service used for the benefit of a belligerent. Another important exception to this rule is the conveyance of the despatches of an ambassador, or other public minister of the enemy, resident in a neutral State. In the language of Sir Wm. Scott, 'they are despatches from persons who are, in a peculiar manner, the favourite object of the protection of the law of nations, residing in the neutral country for the purpose of preserving the relations of amity between that State and their own government. On this point a very material distinction arises, with respect to the right of furnishing the conveyance. The neutral country has the right to preserve its relations with the enemy, and you are not at liberty to conclude that any communication between them can partake, in any degree, of the nature of hostility against you. The limits assigned to the operations of war against ambassadors, by writers on public law, are, that the belligerent may exercise his right of war against them, so long as the character of hostility exists; he may stop the ambassador of his enemy on his passage; but when he has landed in the neutral country, and taken on himself the duties of his office, and has been admitted in his representative character, he becomes a *middle man*, entitled to

peculiar privileges, as set apart for the preservation of the relations of amity and peace, in maintaining which all nations are, in some degree, interested.' . . . 'The practice of nations has allowed to neutral States the privilege of receiving ministers from the belligerent powers, and of an immediate negotiation with them.'¹

¹ Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. viii. § 6; the cases above referred to, with some later decisions, will be found in note 2, p. 321.

In 1861, during the American Civil War, an English steamer, the 'Trent,' left Havannah with Her Majesty's mails for England, having on board numerous passengers. Shortly after noon on the following day, a steamer, being the 'San Jacinto,' having the appearance of a man-of-war, but not showing colours, was observed ahead. On nearing her, she fired a round shot from her pivot gun across the bows of the 'Trent,' and showed American colours. A shell was also discharged. The 'Trent' stopped and an officer with a large armed guard of marines boarded her. The officer demanded a list of the passengers, and on compliance with this demand being refused, the officer said he had orders to arrest Messrs. Mason and Slidell and two others, naming them, and that he had sure information of their being passengers in the 'Trent.' The commander of the 'Trent' and the Admiralty agent in charge of the mails protested against the act of taking by force, out of the vessel, for passengers under the protection of the British flag. Resistance was made of the question, and the four passengers were forcibly taken out of the ship. It was further demanded that the commander of the 'Trent' should proceed on board the steamer, but he refused to do so and was forcibly compelled, and the demand was not insisted on.

These four persons were forcibly taken from on board a friendly vessel, the ship of a neutral power, while pursuing a lawful voyage.

The Government of the United States declared that Captain Wilkes, in executing the proceeding in question, acted without the instructions or foreknowledge of that government, that although a round shot was fired, it was so pointed as to be as harmless as a blank shot, that the commander of the 'Trent' was not required to go on board the 'San Jacinto'; that the persons taken bore pretended credentials and instructions, in law known as despatches; and that the officers of the 'Trent' knew of the assumed characters and purposes of the four persons when they embarked on the vessel. These persons were subsequently released by the United States Government to the British Government, but the arrest raised the very important question, whether or not, the persons arrested were 'contraband of war.' It is contended by the United States that maritime law so generally deals *in rem*, that is *with property*, and so seldom with persons, that although it seems a straining of the term 'contraband' to apply it to the nevertheless, persons, as well as property, may become contraband since the word means broadly 'contrary to proclamation, prohibition, illegal, unlawful'; that all writers and judges pronounce naval officers and military persons in the service of the enemy contraband; that Vattel's 'war allows us to cut off from an enemy all his resources, and to prevent him from sending ministers to solicit assistance'; that Sir Wm. Scott says, 'you may stop the ambassador of your enemy on his passage,' that despatches are not less clearly contraband, and the bearers or couriers who undertake to carry them fall under the same condemnation. The United States acknowledged that a subtlety might

§ 19. If a neutral engages in a commerce which is exclusively confined to the subjects of another country, and which

raised whether pretended ministers of an usurping power, not recognised as legal by either the belligerent or the neutral, could be held to be contraband, but that it would disappear on being subjected to what is the true test in all cases, namely, the spirit of the law; that Sir William Scott, speaking of civil magistrates who were arrested and detained as contraband, says, 'It appears to me on principle to be but reasonable that, when it is of sufficient importance to the enemy that such persons shall be sent out on the public service at the public expense, it should afford equal ground of forfeiture against the vessel that may be let out for a purpose so intimately connected with the hostile operations.'

On the other hand the British Government relied on the grounds, that the general right and duty of a neutral power to maintain its own communications and friendly relations with both belligerents cannot be dispensed. 'A neutral nation,' says Vattel, 'continues, with the two parties at war, in the several relations nature has placed between nations. It stands to perform towards both of them all the duties of humanity, reciprocally due from nation to nation.' For the performance of these duties, on both sides, the neutral nation has itself a most direct and material interest; especially when it has numerous citizens resident in the territories of both belligerents; and when its citizens, resident both there and at home, have property of great value in the territories of the belligerents, which may be exposed to danger from acts of confiscation and violence if the protection of their own government should be withheld.

This was the case with respect to British subjects during the late civil war in North America.

Acting upon these principles, Sir William Scott, in the case of the 'Caroline' 6 Rob. 468, during the war between Great Britain and France, decided that the carrying of despatches from the French ambassador, resident in the United States, to the Government of France, by a United States merchant ship, was no violation of the neutrality of the United States in the war between Great Britain and France, and that such despatches could not be treated as contraband of war. 'The neutral country,' he said, 'has a right to preserve its relations with the enemy, and you are not at liberty to conclude that any communication between them can partake, in any degree, of the nature of hostility against you. The enemy may have his hostile projects to be attempted with the neutral State, but your reliance is on the integrity of that neutral State, that it will not favour nor participate in such designs, but, as far as its own councils and actions are concerned, will oppose them. And if there should be private reasons to suppose that this confidence in the good faith of the neutral State has a doubtful foundation, that is matter for the caution of the government, to be counteracted by just measures of preventive policy; but it is no ground on which this court can pronounce that the neutral carrier has violated his duty by bearing despatches, which, as far as he can know, may be presumed to be of an innocent nature, and in the maintenance of a pacific connection.'

And he continues, shortly afterwards. 'It is to be considered also, with regard to this question, what may be due to the convenience of the neutral State, for its interests may require that the intercourse of correspondence with the enemy's country should not be altogether interdicted. It might be thought to amount almost to a declaration that an ambassador from the enemy shall not reside in the neutral State, if he is declared to be detained from the only means of communicating with his own. For to what useful purpose can he reside there without the opportunities of such

is interdicted to all others, so that it cannot be carried out all in the name of a foreigner, such a commerce is considered

a communication? It is too much to say that all the business of the States shall be transacted by the minister of the neutral State residing in the enemy's country. The practice of nations has allowed to neutral States the privilege of receiving ministers from the belligerent States, and the use and convenience of an immediate negotiation with them.

That these principles must necessarily extend to every kind of diplomatic communication between government and government, whether by sending or receiving ambassadors or commissioners personally, or by sending or receiving despatches from or to such ambassadors or commissioners, or from or to the respective governments, is too plain to need argument, and it seems no less clear that such communications may be as legitimate and innocent in their first commencement as afterwards, and that the rule cannot be restricted to the case in which diplomatic relations are already formally established by the residence of an accredited minister of the belligerent power in the neutral country. It is the neutrality of the one party to the communications, and not either the mode of the communication or the time when it first takes place, which furnishes the test of the true application of the principle. The only distinction arising out of the peculiar circumstances of a civil war, and of the non-recognition of the independence of the *de facto* government of one of the belligerents, either by the other belligerent or by the neutral power, is this, that for the purpose of avoiding the difficulties which might arise from a formal and positive solution of these questions, Diplomatic Agents are frequently substituted, who are clothed with the powers and enjoy the immunities of ministers, though they are not invested with the representative character, nor entitled to diplomatic honours. Upon this footing Messrs. Mason and Shidell, who were expressly stated by Mr. Seward to have been sent as pretended ministers plenipotentiary from the Southern States to the Courts of St. James and of Paris, ~~have~~ have been sent, and would have been, if at all, received; and the reception of these gentlemen upon this footing could not have been justly repudiated according to the law of nations, as a hostile or unfriendly act towards the United States. Nor, indeed, is it clear that these gentlemen would have been clothed with any powers, or have enjoyed any immunities, ~~but~~ those accorded to Diplomatic Agents, not officially recognised.

It appeared to the British Government to be a necessary and correct deduction from these principles, that the conveyance of public agents of this character from Havannah to St. Thomas, on their way to Great Britain and France, and of their credentials or despatches (if any) on board the 'Trent,' was not, and could not be, a violation of the duties of neutrality on the part of that vessel; and, both for that reason, and also because the destination of these persons, and of their despatches, was ~~not~~ neutral, it was, in the judgment of the British Government, clear and certain that these persons were not contraband. The doctrine of contraband has its whole foundation and origin in the principle which is nowhere more accurately explained than in the following passage of Bynkershoek. After stating in general terms the duty of impartial neutrality, he adds:—'*Et sane id, quod modo dicebam, non tantummodo docet, sed et usus, inter omnes fere gentes receptus. Quamvis enim sint cum amicorum nostrorum hostibus commercia, usu tamen placet ne alterutrum his rebus juvemus, quibus bellum contra amicos nostrum instruat et foveatur. Non licet igitur alterutri advehere ea, quibus in bello gerenda opus habet; ut sunt tormenta, arma, et quorum præparatio in bello usus, milites. . . . Optimo jure interdictum est, ne quis eorum*

entirely national as to follow the situation of the country, to impress its hostile character upon the property engaged

bus subministramus; quia his rebus nos ipsi quodammodo videremur in nostris bellum facere.' *Quæst. Jur. Pub. lib. i. c. ix.*

The principle of contraband of war is here clearly explained, and it is visible that men, or despatches, which do not come within that title, can in this sense be contraband. The penalty of knowingly carrying contraband of war is, as Mr. Seward stated, nothing less than confiscation of the ship; but it is impossible that this penalty can be exacted when the neutral has done no more than employ means, usual in nations, for maintaining his own proper relations with one of the belligerents. It is of the very essence of the definition of contraband that articles should have a hostile, and not a neutral, destination. As, says Lord Stowell (the 'Imuna,' 3 Rob., 167), going to a neutral cannot come under the description of contraband, all goods going being equally lawful. 'The rule respecting contraband,' he adds, 'has always understood it, is, that articles must be taken *in debito*, or actual prosecution of the voyage to an enemy's port.' On what principle can it be contended that a hostile destination is less than, or a neutral destination more noxious, for constituting a contraband character in the case of public agents or despatches, than in the case of arms and ammunition? Mr. Seward sought to support his position on this point by a reference to the well-known dictum of Sir William Scott, in the case of the 'Caroline,' that 'you may stop the ambassador of your enemy on his passage,' and to another dictum of the same judge, in the case of the 'Orozembo' (6 Rob., 434), that 'functionaries, if sent for a purpose intimately connected with the operations, may fall under the same rule with persons whose employment is directly military.' These quotations seemed, to the British Government, to be irrelevant. The words of Sir W. Scott were in both cases applied by Mr. Seward in a sense different from that in which they were used. Sir William Scott does not say that an ambassador sent to a belligerent to a neutral State may be stopped as contraband, while on passage on board a neutral vessel, belonging to that or any other neutral State; nor that, if he be not contraband, the other belligerent has any right to stop him on any voyage. The sole object which Sir William Scott had in view was to explain the extent and limits of the doctrine of the inviolability of ambassadors, in virtue of that character, for he says:

'The limits that are assigned to the operations of war against them, by Lord and other writers upon these subjects, are, that you may exercise the right of war against them wherever the character of hostility exists. You may stop the ambassador or your enemy on his passage; but when he arrives, and has taken upon him the functions of his office, and been admitted in his representative character, he becomes a sort of public man, entitled to peculiar privileges, as set apart for the protection of relations of amity and peace, in maintaining which all nations are in some degree interested.' There is certainly nothing in this passage which an inference can be drawn so totally opposed to the general result of the whole judgment, as that an ambassador proceeding to the country to which he is sent, and on board a neutral vessel belonging to that country, can be stopped on the ground that the conveyance of such ambassador is a breach of neutrality, which it must be if he be contraband of war. Sir W. Scott is here expressing, not his own opinion, but the doctrine which he considers to have been laid down by the law of authority upon the subject. No writer of authority has ever maintained that an ambassador proceeding to a neutral State on board one

in it. In the war of 1756, the French Government allowed the Dutch, then neutral, to carry on the commerce between

of its merchant ships is contraband of war. The only writer named by Sir William Scott is Vattel (lib. iv. c. vii. § 85), whose words are these — 'On peut encore attaquer et arrêter ses gens *i.e.*, gens de l'ennemi, partout, où on a la liberté d'exercer des actes d'hostilité. Non-seulement donc on peut justement refuser le passage aux ministres qu'un ~~en~~ ^{certain} envoie à d'autres souverains ; on les arrête même, s'ils entreprennent de passer secrètement et sans permission dans les lieux dont on est maître.' And he adds as an example the seizure of a French ambassador, ~~was~~ ^{passing} passing through the dominions of Hanover during war between England and France, by the King of England, who was also sovereign of Hanover.

The rule, therefore, to be collected from these authorities is, that you may stop an enemy's ambassador in any place of which you are yourself the master, or in any other place where you have a right to exercise acts of hostility. Your own territory, or ships of your own country, are places of which you are yourself the master. The enemy's territory, or the enemy's ships, are places in which you have a right to exercise acts of hostility. Neutral vessels, guilty of no violation of the laws of neutrality, are places where you have no right to exercise acts of hostility.

It would be an inversion of the doctrine that ambassadors have peculiar privileges to argue that they are less protected than other persons. The right conclusion is, that an ambassador sent to a neutral power is inviolable on the high seas as well as in neutral waters while under the protection of the neutral flag.

The other dictum of Sir William Scott, in the case of the 'Orozco', is even less pertinent to the present question. That related to the case of a neutral ship which, upon the effect of the evidence given on the trial, was held by the court to have been engaged as an enemy's transport to convey the enemy's military officers, and some of his civil officers, whose duties were intimately connected with military operations, from the enemy's country to one of the enemy's colonies, which was about to be the theatre of those operations, the whole being done under colour of a simulated neutral destination. But as long as a neutral government, which whose territory no military operations are carried on, adheres to its profession of neutrality, the duties of civil officers on a mission to that government and within its territory cannot possibly be 'connected with' any 'military operations' in the sense in which these words were used by Sir William Scott ; as, indeed, is rendered quite clear by the passage already cited from his own judgment in the case of the 'Caroline'.

It was further argued by the United States Government that the 'Trent,' though she carried mails, was a contract, or merchant vessel, a common carrier for hire ; that maritime law knows only three classes of vessels—viz., vessels of war, revenue vessels and merchant vessels ; and that the 'Trent' falls within the latter class ; that whatever disputes had existed concerning a right of visitation or search in time of peace, none, they supposed, had existed in modern times about the right of a belligerent in time of war to capture contraband in neutral and even friendly merchant vessels, and of the right of visitation and search in order to determine whether they are neutral and are documented as such according to the law of nations. They assumed in the case of the 'Trent,' according to their reading of British authorities, that the circumstance that the 'Trent' was proceeding from a neutral port to another neutral port did not modify the right of the belligerent captor.

The reply of the British Government to this is that according to the law as laid down by British authorities, if the real destination of the vessel be hostile (that is, to the enemy of the enemy's country, it cannot be

the mother country and her colonies, under special licences granted for this particular purpose, other neutrals being

seized and rendered innocent by a fictitious destination to a neutral port, but if the real terminus of the voyage be *bona fide* in a neutral territory, no English, nor, indeed, it is believed any American authority can be found which has ever given countenance to the doctrine that either a vessel or despatches can be subject during such a voyage, and on board a neutral vessel, to belligerent capture as contraband of war. The British Government regarded such a doctrine as wholly irreconcilable with the true principles of maritime law, and certainly with those principles as they have been understood in the courts of Great Britain. It is to be further observed that packets engaged in the mail service, and keeping up the regular and periodical communications between the different countries of Europe and America, and other parts of the world, though in the absence of treaty stipulations they may not be exempted from visit and search in time of war, nor from the penalties of any violation of neutrality, if proved to have been knowingly committed, are still, when sailing in the ordinary and innocent course of their legitimate employment, which consists in the conveyance of mails and passengers, entitled to peculiar favour and protection from governments in whose service they are engaged. To detain, disturb, interfere with them, without the very gravest cause, would be an act almost noxious and injurious character, not only to a vast number and class of individual and private interests, but to the public interests of neutral and friendly governments. If the American arguments were adopted as sound, the most injurious consequences might follow. For instance, in the late civil war, according to that doctrine, any packet ship carrying a Confederate agent from Dover to Calais, or from Calais to Dover, might be captured and carried to New York. In case of a war between Austria and Italy, the conveyance of an Italian minister or agent from Trieste, the capture of a neutral packet plying between Malta and Sicily, or between Malta and Gibraltar, the condemnation of the packet at Trieste, and the confinement of the minister or agent in an Italian prison. So in the late war between Great Britain and France, on the one hand, and Russia on the other, a Russian minister going from Hamburg to Washington, in an American ship, might have been seized at Portsmouth, the ship might have been condemned, and the minister sent to the Tower of London. So also a Confederate vessel might have captured a Cunard steamer on its way from Halifax to Liverpool, on the ground of its carrying despatches from Mr. Seward to London.

In 1864, Mr. Madison, Secretary of State of the United States, issued instructions to Mr. Munroe, the American minister, in England, to the effect that "Whenever property found in a neutral vessel is supposed to be liable on any ground to capture and condemnation, the rule in all cases is, that the question shall not be decided by the captor, but be referred before a legal tribunal, where a regular trial may be had, and the captor himself is liable to damages for an abuse of his power. It is reasonable, then, or just, that a belligerent commander who is restricted, and thus responsible in a case of mere property, of trivial value, should be permitted, without recurring to any tribunal whatever, to commit the crew of a neutral vessel, to decide the important question of their respective allegiance, and to carry that decision into execution by putting every individual he may choose into a service abhorrent to his feelings, cutting him off from his most tender connections, exposing him and his person to the most humiliating discipline, and his

and by the opinions of the most eminent text-writers of the countries. It has generally been designated by the 'rule of the war of 1756.'

§ 20. Few now contest the correctness of the rule that where neutrals, by a special indulgence, are permitted in time of war, to engage in a commerce of the enemy which is purely national, and from which they are excluded in time of peace, they are necessarily impressed with a hostile character. But during the wars of 1793 and 1801, Great Britain contended to give this rule a much greater extension, and asserted that where a commerce, which had been previously restricted to a national monopoly, is thrown open in time of war to all nations, without reserve, by a general, and, on its permanent regulation, neutrals have no right to avail themselves of the concession, but that their entrance into the trade so opened is a criminal departure from the impartiality which neutrals are bound to observe. It was formerly the policy of the European powers to confine exclusively to their own subjects the trade between their own ports, and between their mother country and its colonies. During the wars of 1793 and 1801, some of the continental States abolished this monopoly, and opened their coasting and colonial trade to all nations without reserve. But England contended that such a departure from policy by a belligerent in time of war was not justified by the law of nations, and neutral vessels engaged in such trade were liable to capture.

trade were seized by her cruisers, and condemned by her courts of Admiralty. The confiscation of a vast number of American ships, with valuable cargoes of colonial produce, was the principal fruit of this rule of British law and British policy. But the government of the United States most earnestly and energetically remonstrated against the doctrine, as a modern and violent innovation, unjust in its principle, ruinous in its application, and without the sanction of international law. Neither the British Orders in Council, nor the decisions of British prize courts, seem to have adopted any fixed principle with respect to the prohibition of neutrals from engaging in the colonial and coast trade of a belligerent State. Soon after the commencement of the war of 1793, England entrusted her cruisers 'to bring in for lawful adjudication all vessels laden with goods, the produce of any colony of France, or carrying provisions or supplies for the use of any such colony,' thus prohibiting *all* trade between neutrals and the colonies of the enemy, even that permitted in time of peace. The instructions of January 8th, 1794, were, 'to bring in all vessels laden with goods, the produce of the French West India Islands, and coming directly from any port of the said islands to any port in Europe,' thus permitting American vessels to trade directly between the United States and the French colonies, but not between them and any port in Europe, even though neutral. But, in 1798, the instructions were still further extended so as to permit neutrals to trade between the enemy's colonies and any port of Great Britain, or any port of a country in Europe to which the neutral ship might belong. It will be observed that these relaxations virtually amounted to an abandonment of the principle upon which the British extension of the rule of 1756 was claimed to be founded. Nor was there an entire uniformity in the decisions of the courts, either with respect to the exact limits of the rule, or the penalty to be inflicted on the neutral for its violation. In some of the earlier wars the cargo was condemned, and the ship restored, without freight, but, subsequently, both ship and cargo were condemned. At one time the prohibition was construed to extend only to trade thrown open by the enemy temporarily or during the war; but was afterwards extended to trade made general by regulation declared, in terms, to be permanent.

Moreover, the general principle, that the trade of neutrals with the colonies of the enemy, *because first opened by them during the war*, seems, in some cases, to have been abandoned by the court, and the trade declared to be unlawful only when its direct and immediate tendency was to relieve the colonies from a hostile pressure, so close and imminent, that, but for the assistance rendered them by neutral trade, it would inevitably compel their surrender.¹

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 699, 717; Wheaton, *Hist. Lat. of Nations*, pp. 373, et seq.; the 'Nancy,' 4 Rob., Appen. vi.; *British v. France in Council*, November 6, 1793; January 8, 1794; February 25, 1794; Heffler, *Droit International*, § 174; for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the following note, it has been found necessary to repeat some portions of the above text.

The general principle applied to cases of the interposition of neutral merchants in the colonial trade has been, that the 'fundamental principle of the trade being founded on a system of monopolising to the parent State the whole trade to and from her colonies in time of peace, and competent to neutral States in time of war to assume that trade on particular indulgences, or on temporary relaxations arising from the state of war, and that such a trade is not therefore entitled to the privileges and protection of a neutral character.' The application of this general principle, however, has from time to time been qualified by some relaxations. It is upon the extent and legal effect of these, rather than on the existence or fitness of the general principle itself, that the various discussions which have taken place on these subjects have principally been employed.

During the war between England and her American colonies and the several powers of Europe that interfered to foment those dissensions, the principle was altogether intermitted - and on this ground, that France had professed, a short time before the commencement of hostilities, to have altogether abandoned the principle of monopoly, and meant, by permanent regulation, to admit neutral merchants to trade with the French colonies in the West Indies. The event proved the false nature of that representation; but, for a time, the effect was the same. The Admiralty of Great Britain did not, during that war, apply the principle or interrupt the intercourse of neutral vessels in that branch of commerce more than in any other.

Soon after the commencement of the war of 1793, the first set of instructions that issued were framed, not on the exception of the American war, but on the antecedent practice; and directed cruisers to bring in, for lawful adjudication, all vessels laden with goods, the produce of any colony of France, or carrying provisions or supplies for the use of any such colony. The relaxations that have since been adapted have originated chiefly in the change that has taken place in the trade of that part of the world, since the establishment of an independent government on the continent of America. In consequence of that event, American vessels had been admitted to trade in some articles, and on certain conditions, with the colonies both of Great Britain and France. Such a permission had become a part of the general commercial arrangement, as the ordinary state of their trade in time of peace. If commerce of America was therefore abridged by the foregoing instructions, and debarred of the right generally ascribed to neutral trade in time of war, that it may be continued with particular exceptions on

§ 21. The distinction between the rule of the war of 1756, and that contended for by Great Britain, generally known as

that of its ordinary establishment. In consequence of representations made by the American Government to this effect, new instructions to the British cruisers were issued on January 8, 1794, apparently designed to exempt American ships trading between their own country and the colonies of France. The directions were 'to bring in all vessels laden with goods, the produce of the French West India Islands, and coming directly from any port of the said islands to any port of Europe.'

In consequence of this relaxation of the general principle, in favour of American vessels, a similar liberty of resorting to the colonial market for the supply of their own consumption was conceded to the neutral ships of Europe. To this effect a third set of public instructions was issued by Great Britain on January 25, 1798, which recited, as the special cause of further alteration, 'the present state of the commerce of this country, as well as that of neutral countries,' and directed cruisers 'to bring in all vessels coming with cargoes, the produce of any island or settlement belonging to France, Spain, or Holland, and coming directly to any port of the said islands or settlements to any port of Europe, being a port of this kingdom, nor a port of the country to which such ships, being neutral ships, belonged.'

Neutral vessels were, by this relaxation, allowed to carry on a direct commerce between the colony of the enemy and their own country; a concession rendered more reasonable by the events of war, which, by facilitating the trade of France, Spain, and Holland, had entirely deprived the States of Europe of the opportunity of supplying themselves with the articles of colonial produce in those markets. This is the sum of the general rule, and of the relaxations in the order in which they occurred. On the effect and extent of the law, to be extracted from the rule and the exceptions taken together, much argument has to be displayed and several important judgments have been delivered (*Rob.*, app.).

Pitchard's *Admiralty Digest* contains most of these decisions, but the following principal cases may be of interest to the reader, viz:—

A ship going from the mother country of the enemy to their colony under false papers and a false character, and coming back again to the other country, was to be subject to confiscation by the other belligerent, notwithstanding the clearest evidence of neutral property.—The 'Calypso,' 2 *Rob.*, 154; the 'Phoenix,' 3 *Rob.*, 186; the 'Star,' *Ibid.*, 186.

Neutral property, passing in direct voyages between the mother country of one enemy and the colony of another enemy, was to be liable to condemnation.—The 'Rose,' 2 *Rob.*, 206.

And this whether the trade was opened to the neutral by the enemy or not.—The 'Immanuel,' *Ibid.*, 205.

A neutral ship and cargo, taken trading between the settlement of one enemy and the colonial possession of an allied enemy, was condemned, included under the principle of a trade, between the colony of the enemy and the parent State, which was illegal.—The 'New Adventure,' also the 'Gxolen' Lords of Appeals, 4 *Rob.*, App. A., p. 4, note.

Cargo on board a neutral ship, seized on a voyage from a colony of one enemy to the mother country, notwithstanding an asserted deviation to such destination, but under compulsion of a *vis major*, condemned, and restored, but without freight.—The 'Minerva,' 3 *Rob.*, 229, and the 'Dorothea,' *Ibid.*, 229, n. But the illegality of such voyages was frequently held by the Lords of Appeal to attach as strongly on the

the rule of 1793, is quite obvious. It is thus pointed out by Mr. Wheaton: 'There is,' he says, 'all the difference between ship as on the cargo, and the ship was condemned accordingly.—The 'Yonge Thomas,' 3 *Rob.*, 232, n.

A neutral ship and cargo, taken going from a colony of the enemy to a port of Europe, not being a British port nor a port of the colony, to which either the ship and cargo belonged, which trade, though sanctioned by the claimant to have been, during peace, an open trade, the court is itself bound, under the general rule of maritime States, and in the absence of proof to the contrary by the claimant, to consider as an open trade monopolised by the parent State, condemned on the ground that such trade being a breach of the general law of nations, and outside the limits of the relaxations of the general law allowed by the government of Great Britain.—The 'Wilhelmina,' 4 *Ad. App.*

A neutral ship might lawfully go from her own port in Europe to the colony of an enemy, and there load a cargo, and return with it to her own port.—The 'Providentia,' 2 *Rob.*, 142; the 'Immanuel,' *Ibid.*, 147; the 'Margaretha Magdalena,' *Ibid.*, 138.

Goods were shipped at a neutral port for the colony of the enemy, and afterwards entered at a port of the enemy, where the ship lay, and where part of the cargo was taken out and sent back to the neutral port, similar goods being placed on board in lieu thereof. It was held (but as to that part only of the goods originally shipped to be taken out) under the general prize law of nations, to be considered as exported from the neutral port, the original place of their shipment.—The 'Immanuel,' 2 *Rob.*, 197.

An American vessel taken bringing a cargo of produce from the Havannah to Hamburg, merely touching in America for fresh provisions, without landing the cargo or paying duties, condemned, as also the touching in America being held to be a colourable and fraudulent evasion, and not a *bona fide* importation, and the voyage direct from the Havannah to Hamburg being illegal under the general law of nations.—The 'Mercury' (Lords of Appeal), 4 *Rob.*, App.

The mere touching at an intermediate port, whether of the country to which the vessel belonged or any other, without importing the cargo into the common stock of that country, did not alter the nature of the voyage, which continued the same in all respects, and was consistent with a voyage to the country to which the vessel was actually going for the purpose of delivering the cargo at the ultimate port.—The 'Mercury,' 5 *Rob.*, 365, and see also p. 336.

Perishable commodities, carried from the enemy's country to a neutral port, with a *bona fide* intention of disposing of them in that port, were permitted to be exported to the enemy's colonies, in consequence of their being unable to be sold as intended. Restitution of ship and cargo, with captor's expenses, decreed, reversing the decision of the Vice Admiralty Court of New Providence, condemning ship and cargo on the reason of such trading.—The 'John,' 1 *Ad. App.*, 39.

A plea of distress, set up to account for a neutral trading from the colony of the enemy, putting into a port of the mother country, was rejected on the facts not amounting to a sufficient excuse for so doing. Ship and cargo condemned accordingly.—The 'Star,' 2 *Rob.*, 193, n.

The general principle was not so strictly applied to trade with the European settlements in the East, as in the New World, as the trade of the East had been generally open to neutrals.—The 'Jubana,' 4 *Rob.*, 318.

Trade with the French colony of Senegal was held to have been sufficiently opened by the French to neutrals before the war, to exempt a vessel so trading from the operation of the principle applied to the colonies.

principle and the more modern doctrine which interdicts neutrals, during war, all trade not open to them in time of peace, that there is between the granting by the enemy of special licences to the subjects of the opposite belligerent, protecting their property from capture in a particular trade which the policy of the enemy induces him to tolerate, and a general exemption of such trade from capture. The former is clearly a cause of confiscation, whilst the latter has never been deemed to have such an effect. The rule of the war of 1756 was originally founded upon the former principle; it was suffered to lie dormant during the war of the American Revolution, and, when revived at the commencement of the war against France, in 1793, was applied with various relaxations and modifications to the prohibition of all neutral trade with the colonies, and upon the coasts of the enemy.' This distinction is also clearly pointed out by Mr. Duer, who most conclusively answered the arguments of Sir William Scott.¹

Trade of the enemy, under which property taken in trade between the mother country and colony of the enemy was held liable to confiscation. Situation; captor's expenses allowed.—*Ibid.*

Neutrals were not to trade on freight between the ports of the enemy. Freight and expenses to a neutral ship engaged in the coasting trade of the enemy refused.—The 'Immanuel,' 1 *Rob.*, 302.

In England and most other European countries, the coasting trade was not to the date of this case been open to foreign vessels. Habitual employment in the coasting trade of the enemy would stamp a neutral vessel with a hostile character, but pursuing one voyage in such trade did not be sufficient.—The 'Welvaart,' 1 *Rob.*, 124.

Carrying on the coasting trade of the enemy with false papers was a cause of condemnation. So held, notwithstanding the asserted declaration of France, holding out an assurance that foreign vessels should be admitted into the coasting trade of that country as a permanent regulation. The 'Benazer,' 6 *Rob.*, 252.

The privilege of 'free ships free goods' under the Dutch treaty was held to apply to coasting voyages.—The 'Yonge Jan,' and other ships, 2 *Rob.*, 42, n.

For cases of condemnation of ships and cargoes on the ground of a flag, in violation of the prohibitory Act, with the American States, then enemies of, but in a state of revolt from, Great Britain, see the 'Wilham Frazer,' and cases therein cited, *Hay and Marriott*, 76, the 'Belle Etoile,' cited in the 'Friendship,' *Ibid.* 79, the 'Sally,' *Ibid.* 83.

For cases of restitution, notwithstanding such a trading and the plea, on the ground of peculiarly favourable circumstances applying to it, see the 'Friendship,' *Ibid.* 78, the 'Commerce,' *Ibid.* 80, the 'Becca,' *Ibid.* 107.

As to insurances on a colonial or coasting trade, see *Berens v. Rucker*, 1 *Am. Bluck.*, 314.

Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 27; Wheaton, *Hist. Law Nations*, pp. 373, et seq.; Wheaton, *Rep.*, vol. i. Appendix No. iii.

§ 22. The application of this rule of 1793, made by Great Britain, fully illustrates its objectionable character, even in its most modified form. As explained by the British courts of Admiralty, and relaxed by the Orders in Council, this rule permitted the importation of the produce of the enemy's colonies into a neutral country, and its exportation thence to other countries. A question, however, arose as to what constituted the evidence of importation and exportation by the neutral? An American vessel had imported goods from Havannah, which had been landed in the United States and duties on them paid to the American Government. They had afterwards been carried in the same vessel as a part of a cargo from a port of Massachusetts to Spain. The vessel was captured by British cruisers, and the captors insisted upon a condemnation on the ground of *continuity of voyage*; but Sir William Scott decreed the restoration of ship and cargo, on the ground, that the landing of the goods and the payment of duties in a neutral port were sufficient evidence of an importation in good faith. This decision was rendered in 1800; but in 1805 the Lords of Appeal discovered that these *criteria* of a *bona fide* importation might be fallacious, and therefore were not to be held as conclusive evidence of a breach in the voyage. If the circumstances of their re-exportation were such as to indicate that the original importation into the neutral port was intended for that purpose, the trade was declared illegal, and the vessels and cargoes condemned.

§ 23. The effect of this application of the British rule to the continuity of the voyage from an enemy's colony to a neutral port, and thence to the mother country, or to a port of a belligerent, produced a most disastrous effect upon American commerce. The merchants of the United States, relying upon the rule, recognised by Sir William Scott, that the landing of the goods and the payment of the duties in the neutral port would be regarded as conclusive evidence that the continuity of the voyage had been broken so as to legalise a subsequent exportation (although perhaps the language of the judge did not fully warrant the inference).

p. 306; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 707-717; Sir William Temple's *Works*, p. 313.

¹ The '*Polly*,' decided in 1800, 2 *Rob.*, 361; the '*Essex*,' decided in 1805, 5 *Rob.*, 369; the '*William*,' 5 *Rob.*, 387.

and engaged largely in trade with the colonies of France and Spain, re-exporting the same goods to European ports. When this trade had existed without interruption for some years, the unexpected decision of the Lords of Appeal on the continuity of the voyage, caused the seizure and condemnation of a vast number of American ships and cargoes. If the doctrine of the illegality of neutral trade between the American colonies of the belligerents and European ports be admitted as correct, the decision of the Lords of Appeal, as ordered by Sir William Grant, on the continuity of the voyage will probably follow as a necessary consequence. It is this very uncertainty in the application of the rule of 1793, and the disastrous results produced upon American commerce by a misconception of a single question growing out of that rule, furnish abundant proof of its vague and equivocal character, its tendency to entrap neutral merchants to their ruin, and the arbitrary power over neutral commerce conferred upon a belligerent's court of Admiralty by the uncertainty of its application.¹

§ 24. Notwithstanding the very able and exceedingly plausible arguments advanced by British statesmen and jurists, in support of the rule of 1793, they failed to satisfy, at the least, other countries of its justice or legality. And the discussions which have taken place between writers on public law, since party feelings and national prejudices arising out of the wars in which the rule was enforced by Great Britain have ceased, have greatly shaken, even British faith, in its correctness. Indeed, many of her ablest writers and jurists have now abandoned the extreme grounds taken at that time by her Government and courts of prize. Mr. Phillimore, her most recent writer on international law, whose work exhibits great ability and learning, and who certainly is not backward in defending British pretensions, fully adopts Mr. Justice Story's opinion with respect to the rules of 1756 and 1793. This opinion was as follows: 1st, That coasting trade being by its nature exclusively national, neutrals cannot engage in it, when thrown open during war; but that the British extension of this doctrine to cases where a neutral vessel traded between ports of the enemy with a cargo taken in at

¹ *Wheat, On Insurance*, vol. 1, pp. 719-725; *Kent, Com. on Am. Law*, 1 p. 5, note, the "Maria," 5 Rob., 303.

neutral United States against and independent with respect to that trade, that, for neutral engage in trade between another country and the enemy which is thrown open to it, is a rule in most instances to the same point. But, continues Story, the British have extended doctrine of all interference with the enemy, even from a third country, and herein, it seems to me, they have done wrong. Thus, it seems to me to be the principle of the rule, as to the enemy and the coasting trade, the rule of 1756, as it was at that time applied, see the case of *London*, but its late extension is reprehensible.

§ 25. The British extension of the rule of 1756 to the time of 1793, and its subsequent application to the American commerce, drew from the Government of the United States in earnest and many remonstrances. The grounds then assumed, with respect to the rule of 1756, is no reason to believe that this government will report. They were taken on full deliberation, and carried at the time with signal ability, and they have been repeated by all her ablest statesmen and writers on the law. Some, not properly distinguishing between principles of the rule of 1793 and that of 1756, attacked the doctrine of the latter as unsanctioned by law and nations, but it has now become the settled and that its main principles, when properly limited and distinguished from that of 1793, are just and correct. At the time, the British rule is regarded as a modern innovation, part of the general and permanent code of national jurisprudence—an innovation so unjust and to neutral commerce, that neutral States are bound to any new attempt to force its application. There doubt that the United States would now regard any attempt to apply it to American commerce as an act of direct immediate hostility.¹

§ 26. But there is very little probability that Great B

¹ Phillimore, *2d Int. Law*, vol. iii. 55, 215, 225. Story, *4 Lectures*, vol. ii. pp. 287, 288.

² Monroe, *2d Int. Law*, vol. ii. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100. Madison, *to Monroe*, and *to Secretary*, May 12, 1806. Wheaton, *Int. Law*, ch. vi. § 2. Wheaton, *Int. Law*, pp. 374, et seq. Wheaton, *Reports*, vol. i. Appendix, note ii. p. 500. Story, *Life and Letters*, p. 287.

empt to revive it in any future war, not only on of the resistance it will be certain to provoke, and ædingly doubtful character of the rule itself, but from it change in British opinion on this subject, and more arly from the changes which have since been made olonial system of the powers of Europe. The colo- le of England being now open to the navigation of ld, the theory, on which the restriction of 1793 was ecessarily falls to the ground.¹ Nevertheless, a treatise national law would be very incomplete without an ex- on and discussion of a question so recently regarded nount importance, and which caused the condemnation a vast amount of American property.²

o the coasting trade of Great Britain, it is enacted by 39 and 40 6, re-enacting the provisions of former statutes, that :—All trade om any one port of the United Kingdom to any other port hall be deemed to be a coasting trade, and all ships while l therein shall be deemed to be coasting ships, and no port of :d Kingdom, however situated with regard to any other port, leemed in law with reference to each other to be ports beyond —(s. 140).

foreign ship in the coasting trade is subject to the same laws, l regulations to which British ships are subjected, and to no tes.—(s. 141).

coasting ship is confined to the coasting voyage.—(s. 142).

er in Council, April 15, 1854; *Edinburgh Review*, No. 203, art. 6.

CHAPTER XXIX.

PACIFIC INTERCOURSE OF BELLIGERENTS.

1. Object and character of *commercii belli*—2. General conventions—3. Suspension of arms, truces and armistices—4. Authority to make them—5. Acts of individuals ignorant of truce—6. What may be done during a truce—7. Conditions of special truces—8. Their interpretation—9. Renewal of truces—10. Capitulations—11. Individual promises—12. Passports—13. Conducts—14. When and how revoked—15. Their violation—16. Punished—17. Safeguards—18. Cantels for prisoners—19. Their rights and duties—20. Ransom of prisoners—21. Ransom of captured property—22. Prohibited in England—23. Ransom bill—24. If ransom vessel be lost or stranded—25. Capture of ransomed vessel and ransom bill—26. Hostages for ransom—27. Suits on contracts of ransom—28. Flag of truce.

§ 1. THE usage of civilised nations has introduced a friendly intercourse in war, technically called *commercii belli*, by which its violence may be allayed, so far as is consistent with its object and purpose, and a way be kept open which may lead, in time, to an adjustment of differences, and ultimately, to peace. Were all pacific communications between armies absolutely cut off, war would not only become necessarily cruel and destructive, but there would be no terminating it, short of the total annihilation of the belligerents. Grotius has devoted an entire chapter to the subject, and the concurring testimony of all ages and all nations is, that *good faith* should always be observed between enemies.

the common safety of mankind, and is, therefore, held sacred by all civilised nations.¹

§ 2. Belligerent States, and their armies and fleets, frequently have occasion, during the continuance of a war, to enter into agreements of various kinds; sometimes for a general or partial suspension of hostilities, for the capitulation of a place, or the surrender of an army, for the exchange of prisoners, or the ransom of captured property; and sometimes for the purpose of regulating the general manner of conducting hostilities, or the mode of carrying on the war. All these agreements, of whatsoever kind, are included under the general name of *compacts* or *conventions*. These compacts, which relate to the pacific intercourse of the belligerents, suppose the war to continue; those which put an end to it, come under the general head of *treaties of peace*, which have been considered in a previous chapter.²

¹ Grotius, *De Jure Bel. ac Pac.*, liv. iii. ch. xxi.; Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur.*, cap. i.; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. x. § 174.

² In 1870, the French being unable to defend Versailles, suffered the German troops to enter therein under the following conditions,

1. Respect for persons and properties, for public monuments and works of art.

2. Preservation by the *Garde Nationale* alone, of arms (without powder), uniforms and posts, for the service of police in the town, and at the prison.

3. The German troops will be lodged in the barracks, and in public buildings turned into barracks. The officers will be lodged among the apartments, if necessary (as also soldiers, if the barracks do not suffice).

4. The civil and military hospitals will be respected, and the wounded not imprisoned, according to the Convention of Geneva.

5. The food for marching and forage shall be delivered to the German troops, without any contribution of war. Done at the Hôtel de Ville, 19th September, 1871.

This convention was signed, by a Major of the Prussian army, substituting the ratification of the General of his Division. The next day this General informed the Mayor, that this convention could not be ratified, because Versailles was an open town, and not a fortress or stronghold, and that this decision, which had been submitted to the Crown Prince, was according to the laws of war. The articles of convention were therefore null and void. The National Guard were obliged to give up their arms. The Mayor was assured, that the 'laws of humanity' would be observed towards the inhabitants, and that the public buildings, especially the museum, would be respected.

Notwithstanding this, in consequence of the complaints made to him of the robberies and violence on the part of the soldiers, the Mayor was obliged to complain to the General, that very same evening.—Dejerot, *Journal*.

As an example of courtesy between belligerents, it may be men-

enter into this kind of compact, but such an agreement only bind the detachment itself ; it cannot affect the operations of the main army, or of other troops not under the authority of the officer making it. A suspension of hostilities is only for a temporary purpose, and for a limited period of time, or for a more general purpose, it is called an *armistice*. Truces are either partial or general. A partial truce is limited to particular places, or to particular operations, or a suspension of hostilities between a town or fort, and the forces by which it is invested, or between two armies, or fleets. But a general truce applies to the operations of the war, and whether it be for a longer or shorter period of time, it extends to all the forces of the States, and restrains the state of war from producing its usual effects, leaving the contending parties, and the situation between them, in the same situation in which it was before. Such a truce has sometimes been called a *temporary peace*, 'but when we call it so,' says Rutherford, 'it is only in opposition to *acts* of war, and not in opposition to a *state* of war.'

It is mentioned that in 1802, on Captain Carden, of the British ship *Porpoise*, presenting his sword to Commodore Decatur, of the American ship *United States*, that officer declared he could never take the sword of a man, who had so nobly defended the honour of it.--*Journal of the American Society*, vol. vi., 121.

1. Rutherford. *Institutes of Law*, lib. ii. cap. x. §. 1.

§ 4. Such a general suspension of hostilities throughout the nation, can only be made by the sovereignty of the State, either directly, or by authority specially delegated. Such authority not being essential to enable a general or commander to fulfil his official duties, is never implied, and, in such a case, the enemy is bound to see that the agent is specially authorised to bind his principal. But a partial truce may be concluded between the military and naval commanders of the respective forces, without any special authority for that purpose, where, from the nature and extent of their commands, such authority is necessarily implied, as essential to the fulfilment of their official duties. If the commander, in making such a compact, has abused his trust to the advantage of the enemy, he is accountable to his own State for such abuse. 'The nature of his trust implies,' says Rutherford, 'that he has power to enter into a compact of this sort; and this power is sufficient to render the compact valid. The obligation that he is under, not to abuse his trust, regards his own State only, and not the enemy; and, consequently, it cannot affect the validity of the compact which he makes with the enemy.' A case occurring in the recent war between the United States and Mexico, serves to point out the limitation of the foregoing rule, with respect to the authority of a commander to make a general truce or armistice. By the convention of February 29, ratified by General Butler, March 5, and published in general orders No 18, March 6, 1848, it was stipulated that the Mexican civil authorities, political, administrative, and judicial, were to be re-established and installed in their respective offices. The terms of the convention were general, and included the entire republic of Mexico. But California, although a part of the Mexican territory, had been organised into a separate military department, entirely independent of the general

without delay to the competent authorities and to the troops. Hostilities are suspended immediately after the notification. Art. 50. It rests with the contracting parties to define in the clauses of the armistice the relations which shall exist between the populations. Art. 51. The violation of the armistice by either of the parties gives to the other the right of terminating it ('*le dénoncer*'). Art. 52. The violation of the clauses of the armistice by private individuals, on their own personal initiative, only affords the right of demanding the punishment of the guilty persons, and, if there is occasion for it, an indemnity for losses sustained.

commanding in Mexico. Pico, the Mexican governor of California, basing himself on the words of this convention, demanded of the American military governor of that department, to be reinstated and recognised in his official position and character. The American commander not only refused to comply with Pico's demand, but adopted pretty severe measures to prevent any attempt on his part to exercise authority in California. If the convention, entered into by General Butler in the capital of Mexico, was really intended to include California, as its terms would seem to indicate, he, undoubtedly, exceeded his powers, and the armistice, so far as concerned California, was utterly null and void.¹

§ 5. A truce binds the contracting parties from the time of its conclusion, unless otherwise specially provided; but it does not bind the individuals of the nation so as to make them personally responsible for a breach of it, until they have had actual or constructive notice. If, therefore, individuals, without a knowledge of the suspension of hostilities, kill an enemy or destroy his property, they do not, by such acts, commit a crime, nor are they bound to make pecuniary compensation; but, if prisoners are taken, or prizes captured, the sovereign is under obligation to immediately release the former and to restore the latter. To prevent the danger and damage that might arise from acts committed in ignorance of the truce, it is usual to fix a prospective period for the cessation of hostilities in different places, with due reference to their distance, and the means of communicating with them; it is also proper to provide for cases which do not come within the ordinary rules of notice, such as hostile vessels meeting at sea. But the State is responsible for the acts of its subjects after actual or constructive notice of the truce; it must punish them for the offence, and make ample compensation for the damage; should the State neglect or refuse justice on the complaints of the party injured, it becomes accessory to the wrong, and violates the compact.

§ 6. During the continuance of a general truce, each party

¹ Puffendorf, *De Jure Nat. et Gent.*, lib. viii. cap. vii. § 16. Vél. *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. ix. § 2. Riquelme, *Derecho Int.*, lib. 1. tit. 1. ch. xiii.; Burlamaqui, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, tome v. pt. iv. ch. xii.; Butler, *General Orders*, No. 18, March 6, 1846. *Mason to Adjt Gen'l*, August 23, 1848; Ex. Doc., No. 17, H. R., 31 Cong., 1st sess., pp. 601, et seq.

to it may, within his own territories, do whatever he would have a right to do in time of peace, such as repairing or rebuilding fortifications, constructing and fitting out vessels, levying and disciplining troops, casting cannon and manufacturing arms, and collecting provisions and munitions of war. He may also move his armies from one part of his territory to another, not occupied by the enemy, and call home, or send abroad upon the ocean his vessels of war. And, in the theatre of hostilities, and in the face of the enemy, he may do whatever, under all the circumstances, would be deemed compatible with good faith and the spirit of the agreement. In the case of a truce between the governor of a fortress or fortified town, and the general or admiral investing it, either party is at liberty to do what he could safely have done if hostilities had continued. For example, the besieged may repair his material of war, replenish his magazines, and strengthen his works, if such works were beyond the reach of the enemy at the beginning of the truce, and if the provisions and succours are introduced into the town in a way or through passages which the besieging army could not have prevented. But the besieged cannot construct or repair works of defence, if he could not safely have done this in the case the hostilities had continued; nor introduce provisions, military munitions or troops through passages which were occupied or commanded by the enemy at the time of the cessation of hostilities; nor can the besiegers continue works of attack which might have been prevented or interrupted by the besieged; for all acts of this kind would be making a mischievous and fraudulent use of the agreement, and violating its good faith and spirit; the general meaning of such truces is, that all things within the limits of the theatre of immediate operations, shall remain as they were at the moment of the conclusion of the truce. To receive and harbour deserters within such limits, is an act of hostility, and, therefore, a violation of the implied conditions of a truce.

§ 7. Where a truce is granted for a certain specified object, effects are limited to the purpose mentioned, and if either party should attempt to perform any act to the disadvantage

Wheaton, *Flem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii § 22; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii §§ 197, 198; Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 16.

of the other, not comprehended in the object of such truce this other party has the undoubted right to hinder it by force notwithstanding the compact. So, where the truce is conditional, and the conditions which have been agreed upon are broken by one party, the truce is no longer binding upon the other. 'All truces granted for a certain purpose,' says Rutherford, 'are confined to this purpose; and the party who makes use of the cessation of hostilities, to do anything that is not included within this purpose, and that is to the disadvantage of the other party, breaks the truce. For as this purpose is the sole reason of the compact, the right arising from the compact can extend no farther than this purpose extends.' 'And usually,' says the same author, 'a breach of truce, on one part, will justify the other part in beginning hostilities again before the time of the truce would have otherwise expired.'¹

§ 8. Truces, and other military compacts are to be interpreted by the same rules as treaties or other agreements. Most questions relating to such compacts may be easily determined, either by considering the nature and character of the compact itself, or by applying to it the common rules of interpretation. Nevertheless, a difference of opinion will often arise respecting the proper construction to be given to particular terms, which are, in their nature, ambiguous. Thus, writers on the laws of war have discussed the question, whether a truce for a given period, as, for instance, from the first of January to the first of February, will include or exclude the first day of each of these months. Grotius is of opinion, that the first day of January would be excluded, and the whole of the first day of February included. Puffendorf, Heineccius, and Vattel, would include in the truce both the day of its commencement and the day of its termination. Rutherford can see no good reason why one day should be excluded and the other included. 'One would rather think,' he says, 'that the first day is the beginning of the truce at one end, as the last day is the limit of it at the other end; and, consequently, that there is the same reason for reckoning the first day that there is for reckoning the last day, as a part of the time which is included in the truce.'

¹ Rutherford, *Institutes*, b. ii. ch. ix. § 22.

The rule, however, proposed by the English commissioners in their report on the practice of the English courts in 1831, is to compute the first day exclusively, and the last day inclusively, in all cases. The general rules laid down by treaty-writers, respecting the interpretation and observance of truces and other compacts in war, are necessarily somewhat indefinite, and questions almost always arise in their application to particular cases; it is, therefore, important that stipulations should be inserted in such compacts specifying what may and what may not be done by each party, both within and without the limits of the place, in case of a siege, or of the immediate theatre of military operations, if it be between belligerent forces in the field. Moreover, if the cessation of hostilities is for a given period of time, in order to avoid all ambiguity, the time should be precisely stated, from a certain hour of a certain day to a certain hour of another certain day; and if dates only are given, it should be stated whether or not either or both are included.¹

19. As a truce, or armistice, merely suspends hostilities, they are renewed at its expiration without any new declaration or notice: for as every one is bound to know the effect of such termination, no public declaration is required. But if the truce was for an indefinite period of time, justice and good faith require due notice of intention by the party who terminates it. If, however, the conditions of the truce be broken by one belligerent, there is no doubt that the other may immediately resume hostilities without any declaration. It is sometimes stipulated in the truce, that the violator shall pay a certain penalty for the violation. In such case the penalty should be demanded before a return to war, and, if paid, the right of hostilities does not occur. A truce is not broken by the acts of private persons, unless they are *ordered or ratified* by public authority. But, unless the private offenders are punished or surrendered, and unless the thing seized is restored, or compensated for, it is legally *presumed* that the act of the private offender was duly ordered or ratified. This is the rule of public law.

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. xvi. §§ 244, 245; Rutherford, *Instructions*, lib. ii. ch. ix. § 22; Grotius, *De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. iii. cap. xxi. § 1; Bynkershoek, *De Jure Nat. et Gent.*, lib. viii. cap. vii. § 8; Heineccius, *Elem. Juris*, lib. ii. cap. ix. § 308.

§ 10. *Capitulations* are agreements entered into by a commanding officer for the surrender of his army, or by the governor of a town, or a fortress, or particular district of country, to surrender it into the hands of the enemy. Capitulations usually contain stipulations with respect to the inhabitants of the place which is surrendered, the security of their religion, property, privileges and franchises, and also with respect to the troops or garrison, either allowing them to march out with their arms and baggage, with the honours of war, or requiring them to lay down their arms and surrender as prisoners of war. The general phrase 'with all the honours of war,' is usually construed to include the right to march with colours displayed, drums beating, etc. It is proper, however, that such matters should be precisely stated in the articles of capitulation. The authority to make capitulations falls within the scope of the general powers of the chief commander of the military or naval forces, or of the town, fortress, or district of country included in the capitulation. The power of the general or admiral to enter into an ordinary capitulation, the same as in the case of a truce, is necessarily implied in his office. So, of the chief officer of a town, fortress, or district of country. 'The governor of a town,' says Rutherford, 'is the commander of the garrison, that is of an army employed for the particular purpose of defending the town. The nature, therefore, of his trust implies that his compacts about surrendering the town will bind himself and the garrison. If he surrenders it when he might have defended it, or upon worse terms than he might have made, he is accountable to his own State for his misconduct; but the abuse of his power does not affect any compact which he makes, in consequence of that power.' But if unusual and extraordinary stipulations are inserted in the capitulation which are not within the ordinary and implied powers of the officer making it, they are not binding either upon the State or upon the troops. For example, if the general should stipulate that his troops shall never bear arms against the same enemy, or, if the governor of a place should agree to cede it to the enemy as a conquest, such agreements, not coming within his implied powers, would be null and void, unless special authority to that effect had been given to him.

his acts should subsequently receive the sanction of his Government.¹

§ 11. Small detached parties or individuals, whether belonging to the military service or not, who happen to fall in the enemy in a place distant from succour or any superior power, are left to their own discretion and may, so far as con-

Rutherforth, *Institutes*, b. ii. ch. ix. § 21; Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, § 291, 295; Burlamaqui, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, tome v. ch. vii; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 121; 'La Gloire,' p. 197; Omiteda, *Litteratur*, etc., t. ii. p. 648; Moser, *Versuch*, t. ix. pt. 1. pp. 157, 176; Heffter, *Droit International*, § 142.

The Brussels Conference, 1874, declares—Art. 46. The conditions stipulations shall be discussed by the contracting parties. These stipulations should not be contrary to military honour. When once adopted by a Convention they should be scrupulously observed by both

In April, 1865, General Grant wrote to General Lee that he proposed leave the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, viz. —

That rolls of all the officers and men were to be made in duplicate, copy to be given to an officer of the selection of the former, the other retained by whomsoever the latter might appoint

That the officers give their individual paroles not to take arms for the Government of the United States until properly exchanged, each commander of a company or regiment to sign a like parole for men. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and secured, and turned over to the officers appointed by the former to receive

That this do not include the side-arms of the officers, nor their horses or baggage.

That, this being done, each officer and man shall be allowed to return to his home, and shall not be disturbed by the United States army so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they reside.

General Lee accepted these terms on the same day, and the other armies subsequently surrendered on substantially the same terms.

An agreement made the same month between General Johnston, commanding the Confederate army, and Major-General Sherman, commanding the army of the United States, the Confederate armies then in power were to be disbanded and conducted to their several States respectively, thereon to deposit their arms and public property in the State capital, and each officer and man to agree to cease from acts of war, to oblige the action of both State and Federal authorities. The numbers of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the meantime to be used solely to maintain peace and within the borders of the different States. The Executive of the several States to reorganize the several State governments, on their officers taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United States. The Federal Courts in the several States to be re-established; the people and inhabitants of those States to be guaranteed the rights and franchises so far as the Executive could do so. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States not to disturb the people by reason of the war, so long as they lived in peace and quiet. In fact, a general amnesty to be established.

cerns their own persons, do everything which a commander might do with respect to himself and the troops under his command. Promises made by individuals under such circumstances, if confined to their own persons and within the sphere of a private individual, are valid and binding, and the sovereign has no right to release them from their obligations, or compel them to violate the compact. For, when a soldier can neither receive his sovereign's orders, nor enjoy his protection, he resumes his natural rights, and may provide for his safety by any just and honourable means in his power. Individual promises of this kind, made with competent powers, are of as binding a nature as truces and capitulations, and the good of the State equally requires that faith be kept on such occasions as in more formal agreements. Thus, a prisoner who is released on parole, is bound to observe it with scrupulous punctuality, nor can the sovereign oppose such observance of his engagement. But if a soldier is made prisoner in the vicinity of his commander and while under his immediate orders, he is not properly the master of his own acts or left to his own discretion, and, under ordinary circumstances, he should wait as prisoner of war, till his superiors can treat for his exchange or release. But if he falls into the hands of a barbarous enemy, and, to avoid a cruel imprisonment, or to save his life, he promises a ransom or services not treasonable, his agreement should be respected by his superiors.¹

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. xvi. § 264.

The Brussels Conference, 1874, declares Art. 31 Prisoners of war may be released on parole if the laws of their country allow it. In such a case they are bound on their personal honour to fulfil scrupulously, as regards their own government, as well as that which releases them prisoners, the engagements they have undertaken. In the same case their own government should neither demand nor accept of them any service contrary to their parole. Art. 32 A prisoner of war cannot be forced to accept release on parole, nor is the enemy's government obliged to comply with the request of a prisoner claiming to be released on parole. Art. 33. Every prisoner of war liberated on parole and retaken carrying arms against the government to which he has pledged his honour, may be deprived of the rights accorded to prisoners of war, and may be brought before the tribunals.

The following were among the regulations issued by the War Department of the United States, August 7, 1876, for the government of all persons attached to that service: -

CHAPTER XXI, Section II.—1. Paroling must always take place by the interchange of signed duplicates of a written document, in which the

112 A *passport*, or *safe-conduct*, is a document granting to persons or property an exemption from the operations of war, for the time, and to the extent prescribed in the instrument itself. The term *passport* is applied to personal permissions given on ordinary occasions, both in peace and war, where there is no reason why the parties named in them should not do where they please; while *safe-conduct* is the name usually given to the instrument which authorises an enemy, or an alien, to go into places where he could not go without danger, to carry on trade forbidden by the laws of war. The word *passport*, however, is more generally applied to persons, and

names and rank of the persons paroled are correctly and distinctly stated. One who intentionally mistakes his rank, forfeits the benefit of his parole, and is liable to punishment.

2. None, but commissioned officers, can give parole for themselves and their command, and no inferior officer can give parole without the authority of his superior, if within reach.

3. Paroling of entire bodies of men after a battle or capture, and the paroling of large numbers of prisoners, with a general declaration that they are paroled, is not permitted.

4. An officer who gives a parole for himself, or his command, without reporting to his superior, when it is in his power to do so, will be considered as giving aid and comfort to the enemy, and may be regarded as a deserter, and be punished accordingly.

5. For an officer the pledging of his parole is his individual act, but wholesale paroling by an officer for a number of inferiors in rank, in violation of paragraph 1, is permitted, or will be considered valid.

6. No person belonging to the navy, or marine corps, can give his parole, except through a commissioned officer. Individual paroles not given through an officer, are not only void, but make the individuals giving them amenable to punishment as deserters. The only admissible exception is, when individuals, separated from their commanders, have suffered long confinement, without the possibility of being paroled through an officer.

7. No prisoner can be forced by a hostile government to pledge his parole, and threats or ill-treatment to force giving parole, is contrary to the laws of war.

8. No prisoner of war can enter into an engagement, inconsistent with his character and duties, as a citizen or subject of his State. He can only bind himself not to bear arms against his captor, for a limited period, or on certain conditions, and this only with the stipulated or implied consent of his own government. If the engagement which he makes is not approved by his government, he is bound to return and surrender himself.

9. No prisoner can give his parole, that he will not bear arms against the government of his captors, or their allies, beyond the period of an exchange or release of prisoners, or during the period of the existing war.

10. While the pledging of the military parole is a voluntary act of the individual, the capturing power is not obliged to grant it.

11. Parole not authorised by the law of war, is not valid until approved by the government of the individual so pledging it; and pledging an unauthorised military parole is a military offence, punishable under the laws of war.

safe-conduct, to both persons and things. A passport is not transferable by the person named in the permission; but although there were no objections to giving the privilege to him, there might be very serious objections to the individual taking his place. It, however, generally includes the servant and personal baggage of the person to whom it is granted, unless there should be particular objection to the passage of such servants, or to the admission of the baggage; but to save all doubt and difficulty in such matters, it is usual to enumerate with precision every particular with respect to the extent of the indulgence. A safe-conduct for effects, without designating the person who is to introduce or remove them, may be introduced or removed by any agent of the owner, unless the agent selected should be personally objected to, as an object of suspicion or danger. Instruments of this kind are always to be taken strictly, and must be confined to the persons, effects, purpose, place and time, for which they are granted. But, if the person who has received a passport should be detained in an enemy's country by sickness, or by force, beyond the specified time, he should receive a new instrument, or be considered as still under the protection of the old one. But no detention by business, or by circumstances not entirely unavoidable, will entitle him to such indulgence. If, for example, he should take advantage of a suspension of hostilities to remain, he will do so at his peril, and if he should be found in an enemy's country at the termination of the truce, the time named in his passport having expired, he will be subject to the ordinary laws of war, without any claim for special protection. Passports and safe-conducts are of two kinds; those which are limited in their effect to particular places or districts of country, and those which are general and extend over a whole country. Those of the first class may be granted by military and naval officers, or governors of towns, to have effect within the limits of their respective commands, and such instruments must be respected by all persons under their authority. The power to issue such documents is implied in the nature of their trust. But a general passport, or safe-conduct, to extend over the whole country, must proceed from the supreme authority of the State, either directly or by an agent duly empowered to issue it.

¹ The Government of the United States declared, in August 1861,

4. A passport, or safe-conduct, may, for good reasons, be revoked by the authority which granted it, on the general principle of the law of nations, that privileges may always be revoked, when they become detrimental to the State. A passport granted by an officer may, for this reason, be revoked by his superior, but, until so revoked, it is as binding upon the successor as upon the party who issued it. The grounds for such revocation need not always be given; but pretensions of this kind can never be used as snares to get persons or effects into our power, and then, by a revocation, to treat the persons as prisoners, or confiscate the property. Such conduct would be perfidy toward an enemy, and contrary to the laws of war.¹

5. Any violation of the good faith and spirit of such passports entitles the injured party to indemnity against various consequences. Persons violating these instructions are also subject to punishment by the municipal laws of the State by which they are issued. Section twenty-eight of the Act of Congress, approved April 30th, 1790, provides that any person shall violate any safe-conduct or passport, obtained and issued under the authority of the United States, such person so offending, on conviction, shall be imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined at the discretion of the court. If a soldier or subordinate officer should violate a passport, or safe-conduct, issued by his superior, he is probably, also be subject to be punished for the offence under military law by a court-martial.²

6. *Safe-guards* are protections granted by a general or an officer commanding belligerent forces, for persons or property within the limits of their commands, and against depredations of their own troops. Sometimes they are granted to the parties whose persons or property are to be protected; at others they are posted upon the property itself,

and applied to prisoners of the Confederate States who asked for passports from the United States, and against whom no special charges had been made, would be furnished with passports upon application to the competent authority of State in the usual form.

¹ *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 163; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. i. p. 163; Gardien, *De la Diplomatie*, liv. vi. § 16; Bello, *Derecho Inter-*, pt. ii. cap. ix. § 4; Burlamaqui, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, pt. iv. ch. xi.

² *Statutes at Large*, vol. i. p. 118; Brightly, *Digest of Laws of U. S.*, p. 41.

justified in resorting to the severest in violation of the safety of their trust. rules and articles of war of the United 10th, 1806, provides that, 'whosoever, of the United States employed in fore *safe-guard*, shall suffer death.' A safe-kind of passport or safe-conduct, and according to the rules of interpretation instruments.¹

§ 16. A *cartel* is an agreement between exchange or ransom of prisoners of war of a war is not essentially necessary to but it is sufficient if they are entered in expectation of approaching hostilities; them may just as naturally arise from events, and parties may contract to guard quences of hostilities which they may gerents are bound to faithfully observe cartel party sent under a flag of truce to the provisions of a cartel, is equally to both. 'Good faith and humanity,' say preside over the execution of these designed to mitigate the evils of war, legitimate purposes. By the modern commissaries are permitted to reside in the countries, to negotiate and carry into ef

resort, by reprisals or vindictive retaliation.' In the United States such compacts are not deemed treaties in the sense of the Constitution. A cartel for the exchange of prisoners, between the United States and Great Britain, in 1813, was ratified by the American Secretary of State (May 14th).¹

§ 17. A *cartel ship* is a vessel commissioned for the exchange or ransom of prisoners of war, or to carry proposals from one belligerent to the other, under a flag of truce. Such commission and flag are considered to throw over the vessel, and the persons engaged in her navigation, the mantle of peace; she is, *pro hac vice*, a neutral licensed vessel, and her crew are also neutrals; and so far as relates to the particular service in which she is employed, she is under the protection of both belligerents. But she can carry no cargo, and no ammunition or implements of war, except a single gun for firing signals. This is regarded as a species of navigation which on every consideration of humanity and policy, should be conducted with the strictest regard to the original purpose, and to the rules which are built upon it, since, if this mode of intercourse be broken off, it will be followed by calamitous results to individuals of both belligerents. It is, therefore, said by high authority, that cartel ships cannot be too narrowly watched; and that both parties should take care that the service should be conducted in such a manner as not to become a subject of jealousy and distrust between the two nations. The authority to commission a cartel ship is supposed to emanate from the supreme power of the State, but it may be issued by a subordinate officer, in the due execution of a public duty. When a cartel ship appears to have been employed in the public service, and for the purposes of humanity, it will be presumed that the commission under which she acts was issued by the sanction of the councils of the State, until renounced by the sovereignty from which it is supposed to emanate. Thus, a cartel, granted by the Commander of the British forces, at Amboyna, to a Dutch

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 3; the 'Carolina,' 6 Rob., 336; 'La Gloire,' 5 Rob., p. 492; the 'Mary,' 5 Rob., p. 200; Martens, *Carte du Droit des Gens*, § 275; Gardien, *De la Diplomatie*, liv. vi. § 16. Paroles of prisoners of war are sacred obligations, and the national are pledged to their fulfilment. And cartels are of such force that the sovereign power cannot annul them. (United States *ex re Hen-*
erson v. Wright, 2 *Pittsb.*, p. 440.)

vessel, was held by Sir William Scott to be valid for the protection of the vessel from capture and condemnation.¹

§ 18. The rights, immunities, and duties of cartel ships have been matters of discussion and judicial decision in prize courts. Sir William Scott gave a very elaborate opinion on this subject, in the case of the 'Daifje' (3 Rob., 141). With respect to the character of the ships employed in such service he says it is generally immaterial whether they are merchant ships, or ships of war, but there may be extreme cases in which the nature of the ship might be material; 'as, if a line ship was to be sent on such service to Portsmouth or Plymouth, though she had prisoners on board, she would undoubtedly be an unwelcome visitor to a naval arsenal, and her particular character might fairly justify a refusal to admit her.' He was also of opinion that the cartel protected such ships, not only *in trajectu, adeundum et redeundum*, but also in going from one port to another to be fitted up and to take prisoners on board, although the passage of ships from one port to another of the enemy is liable to suspicion. Moreover that a vessel going to be employed as a cartel ship is not protected, by mere intention, on her way, for the purpose of taking on herself that character when she arrives. When it is necessary to send to another port for vessels for such purpose, it is proper to apply to the enemy's commissary of prisoners for a pass or special safe-conduct. The principal question to be decided in such cases, is that of intention; if the vessel is actually commissioned and employed as a cartel ship, if she is fitted out and conducts herself, in every respect, as a cartel ship, she is protected as such; but if she is acting fraudulently, she is liable to condemnation. Imprudence and negligence do not constitute fraud.

§ 19. The present usage of civilised nations is, as already

¹ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. 1. pp. 539, 540; the 'Carolina,' 6 Rob., 233; the 'Venus,' 4 Rob., p. 355.

A cartel ship may not trade, or carry a cargo, under pain of the confiscation both of ship and cargo ('La Rosine,' 2 Rob., 303). A vessel appointed before the breaking out of war, will not necessarily be condemned, for having taken a cargo on board since the war commenced. The 'Carolina,' *supra*.

Enemies carried on a cartel ship by their own consent must not engage in any act of hostility whilst on board.—The 'Mary,' 5 Rob., 300.

As to a cartel ship being a neutral licensed vessel, see Craswell v. William Penn, *Peters Circ. C.R.*, 106.

ated, to exchange prisoners of war, or to release them on their parole, or word of honour, not to serve against the captor again for a definite period, during the war, or till properly exchanged. But it was formerly the frequent practice for the State to leave to every prisoner, or at least during the war, the care of redeeming himself, and the captor had a lawful right to demand a *ransom* for the release of his prisoners. This practice gave rise to certain rules with respect to the interpretation of the particular agreements of this kind. As the captor was held responsible for the treatment of his prisoner, he could not divest himself of this responsibility by transferring him to another; but, having agreed with his prisoner concerning the price of his ransom, he could transfer the right to a third party, for the agreement then becomes a perfect contract, binding upon both parties, and the right to receive the price may be transferred by the captor to whosoever he pleases. If the prisoner should die before being set at liberty, although the price of the ransom should have been agreed upon, it was not held to be due from his heirs; but if he had obtained his liberty at the time of his death, good faith would require the payment of the price agreed upon. If he should be retaken by his own party after making the compact of ransom, but before its execution, it would not be due, because he was not set at liberty in virtue of the agreement. If he has concealed his rank and character in making the agreement as to the price of ransom, he is guilty of fraud, and, on its discovery, the captor is justified in refusing it. If he has agreed to perform any particular act, not inconsistent with his duty to his own State, as a consideration for his release, he is bound to perform it, and he is deserving of punishment for a neglect or refusal to fulfil his promise. At one time, the wealth to be amassed by the ransom of prisoners of war was one of the greatest inducements to military service, and curious instances of the importance which was attached to this consideration occur in history. Thus, when the Maid of Orleans was to be brought to her disgraceful trial, the advisers of the measure thought it right to pay her captors, whose property she had become, a sum equal to what it was supposed they might be able to take by her ransom.¹

¹ Hallam, *on Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 110; Martens, *Recueil de Traités*.

the captor, by which the latter pays
with his vessel, and gives him a re-
tion of a sum of money which the
and in the name of the owners
promises to pay at a future time
usually made in writing, in duplica-
by the captor, which is properly ca-
the other by the captured vessel,
The general law relating to the ransom
was fully and ably discussed by Stor-

§ 21. The contract of ransom is
tending to relax the energy of war,
the chance of recapture, and several
George III. absolutely prohibited
privilege of ransom of property cap-
case of extreme necessity, to be ju-
Admiralty. Other maritime natio-
ransoms as binding, and to be class-
mate *commencia belli*. They have n-
the United States, and the Act of Con-
interdicting the use of British licen-
apply to the contract of ransom.' 2

§ 22. The general authority to ca-

tome iii p. 361; Wheaton, *Flem. Int. Law*,
Hist of England, vol. v. p. 118; *U. S. Stat*
778, Niles, *Register*, vol. ii p. 382; Bello,
cap. ix, § 5; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*

by the belligerent State to its commissioned cruiser, involves the power to ransom captured property, unless prohibited by the law of the captor's own country. The contract made for the ransom of enemy's property taken at sea, is generally carried into effect by a safe-conduct issued by the captor, permitting the captured vessel and cargo to proceed to a designated port, by a prescribed route, and within a limited time, and such a document furnishes a complete legal protection against the cruisers of the same belligerent State, or its allies, during the period and within the terms prescribed in the safe-conduct. 'From the very nature of the connection between allies' says Kent, 'their compacts with the common enemy must bind each other,' when they tend to accomplish the objects of the alliance. If they did not the ally would reap all the fruits of the compact, without being subject to the terms and conditions of it; and the enemy with whom the agreement was made would be exposed, in regard to the ally, to all the disadvantages of it, without participating in the stipulated benefits. Such an inequality of obligation is contrary to every principle of reason and justice.'

§ 23. As a general rule, the captor, by the safe-conduct implied in a ransom-bill, simply guarantees the ransomed vessel against being interrupted in its course, or retaken by other cruisers of its own nation or of its allies, but not against loss by the perils of the sea. There is no implied insurance in the ransom-bill against such losses. If, therefore, the ransomed vessel should founder at sea, or be wrecked, and become a total loss, the contract is still binding, and the ransom-bill payable to the captor. But it is sometimes specified in the contract of ransom, that the loss of the vessel by the perils of the sea shall discharge the captured party from the payment of the ransom; such a clause is restrained to the case of a total loss *on the high seas*, and is not extended to stranding, which might afford the master a temptation to fraudulently cast away his vessel, in order to save the most valuable part of his cargo, and avoid the payment of the ransom.¹

§ 24. If the ransomed vessel should exceed the time, or deviate from the course, prescribed in the contract, she forfeits her safe-conduct, and is liable to recapture; and if retaken,

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 28; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. p. 110.

the debtors of the ransom are discharged from their obligation, which is merged in the prize, and the amount is deducted from the net proceeds thereof and paid to the first captor, whilst the residuc is paid to the second captor. But any variation from the course prescribed, or the time limited, by the contract, caused by the stress of weather, or unavoidable necessity, does not work a forfeiture of the safe-conduct. If the captor, after having ransomed an enemy's vessel, is himself taken by the enemy, together with the ransom-bill of which he is the bearer, this ransom-bill becomes a part of the capture made by the enemy; and the persons of the hostile nation, who were debtors of the ransom, are thereby discharged from their obligation under the ransom-bill. But questions relating to maritime captures and recaptures will be more particularly considered in the chapter on the rights and duties of captors.¹

§ 25. Sometimes a *hostage* is taken for the faithful performance of the contract on the part of the captured. The death or the recapture of the hostage does not discharge the contract of ransom, unless there is an express stipulation to that effect; for the captor takes the hostage only as a collateral security, and the loss of such collateral security does not cancel the contract, or discharge the debtor from his obligation to pay the ransom. 'The practice in France,' says K&T. 'when a French vessel has been ransomed, and a hostage given to the enemy, is for the officers of the Admiralty to seize the vessel and her cargo, on her return to port, in order to compel the owners to pay the ransom debt, and relieve the hostage; and this is a course dictated by a prompt and liberal sense of justice.' Vattel and others have given very minute rules in relation to hostages for prisoners. If a hostage be given in order to procure the liberty of a prisoner, and the prisoner die, the hostage should be set free, but if the hostage die, the prisoner is not thereby restored to his liberty. If, however, one prisoner has been substituted for another, the death of one releases the other. If a prisoner be released on condition of procuring the release of another, and that other dies before his liberty has been attained, it is said that the survivor is bound to return to

¹ Vide post, ch. xxxi.

his prison! No civilised nation would now impose such conditions.¹

§ 26. Contracts of ransom, like all other agreements being *jure belli*, and lawfully entered into between belligerents, suspend the character of enemy, so far as respects the parties to the contract. There can, therefore, be no just reason why the captor should not bring suit directly on the ransom-bill. And such appears to be the practice in the maritime courts of the European continent. The English courts, however, have decided that the subject of an enemy is not permitted to sue in the British courts of justice, in his own proper person for the payment of a ransom, on the technical objection of the want of a *persona standi in judicio*, but that the payment could be forced by an action brought by the imprisoned hostage in the courts of his own country for the recovery of his freedom. This technical objection is not based on principle, nor supported by reason, and the decision has not the sanction of general usage. 'The effect of this contract,' says Wheaton, 'like that of every other which may be lawfully entered into between belligerents, is to suspend the character of enemy, so far as respects the parties to the ransom-bill; and, consequently, the technical objection of the want of *persona standi in judicio* cannot, on principle, prevent a suit being brought by the captor directly on the ransom-bill.' And Mansfield considered this contract as worthy to be sustained by sound morality and good policy, and as governed by the law of nations and the eternal rules of justice. Licences of trade, which properly belong to *commercium belli*, will be discussed in a separate chapter.²

§ 27. As flags of truce are sometimes sent from the enemy to place forces in position, or on the march, or in action, nominally for making some convention, as for a suspension of arms,

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. xvii. §§ 278-286; Kent, *Comm. on Law*, vol. i. p. 107.

² *Antagonists* were taken, during the Franco-German War, 1870, in towns theoretically, but not practically, occupied. The mayor of Metz and his adjunct, for instance, were made hostages for having secured the arrest of some provision dealers engaged in supplying the enemy's army. As a rule, where a fine was imposed on a town, and not a fine, these two chief officials were kept in custody or under surveillance, the money was forthcoming.

³ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 28; Anthon v. Fisher, 10 A. 145 note; the 'Hoop,' 1 Rob. R., 169; Corun v. Blackburn, 1 B. & C., 641; Ricard v. Beutenham, 3 Burr. R., 1734.

but really with the design of gaining information, it is proper that restrictions should be placed upon its use. Thus, if sent to an army in position, the bearer of said flag should not be allowed to pass the outer line of sentinels, nor even to approach within the range of their guns, without permission. If warned away, and he should not instantly depart, he may be fired on. Similar precautions may be taken by an army on the march. If the flag proceeds from the enemy's lines during a battle, the ranks which it leaves must halt and cease their fire. When the bearer displays his flag, he will be signalled by the opposing force, either to advance, or to retire; if the former, the forces he approaches will cease firing; if the latter, he must instantly retire; for, if he should not he may be fired upon.¹

¹ Scott, *Military Dic.*, p. 304.

During the war in 1807, the British squadron, under Sir Edward Pellew, arrived off Point Pauka, and a commission, with a flag of truce, was immediately sent to the commandant of the Dutch navy to effect the surrender of the ships of war lying at Gressie. The Dutch commander thought fit to detain the boat, and to place in arrest the persons on board of her. He then sent one of his officers to Sir Edward, with a message of the unwarrantable step he had taken, accompanied with a flag of truce to deliver up the ships, although they were all in a dismantled state, and their guns on shore.

The Governor and Council of Sourabaya, a settlement about 150 miles higher up the river, and to which Gressie was subordinate, released the gentlemen of the commission and the boat's crew, disclaimed the measures pursued by the commodore, and offered to treat. By the next day the ships were delivered up to the British, but as they had previously been scuttled by the Dutch commodore, the British completed their destruction by burning them.—*Far. Nav. Hist.*, vol. iv. 358.

In the island of Cayenne, when the British were before Fort D'Armenas as a preliminary measure, Captain Yeo tried the effect of a flag of truce. The French general's advanced guard allowed the gig with the flag of truce to approach within a boat's length, then fired two volleys; and Lord Mulcaster and his party, and quickly retreated. Upon a second attempt a field piece was discharged at them.—*Ibid.*, vol. v. 211.

After the battle of Montebello, 1839, the French refused to receive flags of truce from the Austrian lines. But this was essential in order to conceal some manoeuvres.

In 1870 the Bishop of Strasburg, under a flag of truce, endeavoured to obtain permission from General Werder for the women and children to leave that town, but he was stopped at the outposts and informed that his application would be in vain. Eventually, on the arrival of the delegates from Switzerland, 1,400 old men, women, and children, were allowed to leave for that country.—Edwards, *Germans in France*.

The following were among the regulations issued by the Navy Department of the United States, August 7, 1876, for the government of persons attached to that service:—

CHAPTER XXI., Section I.—1. A flag of truce is, in its nature, of

1. Character of licences to trade—2.
- licences—4. Decisions on their authority—5.
- uniformity in British decisions—6. Re-
7. Intentions of grantor—8. Persons to
- the principal acts as agent for others—9.
11. Exception of a particular flag—12.
- during voyage—13. Protection before
- and quality of goods—15. Protection
- to alien enemy—17. If cargo be injured
19. Compulsory change of cargo—20.
- test re-exportation—21. Cause of re-
- destination—23. Intended ulterior des-
- for convoy—25. Capture before and after
- in licence—27. Licence does not act
- board, or not endorsed—29. Effect of
- blockade, etc., by licenced vessel.

§ 1. A *licence* is a kind of safe-conduct granted by a belligerent State to its own subjects, to neutrals, to carry on a trade which is prohibited by the laws of war, and it operates as a dispensation from those laws, with respect to the State to which the licence is granted. Its terms can be fairly construed to require the tribunals of the State under whose flag the vessel sails to be bound to respect such documents as *licences* in the ordinary state of war; but it is not justly to consider them as *per se* a grant of immunity. Licences are necessarily *ad hoc* and are carried beyond the evident intention for which they are granted; nevertheless they are

§ 3. For the same reasons, a *special licence* to individuals for a particular voyage, or for the importation or exportation of particular goods, must, as a general rule, also emanate from the supreme authority of the State. But there are exceptions to this rule growing out of the particular circumstances of the war in particular places. The governor of a province, the general of an army, or the admiral of a fleet, may grant licences to trade within the limits of their respective commands, and such documents are binding upon them and upon all persons who are under their authority, but they afford no protection beyond the limits of the authority of those who issue them. Thus, in the war between the United States and the Republic of Mexico, the governor of California and the commander of the Pacific squadron issued such licences, but it was not pretended that such protection extended beyond the limits of their respective commands. The peculiar circumstances of the case, the great distance from the seat of the supreme federal authority, the scarcity of provisions and supplies, and the want of American vessels on that coast, were deemed sufficient reasons for the exercise of that power.¹

§ 4. Licences have frequently been granted during the operations of a war, not only for the protection of an enemy trading in the country of a belligerent, but to authorise subjects to trade with the enemy; and the cases relative to their authority and legal effect are numerous, both in the reports of courts of Admiralty, and of common law. The leading case on this subject is that of the '*Hope*,' an American ship laden with corn and flour, and captured whilst proceeding from the United States to the Spanish peninsula, under the

Whitmore, 1 *East*, 475; *Taulman v. Anderson*, 1 *Taunt. R.*, 227, 228; *Mer v. Gordon*, 12 *East*, 296; the '*Charlotte*,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 387.

The Lord Lieutenant of Ireland cannot by proclamation or otherwise authorise a trading of British subjects with the enemy. - 12 *East*, 391; *Charlotte*, 1 *Dodon*, 391.

A general licence must be applied by evidence to the particular case in judgment; it makes part of the title of the party claiming to be licensed to show how he obtained possession of a licence, which in the term of it is general; it makes part of the plaintiff's case against the underwriter to connect himself with the property insured, and to show that it was lawfully insured. - *Rawlinson and others v. Janion*, 12 *East*, 221.

¹ *Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 27; *Letter of Sen. of California*, 31st Cong., 1st sess. H. of R., Ex. Doc., No. 17, p. 2; *Cushing, Opinions U. S. Atty. Gen.*, vol. vi. p. 630.

protection of instruments granted by the English admiral on the Halifax station, and the British consul at Boston. In pronouncing judgment in that case, Sir William Scott remarked, that no consul in any country, particularly in an enemy's country, is vested with power, in virtue of his office, to exempt the property of enemies from the effects of hostilities, and that an admiral could restrain the ships under his immediate command from committing acts of hostility, but could grant no safe-conduct of this kind beyond the limits of his own station. But such acts might be regarded as *spontaneous*, or agreements *sub spe rati*, to which a subsequent ratification, by the proper authority, would give validity. It was shown that these acts of its officers had been confirmed by an Order in Council, and a restitution of the property was decreed accordingly. But, in the case of the 'Charles,' and other similar cases, where the safe-conducts had been signed by an English admiral, and also by the Spanish minister in the United States, but not confirmed by the British Government, it was decided that the licences afforded no protection, being issued without proper authority. So, also, in cases of safe-conducts granted by the British minister, in the United States, to American vessels sailing with provisions to the island of St. Bartholomew. All were condemned where the licences were not expressly included within the terms of the confirmation by the Order in Council.¹

§ 5 There are very few American decisions on the subject of licences, and there is a great want of uniformity in those of the British Admiralty. Mr. Duer has pointed out and commented on the causes of this irregularity. Prior to the peace of Amiens, licences were regarded as an act of special grace, and most strictly interpreted, but, on the renewal of the war, the issuing of licences by England was regarded as a matter of national policy, rather than personal favour. The courts, in consideration of this policy, gave to these instruments the largest interpretation possible. 'Most of the reported cases on the subject of licences, were decided during the period that this liberal doctrine prevailed, and in many of them it is a matter of extreme difficulty to say, whether the determination was governed by the peculiar cir-

¹ The 'Hope,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 226; Johnson v. Sutton, *Doug. R.*, 254.

ed in the licence, must be pursued in its mode of
 son, and there must be an entire good faith on the part
 user, in executing it. And although, as before re-
 d, licences are not to be construed with a literal and
 tic accuracy, yet no greater latitude of interpretation
 mitted than corresponds with the intentions of the
 s, fairly understood; no other or greater deviation is
 d. than it may be justly presumed the grantor, with a
 edge of the circumstances, would himself have sanc-
 'It is a mistake,' says Duer, 'to suppose that the
 of the user may not be prejudiced by a construction of
 ant that is merely erroneous. It is absolutely essential,
 he will of the grantor shall be observed; so that, that
 shall be done which he intended to permit; whatever
 not mean to permit is absolutely interdicted. Hence,
 arty who uses the licence, engages, not only for fair
 ions, but for an accurate interpretation and execution
 grant.'¹

8. The *first* material circumstance to be considered in
 execution of a licence, with respect to the intentions of
 grantor and the good faith of the user, is, *the persons*
ad to use it. A licence is not a subject of transfer or
 ment, and however general may be the terms in which
 antees are described, those who claim for their property
 otection, must show that the application on which it
 asued was made in their behalf, and that the applicant
 d in the licence was, in truth, their agent. But if
 ed to a particular person by name, in behalf of himself

Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 398, 399; the '*Jonge Johannes*,'
 263; the '*Vriendschap*,' 4 *Rob.* 96.

The licence granted be conditional, it is incumbent on the party
 seeks to protect himself under it to conform to its requisitions.—
 the v. Whitmore, 1 *F. & M.* 475. If the conditions be only colour
 supplied with, the licence will be avoided by reason of the fraud.
 the v. Vaughan, 12 *East.* 302.

licence from the king to a particular person to import commo-
 of a certain description, being the property of the person specified,
 it be assigned so as to authorise the importation of goods which
 property of the assigner.—*Fleize v. Thompson*, 1 *Taunt.* 121.

where the goods licenced were, by the terms of the licence, to be
 property of J. B. & Sons, as specified in their bills of lading, it
 considered that the goods were not protected by a general bill of
 assigned to B, who possessed not even a qualified property,
 private bill of lading being transmitted to other persons as the
 their consignees.—*Fleize v. Walters*, 2 *Taunt.* 248.

and others, it is not necessary that the person named should have any share or interest in the property to which the licence relates; it is sufficient if he acted as agent of those to whom its exclusive use is appropriated. If the licence is by express words, made negotiable, or if no mention whatever is made of the persons upon whose application it is granted, or by whom it is to be used, it is a legitimate object of transfer and sale, and the purchaser is as fully protected as if it had been granted to him on his personal application.¹

§ 9. But where the licence is not made negotiable, and the persons named in the licence obtained it in their own name and not as the representatives and agents of others—the licence being *for themselves, their agents, or holders of the bills of lading*—it cannot protect the property of others in whom the grantees act as agents, and in which they are not interested. Thus, a licence to B. & S. and their agents will not protect the property of others for whom B. & S. may see fit to act as agents. But where a licence is issued to B. & S. Co., meaning under that denomination to include persons who had agreed to take part in the shipment made under such licence, such persons are held to be protected.²

¹ *Fleize v. Thompson*, 1 *Taunt. R.*, 122; *Warin v. Scott*, 4 *Taunt. R.*, 605; *Robinson v. Morris*, 5 *Taunt. R.*, 725; *Barlow v. Minter*, 1 *East.*, 311; *Busk v. Bell*, 16 *East.*, 3; *Rawlinson v. Janson*, 17 *East.*, 223; the 'Acteon,' 2 *Dod. R.*, 48; the 'Louisa Charlotte,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 308; *Fenton v. Pearson*, 15 *East.*, 419.

A privilege given by Act of Parliament to ships belonging to the State in amity with Great Britain and manned with foreigners, to transport merchandise, otherwise prohibited, does not extend to foreign ships, British owned. —*Attorney General v. Wilson*, 3 *Price*, 431.

A ship, foreign-built (American), belonging wholly to a British subject, and manned with foreign seamen (with an English mate, warranted within the 43 Geo. III. c. 153, entitled to import flax-seed from Russia) —*Attorney General v. Wilson*, 3 *Price*, 431.

A native Spaniard, domiciled in Great Britain in time of war, between that country and Spain, having been licensed in general terms to bring to ship goods in a neutral vessel from thence to certain ports in Spain, was held competent to effect an insurance on goods embarked in the protected commerce, and to sue in his own name on such insurance, as well in respect of his own interest, as for the benefit of his correspondents abroad. —*Usparecha v. Noble*, 13 *East.*, 332.

In time of war Switzerland and other interior countries have been allowed to export and import through an enemy's port, but strict proof of property has been required. The 'Magnus,' 1 *Rob.*, 32.

² The 'Jonge Johannes,' 4 *Rob. R.*, p. 265; the 'Christina Sophia,' 4 *Rob.*, 367.

10. The *second* point to be considered, in determining the proper execution of a licence, is, *the character of the ship*. The national character of the ship, as described in the licence, is, in most cases, a condition necessary to be fulfilled. Where the licence directs the employment of a neutral vessel belonging to a particular nation, the substitution of a neutral vessel of a different State, standing in the same political relations to the belligerent powers, would, probably, not be regarded as prejudicial. The same may be said of the employment of two ships, when the terms of the licence refer only to one, if both vessels bear the same national character, and there be no variation in the quantity or quality of the goods described in the licence. But, in both these changes, a good and satisfactory cause must be shown. If a neutral ship is mentioned in the licence, the employment of a ship of the enemy issuing the licence is considered an essential deviation, which will lead to a condemnation. So, the employment of a ship belonging to the enemy, when not authorised by the licence, is, in all cases noxious and fatal. When the licence authorises the importation of goods from an enemy's country, on an enemy's ship, although confined, in terms, to the goods, the just construction of law, it is extended to the vessel.

For the necessary effect of such a licence is to legalise the voyage as described, in all its incidents, and hence the ship is, as much a legitimate object of protection as the cargo which is to be brought in it.¹

11. When the licence authorises the transportation of goods by any ship or ships except those under the flag of a particular nation, the exception refers to the *fact* of the nationality of the ship, not merely to the external signs. Although the vessel may be documented as belonging to, and actually bear the flag of, another State, if it be shown that she really belonged to the excepted nation, she will not be protected by the licence and the flag. The reason of this rule is, that vessels of the excepted nation might otherwise engage in prohibited navigation, by substituting a foreign flag for their own. But the unauthorised employment of such excepted

¹ *Kensington v. Inglis*, 9 *East.*, 273; the '*Dankbaarheid*,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 140; the '*Vrouw Cornelia*,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 340; the '*Jonge Arend*,' 5 *Rob.*, 140; the '*Goede Hoffnung*,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 257; the '*Bourse*,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 341; the '*Speculation*,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 344; the '*Hoffnung*,' 2 *Rob.*, 140.

vessels is not permitted to affect the goods of shippers who were not privy to the deception, or cognisant of the act. Where there is no ground for imputing to them a voluntary departure from the conditions of the licence in this respect, their property, if embraced by its terms, retains its protective character. The vessel itself is condemned.¹

§ 12. Again, if the vessel was, in fact, not of the excepted nation when she sailed, but became so during the voyage, by some unexpected change of circumstances, as the conquest or annexation of the country to which she belongs, by the excepted State, such change of political relations will not deprive her of the protection of the licence, where the parties have acted fairly under it. Thus, where the licence was for a ship bearing any other flag than that of France, and the owners had become French subjects during the voyage, by the sudden annexation to France of the port and territory in which they resided, it was held by Sir William Scott, that the ship continued under the protection of the licence, notwithstanding this change of national character.²

§ 13. A licence to a vessel to import a particular cargo is held to protect a vessel, in ballast, on her way to the port of lading, for the express purpose specified in the licence. It is also, a licence to export a cargo to an enemy's port, on board the ship, in ballast, on her return. In each of these cases the voyage to which the licence is extended by implication has a necessary connection with that to which it expressly relates. But the protection extends no further than is necessarily implied in the licence; the taking of any part of a cargo on board in the outward voyage in the case of importation, or on the return voyage in the case of exportation, subjects the ship and goods to confiscation.³

§ 14. The *third* point to be considered in the execution of

¹ The 'Bourse,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 370; the 'Dankbaarheid,' 1 *Id.* 711.

² But a licence granted to a vessel to sail in ballast from the port of Holland, which country was at that time in a state of hostility, not standing anything contained in the British Order of Council of the 20th April, 1809, was held not to protect a ship which was the property of an alien enemy, and the insurance on the vessel was determined to be void.—Gregg v. Scott, 4 *Compt.*, 331. In this case the licence was held to be only a dispensation with the Order in Council, and was not to be regarded as a remission of the belligerent rights of the Crown.

³ Doer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 599, 612.

⁴ Le Cheminant v. Pearson, 4 *Faint. R.*, 367; the 'Friedrichsdorf,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 316.

ance is, *the quality and quantity of goods it protects*. A
excess in quantity, or the partial substitution of those of
erent quality, if free from the imputation of concealment
ud, will not absolutely vitiate the licence, under the
r of which they were introduced. The goods not pro-
d by it are condemned, while those which it is admitted
brace are restored. If the excess in quantity be very
l, and not attributable to design, it is intimated by Sir
am Scott, that it would not be regarded as an essential
tion; but any change in the quality of the goods cannot
stified or excused, and the articles not protected by
licence are condemned. The fraudulent application of a
ce to cover or conceal goods not intended by the grantor,
as it wholly void, and exposes to confiscation even the
that are embraced in its terms. Thus, where a vessel
icensed to proceed only with a cargo of corn on the
ge described, and a quantity of firearms was stowed under
argo for concealment, both ship and cargo were con-
ed.¹

15. It was at one time held, that express words were
ary to protect the property of an *enemy*; but it was
y decided by the Court of Exchequer chamber, that a
e containing the words, 'to whomsoever the property
appear to belong,' included goods shipped on account
emy's subjects. But Mr. Duer expresses a doubt
er this last decision was not to be referred to the
ar circumstance of the war, and to be regarded as the
of the extreme liberality of construction which prevailed
gland at that particular time.²

Widman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. pp. 256, 257; the 'Jonge Clara,' 1 *Edw.*
the 'Juffrow Catharina,' 5 *Rob.*, 141; the 'Nicoline,' 1 *Edw. R.*,
the 'Vriendschap,' 4 *Rob.*, 96; the 'Goede Hoop,' *Edw. R.*, 336;
Catharina Maria,' *Fife. R.*, 337; the 'Wolfarth,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 365;
Verstadt,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 241; Kier v. Andrade, 6 *Taunt. R.*, 498.
Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 604, 605; the 'Cousine Marianne,'
R., 346; the 'Hoffnung,' 2 *Rob.*, 162; the 'Beurse van Konings-
Rob., 169; Mennett v. Bohnam, 15 *East. R.*, p. 477; Uspancha
e. 13 *East. R.*, 332; Foyle, v. Bourdillon, 3 *Taunt. R.*, 546;
Bell, 4 *Taunt. R.*, 478; Anthony v. Moline, 5 *Taunt. R.*, 711;
Conex v. Andrews, 5 *Taunt. R.*, 716; Robinson v. Touray, 1 *M.*
R., 217; Hullman v. Whitmore, 3 *M. and Sel. R.*, 337.
licence granted to certain British subjects on behalf of themselves
ers to export in a specimed ship bearing any flag, except the
a cargo from London to Archangel, being an enemy's port, and
it from thence, in the same ship, certain articles of a particular

§ 16. A licence to an alien enemy removes all his personal disabilities, so far as is necessary for his protection in the particular trade which is rendered lawful by the operation of the licence. In respect to the voyage and trade which the licence is intended to authorise and cover, he is not to be regarded as an enemy, but has all the legal privileges of a subject. So far as that particular voyage, trade, or cargo is concerned, he has a *persona standi* in all the courts, and may maintain suits in his own name, the same as a subject.¹

description to any port in the United Kingdom, notwithstanding all the documents which accompanied the ship and cargo, may represent the same to be destined to any neutral or hostile port, and to whomsoever such property may appear to belong. *Edw. 20*, is considered capable of protecting a cargo, either outwards or homewards, which is in the whole or in part the property of an alien enemy.—*Hulkman v. Whitmore*, 3 *M. and S.*, 100, 307.

So a licence granted to C. and H., who were shipowners in London on behalf of themselves and British or neutral merchants, to import and export a cargo on board the Russian ship 'Fortuna,' from London to any port in the Baltic not under blockade, was held to protect a cargo of property exported from this country on a voyage to a Russian port, Russia being at war with Great Britain.—*Rucher v. Ansry*, 3 *M. and S.*, 25.

¹ *Morgan v. Oswald*, 3 *Taunt. R.*, 555; *Uspancha v. Noble*, 15 *F. R.*, 332; *Fbindt v. Scott*, 5 *Taunt. R.*, 674; 15 *East. R.*, 525; *Fisher v. Pearson*, 15 *East. R.*, 419.

His Majesty, says Lord C. B. Comyn, may grant letters of safe conduct to an enemy, and by this means take him into his keeping and protection; see *Com. Dig. Precog. B. 5*; *Wells v. Williams*, 1 *Ad. R.*, 175, and independently of letters of safe conduct or passports, a person residing in this country by the licence and under the protection of the Sovereign, is not to be regarded as an alien enemy. See *Wells v. Williams*, 1 *Ad. Raym.*, 282. In like manner, an insurance may be effected upon the interest of an alien enemy under the protection of a licence from the Crown.—*Hallman v. Whitmore*, 3 *M. and S.*, 38.

In the course of the wars of 1810, the conflicting relations in which the different States of Europe were placed towards one another by the overruling power of France rendered it necessary for the interest of Great Britain that the prerogative of granting licences should be resorted to and called into exertion. Acts of Parliament were also passed, by which powers were given, during the war, to the King in Council, and to the Secretary of State, to a greater extent than the King's prerogative was alone sufficient to authorise; and, in particular, of granting dispensations, conjunctures, dispensations from the navigation laws, which, being in statutes of the realm, could not be encroached upon by the unassisted prerogative of the Crown.—See *Shiffner v. Gordon*, 12 *East.*, 296, and statutes of George III., 4, c. 3; 45, c. 34; 47, c. 37; 48, c. 37; 48, c. 151; 49, c. 25; 49, c. 60.

The licences so issued were in general granted to British subjects, but sometimes to alien enemies, and generally for certain voyages either to or from an enemy's country, either to export commodities with which the British markets were overstocked, or to import such articles as they stood in need of. Much contrariety of opinion existed with respect to

§ 17. The protection of a licence is not limited, in all cases, to the cargo originally shipped; for if the original cargo should be accidentally injured or spoiled, it may be replaced by a second one, *precisely corresponding* with that described in the licence. A licence, says Wildman, was granted to a neutral vessel to import a specified cargo from Amsterdam; the ship having taken on board her cargo, sailed from Amsterdam, but was obliged to put into Medemblick, which bears the same relative situation to Amsterdam that Gravesend does to London. At Medemblick it was necessary to unload the cargo, which was found to be so much damaged that it was not fit to be put on board again. The old cargo was therefore sold, and a new one of the same identical nature with the first, corresponding with it both in substance and quality, was put on board. It was held that, under these circumstances, the parties were not deprived of the protection of the licence. The case would have been widely different, if goods of a different description had been taken instead of the original cargo. Here the original purpose was pursued; no new speculation was originated, nor was there any change, except such as was produced by time, and unavoidable accidents.¹

§ 18. A licence to export goods to an enemy's port, although

is to be put on these licences, and in particular on the question whether to any, and to what extent a licence of this kind operated to remove the personal disabilities of an alien enemy who may be interested in the property, being a high act of sovereignty, care must be taken that the licence is not extended beyond the intention of the power from which it emanated, and that it is not by too great a latitude of interpretation made auxiliary to the purpose of fraud.

But subject to this limitation the rule was that the licence should receive a liberal construction to effectuate the purpose for which it was intended, and that the terms which it contained were not to be limited in construction, where the adventure contemplated had been fairly pursued. It should be remembered that a licence is granted not so much for the benefit of the individual upon whom it is conferred, as for the promotion of the national interest; and the strictness of interpretation, which may be applicable in the case of a grant of property from the Crown, cannot be exercised towards such an instrument. A licence of this nature, legalising a particular adventure, incidentally legalises all the measures necessary to be adopted for its due and effectual prosecution; it therefore implicitly allows a person whose commerce it authorises, although he be an alien enemy, to protect his interest by insurance; and a British agent, in whose name the insurance is effected, may bring an action upon the policy even during the continuance of the war.—Kensington v. Ingles, 8 East, 273.

¹ Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 258; the 'Wolfarth,' 1 Dod. R., 305; *Alkin v. Glover*, 4 Tunn. R., 717.

limited in terms to the outward voyage, is sufficient to protect both ship and cargo on the return, if the delivery of the goods at the port of destination was prevented by some inevitable accident, as a blockade, or a reasonable apprehension of seizure. But to entitle himself to the benefit of this liberal construction, the claimant must prove that the goods brought back are the identical goods exported under the licence.¹

§ 19. It is never admitted as a valid excuse for receiving on board goods not permitted in the licence, that compulsion had been used by the hostile government, and that they were received only to avoid the seizure of the vessel. If such an excuse were admitted, it would open the door to fraud and collusion, as it would be difficult, if not impossible, to discover whether such a transaction, taking place in an enemy's port, was voluntary or not.²

§ 20. Where a licence is given expressly for *importation*, it is held that it can be used for that purpose only, and not for re-exportation. Although the application should be made for a licence to import, for the particular and special purpose of re-exportation, the permission to import would extend no further than was expressed in the instrument itself. So, too, a licence to import for the purpose of exportation, with condition of putting cargo in government warehouses, as security for re-exportation, must be strictly complied with. Such a licence does not cover importations for sale.³

§ 21. The *fourth* point to be considered in determining the due execution of the licence is, *the course and route of the voyage*. The requisitions of a licence as to the port of shipment or delivery, of departure or destination, must be strictly followed. The same may be said, in general, with respect to the course of the voyage. If the licence directs that the ship shall stop at a particular port for convoy, the neglect or omission to comply with the direction invalidates the licence. The same result would follow the touching for orders at an interdicted port; but a deviation, for the same purpose, to neutral or other port not forbidden, although not authorise-

¹ The 'Jonge Frederick,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 357.

² Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. 1. p. 608; the 'Catharina Maria,' *Edw. R.*, 337; the 'Seyersadt,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 241.

³ The 'Vrouw Deborah,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 160.

depends in some degree upon the time of capture. If such vessel be seized on her way to such intermediate port the presumption of law is that she was going thither for the purpose of violating the licence. But if taken after leaving the intermediate port, with the identical cargo which she carried in, and while actually proceeding for her lawful destination, the presumption of *mala fides* would be removed. Touching at an *interdicted* port vitiates the licence, unless expressly permitted in the licence itself.¹

§ 26. The *fifth* point to be considered is *the time limited in the licence*. There is a material distinction between the construction of a licence for the exportation of goods to an enemy's port, and one for an importation merely. Where the licence requires that the goods to which it relates shall be exported on or before a certain day, a delay for a single day beyond that which is specified, renders the licence wholly void. But not so with respect to importations. If the purchaser having a licence be prevented from commencing the voyage, or be delayed in its prosecution by stress of weather, the act of a hostile government, or other similar cause, over which he has no control, the time thus consumed is not to be considered in computing the period that the government intended to allow. But if he takes upon himself, at his own discretion, to extend the period specified, he loses the protection to which he would otherwise have been entitled.²

§ 27. A licence does not act retrospectively, and cannot take away any interest which is vested by law in the captor. Thus a vessel was captured on the 24th January, with an expired licence on board. Another licence was obtained, and its date carried back to January 20th. It was held by the court that the vessel at the time of capture was not protected either by the licence which had expired, or by that subsequently obtained.³

¹ The 'Europa,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 342; the 'Frau Magdalena,' 1 *Law. R.*, 367; the 'Hoppet,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 369.

² The 'Sarah Maria,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 361; the 'Diana,' 2 *Asi. R.*, 34; the 'Æolus,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 300; Williams v. Marshall, 6 *Taunt. R.*, 39; Tullock v. Boyd, 7 *Taunt. R.*, 468; Freeland v. Walker, 4 *Taunt. R.*, 478; Effarth v. Smith, 5 *Taunt. R.*, 329; Stiffen v. Glover, 4 *Taunt. R.*, 77; Leevin v. Corniac, 4 *Taunt. R.*, 483; Stiffen v. Allnut, 1 *M. and Sel.*, 39; Groning v. Crockett, 3 *Camp. R.*, 55.

³ Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. 1, p. 618; Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. II, p. 265; the 'Vrouw Deborah,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 160, the 'St. Ivan,' *Edw. R.*

§ 28. Moreover, a licence, not on board at the time of capture, but afterwards endorsed for it by the shipper, is no protection. If the licence be general in its terms, the mere fact of its being found on board is not sufficient, unless it has been appropriated to such ship by an endorsement to that effect, or by some positive evidence that this application was intended by the parties entitled to its use. These rules are obviously necessary to prevent a misapplication of the licence by persons not having a right to avail themselves of its protection.¹

§ 29. A licence is vitiated and becomes a mere nullity by an alteration of its date. In this respect licences are governed by the same rules as other grants issued by the supreme power of the State; they are utterly vitiated by any fraudulent alteration, and any change is *primâ facie* fraudulent. It may, however, be explained.²

§ 30. A licence to trade with a port of the enemy does not serve as a protection for a breach of blockade, in case the port is blockaded; nor does it afford any protection for carrying goods contraband of war, enemy's despatches, or military persons, or for a resistance of the right of visitation and search; in fine, it can cover no act not expressly mentioned in the licence or implied as a means necessary for its execution.³

6; the 'Edel Catharina,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 45; *Henry v. Stanniforth*, 4 *mp. R.*, 270.

¹ The 'Speculation,' *Edw. R.*, 344; the 'Fortuna,' *Edw. R.*, 236; the *Arcturion*, *Edw. R.*, 339.

² The 'Louise Charlotte,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 308; the 'Aurora,' 4 *Rob.*, 218; the 'Diana,' 2 *Act. R.*, 54.

³ The 'Nicoline,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 364; the 'Acteon,' 2 *Dod. R.*, 54; the 'Field,' 1 *Edw. R.*, 190.

RIGHTS AND DUTIES

1. Of captures generally—2. Of marine
 fit they ensure 4. Title, when dis-
 taken—6. Of joint captures gener-
 public vessels of war—8. When act
 joint chase—10. Antecedent and suc-
 ciated in same enterprise—12. Of
 Convoying ships—14. Vessels detain-
 ed by land and sea forces—16. By pub-
 lic captures not allowed to private
 letters of marque—19. Joint capture
 By prize masters—22. By non-commis-
 sion vessels of war and privateers, etc.—23
 benefit of joint capture—25. Distribu-
 tion—26. Distribution of head-money—27
 seizure of claims to prize—29. Liabil-
 ity—30. Of commanders of fleets
 privateers—32. Duties and responsibil-
 ity—agents.

§ 1. WE have discussed, in the previous chapter, the rights of war over enemy's property, and the hostile by the acts of its owners, and its use or disposition ; it remains to discuss particularly the rights and duties of its capture. In principle, capture is not dependent upon the time it happens to be made, nevertheless the courts have established rules for the capture of property different from those applicable to the capture of persons. The latter have, for a long time, been

But there must be a manifest intention *to retain* as prize as well as an intention *to seize*, otherwise the capture will be regarded as abandoned. It is therefore generally necessary for the officer who seizes a prize to commit her to the care of a competent prize master *and crew*, because of a want of right to subject the captured crew to the authority of the captor's officer. But the capture is not abandoned, though even a prize-master is put on board, if the captured crew be subjects of the same government as the captor. It has been shown that, as a general rule, all property belonging to the enemy found afloat upon the high seas, and all property so situated belonging to subjects, neutrals, or allies, who conduct themselves as belligerents, may be lawfully captured. All property condemned is, by fiction, or rather by intendment, of law, the property of enemies; that is, of persons to be so considered in the particular transaction. Hence, prize acts and laws of capture, with reference to enemy's property, are construed to include that of subjects, neutrals, and allies, who, in the particular transaction, are to be regarded as enemies. It has also been shown that a belligerent can exercise no rights of war within the territorial jurisdiction of a neutral State, and that this jurisdiction extends, not only within ports, headlands, bays, and the mouths of rivers, but to a distance of three miles from the shore itself. All captures, therefore, made by belligerents, within these limits, are, in themselves, invalid. But this invalidity can be set up only by the government of the neutral State, for, as to it only, is the capture to be considered void; as between enemies, it is deemed, to all intents and purposes, rightful. With respect to the enemy, no right is thereby violated; but with respect to the neutral, an offence has been committed, and he may restore the prize if in his power, or otherwise demand satisfaction. But if he omits or declines to interpose any claim, it is condemnable, *jure belli*, to the captors. Captures, as already shown, may be made not only by public ships of war and vessels commissioned as privateers, but also by non-commissioned vessels, boats, tenders, etc. This general right to make captures, results from the law of war, which places all the inhabitants of one belligerent State in the position of public enemies toward all the inhabitants of the other belligerent State. There, however, is a marked distinction between the rights of the captured pro-

to settle upon the principle, that the captor acquires an inchoate title by possession alone, and that, to make this complete and perfect, a condemnation by a competent court of prize is necessary. By the ancient law of Europe, the *perductio infra præsidia, infra locum tutum*, was considered necessary for the conversion of the property captured; but much difficulty arose as to what constituted a *perductio infra præsidia*. By a late usage, a possession of twenty-four hours was sufficient to divest the title of the former owner. This, according to the commentaries of Grotius and Barbeyrac, is the meaning of the 287th article of the *Consolato del Mare*. Bynkershoek and Grotius express themselves to the same effect, and Loccenius considered this rule as the general law of Europe. Lord Stair decided this to be the rule of law in Scotland, and, according to Valin, a similar practice prevailed in France. It was also the ancient law of England, that the former owner was divested of his property, unless it was reclaimed *ante occasum solis*. The ordinance of 1649 directed a restitution upon salvage to British subjects, although the common law still prevailed when the enemy had fitted out the prize as a vessel of war. As England became more commercial, it became her settled policy to regard the property of a captured vessel as not changed, without a regular sentence of condemnation, pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the title from the time of capture, till such condemnation, as in abeyance, and not capable of being transferred. This principle is not only recognised by her prize courts, but is now firmly incorporated into her common law. The same rule is adopted by the courts, and incorporated into the statutes of the United States. But, as most of the continental States of Europe adhere, in a measure, to their ancient practice, both Great Britain and the United States adopt toward them, in case of recaptures, the rule of reciprocity, giving to them the same measure of justice, which they mete out to others. But this question belongs more properly to another branch of the subject, and will be discussed in the chapter on the rights of postliminium and recapture.¹

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii., §§ 11, 12; Phillimore, *Int. Law*, vol. iii., §§ 407, et seq.; Grotius, *De Jur. Bel. ac Pac.* lib. i. cap. vi., § 3; Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pab.* lib. i. cap. v.; Loccenius, *Mandatum*, ii. v., § 4, 5; Goss et al. v. Withers, 2 Barr. 6; the 'Ceylon,' 1 Desh. R., 105; the 'L'Actif,' *Edw. R.*, 185; Assenier.

15 It is incumbent on the captor to bring his prize, as speedily as may be consistent with his other duties, within the jurisdiction of a court competent to adjudicate upon it. But if prevented by imperious circumstances from bringing it in, he may be excused for taking it to a foreign port, or for selling it, provided he afterwards reasonably subjects its proceeds to the jurisdiction of a competent court of prize. The court within whose jurisdiction the proceeds of the sale are brought, takes cognizance of the case, and adjudicates not only upon the validity of the original capture, but also upon the disposition which has been made of the captured property. But this subject will be more particularly considered in another place.¹

¹ Cambridge, 10 *Mod. R.*, 77; Brymer v. Atkins, 1 *H. Black. R.*, 189; the 'Sudeten,' 1 *Rob.*, 117; the 'Estrella,' 4 *Wheat. R.*, 298.

Cotton belonging to the Confederate Government was sold by a person who came through the rebel lines for that purpose to A. A., procuring the assistance of United States troops, proceeded to where the cotton was stored in charge of an officer of the Confederate Government, secured it, and forwarded it to a military post of the United States. The officer in command at this post, seized the cotton and turned it over to the quarter-master. Subsequently the quarter-master delivered the cotton to A., who shipped it North. Before it reached its destination, it was again seized by military authority. After the release of the cotton by the quarter-master, and prior to the last seizure, A. sold it to third parties, who were informed of the facts. It was held, that the title of the United States related back to the time of original capture; that if the surrender of the cotton to A. was through a fraudulent connivance between him and the quarter-master, such surrender was not voluntary, within the legal meaning of the term; that the third parties (the claimants) having knowledge of the facts, were not protected, and that the cotton must be condemned.—*United States v. Two hundred and sixty-nine and a half Bales of Cotton*, *Rev. Cas.*, 2, 64.

The title of the absolute owner prevails in a prize court, over the interests of a lien holder, whatever the equities between those parties may be.—The 'Winfred,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 2.

Where a merchant purchased a cargo of coffee for enemy correspondence, partly with their funds and partly with his own, and shipped under a bill of lading by which it was to be delivered to his order, and a statement thereon that part of the coffee was the property of the merchants.—Heid, that as he had the legal title and possession, he was not deemed a lien holder, but rather a trustee with the right of retention in his advance should be repaid. In such cases, a prize court will look to the legal title, dealing with the beneficiary interest.—The 'Amy Warwick,' 2 *Sprague*, 150.

² Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. v. § 5; the 'Peacock,' 4 *Rob.*, 192; Jecker et al v. Montgomery, 13 *Howard R.*, 516; the 'Principe,' 1 *R.*, 70; the 'Wilhelmina,' 5 *Rob.*, 142; the 'Washington,' 6 *Rob.*, 5; the 'Madonna del Burso,' 4 *Rob.*, 169; the 'Corrier Marittimo,' 1 *Rob.*, 287.

The following were among the regulations issued by the Navy Department of the United States, August 7, 1876, for the government of persons attached to that service:—

CH. XX.—2. When a vessel is seized as a prize, it shall be the duty of

§ 6. *Joint captures* are those made by two or more vessels acting in conjunction, or by one or more vessels with the co-operation of land forces. Where all captured property

the commanding officer of the vessel making the capture to cause all the hatches and passages leading to the cargo to be secured and sealed, except such as it may be indispensably necessary to keep open. The log-book, and all papers relating to the vessel and cargo, shall also be sealed up, and placed in charge of the prize-master, for delivery with the vessel and cargo.

3. Should it be necessary to take out of a vessel seized as a prize any property, either for its better preservation or for the use of the vessel or armed forces of the United States, a correct inventory, and a certificate of appraisement of its value, by suitable officers qualified to judge, shall be made. This inventory and appraisement to be made in duplicate, one of which is to be transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy and the other to the judge or the United States' attorney of the district to which the prize may be sent.

4. If it should become necessary to sell any portion of captured property, a full report of the facts must be made to the United States' attorney or judge of the district court to which the prize is sent, and any proceeds of sale shall be held subject to the order of the said judge.

5. The prize-master will vigilantly guard the property intrusted to his care from spoliation and theft, these offences leading to a forfeiture of prize-money, and such other punishment as a prize-court may inflict, both of the crew and the prize-master.

6. The commanding officer of any vessel making a capture shall report to the Navy Department, and to the judge of the court to which the prize is sent, all the material facts, including the names of all vessels within signal distance at the time, with all the circumstances of their position.

7. The commanding officers of all vessels claiming to share in a prize will cause the prize-list to exhibit not only the name and rank of each person but also the rate of the annual or monthly pay of each person before the books at the time of the capture to which the list refers. They will also forward a statement of their claims, with the grounds upon which they are based, to the Navy Department, and to the judge of the district court to which the prize is sent.

8. The master of the captured or seized vessel, and as many of the officers and crew as can properly be taken care of, shall be sent on board of the prize-master, who will report immediately on his arrival to the United States' attorney, as well as to the Navy Department. The master and supercargo, after the master, are the most important witnesses before a prize-court, and should always be sent with the vessel, or carried to the port to which she may be sent for adjudication, without delay.

9. In time of war the commanding officer of a vessel is to exercise constant vigilance to prevent supplies of arms, munitions, and other articles being conveyed to the enemy, yet under no circumstances will he seize any vessel within the waters of a friendly nation.

10. A commanding officer in time of war is to exercise the right of visitation and search on all suspected vessels other than neutral vessels at war, but in no case is he authorised to fire at a vessel without displaying his colours and giving her notice of a desire to speak and to visit her. A blank cartridge is to be fired; second, a shot fired wide of her; third, a shot fired at the vessel; nor is he to fire at any such vessel or crew in an act of hostility or of authority within a marine league of any neutral country with which the United States is at peace.

11. When a visit is made, a vessel, if neutral, is not to be

med to the government, it is of very little importance to be considered the real captors, where several lay to that title ; but where captured property is condemned

a search renders it reasonable to believe that she is engaged in contraband of war for or to the enemy, and to his ports, directly or indirectly, or unless she is attempting to violate a blockade established in the United States. If, after any visitation and search, it shall appear that the vessel is, in good faith and without contraband, actually bound on her way from one neutral port to another, and not bound or prohibited to or from a port in the possession of the enemy, then she cannot lawfully be seized. It is the duty of the officer making the search to enter upon the ship's register or licence the fact of the visit, the nature of the search, by what vessel made, the name of her commanding officer, the date and longitude, the time of detention, and when released.

In order to avoid difficulty and error in relation to papers found on a neutral vessel that may have been seized, the commanding officer will take care that official seals, or fastenings of foreign authorities, in case broken, and that parcels covered by them are never read by naval authorities ; but that all bags or other covering of such nature are remitted to the prize-court.

The officers and crew of a neutral vessel seized are not to be detained except by detention on board, unless by their own conduct they render further restraint necessary. Their personal property is to be protected, and a full and proper allowance of provisions is to be distributed to them. If any cruelty or unnecessary force is used towards them, a prize-court will decree damages to the injured parties.

A neutral vessel seized is to wear the flag of her own country until she is adjudged to be a lawful prize by a competent court. The flag of the United States, however, may be exhibited at the fore, to indicate that she is, for the time, in the possession of officers of the United States.

The form of a letter of instructions to be given to prize-masters is as follows :

‘ United States S —————
‘ Off —————.

‘ You will take charge of the —————, captured on the —————, 18—, by —————, and proceed with the said prize to the port of —————, and there deliver her with the accompanying papers (here all that were found on board), and the persons sent as witnesses to the judge of the United States district court, or to the United States prize commissioners at that place, taking his or their receipt for her. You will not deliver either the vessel, the papers, or the witnesses to the order of any other person or parties unless directed to act by the Navy Department or flag officer commanding the station to which you are attached.

‘ Upon your arrival at ————— you will immediately report in person to the commanding or senior navy officer of the navy yard or station, and show him these instructions ; and you will report also, by letter, to the Secretary of the Navy, stating in full the particulars of your capture, and transmit to him, through the commandant or senior officer, the names of the officers and men composing your prize crew, and the communications for the Department with which you may be connected. You will on your arrival allow no person to leave the vessel without permission from the commandant of the station, nor go on shore except on your necessary duty. You will not sleep out of the vessel on charge, nor allow any boats to approach and

as prize to the benefit of the captors, it becomes a question of special interest to determine who are, in law, to be considered as captors, and, consequently, to share in the prize. As a general rule, all the parties who are actually engaged in the seizure, or who directly contribute to the surrender, are properly to be considered as joint captors, and, consequently,

only official persons on duty to come on board. You will without delay after reporting call upon the United States attorney at _____, show him these instructions which are issued by order of the Secretary of the Navy, and give him all the information in your power respecting the circumstances connected with the capture of the _____. You will then report and show these instructions to the naval prize commissioner of the district, who is hereby directed to ascertain and notify you of the exact date at which your attendance shall no longer be required by the court, and to endorse the notification on this paper. You will on being discharged from attendance, if not in the meantime instructed, and whenever you need instructions respecting yourself, officers, or prize crew, immediately report to the commandant of the nearest yard or station or senior officer for such instructions. You will particularly bear in mind and strictly observe the injunctions of the law and of the department respecting captured property or persons under your charge, and recollect that you will be held rigorously responsible for any mismanagement of the trust confided to you. You, your officers, and prize crew are hereby detached from the _____ and you will be careful to apply for and take with you their pay accounts and your own, to be presented to the paymaster of the yard or station at or nearest to the port to which you are ordered. The pay of yourself and officers will continue while in charge of the prize or under the orders of a flag officer or senior navy officer afloat, but your names will not be borne on the books of the vessel from which you are detached and you will not be entitled to share in prizes made by such vessel after your detachment.

(Signed) _____,

To _____, Commanding the United States _____.

16. The prize-master in whose charge instruments are placed, or to whom arms are intrusted, will be held strictly accountable for their condition, and in case of loss or damage by neglect, or other cause not satisfactorily explained, the value will be charged to his account. The officer appointing a prize-master will require him to give a receipt in duplicate for the instruments and arms with which he may be furnished, one to be forwarded to the commanding officer of the station to which the prize vessel is bound, and the other to be retained by such appointing officer; and in case of any deficiency in the delivery of, or palpable abuse of them, the commanding officer of the station will at once have the matter investigated, and report the result to the Navy Department.

17. Prisoners of war are to be treated with humanity, their personal property is to be carefully protected; they shall have a proper allowance of provisions, and every comfort of air and exercise which circumstances will permit of. Every precaution must be taken to prevent any hostile attempt on their part, and, if necessary or expedient, they may be armed and closely confined. If officers give their parole not to attempt any hostile act on board the vessel, and to conform to such requirements as the commanding officer may consider necessary, they may be permitted any privileges he may deem proper.

18. If any vessel shall be taken acting as a vessel of war, or a privateer, without having a proper commission so to act, the officers and crew shall be considered as pirates, and treated accordingly.

share in the prize, but the actual amount of assistance necessary to constitute joint capture, under the different circumstances of chase and surrender, as determined by the decisions of courts of prize, depends in a great measure upon the character of the vessels and their position at the time of actual seizure.¹

17. We will first consider joint capture *by public vessels of war*. All ships of war which are *in sight* at the time of the actual seizure are deemed to be constructively assisting, and, therefore, are entitled to share in the prize. The reason of this rule is, that public ships are under a constant obligation to attack the enemy wherever seen, and, therefore, from the mere circumstance of being in sight, a presumption is sufficiently raised that they are there *animus capiendi*; and this rule is additionally supported by the obvious policy of promoting harmony in the naval service. But the vessel claiming such *constructive* assistance must be actually in sight at the time of capture, or at least at the commencement of the engagement or chase, for there must be some actual contribution of endeavour as well as of general intention. If the circumstances of the case repel the presumption of the *animus capiendi*, as where the public ship is steering an opposite or a different course, inconsistent with the notion of an intent to capture, the claim to joint capture cannot be sustained. But the mere sailing on a different course is not sufficient to defeat this claim; for it is not always necessary that two vessels should pursue the same line, where, acting with a unity of purpose, the same object is sometimes better accomplished by one vessel sailing in one direction, and another in a different direction. If the ship claiming as joint captor, has changed her course before the actual capture, in such a manner as to show she had abandoned all design of continuing the pursuit, the claim is defeated. So, also, if the prize has been merely *annoyed*, without any attempt at pursuit. It is very doubtful whether merely seeing the prize from masthead, however clearly the *animus capiendi* may be proved, will bring the vessel within the rule of being *in sight*. In all cases of constructive joint capture, the *onus probandi* rests upon the party claiming the benefit of the rule. Nor is it sufficient to prove that the joint captor was in sight of the actual captor, it is

¹ Philimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii., §§ 380

also necessary that she was seen by the prize. Both these facts must be established; the one by direct evidence, and the other by implication and necessary inference. Being in sight means being seen by the prize, as well as by the actual captor, and thereby causing intimidation to the enemy, and encouragement to the friend. One of these will not do without the other.¹

§ 8. But actual sight is not absolutely necessary to constitute constructive joint capture. If it be shown that the asserted joint captor was in sight when the darkness came on, and that she continued steering in the same course by which she was before nearing the prize, and that the prize itself also continued the same course, it amounts almost to a demonstration that the vessels would have seen, and been seen by each other at the time of capture, if darkness had not intervened. In such a case, the vessel so pursuing is let into the benefit of joint capture. But, if the seizure is made at such a distance from the asserted joint captor that she could not have been in sight if it had been day, the claim cannot be sustained.²

§ 9. In respect to *joint chase*, much depends upon whether the vessels are acting in association, or separately with a common object in view. In the latter case, the question of actual or constructive sight will generally determine the claim to joint

¹ The 'Drie Gebroeders,' 5 Rob., 339; the 'Jan Frederick,' 5 Rob., 12; the 'Robert,' 3 Rob., 194; the 'Lord Middleton,' 4 Rob., 153; the 'Spangler,' 1 Dod. R., 359; the 'Rattle-snake,' 2 Dod. R., 35.

As to what constitutes 'signal distance' within the meaning of the Act, regulating the distribution of prize money, see the 'Anes,' 2 Sprag., 262; the 'St. John,' *Ibid.*, 266; the 'Ella and Anna,' *Ibid.*, 267; the 'Llla,' 2 Int. R. R., 117.

² The 'Union,' 1 Dod. R., 346; the 'Financier,' 1 Dod. R., 61.

The single fact, that a vessel is one of a common force, does not entitle her to participate in the prize shares, obtained by the separate members of the force. It must be shown, that such vessel was 'in sight' or 'within signal distance' of the occurrence, out of which the taking of the prize was realised. She must have been so situated, as to be able, by her own accord, to contribute direct assistance to the captors, by deterring the enemy from resistance, or by aiding physically in overcoming such resistance, and the vessel to be aided must have possessed the means of communicating intelligent directions, to the one whose aid was needed. The Acts of Congress, on the subject of distribution of prize money, contemplate that it shall be shared among vessels, which, at the time of capture, were in view of each other, so as to be able to receive and respond to signals correctly. A vessel, claiming to share in the proceeds of a capture, must show that she was within signal distance, of the vessel making the prize, in circumstances which might have justified the capturing vessel in demanding and expecting her assistance.—The 'Anglia,' *Blat. Af. Car.*, 566.

of the harbour, while the rest of the squadron, maintaining the blockade, are stationed at some distance. In the case of the 'Guillaume Tell,' a squadron was stationed to watch the harbour of La Vallette. The prize, in attempting to escape, was pursued and taken by a part of the squadron, while the others remained stationary. The claim to joint capture was allowed, notwithstanding the physical impossibility of active co-operation arising from the state of the wind.¹

§ 12. But mere association is not sufficient to entitle vessels to share as constructive joint captors; they must have a military character, and be capable of rendering military service. In other words, there must be an *animus capiendi*. Thus a ship forming part of a blockading squadron, but totally unarmed, and incapable of rendering any service at the time of capture, is held to be as much excluded as one totally unconscious of the transaction; because, by no possibility, could the ship be enabled to co-operate in time. So of transports and store-ships, although associated in the same service with the actual captor, if destitute of a military character, and incapable of rendering assistance, they cannot be regarded as joint captors. It is not sufficient that the enemy may have been intimidated by the presence of such vessels. Mere intimidation may be produced without any co-operation having been given or intended. If a frigate were going to attack an enemy's vessel, and four or five large merchant ships, unconscious of the transaction, should appear in sight, they might be objects of terror to the enemy, but such terror would not entitle them to share in the prize as joint captors.²

§ 13. Convoying ships are under no disability of claiming as joint captors an account of their employment, if, in other respects, entitled to share in the prize, unless the capture is made at such a distance as would remove them from the scene.

¹ The 'Harmonie,' 3 Rob., 318; the 'Henriette,' 2 Dod. R., 97. & 'Guillaume Tell,' *Edw. R.*, 6; the 'Empress,' 1 Dod. R., 368.

² The 'Cape of Good Hope,' 2 Rob., 274, the 'Twee Gesanten' & 'Le Franc,' 2 Rob., 284, note.

A captain of marines who happened to be on board a merchant ship when she took a prize, but who did not belong to her complement, did not share as a passenger.—*Weinys v. Luncey*, 1 Dougl., 324.

A captain of a ship being on board at the time that his ship captures a prize is entitled to prize money, even though he be in arrears, and another officer has been sent on board to command.—*Lumley v. Benger*, 8 T. R., 224.

hance of the special duty of protecting their convoy. Being enemy ships and capable of rendering assistance (where not interfering with this special duty), they are entitled to all the fruits of constructive capture, whether the construction arises from association, sight, or otherwise. But if the convoying vessel desert her duty, she forfeits all benefit of capture.¹

§ 14. If a vessel be detached from the fleet at the time of capture so as to separate her from the joint object, she cannot be considered as a constituent part or member of the association, and cannot claim the benefit of joint capture with the fleet, nor can the fleet be allowed to come in as joint captors of any prize taken by her after she was detached. Thus, where two vessels of a blockading squadron were sent to look for an enemy's ship and captured her, the rest, which maintained their station, were held not entitled to share. So, where two vessels were detached, one by stress of weather and the other in chase, they were held not entitled to share in a capture made in their absence. But where two vessels were sent to chase and the rest of the fleet were bearing up to support them, the claim of the latter to joint capture was allowed. And a ship, forming a part of a blockading squadron and continuing as such, although temporarily detached at the time the summons, and not returning till after the capitulation of the place so blockaded, was, nevertheless, entitled to share as joint captor with the rest of the blockading force. So, a ship in joint chase of one vessel, being ordered by a superior to chase another, the two chasing vessels are regarded as associated in the joint object of capturing both of those chased, and, though only one is captured, they jointly share in the prize. If neither received or was actually under the orders of the fleet, or of a common superior, the case would be different.²

§ 15. When land and sea forces act in conjunction, and no express provision is made by statute for the distribution of prizes taken by their joint operation, resort must be had to the principles established by judicial decisions. It has been held that a mere general co-operation, in the same general objects, will not be sufficient to make land forces joint captors

¹ The 'Waaksamheid,' 3 Rob., 1; the 'Fury,' 3 Rob., 9.

² The 'Vorsigteld,' 3 Rob., 311; the 'Island of Trinidad,' 5 Rob., 92; the 'L'Étoile,' 7 Dod. R., 100; the 'Naples Grant,' 2 Lion. R., 273; the 'Western,' cited, Edw. R., 126; the 'Cherokee,' ante p. 391.

with a fleet ; there must be an actual assistance and co-operation in the particular capture. Where there is pre-concert, very slight service is sufficient. So, where soldiers are landed on the coast, to co-operate with a fleet, in a conjunct expedition, or in a particular engagement, they are entitled to share in the capture. In the case of a claim on the part of the army to share in a capture made by the fleet, the *onus probandi* is upon them to show that there was an actual co-operation on their part, assisting to produce the surrender. Without a pre-concert, or conjunct expedition, they are not entitled to the benefit of constructive capture ; therefore, to establish a claim of joint capture between them, there must be a contribution of actual assistance, and the mere presence, or being in sight, will not be sufficient. Between public ships of war, there is always conceived to be a privity of purpose, which constitutes a community of interest ; and this community of interest extends to public ships of different countries, if allies ; but between land and sea forces, acting independently of each other, such privity can be presumed. Hence, the difference of the rules applicable to the two cases.¹

§ 16. The public ships of allies, serving together, are entitled to share in captures, the same as those of a single belligerent. There is no difference in this respect, whether the benefit

¹ The 'Stella del Norte,' 5 Rob., 349 ; the 'Dordrecht,' 2 Rob., 31.

It is no legal ground of objection to the jurisdiction of a prize court that the arrest was made out of its territorial authority. The court has jurisdiction under the law of nations and by municipal law when the subject matter of the suit is prize of war, without regard to the local cause of arrest or cause of action, and it is unimportant to the question of prize, no prize whether the capturing land and sea forces act in concert or separately. Where a combined action exists between vessels of war and land forces in making a capture, it is usually cast upon the latter to prove that their co-operation was direct and positive to authorise their share in the prize, and they are not ordinarily recognised as joint captors unless it is proved on their part that the capture was produced by their interference. The court has cognizance of all captures in an enemy's country made in creeks, havens, and rivers, when made by a naval force solely or in co-operation with land forces.—The 282 Bales of Cotton, *Blatch. Pr. Cas.*, 302.

By 27 and 28 Vict. cap. xxv. s. 34, it is enacted that where, in an expedition of any of her Majesty's naval or naval and military forces, against a fortress or possession on land, goods belonging to the State or to an enemy or to a public trading company of the enemy, exercising powers of government, are taken in the fortress or possession, or a ship is taken in waters defended by or belonging to the fortress or possession, a prize court shall have jurisdiction as to the goods or ships so taken, and as to goods taken on board the ship, as in case of prize.

policy, it will not lead to the same inference, as in the case of public ships of war. Hence, the *animus capiendi* of a privateer must be demonstrated by some overt act, by some variation of conduct, which would not have taken place, but with reference to that particular object, and if the intention of acting against the enemy had not been entertained. A difference would induce privateers to follow in the wake of public ships of war, and keeping in sight of them, merely to become entitled to the joint benefit of the captures which they might make. But a public ship of war is entitled to the benefit of constructive joint capture, where the actual taker is a privateer, the same as though both were vessels of war. The reason of this rule is obvious.¹

§ 18. Revenue cutters are sometimes furnished with letters of marque and cruise, beyond the ordinary limits of their duty as coast-guards, for the purpose of capturing enemy's merchant vessels. They are public vessels, but not public vessels of war, and, with respect to the benefits of joint capture, are by English courts, considered in the light of privateers, and the rule of constructive assistance, from being in sight, does not apply to them; for, not being under the same obligations as king's ships to attack the enemy, they are not entitled to the same presumption in their favour.²

§ 19. With respect to captures made by *boats*, it is a general rule, that the ships to which they belong, are entitled to share as joint captors; or rather, the capture is considered as made by the ship, the boats being a part of the force of the ship. But if the capturing boat has been detached from the ship to which it belongs, and attached to another, only the ship

¹ The '*L'Ami*,' 6 *Rob.*, 261; the '*Santa Brigada*,' 3 *Pas.*, 3; *Talbot v. 'Three Briggs'*, 1 *Dallas R.*, 95; '*La Flore*,' 5 *Fos.*, 331; '*Galen*,' 2 *Dod. R.*, 19.

If a prize be made by two or more privateers, they are to share proportionally, according to the number of men of which their respective crews consist. — *Roberts v. Hartley*, 1 *Dougl.*, 311.

² *Phillimore, On Int. Law*, vol. III., § 395; the '*Bellona*,' *Edw. F.*

When it appeared that the prize property was captured by a United States steam transport ship, no other vessel co-operating therewith, within signal distance at the time, and that the prize vessel was of the same force, the court, to carry into effect the Act of June 30, 1864, directed the commanding officer of the transport ship to report the names and employments of the crew on board the transport ship present, and engaged in the capture, and the relative compensation properly allowable to them severally. — *The 'Blanchet'*, *Pr. Cas.*, 607.

which it is attached at the time of capture, shares in the prize. Where constructive capture by boats, will hardly entitle the ships to which they belong, to be allowed to come in as joint captors, for the fact of boats being in sight, does not necessarily raise the presumption of assistance, by the intimidation of the enemy, and the encouragement of the friend. Thus where the boats of a ship, lying in a harbour, were within sight at capture, it was held that the ship could not be allowed to share as joint captor.¹

20. Captures made by *tenders* are regulated by the same rules as those made by boats, the ship to which the tender is attached being entitled to share, however distant she may be at the time of capture. But, in order to support the averment that the claimant was the principal, and the capturing vessel mere tender, it must be shown, either that there had been an express designation of her as of that character, or that there had been a constant employment and occupation in a manner peculiar to tenders, equivalent to an express designation, and sufficient to impress that character upon her.²

21. Prizes hold the same relation to their captors, as do boats of the same vessel. Hence, prize interests acquired by a prize-master on board of a captured vessel, enure to the benefit of the whole ship's company. This is the natural and reasonable result of that community of interest existing between the prize-master and prize-crew, and the capturing

¹ The 'Anna Maria,' 3 Rob., 211; the 'Odin,' 4 Rob., 318; the 'Melodora,' 5 Rob., 41.

² *Woolman, Int. Law*, vol. ii., pp. 334, 335; the 'Carl,' *Spinks R.*, 261; the 'Island of Curacao,' 5 Rob., 282, note.

The British Court of Admiralty, in 1814, held that the mere employment of a ship in the military service of the enemy was not a sufficient *factum* for war to entitle a recaptor to condemnation under the provisions of the existing prize act, but that if there was a fair semblance of authority in the person directing a vessel to be so employed, and there was nothing upon the face of the proceedings to invalidate it, the court might presume that he was duly authorized. The commander of a single vessel may be vested with this authority as well as the commander of a fleet. The 'Georgiana,' 1 Dicks., 397.

In the case of the 'Castor' (*Lords of Appeal*, 1795), the authority of the commander of a fleet was considered sufficient. In the case of the 'Munster' (*1 Dicks.*, 105), it was held that the employment of a ship for service of war under the authority of the Governor of the Mauritius was sufficient to constitute it a public ship of war. No particular inconsistency can arise from the practice, the only question is whether the captured vessel should be condemned to the individual captor or to the Government, but the decision either way could afford but little consolation to the captured.

vessel, the former being merely temporarily detached to take the prize into port, but without any real separation of object or interest.¹

§ 22. The general rules of joint capture for commissioned privateers, are also applicable to non-commissioned vessels, with this distinction: that all captures by the latter must be condemned to the government as *droits of Admiralty*, the captors only receiving compensation in the nature of salvage, which is usually awarded by the prize-court, where their conduct has been fair; and, in cases where there has been personal gallantry and merit, the whole value of the prize is given them. Where a vessel has a commission against an enemy, but none against another whose property is captured, it is regarded as non-commissioned with respect to that particular capture. If, at the time of the capture by a vessel commissioned by a letter of marque, the master of the capturing vessel be not on board, the capture is considered as made without commission, and enures to the government. So if a vessel fitted out and manned by a ship of war, and sent without any authority or commission; unless brought within the definition of a *tender*, it is deemed a non-commissioned vessel, and its captures enure, not to the benefit of the ship of war, but to the government. But the question whether the capture is made by a duly commissioned captor, or not, does not concern the government and the captor, with which claimants have nothing to do; they have no legal standing to assert the right of the State.²

§ 23. Where a privateer or a non-commissioned vessel is the actual captor, and a man-of-war only a joint captor, the latter has no right to dispossess the former, but is entitled to put some one on board to take care of the interests she may

¹ The 'Anna Maria,' 3 Rob., 211, the 'Melomane' 5 Rob., 41, the 'Belle Coquette,' 1 Deak. R., 18; the 'Nancy,' 4 Rob., 327, note.

² The 'Charlotte,' 5 Rob., 280, the 'Dos Hermanos,' 2 H. & A. 8, the 'Cape of Good Hope,' 2 Rob., 274.

The profits of a capture made by individuals, acting without a commission, enure to the government, but it has not been the practice to exact them. It has been their practice to recompense privateers for their private, courage, and patriotism, by assigning the captor a part, and sometimes the whole of the prize. 1 Op. Att. Gen., 463.

Under the Acts of March 25, 1802, and July 17, 1802, § 12, 13, 14, 375, 41, and 607, 61, an armed merchant vessel, not in the service of the United States, having no commission from the United States, although she is present at the capture of a prize and co-operates therein, is not entitled to share in the proceeds.—The 'Merrimac,' *Walsh's Pr. Cas.*, 384.

in the capture. It is not essential, but a measure of great precaution and of great convenience, that an interest should be asserted at the time. Where expenses were incurred by the actual captor in consequence of an omission of this precaution, they were directed to be paid out of the proceeds. Where a man-of-war and a privateer were joint chasers, and the privateer came up first, and struck the first blow, but the man-of-war was the actual taker, they were held to be joint captors.¹

§ 24. Any misconduct or fraud on the part of the capturing vessel, intended to deceive another, in order to prevent her from taking part in a capture, is generally punished by admitting the claim of the latter to the benefit of joint captor. Thus in the case of the 'Herman Parlo,' the actual captor extinguished his lights in order to prevent other ships from seeing her chase or capture. In the case of the 'Eendraught,' the vessel hoisted American colours, and offered to protect the vessel against the other vessels who were chasing her; by this means, the actual capture was deferred till the other vessels were out of sight. In both these cases the claims to joint capture were admitted, although the claimants were not in sight when the capture took place. Moreover, in the latter case the claimants were awarded costs against the actual captor. Where two convoying ships were detached to reconnoitre an enemy's vessel, which turned out to be a British frigate, and an enemy's vessel, the frigate signalled her number, but made no signal of an enemy's ship ahead, thereby causing the convoying ships to be recalled. He afterwards made the capture, and the convoying ships were admitted as joint captors on account of her neglect to make the proper signal. So, where a non-commissioned schooner which had had an encounter with an enemy's vessel, and though beaten off, was hanging upon her, was induced to sheer off by the actual captor coming up and hoisting French colours, the claim of the schooner to joint capture for the schooner was sustained by prize-court.²

¹ 'La Flore,' 5 Rob., 271; the 'Marianne,' 5 Rob., 13; the 'Sacra-
ment,' 5 Rob., 362; the 'San José,' 6 Rob., 244; 'L'Amitié,' 6 Rob., 208,
W. & A. 11, P. 112, R., 208.

² The 'Herman Parlo,' 3 Rob., 8; the 'Eendraught,' 3 Rob., appen.
the 'Spunkier,' 1 Dod. R., 359; the 'Wassamheid,' 3 Rob., 1, 'La
me,' 5 Rob., 124, the 'Robert,' 3 Rob., 194.

§ 25. The distribution of prize among joint captors usually regulated by statute, but in cases where no statute exists, resort is had to the general rule of prize law established by the courts, which is that joint captors share in proportion to their relative strength. And this relative strength is determined by the number of men on board the actual captor and the ships assisting in the capture. The same rule is applicable to the case of a joint capture by a public and private ship, whether the latter be commissioned or not; as where an ally co-operates in the capture.¹

§ 26. The foregoing remarks respecting joint capture do not benefit in *prize*; but some States also allow a *bounty*, or *money*, for the taking or destroying of vessels of the enemy. Such provision is made by the fifth section of the English Prize Act. As grants of this description are considered as to reward immediate personal exertion, and, moreover, *public grants*, the courts construe them with much more liberality than they do the conflicting claims of individuals for share in prize money. In these, as in all other public grants, the presumption is in favour of the grantor, and against the grantee. Hence, all claims of constructive joint capture, as from association in chase, etc., are rejected. Originally the grant was confined to actual combat only; but, it is now held that where a capture can be considered as a continuation of a general action, the whole fleet is equally entitled to share in the money, notwithstanding the particular combat and the taking or destroying by a single ship belonging to the grantee. It is otherwise where the capture is not the immediate sequence of the general action. In a general engagement there can be no distinction of combatants; the whole fleet is supposed to contend with the whole opposing force; it is so in fact, and always so in supposition of the law. Where the capture is made under such circumstances as to denote all supposition of a continuity of the general engagement, the court will pronounce against the claim of the fleet to share in the head money.²

¹ Roberts v. Hartley, *Doug. R.* 311; Duckworth v. Tucker, 2 *R.* 7; the 'Dispatch,' 2 *Gallop. R.* 1; the 'Twee Gesuster,' 2 *R.* note; 'Le Frigate,' 2 *Rob.* 285, note.

² The 'Clorinde,' 1 *Dod. R.* 436. 'La Gloire,' *Edw. R.* 1; 'L'Alerte,' 6 *Rob.* 238; the 'Ville de Varsovie,' 2 *Dod. R.* 3; Rayo, 1 *Dod. R.* 42, the 'Babilon,' *Edw. R.* 39; 'L'Elise,' 1 *D.*

§ 27. In all cases of collusive captures, the captors, whether single or joint, acquire no title to the prize, and the captured property is condemned to the government. If collusion be alleged, the usual simplicity of the prize proceedings is departed from in order to discover the fraud, if any exist. Evidence invoked from other prize causes is sometimes resorted to as proof of collusion. Thus, where the same vessel has been proved guilty of collusion in another case, during the same cruise, the court will take cognisance of that fact in the claim before it. The British Prize Act (section twenty) provides for forfeiture in all cases of capture by collusion, or connivance, or consent, and any bond given by the captain or commander of the captured vessel is, also, declared to be forfeited to the crown. But even without a statutory provision, the same result would follow from the general rules of maritime capture, for prize courts generally will decree forfeiture of the rights of prize against the captors for gross irregularity or fraud, or for any other criminal conduct. Although the capture may be a good prize, if there should prove to be fraud and collusion between the captors and the captured, the former will have forfeited their rights, and the property is condemned to the government generally. Forfeiture may, also, be declared in favour of the government for other acts of misconduct, and for wilful and obstinate violation of duty on the part of the captors.¹

§ 28. So, in all cases of forfeiture of interest in the prize by

¹ 442 the 'Dutch Schuyts,' 6 Rob., 48; the 'Matilda,' 1 Dod. R., 367; the 'San Joseph,' 6 Rob., 331; the 'Uranie,' 2 Dod. R., 172; 'La Francha,' 1 Rob. 157; the 'Santa Brigada,' 3 Rob., 58; the 'Bellone,' 2 Dod. R., 342.

² Under section 2 of the Act of Congress of July 17, 1862 (12 Stat. at L. 605), which provides for the distribution of prize money, according to the relative force of the vessel or vessels making the capture, as compared with that of the captured vessel. Held, that it was proper to consider as the capturing force not only the flag ship which, in fact, inflicted the damage received by the captured vessel, but also any other vessels which, by diverting the fire of the enemy, etc., contributed to the capture. The schooner 'Atlanta,' 3 Wall. 425, affirming 2 Am. Law Rep. 51, 625.

³ K. v. Com. on Am. Law, vol. i., p. 359; the 'Johanna Tholen,' 6 Rob. 72; the 'George,' 1 Wheat. R., 408; *Oswell v. Vigne*, 13 East, 70; the 'George,' 2 Wheat. R., 278; the 'Experiment,' 8 Wheat. R., 261; the 'Hercules' and the 'Johnst. B.,' 2 Wheat. R., 169.

⁴ Where two vessels engaged in combat under a mutual mistake in as to each others character, and the vessel attacked captured the other, it was held in the United States that the capture was not unlawful.

the captors, the condemnation is to the government. The captor may forfeit his right of prize in various ways, as, by unreasonable delay in bringing the question of prize to an adjudication by a competent court; by unnecessarily taking the captured vessel to a neutral port; by treatment of the captured crew; by breaking bulk on board except in case of necessity; by embezzlement; by breaching instructions, or any offence against the law of nations. But irregularities on the part of captors, originating in mistake or negligence, which work no irreparable mischief and are consistent with good faith, will not forfeit their right of prize. In order that a prize-court may decree forfeiture and restitution, it is not necessary that the prize itself be brought within its jurisdiction; it is sufficient that a proceeding be instituted by the claimants against the captor. Thus, if a prize be lost at sea, the court still has jurisdiction of the case, and may proceed to its adjudication at the instance of either the captors or the claimants. So, if captured property is converted by the captors, the jurisdiction of the prize-court over the case continues; it may always proceed to its judgment wherever the prize, or the proceeds of the prize, can be traced to the hands of any person whatever; and thus it may notwithstanding any stipulation in the nature of bail had taken for the property. But the court may exercise a discretion whether it will interfere in favour of the captors, if the case the captured property has been unjustifiably or illegally converted, and in case the disposition of the captured property and crew has not been according to duty. 'If no such cause,' says Chief Justice Taney, 'is shown to justify the capture, and the conduct of the captor has been unjust and oppressive, the court may refuse to adjudicate upon the validity of the capture, and award restitution and damages against the captor, although the seizure of the prize was originally lawful, made upon probable cause. And the same rule prevails, if the sale was justifiable, and the captor has delayed for an unreasonable time, to institute proceedings to condemn it. If a libel filed by the captured, as for a marine trespass, the court will refuse to award a monition to proceed to adjudication.

being apparently required in self-defence, and that the act of bringing in of the vessel for adjudication was not a cause for damages.—The 'Mariana Flora,' 11 Wheat. 1.

the question of prize or no prize, but will treat the captor as wrong-doer from the beginning.'¹

¹ Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii., p. 298; the 'Susannah,' 6 *Rob.*, 48; the 'Falcon,' 6 *Rob.*, 194; 'L'Ecole,' 6 *Rob.*, 220; 'La Dame Cécile,' 6 *Rob.*, 257; the 'Pomona,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 25; the 'Arabella and Maderra,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 368; Jecker et al. v. Montgomery, 13 *Howard R.*, 516.

The settled rule is to require the captors of a vessel to bring in for examination her master and principal officers and some of her crew—the 'Jane Campbell,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 101; but an omission to do so is not a sufficient ground to defeat a capture made by a government vessel.—The 'Stark,' *Ibid.*, 215.

Captors are not bound to allow the captured crew to navigate the ship, nor are the latter bound to perform such duty. The captors are bound to put on board a sufficient crew to navigate the ship.—The 'George,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 24.

The latest decision of the United States with regard to persons found on board of a captured vessel is, that they do not pass with the vessel and are not into judicial custody. But they are subject to the control of the court for the purpose of examination, and their subsequent discharge or detention rests with the officers of the naval service, according to its rules.—The 'Salvor,' 4 *Phil.*, 409.

The duties of captors of prize are prescribed, by the Act of June 30, 1794, s. 1, 13 *Stat. at L.*, 306.

Misconduct on the part of the captors, e.g. wrongful spoliation of property on board a prize, or separation of officers and crew from her, may question the legality of the capture, and may subject the captors personally to punishment for the infringement of the laws of maritime warfare. The right of seizure is dependent on its lawful use.—The 'Anna Maria,' 2 *Wash.*, 327; the 'Jane Campbell,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 101.

International law prohibits, under penalty of the disallowance of the right of prize to the captors, and the positive infliction of punishment by penalties and costs, any irregularities against the property seized or the captured crew, especially where the latter are neutral.—The 'Jane Campbell,' *Ibid.*

Where captures are made by public ships, the actual wrong-doer alone is responsible for any wrong done or illegality committed on the prize, except as respects acts done by members of the seizing vessel, in obedience to the orders of their superiors.—The 'Louisa Agnes,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 107.

Concerning the treatment of a captured crew, Sir W. Scott remarks:—There are two parts of the charge to which it is necessary for me to advert. The first is the imputation of a practice which, if proved to be existent to the extent alleged and without necessity, must be pronounced to be disgraceful to the character of the country, since no one who hears me will deny that to apply even to enemies modes of restraint which are unnecessary and at the same time convey personal indignity to the sufferers, is highly dishonourable. It is alleged that the British crew, to the number of 22 persons, were put in irons. This is a charge which certainly requires much explanation, for I will not say there may be cases in which such restraint may be necessary, and therefore justifiable. But the necessity must be urgent and evident. The captor here called upon for his explanation has furnished no apology but that offered by his counsel. Admitting the motive to be truly stated, that the crew was done for security, I am afraid it will not amount to a justification. Because it was incumbent on the captor to pursue a proper purpose by other means. It should be established, to the satisfaction of the court, that a species of security alone would have been sufficient for his preservation.

§ 29. *Probable cause of seizure* is, by the general usage of nations and the decisions in Admiralty, a sufficient excuse in cases of capture *de jure belli*, and this question belongs exclusively to the court, which has jurisdiction to restore or condemn. The general principles which govern cases of this character, are embodied in the statute laws of the United States. The Act of June 26th, 1812, section six, provides that the courts of the United States, in which the case may finally be decided, 'shall and may decree restitution, in whole or in part, when the capture shall have been made without *probable cause*; and if made without *probable cause*, or otherwise unreasonably, may order and decree damages and costs to the party injured.' If there be a reasonable suspicion, it is proper to make the capture, and submit the cause for adjudication before the proper tribunal, and, although the court should acquit without the formality of further proof, the capture will be justifiable, by reason of such probable cause; but where the seizure is wholly without excuse, they are liable for costs and for the damages which ensue from the seizure, and the damages and costs will be decreed to the party injured. The liability of the captor for damages and costs, depends, in general, upon his good faith and intentions; a court will seldom impose damages for a mere error of judgment, unless the irregularity is very gross, and works a serious injury to the claimants. They are never responsible for the neglect or loss of the captured vessel. Thus, if a vessel, although not liable to condemnation, has defective documents on board, or does not show proper papers, the captor is not liable for either costs or damages, but, on the contrary, the court will generally allow

At the same time, I must say that the misconduct appears to have proceeded, rather from an improper notion of security, than from any intention to inflict pain or personal indignity. If any such intention had been proved, I should have thought it my duty to pursue the matter much farther.—The 'Juan Baptista,' etc., 5 Rob., 39. see also the 'Fire Damet,' *Ibid.* 357.

The 'Java's' men were treated by the American officers in a very graceful manner. The moment the prisoners were brought on board the 'Constitution' they were handcuffed and pillaged of almost every thing they possessed. True, Lieut.-General Hislop got back his valuable sword of plate and the other British officers were treated civilly. *See Nav. Hist.* vol. vi., 136.

After the 'Berwick' had been taken by the French squadron, the officers and crew were distributed about among the different ships, being allowed to take any clothes except those on their backs, and were in every other respect most shamefully treated. *Ibid.*, vol. i., 233.

§ 30. Questions with respect to the liability of admirals, fleets, and commanders of squadrons, for captures made

fair ground of suspicion. In such a case a belligerent may seize a vessel and take the chance of something appearing on investigation to justify the capture; but if he fails in such a case it seems very fit that he should pay the costs and damages which he has occasioned. The lords considered that the case before them was brought within the last of these rules, and gave the claimants their costs in the court below, but no costs in the Appeal. They also gave them damages, the amount to be referred to the Registrar and merchants. The amount was subsequently paid by the British Government.

Costs and damages, when decreed against the captors, are not given as a punishment on the captors, but as affording compensation to the injured party. In order to exempt captors from costs and damages in a case of restitution, there must be some circumstances connected with the capture of the ship or cargo, affording reasonable ground for belief that the ship or cargo might prove a lawful prize. What amounts to such a probable cause to justify a capture, is incapable of definition and is to be regulated by the peculiar circumstances in each case. It is not necessary to impute vexatious conduct on the part of the captors, to subject them to condemnation in costs and damages. Neither will honest mistake, though sanctioned by an act of government, relieve the captors from liability to compensate a neutral for damages, which the captors by their conduct caused the neutral to sustain.

In the course of the judgment, their lordships further observed — 'The law which we are to lay down, cannot be confined to the British; the rule must be applied to captors of all nations. No country is permitted to establish an exceptional rule in its own favour, or in favour of particular classes of its own subjects. On the Law of Nations, the decisions are entitled to the same weight, as those of the country in which the tribunal sits. America has adopted almost all her prize law from the decisions of English courts, and whatever may have been the case in former times, no authorities are now cited in English courts, in cases to which they are applicable, with greater respect than those of the distinguished jurists of France and America. What is held in England to justify or excuse an officer of the British will be held by the tribunals of every country, both on this and the other side of the Atlantic, to justify or excuse the captors of their own nations.' *Schacht v. Otter*, 9 *Moore, Prize Council Cas.*, 150.

Prize courts deny damages, or costs, in cases of seizure made 'probable cause,' that is to say, where there were circumstances sufficient to warrant suspicion, though not to warrant condemnation. — *The "Plover"*, 3 *Wall.*, 155; affirming *S. C.*, *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 377.

Where a ship is *bona fide* seized as a prize, and afterwards released without any suit being instituted against her, the owner cannot sustain an action at common law for the seizure. His remedy, if any, is in the Court of Admiralty. — *Faith v. Pearson*, 6 *Taunt.*, 439.

No action lies at common law for false imprisonment, where the imprisonment was merely in consequence of taking a ship as prize, and the ship has been acquitted. — *Le Caux v. Eden*, 2 *Engl.*, 594.

It was held a good defence, in an action for taking a steam vessel, that the defendant was an admiral in the Portuguese navy, and that he took the vessel as a prize, and that it became forfeited to the Queen of Portugal, although he was a natural born subject of Great Britain. — *Dobree v. Napier*, 3 *Scott.*, 201.

vessels and officers under their commands, and of owners of privateers for the acts of their captains, have often been adjudicated upon by the courts. The commander of a squadron, or the admiral of a fleet, is liable to individuals for the trespasses of those under his command, in case of actual presence and co-operation, or of positive orders. Where, in such cases, the capture has actually taken place, the prize-master is considered as a bailee to the use of the whole fleet or squadron, who are to share in the prize money, and thus the commander may be made responsible; but not so as to mere trespasses, unattended with a conversion to the use of the fleet or squadron. With respect to *costs and damages*, it is a general rule in relation to public ships, that the actual wrong-doer, and he alone, is responsible. It is not meant by this that the crew of the capturing ship are responsible for a seizure made in obedience to the commands of their superior; but that the person actually ordering the seizure is the one to be held liable for costs and damages. Thus, the commander of a single vessel is liable for the acts of all under his command, and the commander of a fleet or squadron, in case of actual presence and co-operation, or of positive orders. In the United States he is also held responsible for acts done under his *permissive* orders; but not so in England. The captain, there, must be looked to as the actual wrong-doer, and the admiral is responsible to him if he has given express orders for the particular seizure.¹

Captors are not liable for damages in a case where the vessel captured presents probable cause for the capture, even though she was led into the port in which she is found involuntarily, and by the mistake of the revenue officers of the captors' own government.—The 'La Manche,' 3 Sprague, 207.

Kent, *Comm. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 100; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. ii. § 457; the 'Mentor,' 1 Rob., 177; the 'Diligentia,' 1 Dod. R., 404; the 'Eleanor,' 2 Wheat. R., 346.

An action between the single ships of two nations at peace is rare. More rare is an action, under similar circumstances, between two squadrons. Unfortunately an action was fought in 1804 between an English and Spanish squadron in open day; not through any accident, but under express orders from the government of one of the combatants; and so far from the matter being afterwards made up, it led to an almost immediate declaration of war by the party who had to complain of the action. Towards the end of the summer of 1804 the British Government received intelligence which, however, was afterwards disproved by the Spanish Government, that an armament was fitting out in Ferrol, and a considerable force was already collected there, and that the French were near at hand. Immediately on this information the British sent a squadron off Cadiz to intercept and detain, by force, four Spanish frigates known to be bound to that

§ 31. In the case of privateers, the owners, as well as the masters, are responsible for the damages and costs occasioned by illegal captures, and this to the extent of the actual loss and injury, even if it exceed the amount of the bond usually given upon the taking out of the commission. But such owners who are only constructively liable, are not bound to the extent of vindictive damages, although the original wrongdoers, in case of gross and wanton outrage in an illegal seizure, may be made responsible beyond the loss actually sustained. The sureties to the bond are responsible only to the extent of the sum in which they are bound. But, if a person appears on behalf of the captain of a privateer, and give security in his own name as principal in the stipulation, with other sureties, he is liable, in the same manner as the captain, as principal. A part owner of a privateer is not exempted from being a party to the suit, in consequence of having made compensation for his share to the claimant and received a release from him. A person may be holden a part owner of a privateer, although his name has never been inserted in the bill of sale or in the ship's register.¹

port with an immense quantity of specie, which they were bringing from Monte Video. On Oct. 5 the four British frigates sighted the Spanish frigates and immediately made sail in chase, and upon the refusal of the Spanish commanding officer to allow the squadron to be detained, action was commenced, during which one of the Spanish ships blew up, and the other three were taken by the British ships. Their cargo netted very little short of a million sterling. Many persons, who occurred in the expediency, doubted the right of detaining these ships, and many again, to whom the legality of the act appeared clear, were of opinion that a more formidable force should have been sent to execute the service, in order to have justified the Spanish admiral in surrendering without an appeal to arms. On Nov. 27 an order was made to make reprisals on English property, and on Dec. 12 war was declared against England by Spain.—*Jas. Nav. Hist.* vol. iii. 280.

¹ Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. ii. c. 13; Brown, *Civil and Adm. Law*, vol. ii. p. 140; Pothier, *De la Propriété*, No. 92. Valin, *de l'Ordonnance*, liv. iii. tit. ix.; Talbot v. Three Brigs, 1 *Dall. R.*, 95; the 'Die Fire Damer,' 5 *Rob.*, 118; the 'Der Mohr,' 3 *Rob.*, 129; the 'Verlamia,' 3 *Hagg. R.*, 187; Del Col. v. Arnold, 3 *Dall. R.*, 333; the 'Antonia Maria,' 2 *Wheat. R.*, 327; King v. Ferguson, *Fidw. R.*, 84; the 'Karsin,' 5 *Rob.*, 260; the 'William,' 4 *Rob.*, 214; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. c. v., § 5; *Code de Commerce*, liv. ii. tit. iii., art. 217; Bedarride, *Droit Com.*, §§ 300 et seq.

The distribution of the prize proceeds is generally directed by agreement between the owners, officers, and crew; but if no agreement is executed, the Admiralty court will make distribution in proportion to the number, interest, and merits of the captors.—Keane v. the 'Glaucus,' 2 *Dall.*, 36.

Lord Nelson, writing to the Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court

§ 32. It is the duty of the prize-master, immediately on his arrival in port, to institute proceedings in the proper court for the adjudication of his prize. He should also deliver over to the commissioner, or proper officer of the court, all the papers and documents found on board, and, at the same time, make affidavit that they are delivered up as taken, without fraud, addition, subdivision, or embezzlement. He should also have the master and principal officers, and some of the crew, of the captured vessel, brought in for examination. This examination should take place as soon as possible after the arrival of the vessel. Prize-masters are considered as bailees to the use of the captors, who are to share in prize money. If the prize be lost by the misconduct of the prize-master, or for neglecting to take a pilot, or to put on board a proper prize crew, the captors are held responsible. So, also, in claims for demurrage in not bringing in the prize in due time, or neglecting to have the case adjudicated before a competent court. Courts of prize have jurisdiction of all prize agents, and determine upon the legality of their appointment, and the disposition which they may make of the proceeds of sales of prizes, etc. If they pay such proceeds over to the captors without an order of the court, they are responsible to the owners of the captured property for the net amounts so received by them, in case restitution is received. The duties and responsibilities of prize-agents, where not regulated by statutes, are usually determined by the rules and orders of the courts.¹

Sumner in 1804, says:—'With respect to the history about the French privateers from Ancona, and the conduct of the English privateers at Ancona, I believe you are correct, but our enemies never adhere to it. They go in and out of the Spanish and Sicilian ports at all times night and day—in short, to examine all vessels passing. But all privateers are incorrect, and I sincerely wish there were no such vessels allowed. They are only one degree removed from pirates; but I believe an English vessel never yet trusted his cause to any court but an English court of Admiralty. However, I have no power over them. But certainly the custom of the government of Fiumesino has invariably been to allow any corsair to sail out of the port until the 24 hours after the capture of a neutral, then our privateer ought to have been forced to conform. But I daresay the French go in and out of Ancona as they please, and so, the court of Rome has no great cause of complaint. I can only repeat that over privateers I have no control.'

The 'Speculation,' 2 Rob., 293; Del. Col. v. Arnold, 3 Dall. R., 333; Cox v. L' Ins. Co., 2 Binn. R., 574; Willis v. Commissioners, 5 East, 22; the 'Noysemede,' 7 L. R., 593; Smart v. Wolff, 3 Durn. & Est., 123; the 'Pomona,' 1 Dod. R., 25; the 'Herkimer,' Stew. R., the 'Louis,' 5 Rob., 146; the 'Polly,' 5 Rob., 147, note, the 'Printz

Henrick, 6 *Rob.*, 95; the 'Exeter,' 1 *Rob.*, 173; the 'Princessa,' 2. 31; the 'St. Lawrence,' 2 *Gallis. R.*, 19; the 'Brutus,' 2 *Gallis. R.*, Bingham v. Cabot, 3 *Dallas. R.*, 19; Kean v. Brig Gloucester, 2 *R.*, 36; Hill v. Ross, 3 *Dall. R.*, 331; Penhallow v. Doane, 3 *R.*, 54.

W A sale of captured property, by authority of the captors, before
tence of condemnation, if the property be afterwards condemned
valid.—Williams v. Armroyd, 7 *Cranch.*, 423.

V

CHAPTER XXXII.

PRIZE-COURTS, THEIR JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS.

Title to property captured at sea—2. Must be tried by prize-court of captor—3. Apparent exceptions to rule—4. Rule varied by municipal regulations—5. By treaty stipulations—6. Prize-courts in general—7. In Great Britain—8. In the United States—9. The President cannot confer prize jurisdiction—10. Court may sit in the country of captor or his ally—11. But not in neutral territory—12. In conquered territory—13. Extent of jurisdiction—14. Location of prize—15. Verdict conclusive—16. But State responsible for unjust condemnation—17. Cases of England and Prussia in 1755, and the United States and Denmark in 1830—18. When jurisdiction may be acquired *inchoate*—19. How far governed by municipal laws—20. Character of proceedings, of proofs, etc.—21. Custody of property—22. Conduct of suit by captors—23. Who may appear as claimants—24. Duties of claimants—25. Nature and form of decrees.

§ 1. IT has been shown elsewhere, that in war on land, the title to personal and movable property is considered as lost to the owner as soon as the captor has acquired a *firm possession*, which, as a general rule, is considered as taking place after a lapse of *twenty-four hours*; but, that this rule does not, at least in Great Britain and the United States, apply to maritime captures, which are held in abeyance till the legality of the capture is determined by some court of competent jurisdiction. A different principle, however, is applied in case of the recapture of property of the continental nations of Europe, who adhere to the old rule of *perductio infra presidium*, or of *reclamation ante occasum solis*. Kent, and other modern writers of authority, contend for the absoluteness of the rule, as one fully established by usage and incorporated into the code of international jurisprudence, that, 'the property is not changed in favour of the neutral vendee or recaptor, so as to bar the original owner, until a regular sentence of condemnation has been pronounced by some court of competent jurisdiction, belonging to the sovereign of the captor; and the purchaser must be able to show documentary evidence of that

fact to support his title.' Such is undoubtedly the practice of Great Britain and the United States, but with respect to captures, it is by no means universal, some States retain the ancient practice, and others adopting the rule of reciprocity. But this question will be particularly considered under the head of recaptures.¹

§ 2. The validity of a maritime capture must be determined by a prize-court of the government of the captor, and cannot be adjudicated by the court of any other country. The reason of this rule is based upon the responsibility which the law of nations imposes upon the government of the captor in case of unlawful condemnation of the captured property. If the court of any country other than that of the captor were to condemn the government of the captor could not be held responsible to the government whose citizen is unlawfully deprived of property. This rule necessarily excludes the jurisdiction of a prize-court of an ally over captures made by his co-belligerent. The government of the captor is held responsible to other States for the acts of his own subjects, but not for those of his allies. It is, therefore, evident that the courts of an ally cannot determine whether captured property shall be restored to the original owner, or whether the captor's government shall assume the responsibility of its condemnation. R. Phillimore asserts, that the question of prize may be adjudicated in 'the court of the captor or of his ally,' on the ground that *unam constituent civitatem*; but none of the authorities which he refers support his position; they refer to the *locus* of the prize when condemned, or to the *place* where the captor was sitting at the time of condemnation, but not to the *jurisdiction* of the court itself; in none of the cases to which he refers it is held that the *court* of an ally may condemn. On the contrary, Chancellor Kent says distinctly, 'The prize-court of an ally *cannot* condemn;' and Mr. Wheaton is equally direct and emphatic: 'Where the property is carried into the hands of an ally, there is nothing to prevent the government of

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. pp. 101, 102; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. v. § 4; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 4 and seq.

The proceedings of a prize-court of the late Confederate States of no validity in the United States, and a condemnation and sale by a court did not convey any title to the purchaser, or confer upon him the right to give a title to others.—The 'Lilla,' 2 *Sprague*, 177.

country, *although it cannot itself condemn*, from permitting the exercise of that final act of hostility,' etc. For the same reason, the condemnation of a capture cannot be pronounced in the prize-court of a neutral; for, as the government of the captor is answerable to other States for such condemnation, it is proper that it should be made by its own courts. Moreover, if the courts of neutral countries were allowed to determine such questions, their decisions would inevitably involve their respective governments in hostilities with one or the other of the belligerent parties, or with other neutral States, the property of whose citizens might be condemned for some violation of neutral duties. Their exclusion rests not only on the fact that the exercise of this authority would be inconsistent with the neutral character, but, also, on the well-established practice and usage of nations.¹

§ 3. There are two apparent exceptions to this exclusive jurisdiction of the prize-courts of the captor's country over questions of prize: *first*, where the capture is made within the territory of a neutral State, and, *second*, where it is made by a vessel fitted out within the territory of the neutral State. In either of these cases, the judicial tribunals of such neutral State have jurisdiction to determine the validity of captures so made, and to vindicate its own neutrality by restoring the property of its own subjects, or of other States in amity with it. 'A neutral nation,' says the Supreme Court of the United States, 'which knows its duty, will not interfere between belligerents, so as to obstruct them in the exercise of their undoubted right to judge, through the medium of their own courts, of the validity of every capture made under their respective commissions, and to decide on every question of prize law which may arise in the progress of such discussion. But it is no departure from this obligation, if, in a case in which a captured vessel be brought, or voluntarily comes *infra*

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 103; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, vol. i. p. 13; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 365, et seq.; Martens, *Précis de la Science des Bâtimens*, etc., liv. i. ch. xi., § 8; Martens, *Précis de la Science des Bâtimens*, liv. i. ch. vii. § 312; the 'Flad Oyen,' 1 Rob., 155; the 'Esperance,' 2 Rob., 240; the 'Kierghett,' 3 Rob., 95; Havelock v. Jackson, 8 Bourn. & Fitt., 268; Donaldson v. Thompson, 1 Com. p.; the 'Invincible,' 2 Gallis. R., 28; 1 Wheat. R., 238; Mossman v. Newing, 2 Gallis. R., 224; the 'Finlay and William,' 1 Peters. R., 12; Wright v. Depeyster, 1 Johns. R., 471; Page v. Lenox, 15 Johns. R., 172.

præsidia, the neutral nation extends its examination so far as to ascertain whether a trespass has been committed on its own neutrality by the vessel which has made the capture. So long as a nation does not interfere in the war, but professes an exact impartiality toward both parties, it is its duty, as well as its safety, good faith and honour demand of it, to be vigilant, in preventing its neutrality from being abused for the purpose of hostility against either of them. . . . In the performance of this duty, all the belligerents must be supposed to have an equal interest; and a disregard, or neglect of it, would inevitably expose a neutral nation to the charge of insincerity, and to the just dissatisfaction and complaints of the belligerent, the property of whose subjects should not under such circumstances, be restored.¹ These are not properly considered, exceptions to the general rule of prize jurisdiction, but are cases where the courts of a neutral State are called upon to interfere for the purpose of maintaining and vindicating its neutrality.¹

§ 4. Attempts have been made by some States to give to their own tribunals prize jurisdiction of all captured property brought within their territorial limits. Such a municipal regulation was made by France, in 1681, and its justice is defended on the ground of compensation for the privilege of asylum granted to the captor and his prizes in a neutral port. 'There can be no doubt,' says Mr. Wheaton, 'that such a condition may be annexed by the neutral State to the privilege of bringing belligerent prizes into its ports, which it may grant or refuse, at its pleasure, provided it be done impartially to all the belligerent powers; but such a condition is not implied in a mere general permission to enter the neutral ports. The captor who avails himself of such a permission, does not thereby lose the military possession of the captured property, which gives to the prize-courts of his own country exclusive jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of the capture. The claim of any neutral proprietor, even a subject of the State into whose ports the captured vessel or goods may have been carried, must, in general, be asserted in the prize-court of the

¹ The '*Estrella*,' 3 *Wheat. R.*, 298; the '*Santissima Trinidad*,' *Wheat. R.*, 284; '*La Amistad de Rues*,' 5 *Wheat. R.*, 305; *Br. v. Am. Cargo v. Blas Moran*, 9 *Cran. & R.*, 359; '*La Concepcion*,' 11 *Wheat. R.*, 235; *Talbot v. Jansen*, 3 *Dallas R.*, 133.

elligent country, which alone has jurisdiction of the question of prize or no prize.' ¹

15. The rule has sometimes been varied by treaty stipulations. Thus, in the treaty between the United States and the Republic of Columbia in 1825, art. 21, and between the United States and Chile in 1832, art. 21, it was agreed that the established courts for prize cases in the country to which the prizes may be conducted, should alone take cognizance of them. But it must be observed that such stipulations can bind only those who make the engagements. The courts of neutral States would not be bound to exercise such jurisdiction, nor could States not parties to the treaty be debarred from claiming the right of trial by their own prize-courts, which alone, under the general law of nations, have jurisdiction of prize causes. ²

16. There is evidently a wide distinction between the ordinary municipal tribunals of the State, proceeding under the municipal laws as their rule of decision, and prize tribunals appointed by its authority, and professing to administer the law of nations to foreigners as well as subjects. 'The ordinary municipal tribunals,' says Wheaton, ³ 'acquire jurisdiction over the person or property of a foreigner, either *expressed* by his voluntarily bringing the suit, or *implied* by the fact of his bringing his person or property within their territory. But when courts of prize exercise their jurisdiction over vessels captured at sea, the property of foreigners is brought by force within the territory of the State by which those tribunals are constituted. By natural law, the tribunals of the captor's country are no more the rightful exclusive judges of captures in war, made on the high seas from under the neutral flag, than are the tribunals of the neutral country. The equality of nations would, on principle, seem to forbid the exercise of jurisdiction thus acquired by force and violence, and administered by tribunals which cannot be impartial between the warring parties, because created by the sovereign of the one to judge the other. Such, however, is the actual constitution of the tribunals in which, by the positive international law, is vested the exclusive jurisdiction of prizes taken in war.' From

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 14.

² *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. viii. pp. 316, 439.

³ *Elem. Int. Law*, *supra*.

this evident and wide distinction between ordinary cases of litigation, under municipal law, and the condemnation of maritime captures, under the law of nations, there has resulted the rule that no court can have prize jurisdiction unless it be expressly made a prize tribunal by the authority of the State to which it belongs. But, the organization of the court, and the manner of exercising this jurisdiction, must depend upon the constitution and local laws of each State, and are different in different countries.¹

§ 7. The English Court of Admiralty is divided into two distinct tribunals, one of which is called the *instance court*, and the other the *prize-court*; the former having generally all the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, except in prize cases, and the latter, acting under a special commission, distinct from the usual commission given to judges of the Admiralty, to enable the judge, in time of war, to assume the jurisdiction of prize. 'The manner of proceeding,' says Lord Mansfield, 'is totally different. The whole system of litigation and jurisprudence in the prize-court is peculiar to itself; it is no more like the court of Admiralty than it is to any other court in Westminster Hall.' 'The courts of Westminster Hall never have attempted to take cognizance of the question, *prize or no prize*; not from the locality of being done at sea, as I have said, but from their incompetence to embrace the whole of the subject.'²

¹ A prize-court is in its very constitution an international tribunal, controlled by the law of nations, not by municipal law (United States v. *Indra*, 10 Pet. 21; *of Cotton*, 10 Pet. 21; *Rev. Cas.*, 2), but a municipal seizure is regulated by municipal law — *Hudson* v. *Guestier*, 4 *Cranch*, 293.

Courts established in a foreign country, by the command of an armed force, can have no jurisdiction in cases of prize. — *Jecker* v. *Montgomery*, 13 *Haw*, 498.

The Court of Admiralty has jurisdiction to entertain prize proceedings commenced after the cessation of war. — *Cargo ex Katharina*, 30 L. J. *Adm.*, 21.

A court of Common Law cannot even incidentally decide a question of prize. — *Manissouart* v. *Keating*, 2 *Gill*, 325; *Bingham* v. *Carbutt*, 1 *Dill*, 19.

Questions of prize, or no prize, are exclusively of Admiralty jurisdiction. — *Ibid*.

The question of prize or no prize, or by whom taken, cannot be tried at Common Law. — *Mitchell* v. *Rodney*, 2 *Fro. P. C.*, 425.

² *Indra* v. *Rodney*, 10 *Pet.*, 613. *Ex parte Lynch*, 1 *Madd.*, 13.

The following opinion, on the general principles of proceeding in prize courts, was drawn up in the form of a letter to Mr. Jay, on the behalf of the Government of the United States, by Sir Wm. Scott and Sir J. Nichol, in 1804, as follows: —

'We have the honour of transmitting, agreeably to your Excellency's

§ 8. The constitution of the United States extends the judicial power 'to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'

request, a statement of the general principles of proceeding in prize causes, in British courts of Admiralty, and of the measures proper to be taken when a ship and cargo are brought in as prize within their jurisdiction.

The general principles of proceeding cannot, in our judgment, be stated more correctly than we find them laid down in the following extract from a report made to his late Majesty in the year 1753, by Sir G. Lee, then Judge of the Prerogative Court, Dr. Paul, his Majesty's Advocate-General, Sir D. Rider, his Majesty's Attorney-General, and Mr Murray afterwards Lord Mansfield, his Majesty's Solicitor General :

" When two powers are at war, they have a right to make prizes of the ships, goods, and effects of each other, upon the high seas ; whatever the property of the enemy, may be acquired by capture at sea ; but the property of a friend cannot be taken, provided he observes his neutrality.

" Hence the law of nations has established,

" That the goods of an enemy, on board the ship of a friend, may be taken.

" That the lawful goods of a friend, on board the ship of an enemy, ought to be restored.

" That contraband goods, going to the enemy, though the property of a friend, may be taken as prizes, because supplying the enemy with what enables him better to carry on the war, is a departure from neutrality.

" By the maritime law of nations, universally and immemorially received, there is an established method of determination, whether the capture be or be not, lawful prize.

" Before the ship, or goods, can be disposed of by the captor, there must be a regular judicial proceeding, wherein both parties may be heard, and condemnation thereupon as prize, in a court of Admiralty, judging by the law of nations and treaties.

" The proper and regular court for these condemnations is the court of that State to whom the captor belongs.

" The evidence to acquit or condemn, with or without costs or damages, must, in the first instance, come merely from the ship taken—viz, the papers on board, and the examination on oath of the master, and other principal officers; for which purpose there are officers of Admiralty in all the considerable sea-ports of every maritime power at war, to examine the captains, and other principal officers of every ship, brought in as a prize, upon general and impartial interrogatories : if there does not appear from thence ground to condemn, as enemy's property, or contraband goods going to the enemy, there must be an acquittal, unless from the aforesaid evidence the property shall appear so doubtful, that it is reasonable to go into further proof thereof.

" A claim of ship, or goods, must be supported by the oath of somebody, at least as to belief.

" The law of nations requires good faith : therefore every ship must be provided with complete and genuine papers ; and the master, at least, must be privy to the truth of the transaction.

" To enforce these rules, if there be false or colourable papers : if any papers be thrown overboard, if the master and officers examined in preparation grossly prevaricate ; if proper ship's papers are not on board, or if the master and crew cannot say, whether the ship or cargo be the property of friend or enemy, the law of nations allows, according to the different degrees of misbehaviour, or suspicion, arising from the fault of the ship and other circumstances of the case, costs to be paid, or not to be paid by the claimant, in case of acquittal and restitution : on the other hand, if a seizure is made without probable cause, the captor is adjudged

...the captor is
paying costs, because he is not in
of the case, may justly be entitled

" If the sentence of the court
there is in every maritime court
of the most considerable persons
selves aggrieved may appeal. In
rule which governs the court of A
the treaties subsisting with that
before them

" If no appeal is offered, it is
sentence by the parties themselves

" This manner of trial and ad
enforced, by many treaties.

" In this method, all captures
Great Britain, France, and Spain.
In this method, by courts of Ad
nations and particular treaties, all
judged of, in every country of Euro
be manifestly unjust, absurd, and i

" Such are the principles which
courts

" The following are the measures
and by the neutral claimant, upon
prize. The captor immediately, up
up, or delivers upon oath, to the
papers found on board the captured
the preparatory examinations of the
captured ship are taken, upon a set
commissioners of the port to which
also forwarded to the registry of the
tion is extracted by the captor from
Royal Exchange, notifying the capt
rested to appear and show cause, w
condemned. At the expiration of
into the registry, with a certificate of
given, the cause is then ready for hi
of the ship.

acts, torts, and inquiries strictly of civil cognisance, independent of belligerent operations and contracts, claims and services,

present a claim supported by an affidavit of the claimant, stating briefly to the best of his belief, the ship and goods claimed belong, and that no enemy has any right or interest in them. Security must be given to the amount of the goods to answer costs, if the case should appear so grossly fraudulent on the part of the claimant as to subject him to be condemned therein. If the captor has neglected in the meantime to take the usual steps (but which seldom happens, as he is strictly enjoined both by his instructions, and by the Prize Act, to proceed immediately to adjudication), a process issues against him on the application of the claimant's proctor, to bring in the ship's papers and preparatory examinations, and to proceed in the usual way.

As soon as the claim is given, copies of the ship's papers and examinations are procured from the registry, and upon the return of the monition the case may be heard. It, however, seldom happens, owing to the great pressure of business, especially at the commencement of a war, that causes can possibly be prepared for hearing immediately upon the expiration of the time for the return of the monition; in that case, each cause must necessarily take its regular turn. Correspondent measures must be taken by the neutral master, if carried within the jurisdiction of a Vice-Admiralty court, by giving a claim supported by his affidavit, and offering a security for costs, if the claim should be pronounced grossly fraudulent.

If the claimant be dissatisfied with the sentence, his proctor enters an appeal in the registry of the court where the sentence was given, or before a notary public, which regularly should be entered within fourteen days after the sentence, and he afterwards applies at the registry of the Lords of Appeal in prize causes, which is held at the same place as the registry of the High Court of Admiralty, for an instrument called an inhibition, and which should be taken out within three months, if the sentence be in the High Court of Admiralty, and within nine months if within a Vice-Admiralty court; but may be taken out at later periods, if a reasonable cause can be alleged for the delay that has intervened. This instrument directs the judge whose sentence is appealed from to proceed no further in the cause; it directs the registrar to transmit a copy of all the proceedings of the inferior courts, and it directs the party who has obtained the sentence to appear before the superior tribunal to answer to the appeal. On applying for this inhibition, security is given on the part of the appellant to the amount of two hundred pounds to answer costs, in case it should appear to the Court of Appeal that the appeal is merely vexatious. The inhibition is then served upon the judge, the registrar, and the adverse party and his proctor by showing the instrument under seal, and delivering a note or copy of the contents. If the party cannot be found, and the proctor will not accept the service, the instrument is to be served *sub et modo* that is, putting it to the door of the last place of residence, or by hanging it from the pillars of the Royal Exchange.

The part of the process above described, which is to be executed abroad, may be performed by any person to whom it is committed, and the same part at home is executed by the officer of the court. A certificate of the service is endorsed upon the back of the instrument, sworn before a magistrate of the superior court, or before a notary public, if the service is abroad.

If the cause be adjudged in the Vice-Admiralty Court, it is usual upon entering an appeal there, to procure a copy of the proceedings, which the appellant sends over to his correspondent in England, who carries it to a notary, and the same steps are taken to procure and put in inhibition as where the cause has been adjudged in the High

purely maritime, and rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation. Prize jurisdiction, therefore, is a branch of Admiralty, belongs to the Federal courts. 'It is obvious upon the slightest consideration,' says Story, 'that cognisance of all questions of prize, made under the authority of the United States, ought to belong exclusively to the national courts. How, otherwise, can the legality of the capture be satisfactorily ascertained, or deliberately vindicated? It seems not only a natural, but a necessary appendage to the power of war, and negotiation with foreign nations. It would otherwise follow, that the peace of the whole nation might be

Admiralty. But if a copy of the proceedings cannot be procured in time, an inhibition may be obtained by sending over a copy of the judgment of appeal, or by writing to the correspondent an account of the time and substance of the sentence.

'Upon an appeal, fresh evidence may be introduced, if upon hearing the cause the Lords of Appeal shall be of opinion that the case is of such doubt as that further proof ought to have been ordered by the court below. Further proof usually consists of affidavits made by the assertors and proprietors of the goods, in which they are sometimes joined by their friends and others acquainted with the transaction, and with the real proprietors of the goods claimed. In corroboration of these, affidavits may be made of original correspondence, duplicates of bills of lading, invoices, extracts from books, &c. These papers must be proved by the affidavits of persons who can speak of their authenticity, and if copies or extracts, they must be collated and certified by public notaries. The affidavits are sworn before the magistrates, or others competent to administer oaths in the country where they are made, and authenticated by a certificate from the British Consul.

'The degree of proof to be required depends upon the degree of suspicion and doubt that belongs to the case. In cases of heavy suspicion, and of great importance, the court may order what is called "plea and proof," that is, instead of admitting affidavits and documents, introduced by the parties only, each party is at liberty to allege in regular pleadings various circumstances as may tend to acquit or to condemn the capture, and to call witnesses in support of the allegation, to whom the adverse party may administer interrogatories. The depositions of the witnesses are taken by writing. If the witnesses are to be examined abroad, a commission is sent for that purpose; but in no case is it necessary for them to come to England. These solemn proceedings are not often resorted to.

'Standing commissions may be sent to America, for the general purpose of receiving examinations of witnesses in all cases where the court may find it necessary, for the purposes of justice, to decree an inquiry to be conducted in that manner.

'With respect to captures and condemnations at Martinico, which are the subjects of another inquiry contained in your note, we can only say in general, that we are not informed of the particulars of such captures and condemnations, but as we know of no legal court of Admiralty established at Martinico, we are clearly of opinion that the legitimacy of any prizes so taken there must be tried in the High Court of Admiralty of England, and that claims given in the manner above described, by such persons as may consider themselves aggrieved by the said captures.'

put at hazard at any time, by the misconduct of one of its members.' The District courts of the United States, as courts of *Admiralty*, are *prize-courts* as well as *instance* courts. Their *prize* jurisdiction, however, was originally much questioned, on the ground that it was not an ordinary inherent branch of *Admiralty* jurisdiction, but an extraordinary power, requiring, as in England, a special commission on the breaking out of war, to call it into action. This question, in 1794, came up directly to the Supreme Court of the United States, and it was decided by the unanimous opinion of the judges, 'that every District court of the United States possesses all the powers of a court of Admiralty, whether considered as an *instance* or a *prize-court*.' This decision was re-affirmed in other cases, and the jurisdiction claimed was expressly sanctioned by the Prize Act of June 26th, 1812. The District courts of the United States are therefore *prize-courts of Admiralty*, possessing all the powers incident to their character as such under the law of nations.¹

19. It has also been decided by the Supreme Court, that neither the President of the United States, nor any officer

¹ Conkling, *Treatise, &c.*, p. 135; Glass et al. v. the sloop 'Betsey' et al., 3 Dall. R., 6.

District courts in the United States have the same jurisdiction in *prize* cases, as is exercised by the Admiralty courts of England.—'Act of Congress, Sept. 24, 1789, s. 9.

In *prize* cases, the court of that district of the United States, into which the property is carried and proceeded against, has jurisdiction. The mere carrying of a vessel, or of her cargo, seized on the high seas as prize of war, into any particular district, without institution there of any proceedings in *prize*, cannot affect or take away the jurisdiction over the property of the district of another district, in which the proceedings against the property may be instituted after the property has been carried into such other district.—The 'Peterhoff,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 463.

Cotton captured as *prize*, and in the custody of the marshal, under a warrant from the *prize-court*, is not liable to be proceeded against for the internal revenue tax, while in his custody.—The 'Victory,' 2 *Sprague*, 210.

A vessel was chased at sea while attempting to break blockade, and was driven on shore in the enemy's territory, and then captured with her cargo and was wrecked after capture. Held, that a part of her cargo, which was brought into a district of the United States, might be condemned as *prize* of war by the District court. The 'Pevensey,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 638.

The officers and crew of a *prize*, in case of condemnation, are not entitled to wages from the *prize* property. Where a *prize* is condemned, the officers and crew who are sent in as witnesses in pursuance of the Law of Nations, are not entitled to witness fees or compensation for their necessary attention, from out of the *prize* property.—The 'Lilla,' 2 *Sprague*, 177, the 'Britannia,' *Ibid.*, 225.

acting under his authority, can give prize jurisdiction to officers not deriving their authority from the constitution or laws of the United States. The *alcalde* of Monterey, a port of Mexico, in the possession and military occupation of the United States as conquered territory, was appointed by the governor of California as a judge of Admiralty with prize jurisdiction, and his appointment was ratified by the President, on the ground that prize crews could not be spared from the squadron to bring captured vessels into a port of the United States. The Supreme Court held that such a court could not decide upon the rights of the United States, or of individuals, in prize, nor administer the laws of nations; that its sentence of condemnation was a mere nullity, and could have no effect on the rights of any party.¹

§ 10. Having shown that the prize-court of the capturing country has exclusive jurisdiction of the question of prize, and that no mere municipal court can exercise prize jurisdiction, unless it is especially conferred by the constitutional or local laws of the State to which it belongs, we now turn to the inquiry, where such court may sit or exercise its authority. We have already seen that the prize-court of an ally cannot condemn; but may not the prize-court of the captor sit in the territory of an ally? The objections made to the jurisdiction of an ally's court do not apply to a court belonging to the country of the captor sitting in an ally's territory. Chancellor Kent says, that such court, so sitting, may lawfully condemn. It has also been held by the English courts that a prize carried into a State in alliance with the captors, in war with the country to which the captured vessel belonged, or into the country of the captors, may be legally condemned there by a consul belonging to the nation of the captor. It was at one time supposed, that the authority of the *'Flad Olen'* was against the legality of such a condemnation. But William Scott subsequently pointed out and explained the distinction.²

§ 11. But a prize-court of the captors cannot sit in

¹ *Jecker et al. v. Montgomery*, 13 *Howard R.*, 498.

² Kent, *Comm. on Am. Law*, vol. vi. p. 103; the *'Flad Olen'*, 135; the *'Christopher'*, 2 *Rob.*, 209; the *'Harmony'*, the *'Adrian'*, the *'Betsey Kruger'*, 2 *Rob.*, 210, note; *Oddy v. Bovill*, 2 *Eng. Wheelwright v. Depeyster*, 1 *Johns. R.*, 471; *Pistoye et Duval v. Prises*, tit. 8.

tral territory, nor can its authority be delegated to any tribunal sitting in neutral territory. The reason of this rule is obvious. Neutral ports are not intended to be auxiliary to the operations of the belligerents, and it is not only improper but dangerous to make them the theatre of hostile proceedings. A sentence of condemnation by a belligerent prize-court in a neutral port is, therefore, considered insufficient to transfer the ownership of vessels or goods captured in war, and carried into such port for adjudication. This question was first decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1794, and in 1799 it was re-examined and discussed at much length by Sir William Scott, who decided that an enemy's prize-court, in neutral territory, could not lawfully condemn.¹

§ 12. The objections made to the establishment of a prize-court in neutral territory would not apply to conquered territory in the possession and military occupation of the captors. Such territory is *de facto* within the jurisdiction of the conqueror, and a condemnation regularly made by a prize-court legally established in such conquered territory would not be set aside for that reason alone. The *legality* of the court may, however, be a question of some difficulty, and must be determined by the constitution and local laws of the captor's country. It will, hereafter, be shown that, in this respect, the laws of different countries are very different; that the laws of Great Britain instantly extend over conquered territory; but, that territory in the military occupation of the United States is not a part of the Federal union; that when the conquest is confirmed, the inhabitants of such territory become entitled to

¹ *Glass et al. v. the sloop 'Betsey' et al.*, 3 *Dall. R.*, 6; the 'Henrick and Maria,' 4 *Rob.*, 45.

The prize-court of a belligerent cannot exercise jurisdiction, in a neutral country.—The 'Fiad Oyen,' 1 *Rob.*, 135.

But it can, in the country of a belligerent ally.—*Oddy v. Bovill*, 2 *East.*,

53. Courts of neutral governments have no right to try the prizes taken by ships, public or private, of another. Similarly, the liberty of a belligerent to sell prizes in a neutral territory is not a perfect right, but subject to the regulation of the neutral government.—*Findlay v. the 'William,'* 1 *Pet. Adm.*, 12.

The sentence of a court of Admiralty, sitting under a commission in a belligerent power, in a neutral country, will not be recognised in British courts. For this purpose a neutral country will be one in which, although the forms of an independent neutral government are preserved, the belligerent possesses the real sovereignty.—*Donaldson v. Thompson*, 1 *Camp.*, 429; *Smith v. Surridge*, 4 *Exch.*, 25.

the rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the constitution, but that the action of Congress is requisite to extend the general laws of the United States over territory after cession or confirmation of conquest. It has already been shown that neither the executive nor military authorities of the United States have power to establish prize-courts in conquered territory to administer the law of nations. But this is different with Great Britain; for, as the limits of the empire are extended, *ipso facto*, by the conquest, and as the conquered territory becomes instantly a dominion of the crown, the monarch issues prize commissions of his own authority, may establish courts there for the exercise of such jurisdiction. In spite of the island of Heligoland, which had been taken possession of by British forces, but had not been confirmed to Great Britain by a treaty of peace, Sir William Scott remarked that he might have erected a court there, for the exercise of Admiralty jurisdiction; and, if it did not, I presume it refrained from doing because it was not thought that the public convenience required it. The enemy certainly had no right to say that a court of that kind should not be there erected.¹

§ 13. The ordinary prize jurisdiction of the Admiralty tends to all captures in war made on the high seas; to captures made in foreign ports and harbours; to captures made on land by naval forces; to surrenders made to naval forces alone or acting conjointly with land forces; to captures made in rivers, creeks, ports, and harbours of the captor's own country at time of war, and to seizures, reprisals, and embargoes, in anticipation of war. It also extends to all ransom bills, and captures; to money received as a ransom, or commutation for a capitulation to naval forces, alone or jointly with land forces; in fine, to all uses of maritime capture arising *jure belli*, and to all matters incidental thereto. Prize-courts also have exclusive jurisdiction and an enlarged discretion, as to allocation of freight, damages, expenses, and costs, and as to all personal injuries, ill-treatments, and abuse of power, connected with maritime captures *de jure belli*, and they frequently award large and liberal damages in such cases. This rule rests on the ground that where the prize-court has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the original matter, it ought also to

¹ Jecker et al. v. Montgomery, 13 Howard R., 515; Cross v. Harrison, 16 Howard R., 165; the 'Flouina,' 1 Dod. R., 452.

jurisdiction of all its consequences, and of everything incidental thereto. It is, therefore, held in England that courts of Common Law can have no jurisdiction at all in incidental questions, and this doctrine has been repeated by the courts of the United States. Indeed, so far as has been decided by the Federal courts of the United States, they have claimed and exercised a jurisdiction equally as broad and extensive as the prize-courts of Great Britain. Cases of recapture are held to be cases of prize, and are treated with as such. It is understood in England that the Admiralty, merely by its own inherent powers, never exercises jurisdiction of captures, or seizures as prize, made on shore without the co-operation of naval forces. Such were the opinion of Lord Mansfield, and his opinion on this point was repeated by Sir William Scott. As before remarked, we know of no decision by the courts of the United States bearing upon the question; in the case of the 'Emulous,' although the court gave no opinion as to the right of the Admiralty to take cognisance of mere captures made on the land, and solely by land forces, yet it was declared to be very clear that its jurisdiction was not confined to captures *at sea*. Prize-courts do not, in general, take jurisdiction of questions of mere *booty*. If, however, the jurisdiction of a prize-court is once attached, that is, if the capture be such as to be within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, the process of the prize-court will follow the goods on shore, and its jurisdiction continues not only over the capture, but also over all consequences incident to it. So, also, if the prize should be unlawfully carried into a foreign port and there given up by the captors on security. In this respect the prize-court holds a jurisdiction greater than the instance court; for in cases of derelict, if the goods are once on shore or landed, the jurisdiction of the common law attaches.¹

¹ *Law on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 35, § 358; the 'Emulous,' 1 Cranch, 563; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 126, et seq.; Elphinstone, *Knapp R.*, 316.

² Property captured by a public vessel, in an enemy's port, and was, when seized, stored in a warehouse on land near the shore, under the facts, to be lawful prize.—'Twelve hundred and thirty bags of Rice,' *Blut hf. Pr. Cas.*, 211.

³ No legal ground of objection, to the jurisdiction of a prize-court, can be made out of its territorial authority. Under the law of nations, and by the municipal law of the United States, the court has jurisdiction, when the subject matter of suit is prize of war, without

§ 14. The next question for consideration, is the locality of the captured property. If it be carried into a port of the captor's country, there can be no doubt respecting the jurisdiction of the prize-court of the same country. But what particular tribunal of that country shall exercise the prize jurisdiction of a particular case, will depend, of course, upon the local laws under which such tribunals are organised, and their respective jurisdictions are assigned and limited. This is entirely a question of local law. So, also, if the captured property is carried into a port of the captor's co-belligerent, it may be adjudicated by a properly constituted prize tribunal of the captor's country; for, although the government of an ally cannot itself condemn, there is nothing to prevent it from permitting the exercise of that final act of hostility on the part of its co-belligerent, the condemnation of property captured in a common war. 'There is a common interest,' says Wheaton, 'between the two governments, and both may be presumed to authorise any measures conducing to give effect to their arms, and to consider each other's ports as mutually subservient. Such an adjudication is, therefore, sufficient in regard to property taken in the course of the operations of a common war.' It was at one time supposed that a prize-court, though sitting in the country of its own sovereign, or of his ally, had no jurisdiction over prizes lying in a neutral port. Sir William Scott admitted that, on principle, the exercise of such jurisdiction was irregular, as the court wanted that possession which was deemed essential to a proceeding *in rem*; but he considered that the English Admiralty had gone too far in its practice, to be recalled to the original principle. Sir William Grant, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeals, in the same case, expressed

to the locality of the arrest or cause of action, and it is unimportant to the question of prize or no prize, whether the capturing land and sea forces act in conjunction, or separately.—12 *Stat. at L.* 759, 12 *Ibid.* 319; '1800 hundred and eighty two Bales of Cotton,' *Bhatkf. Pr. Cas.*, 302.

Slaves cannot be libelled as prize, under the United States Act of June 26, 1812, nor will the District court consider them as prizes in war, their disposition being exclusively a question of State policy with which the judiciary cannot interfere.—See 'Amelia' v. Certain Slaves, 5 *U. S. Law*, 2 N. S., 459.

Books intended for a public library will not be confiscated in a prize court. The 'Amelia,' 4 *Phil.*, 417.

For example of the condemnation of an enemy's vessel, in the naval service of the enemy as a gunboat, see the 'Ellis,' *Bhatkf. Pr. Cas.*, 348.

the same opinion, and the English rule is now considered as definitively settled. The Supreme Court of the United States has followed the English rule, and has held valid the condemnation, by a belligerent court, of prizes carried into a neutral port and remaining there, the practice being justifiable on the ground of convenience to belligerents, as well as neutrals, and though the prize was, in fact, within neutral territory, it was still to be deemed under the control, or *sub potestate*, of the captor, whose possession is considered as that of his sovereign. It may, also, be remarked, that the rule thus established by the highest courts of England and the United States, is sanctioned by the practice of France, Spain, and Holland. But several French publicists deny its legality. For the same reason that a prize-court of the captor may condemn captured property while in a neutral port, it may condemn such property situate in any foreign port, which is in the military possession of the captor. 'As a general rule,' says Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, 'it is the duty of the captor to bring it within the jurisdiction of the prize-court of the nation to which it belongs, and to institute proceedings to have it condemned. This is required by the Act of Congress, in cases of capture by ships of war of the United States; and this Act merely enforces the performance of a duty imposed upon the captor by the law of nations, which, in all civilised countries, secures to the captured a trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, before he can be finally deprived of his property. But there are cases where, from existing circumstances, the captor may be excused from the performance of this duty, and may sell, or otherwise dispose of, the property, before condemnation. And where the commander of a national ship cannot, without weakening inconveniently the force under his command, spare sufficient prize crew to man the captured vessel, or where the orders of his government prohibit him from doing so, he may lawfully sell or otherwise dispose of the captured property in a foreign country, and may afterwards proceed to adjudication in a court of the United States.'¹

¹ Wheaton, *Hist. Law of Nations*, p. 321; Jecker et al. v. Montgomery, 13 Howard R., 516; the 'Peacock,' 4 Rob., 185; Hudson v. Boston, 4 Cranch R., 293; Williams et al. v. Arnoid, 7 Cranch. R., 33, the 'Arabela and Madena,' 2 Gallis. R., 368, the 'Henric and

§ 15. The sentence of a competent prize-court of the captor's country is conclusive upon the question of property in the captured thing; it forecloses all controversy respecting the validity of the capture, as between the claimants and the captors of those claiming under them, and terminates the ordinary judicial inquiry upon the subject matter. The court cannot be held responsible in the court of any other country, nor can the question of the ownership of the captured property be made a matter of judicial investigation when once decided by a competent prize-court. A contrary rule, allowing the prize-courts of one country to review and reverse the decisions of the prize-courts of another country, would lead to great irregularities and endless disputes and litigation. The competency of the court and its jurisdiction may, however, as will be shown hereafter, be made the subject of judicial inquiry.

§ 16. 'Where the responsibility of the captor ceases,'

Mania, 6 *Rob.*, 138, note; the '*Falcon*,' 6 *Rob.*, 198; '*La Dame Cécile*,' 257.

It is fully within the usage of the prize-courts to entertain and exercise their jurisdiction over property captured on board a vessel, without the vessel itself brought within their cognisance. In many cases, it is indispensable, as in the case of enemy's property captured in a neutral vessel, or when the enemy's vessel has been destroyed in capture. — *Edward Barnard*, '*Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*,' 123.

A prize court may take judicial cognisance of a capture, without the prize being brought within its territorial jurisdiction, and without the vessel being brought there, during the pendency of the suit. — *The 'Zay'*, '*Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*,' 173.

The possession of the captors in a neutral port, is the possession of their sovereign, and gives jurisdiction to his courts. — *Hudson v. Gao*, 4 *Crim. R.*, 293. The jurisdiction of the courts of France as to seizures is not confined to seizures made within two leagues of the coast. — *Re*

Under peculiar circumstances, the English prize-court will condemn prize, which has been taken into and lies in a neutral port, and allow it to be sold there. — *The 'Polka'*, '*Spinks' Prize Cases*,' 57.

The right of adjudicating, on all captures and questions of prize, belongs exclusively to the courts of the captor's country; but it is an exception to the general rule that, where the captured vessel is brought, or is taken, into the port of a neutral power, that power has a right to inquire whether its own neutrality has been violated by the cruiser which effected the capture, and if such violation has been committed, it is in duty bound to restore to the original owner property captured by cruisers, and to allow it to be sold there. — *The 'Estrella'*, 4 *Wheat*, 298.

D. Ilor. Répertoire, verb. Prises Maritimes, § 7.

Although the decision of a foreign prize-court must be received as evidence, still it may be examined, to see whether the fact, in proof of which it is adduced, was clearly and certainly found by the court that gave it, and it is for the court of that nation, in which the decision of the foreign court is quoted, to ascertain what facts were so found, without inquiring into the legal validity of the grounds of the judgment. — *Hobbs v. Flax*

Mr. Wheaton, 'that of the State begins. It is responsible to other States for the acts of the captors under its commission, the moment these acts are confirmed by the definitive sentence of the tribunals which it has appointed to determine the validity of captures in war.' The sentence of the judge is conclusive against the subjects of the State, but it cannot have the same controlling efficiency toward the subjects of a foreign State. It prevents any further judicial inquiry into the subject matter, but it does not prevent the foreign State from demanding indemnity for the property of its subjects, which may have been unlawfully condemned by the prize-court of another nation. 'The institution of these tribunals, so far from exempting, or being intended to exempt, the sovereign of the belligerent nations from responsibility for the acts of his commissioned cruisers, is designed to ascertain and fix that responsibility. Those cruisers are responsible only to the sovereigns whose commissions they bear. So long as seizures are regularly made upon apparent grounds of just suspicion, and followed by prompt adjudication in the usual mode, and until the acts of the captors are confirmed by the sovereign in the sentences of the tribunals appointed by him to adjudicate in matters of prize, the neutral has no ground

5 *Wheat. R.* 1865, 406. See also *Hughes v. Cornelius*, 2 *Mont.* 232; *Doe v. Geyer*, 2 *Am. L. C.* 634; *Geyer v. Aguilar*, 7 *T. R.*, 681; and *Donaldson v. Thompson*, 1 *Camp.* 429.

The sentence of a foreign court of Admiralty, is evidence only of what it positively and specifically affirms in the adjudicative part of it, not what may be gathered from it by way of inference.—*Fisher v. Ogle*, 1 *Camp.* 414; *Cloutier v. Secretan*, 8 *T. R.*, 192.

Therefore, a condemnation of a vessel for attempting to violate a blockade, is not conclusive, unless it appear on the face of the sentence, free from doubt, whether the ground of condemnation be a just one by the laws of nations, or merely by the municipal regulations of the condemning country.—*Dalgleish v. Hodgson*, 7 *King.* 405.

In *Bernardi v. Molteux*, 2 *Dougl. R.*, 581, an action on a policy of insurance, it was held by Lord Mansfield, that a condemnation by a foreign court of Admiralty is not conclusive evidence that the ship was not neutral, unless it appear that the condemnation went upon that ground. The suppression of controversy about the ground of a foreign sentence, would be obviated, if foreign courts would say in their sentences—'condemned as enemy's property.'

In *Haring v. Clavett*, 3 *B. and P.*, it was collected, that the ground of condemnation was the ship being enemy's property, and not the infringement of some positive regulations of the foreign country. The court held the sentence, conclusive evidence against a warranty of neutrality. In *Yates v. Henderson*, *Ibid.*, 479, the House of Lords held, that a foreign sentence adjudging a ship, for whatever cause, to be enemy's property, was conclusive against its neutrality.

of complaint, and what he suffers is the inevitable result of the belligerent right of capture. But the moment the decision of the tribunal of the last resort has been pronounced (supposing it not to be warranted by the facts of the case and by the law of nations applied to those facts), and justice has thus been finally denied, the capture and the condemnation become the acts of the State, for which the sovereign is responsible to the government of the claimant. Not only may a State demand indemnity for the property of its citizens unlawfully condemned by a foreign prize-court, but, if refused, it may resort to reprisals or even to war. The right of redress in this case rests upon the same grounds as the right of redress for injuries received, and a denial of justice perpetrated. This principle is supported by the authority of publicists, and by historical examples. If justice is not done to the other claimants by the prize-courts of the captors, says Rutherford, 'they may apply to their own State for a remedy, which may, consistently with the law of nations, give them a remedy, either by solemn war or reprisals.' In order to determine when their right to apply to their own State begins, we must inquire when the exclusive right of the other State to judge in this controversy ends. As this exclusive right is nothing else but the right of the State, to which the capture belongs, to examine into the conduct of its members, before it becomes answerable for what they have done, such exclusive right cannot end until their conduct has been thoroughly examined. Natural equity will not allow that the State should be answerable for their acts, until those acts are examined by all the ways which the State has appointed for this purpose. Since, therefore, it is usual in maritime countries to establish not only inferior courts of marine but likewise superior courts of review, to which the parties may appeal, if they think themselves aggrieved by the inferior courts, the subjects of a neutral State can have no right to apply to their own State for a remedy against an erroneous sentence of an inferior court, till they have appealed to the superior court, or to the several superior courts, if there are more courts of this sort than one, and till the sentence has been confirmed in all of them. For these courts are so many means appointed by the State, to which the captors belong, to examine into their conduct; and, till their conduct has

been examined by all these means, the State's exclusive right of judging continues. After the sentence of the inferior courts has been thus confirmed, the foreign claimants may apply to their own State for a remedy, if they think themselves aggrieved; but, the law of nations will not entitle them to a remedy, unless they have been actually aggrieved. When the matter has been carried thus far, the two States become the parties to the controversy.¹

§ 17. In 1753, the King of Prussia undertook to set up within his own dominions a commission to re-examine the sentences pronounced against his subjects in the British prize-courts; this was deemed an innovation upon the settled usage of nations. But, although the British government asserted the proceedings of their prize tribunals to be the only legitimate mode of determining the validity of captures made in war, it did not consider these proceedings as excluding the demand of Prussia for redress upon the government itself. The King even resorted to reprisals, by stopping the interest upon a loan due to British subjects, and secured by hypothecation upon the revenues of Silesia, until he actually obtained from the British Government an indemnity for the Prussian vessels unjustly captured and condemned. So, also, under the treaty of 1794, between the United States and Great Britain, a mixed commission was appointed to determine the claim of American citizens, arising from the capture of their property by British cruisers during the existing war with France, and a full and satisfactory indemnity was awarded in many cases where there had been a final condemnation by courts of prize. Again, in the negotiation between the Danish and American governments respecting the captures of American vessels by the cruisers of Denmark during the war between that power and England, it was admitted that, although the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the capturing nation was exclusive and complete, and had the effect of closing for ever all private controversy between the captors and the captured, still, the American government might demand indemnity for unlawful condemnations. The demand which the United States made upon the Danish Government was not for a judicial reversal of the sentences pronounced by its tribunals, but for the

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 16; Rutherford, *Institutes*, b. ii. ch. ix. § 19.

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the subject matter, but also with respect to the authority from which it has emanated; and if the jurisdiction be unauthorised from either cause, it is a decisive objection to the sentence.¹

§ 19. We have already pointed out the distinction between prize-courts and municipal tribunals, with respect to their constitution and character. The same distinction exists with respect to the laws which they administer. Prize-courts are in no way bound to regard local ordinances and municipal regulations, unless they are sanctioned by the law of nations. Indeed, if such ordinances and regulations are in contravention of the established rules of international jurisprudence, prize-courts must either violate their duty, or entirely disregard them. They are not binding on the prize-courts, even of the country by which they are issued. The stipulations of treaties, however, are obligatory upon the nations which have entered into them, and prize-courts must observe them in adjudicating between subjects or citizens of the contracting parties. The language of Sir William Scott, in delivering the judgment of the court in the case of *'The Maria,'*² is peculiarly just and appropriate. 'In forming my judgment, I trust it has not escaped my anxious recollection for one moment, what it is that the duty of my station calls from me; namely, to consider myself as stationed here, not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions, to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to administer, with indifference, that justice which the law of nations holds out, without distinction, to independent States, some happening to be neutral and some to be belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is, indeed, locally *here*, in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but the law itself has *no locality*. It is the duty of the person who sits here, to determine this question exactly as he would determine the same question, if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretensions on the part of Great Britain, which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances; and to impose no

¹ Phillips, *On Insurance*, vol. ii pp. 680, et seq.; *Armroyd v. Williams*, 10 *Wash. R.*, 608; *Cherrot v. Foussat*, 3 *Binn. R.*, 220; *Snell v. Foussat*, 1 *Wash. R.*, 271; *Bradstreet v. Nep. Ins. Co.*, 3 *Summ. R.*, 600; *Francis v. Ocean Ins. Co.*, 6 *Cowen R.*, 404; *Cuculler v. Lou. Ins. Co.*, 5 *Mart. R.*, 3, 4th ed.; *Ocean Ins. Co. v. Francis*, 2 *Wend. R.*, 65.

² 1 *Rob.*, 340.

duties on Sweden, as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain, in the same character. If therefore, I mistake the law in this matter, I mistake that which I consider, and which I mean should be considered as universal law upon the question.' In speaking of the right of a prize-court to adjudicate upon maritime captures, Rutherford remarks: 'The right which it exercises is not civil jurisdiction; and the civil law, which is peculiar to its own territory, is not the law by which it ought to proceed. Neither the place where the controversy arose, nor the parties who are concerned in it, are subject to this law. The only law by which this controversy can be determined, is the law of nature, applied to the collective bodies of civil society; that is, *the law of nations*; unless, indeed, there have been any particular treaties made between the two States, between the captors and the other claimants belong, mutually binding them to depart from such rights as the law of nations would otherwise have supported. Where such treaties have been made, they are a law to the two States, as far as they extend, and to all the members of them in their intercourse with each other. The State, therefore, to which the captors belong, in determining what might or what might not be lawfully taken, is to judge by these particular treaties, and by the law of nations taken together.'

§ 20. 'No proceedings,' says Mr. Justice Story, 'can be more unlike than those in the courts of common law and the Admiralty. In prize-courts, in an especial manner, the allegations, the proofs, and the proceedings, are, in general, modelled upon the civil law, with such additions and alterations as the practice of nations and the rights of belligerents and neutrals unavoidably impose.' The parties in a prize case are, therefore, not limited in their recovery, *tantum allegata et probata*, as in the case of a declaration at common law; but the court having jurisdiction over the property, exerts its authority over all the incidents, and will shape its decree as the circumstances of the case may require. At the first hearing of the cause, orders are made for further proof, not only in the court below, but also in the appellate court. Not only the proceedings, but also the rules of evidence, are, in many respects, different from those of courts of common law; and prize-courts not only decide upon the

claims of the captors, but also upon their conduct in making the capture, and subsequently, and not unfrequently, declare a forfeiture of their rights, with vindictive damages. We subjoin a digest of some of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on proceedings in prize cases, and the duties and liabilities of captors. In prize causes, the evidence to acquit or condemn, must come, in the first instance, from the papers and crew of the captured ship. It is the duty of the captors to bring the ships' papers into the registry of the district court, verify them on oath, and to have the examinations of the principal officers and seamen of the captured ship taken on the standing interrogatories, and not *visa voce*.¹ It is exclusively upon these papers and examinations that the cause is to be heard in the first instance. If, from this evidence, the property clearly appears to be hostile or neutral, condemnation or restitution immediately follows. If the property appears to be doubtful, or the case suspicious, further proof may be granted according to the rules which govern the legal discretion of the court, if the claimant has not forfeited his right to it by a breach of good faith. The Supreme Court hears the cause, in the first instance, upon the evidence transmitted from the Circuit court, and decides upon that, whether it is proper to allow further proof. If the court below has denied an order for further proof, when it ought to have been granted, or has allowed it, when it ought to have been denied, and the objection was made by the party, and appears on the record, the appellate court can administer the proper relief. Where the national character does not distinctly appear, or where the question of proprietary interest is left in doubt, further proof is usually ordered. If the parties have had the benefit of plenary proof in the court below, an order for further proof² is not allowed by the ap-

¹ Judge Story observes, that the standing interrogatories used in the English High Courts of Admiralty (1 *Rob* 381) have been drawn up with great care, precision, and accuracy, and are an excellent model for other courts. They were generally adopted during the war of 1812, by the District Judges in the United States, with few additions and scarcely any alterations. — *W & Ad R.*, app., note ii. p. 494.

² A vessel, under Greek colours, was captured in the offing of Odessa in 1855, by an English ship of war, while attempting to enter that port, which was declared to be in a state of blockade. A claim for her restitution was founded on the necessity of her attempting that port, by reason of the blockade. It appeared that the claimant was not in a better position. Further proof was allowed by the English prize court, in

pellate court, except under very special circumstances. There is reason to believe that the applicant has suppressed important documentary evidence, or that the parties have been guilty of gross fraud, or misconduct, or illegality. Further proof is not allowed. Further proof by the claimant inconsistent with that already in the case, is refused. When an order for further proof is made, and a party neglects to comply with it, courts of prize are in the habit of considering such negligence as fatal to his claim. The concealment or spoliation of papers by an enemy-master carrying a cargo chiefly hostile, does not thereby preclude a neutral claimant to whom no fraud is imputable, from further proof. The circumstances of goods being found on board an enemy's ship raises, in general, a legal presumption that they are enemy property, and the *onus probandi* of a neutral interest rests on the claimant. Affidavits, to be used as a further proof, must be taken under a commission. Depositions taken on further proof, in one prize cause, cannot be invoked into another. Where the affidavits produced as further proof are positive but their credibility impaired by the non-production of letters mentioned therein, a second order for further proof will be allowed in the appellate court.¹

claimant and the captors—the one to prove, the other to disprove—the intention to enter the blockaded port arose from ‘imperious and overwhelming necessity.’ The claim was also allowed to be amended, to show who was the real owner.—The ‘Panagia Rhomba,’ 3 A. S., 23.

Both parties were allowed to give further proof, as to the intention to violate blockade, in the case of the ‘Jane Campbell,’ *Blatchf. Pr.*, 101.

A claimant forfeits the right to ask to take further proof, by any concealments previously made in the case.—The ‘Grey Jacket,’ 5 R. 342.

It is the ordinary course of prize-courts, upon an order for further proof, especially where it becomes material to ascertain the circumstances of capture, to allow the attestations of the captors as evidence; for, in such cases, the fact lies as much within the knowledge of the captors as the captured, and the objection of interest generally applies as strongly to both parties as to the other.—The ‘Anne,’ 3 Wheat., 435.

It is enacted by 27 & 28 Vict. c. 25, s. 21, that where, on production of the preparatory examinations and ship papers, it appears to the court doubtful whether the captured ship is good prize or not, the court may direct further proof to be adduced, either by affidavit or by examination of witnesses, with or without pleadings, or by production of further documents, and on such further proof being adduced, the court shall with convenient speed proceed to adjudication.

¹ The ‘Dos Hermanos,’ 2 Wheat. R., 76; the ‘Pizarro,’ 2 Wheat. 227; the ‘Amiable Isabella,’ 6 Wheat. R., 1; the ‘London Packet,’

§ 21. A vessel libelled as prize, is in the custody of law and under the control of the court. The prize-court in which proceedings were instituted, has power to order a sale, even after an appeal; and although such sale, after an appeal, is irregular, this irregularity will not render the captors liable to pay the amount of the sales, which did not come into their hands, but were under the control of the court. A sale made before condemnation, by one acting under the possession of the captor, does not divest the prize-court of its jurisdiction, to decide the question of prize, and the subsequent condemnation relates back to the capture, affirms its legality, and establishes the title of the purchaser. In the United States a warrant immediately goes to the marshal to take possession

1 Wheat. R., 371; schooner 'Adeline' and cargo, *9 Cranch. R.*, 244; the 'Annis', *5 Wheat. R.*, 127; the 'Atalanta', *5 Wheat. R.*, 433; the 'Fortuna', *3 Wheat. R.*, 236, the 'Euphrates', *8 Cranch. R.*, 385; the 'Experiment', *4 Wheat. R.*, 84.

The common law doctrines, as to the competency of witnesses, are not applicable to prize proceedings. No person is incompetent in those courts, merely on the ground of interest. His testimony is admissible, subject to all exceptions as to its credibility. The 'Anne', *3 Wheat.*, 435.

The rule that the testimony, for the condemnation of a prize, must be obtained, in the first instance, directly from documents or witnesses found on board the vessel at the time of her seizure, is always adhered to, unless satisfactory reasons are shown for departing from it in a particular instance. The 'Zavalla', *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 173; the 'Jane Campbell', *Id.*, 101.

Where all the persons on board escaped before the capture of a vessel, and the capture was made while she was attempting to violate a blockade, it was held that, upon satisfactory proof that the vessel and cargo were enemy's property, a decree might be entered against them in the absence of an examination of the papers and crew. The 'Gipsy', *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 126.

A vessel, after her capture, was appropriated to the use of the United States, and was not sent into port. Her cargo was sent in by another vessel, and was arrested in the suit. None of her company were sent in as witnesses. A person present at the capture was, by order of the court, retained as a witness, and the cargo condemned; but the vessel was discharged for want of legal arrest and prosecution.—The 'Wave', *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 329.

Where none of the officers or crew of the vessel were sent into port with her, produced as witnesses, it was held, that subsequent appearance and examination *propratorio* of the vessel, cured the irregularity.—The 'Henry Middleton', *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*,

A vessel and cargo were condemned as enemy's property, upon proof of the spoliation of papers at the moment of capture, and that a former owner remained in possession as master of the vessel for a year, and two alleged sales to neutrals, the alleged neutral owners, who died near the place where the vessel and cargo were libelled, leaving no defence to such former owner.—The 'Andromeda', *2 Wall.*,

of the property, and he is bound to keep it in *salvo et sana custodia*; and if any loss happen by his negligence he is responsible for it to the court. In England, it formerly actually remained in the custody of the court, and does so now in contemplation of law, although the Admiralty, merely for convenience, allow the captors to retain the possession in England but as the agents of the court, and not in the right of property. And the court still retains its custody, notwithstanding an unlivery and deposit in public warehouses.¹

§ 22. As has already been remarked, it is the duty of the captors to send their prize into a convenient part of their own country, and to immediately bring the case before the proper court for adjudication. If they fail to do this, the claimant may apply to the court for a monition to the captors to proceed forthwith for adjudication, and if they neglect to do so after service and return of such monition, the court will, if a proper case be laid before it, proceed to award not only restitution, but also damages and costs. Even if the captors agree to a restitution, if they have unreasonably delayed to make it, demurrage will be allowed against them. The libel filed by the captors is usually in very general terms, setting forth the facts of the capture, and alleging the captured property to be a subject of prize rights; but the captors are not required at the commencement of the suit to allege the particular grounds

¹ *Smart v. Wolff*, 3 *Durn. & East.*, 323, 329; the 'Herkimer,' *Steers R.*, 128; the 'Readsberg,' 6 *Rob.*, 142; the 'Concord,' 9 *Cranf. R.*, 27; the 'Nereide,' 1 *Wheat. R.*, 171; the 'Hoop,' 3 *Rob.*, 145.

Application for a sale of prize property, before hearing, on the ground that it was in a perishing condition, granted, under the circumstances of the case. — *Stoddart v. Read*, 2 *Dall.*, 40; the 'Pioneer,' *Blanchf. Pr. Cas.*, 123.

On a motion, for the sale of a cargo pending the hearing, on the ground that it is in a perishing condition, the judgment of the prize commissioners, founded on their inspection, as evidenced by their report, prevails, unless controlling evidence is produced counteracting their judgment. — The 'Nassau,' *Blanchf. Pr. Cas.*, 198.

The application for the sale of prize property, in a perishing condition was refused in the case of the 'Alliance,' *Blanchf. Pr. Cas.*, 106; compare *Harlan v. the 'Nassau'*, *Ibid.*, 220.

A sale of prize property was allowed before a hearing, under the circumstances of the case, of the 'Sarah and Caroline,' *Blanchf. Pr. Cas.*, 123; and of the 'Nymph,' *Ibid.*, 564.

A libel, in a prize case, need contain no further averment than that the property seized is prize of war. — The 'Sally Magee,' *Blanchf. Pr. Cas.*, 382.

When a sale will be ordered, pending an appeal, see the 'Cromwell,' *Blanchf. Pr. Cas.*, 631; the 'Hiawatha,' *Ibid.*, 632; the 'Sanbeam,' *Ibid.*, 638.

upon which they base their claim to a condemnation. But the court may, in its discretion, afterwards order special pleadings. In case of joint captures, the libel is filed by the actual captors, and those claiming the benefit of joint capture afterwards file their claim, giving bonds to the required amount for costs. On the filing of the libel, the usual practice is to issue a monition, citing all persons who are interested to appear by a given day, and show cause why the specified property should not be condemned as prize, etc.¹

¹ The 'Betsey,' 1 Rob., 93; the 'Mentor,' 1 Rob., 181; the 'Huldah,' 3 Rob., 239; the 'Der Mohr,' 3 Rob., 129; the 'George,' 3 Rob., 212; the 'William,' 4 Rob., 215; the 'Susanna,' 6 Rob., 48; the 'Adeline,' 9 Cranch., 244; the 'Fortuna,' 1 Dougl. R., 81; the 'Conqueror,' 2 Rob., 303.

Goods are usually condemned, for want of a claim, after a year and a day have elapsed from the date of the return of the monition.

During the Crimean war, this time was reduced to three months by the 17 & 18 Vict. c. xviii., s. 37, liberty being reserved to the Judicial Committee, to allow the appeal to be prosecuted after the expiration of that period. But the motion by a claimant, the owner of a cargo, upon notice to the captor for leave to appeal from a sentence of the Admiralty Court in England, pronounced *in pœnam contumacie*, fifteen months after the capture, was granted subject to the presentment of a petition of leave to appeal, on payment of costs, and on the terms of prosecuting the appeal within three months, bail being given for payment of the captor's costs. The proceedings in England were unknown to the owner of the cargo, and the sentence of condemnation not having been communicated by the captors to the owner, he had no knowledge thereof, until long after the time for appealing had expired.—The 'Aspasia,' 11 Moore P. C. C., 80. See also the 'Achilles,' 11, *Ibid.*, 86.

It is enacted by the 27 & 28 Vict. cap. xxv., s. 36, that before condemnation, a petition on behalf of asserted joint captors shall not, except by special leave of the court, be admitted, unless and until they give security, to the satisfaction of the court, to contribute to the actual captors a just proportion of any costs, charges, expenses, or damages that may be incurred by, or awarded against, the actual captors on account of the capture and detention of the prize. After condemnation, such a petition shall not, except by special leave of the court, be admitted, unless and until the asserted joint captors pay to the actual captors a just proportion of the costs, charges, and expenses incurred by the actual captors in the case, and give such security as aforesaid, and show sufficient cause to the court why their petition was not presented before condemnation.

A British prize-court, on proof of any offence against the law of nations or against the Act below mentioned, or any Act relating to naval discipline, or against any Order in Council or Royal Proclamation, or of any breach of her Majesty's instructions relating to prize; or of any Act of disobedience to the orders of the Lords of the Admiralty, or to the command of a superior officer, committed by the captors in relation to any ship or goods taken as prize, or in relation to any person on board such ship, may on condemnation reserve the prize to her Majesty's disposal, notwithstanding any grant that may have been made by her Majesty in favour of captors. 27 & 28 Vict. cap. xxv., s. 37.

The practice in American prize-courts is, in general, to make final condemnation of enemy's property at the hearing of the cause, upon the

unliquidated, is not entitled to mortgagee assert any claim, while left in possession. An appeal by claimants, duly entered, cures the want of monition or of due diligence, that one partner has no authority to bind the parties, yet a general appeal is good and legally binding. All parties interested, if present, or their agents, of the ship, or some agent of the court, will not be permitted to interpose on the chances of an acquittal.¹

ship's papers and the evidence *in proceedings* for a year and a day, after a decision, it is doubtful upon the evidence, whether the vessel is enemy or is neutral. The *'Falco'*.

The rule of the prize-courts, to condemn neutral vessels, for claimants to appear. It is allowed as of right, where the vessel is seized solely on the ground of default. If the vessel is enemy property, or of contraband, or if it may condemn the vessel or cargo, all the papers, and papers, in the absence of claimants. So if it shall be proved, that the vessel was seized on the ground of default, and the presumptions arise. The *'Julia'*, 2 *Sprague*, 164.

What order may be made, where the vessel is chargeable with wrongful delinquency. *Jecker v. Montgomery*, 1 *Robinson*, 104.

§ 24. A claimant who wishes to procure the restitution of any property captured as prize, must, after the libel is filed, and at or before the return of the monition thereon, or within the time assigned by the court, enter his claim for such property, accompanied with an affidavit, stating briefly the facts respecting the claim and its verity. If the parties themselves are not within the jurisdiction of the court, or at a very great distance, the claim may be sworn to by an agent. Before the claim duly sworn to is put in, the claimants are not, as a general rule, permitted to examine the ship's papers, as this might lead to great abuses, but sometimes, on special application, the court will permit so many of the papers to be examined as it may deem proper, in order to enable the claimant to set forth the particular grounds of his claim. The pleadings both on the part of the captors and claimants, are of a very simple character, formed upon the rules and practice of the Roman law.

Both the libel and claim are of a general character, and allegations of particular circumstances not being usually made. With respect to the reception of evidence, courts allow a relaxation of technical rules which are permitted to prevail in the country in which it is taken. As a general rule no claim is admitted which stands in entire opposition to the ship's papers and to the preparatory examinations. Nor can

when the captured vessel is brought for adjudication, and which the parties setting up such lien can, on proper presentation of their claim to the tribunal, have decided. But if such parties do not so present, and seek to have it decided, the question is not properly before the Supreme Court for review, in a case where the District court only dismissed the libel, as improperly filed on its instance side.—The 'Nassau,' 4 Wall., 634; Harlan v. the 'Nassau,' Blatchf. Pr. Cas., 220.

A mortgagee of captured property has no right to assert his mortgage in a prize court, and demand its payment out of the proceeds of the property, if condemned. All liens upon captured property, which are not in the very nature upon and apparent, like that for freight upon the cargo taken on board a captured vessel, are utterly disregarded by prize-courts.—The 'Deka,' Blatchf. Pr. Cas., 133.

In proceedings in prize, and under principles of international law, mortgages on vessels captured *jure belli* are to be treated only as liens, subject to being overruled by the capture; not as *jura in re*, capable of enforcement superior to the claims of the captors.—The 'Hampton,' 4 Wall., 372.

Demands, against property captured as prize of war, must be adjusted in a prize court. The property arrested as prize, is not attachable at the suit of private parties. If such parties have claim, which, in the view, comports the rights of captors, they must present them to the prize-court for settlement.—The 'Nassau,' 4 Wall., 634; Harlan v. the 'Nassau,' Blatchf. Pr. Cas., 220.

any person be permitted to claim in a prize where the transaction in which he is engaged is in violation of the municipal law of his own country, or of that where the court is sitting. Claimants must give bonds for costs and expenses to the amount required by statute or the rules of the court.¹

§ 25. When a sentence is pronounced either of acquittal or condemnation, it is generally, in the English prize-court, by an *interlocutory decree*, but in the United States it is the more common practice to reserve a decree until a final decision of all the questions before the court. Decrees of *acquittal* may be either with or without damages and costs, or on condition of paying costs and expenses. If the specific property remains in the custody of the court and *restitution* is decreed, it is directed to be delivered to the claimant; but if disposed of, the proceeds are so delivered. In case of *condemnation* in favour of a privateer, it is usual in England to deliver a decree with a proper commission to the master of the privateer to make sale of the prize and return an account to the court; but in the United States all sales before and after condemna-

¹ The 'Port Mary,' 3 *Rob.*, 233; the 'La Flora,' 6 *Rob.*, 1; the 'Walsingham Packet,' 2 *Rob.*, 77; the 'Urusco,' 4 *Rob.*, 262; the 'Cruz and Maria,' 5 *Rob.*, 23; the 'Peacock,' 4 *Rob.*, 185; the 'Arabella and Madeira,' 2 *Gallis. R.*, 368.

It is not competent for a neutral consul, without the special authority of his government, to interpose a claim in a case of prize, on account of a violation of the territorial jurisdiction of his country in the capture.—(Supreme Ct., 1818), the 'Anne,' 3 *Wheat.*, 435.

Where, after condemnation of a vessel and cargo, the decree as to the vessel was opened by consent on the application of owners of the vessel, who showed that she had been previously captured from them by a privateer of the enemy. Held, that the vessel should be restored, or payment of one eighth of her value as salvage to the captors.—The 'Hague,' *Blakely Pr. Cas.*, 579.

Cargo on board enemy's vessel, being neutral property on transportation in a lawful trade, released without costs to the captors, there having been no probable cause for its arrest.—The 'Velasco,' *Blakely Pr. Cas.*, 54.

Where there was probable cause for the seizure, but the vessel was neutral property, on a lawful voyage, and was making for a blockade port for repairs, she was restored to the claimants without costs.—The 'Jane Campbell,' *Blakely Pr. Cas.*, 101.

Instances of the vessel and cargo released and restored to the claimants upon the facts in the case.—See the 'Tropic Wind,' *Blakely Pr. Cas.*, 64; the 'Labuan,' *Id.*, 165; the 'Glen,' *Id.*, 375; the 'Sybil,' *Id.*, 41; the 'Sarah M. Newhall,' *Id.*, 629; the 'Argonaut,' *Id.*, 62; the 'Hannah Johnson,' *Id.*, 2; the 'Forest King,' *Id.*, 2, the 'Gondar,' *Id.*, 64; reversing S. C., *Id.*, 266; the 'Science,' 5 *Wall.*, 178; the 'Terreza,' *Id.*, 181; the 'Volant,' *Id.*, 179.

tion are made by the marshal, who returns the funds to the court to be distributed by its order.¹

¹ Phillimore, *On. Int. Law*, vol. iii., §§ 493-497 ; *Marriott's Forms*, pp. 194, 196.

The master, of an enemy's vessel condemned as prize, is not entitled to be repaid out of the proceeds of the vessel, for disbursements made by him for her use.—The 'Velasco,' *Blatchf. Pr. Cas.*, 54.

Prize cargoes sent in for adjudication in a transport chartered by the government, are not chargeable with the payment of freight or any part of the vessel.—The 'Undaunted,' 2 *Sprague*, 194.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

RIGHTS OF MILITARY OCCUPATION.

1. Military occupation and complete conquest distinguished—2. When rights of military occupation begin—3. Submission sufficient—4. Force upon political laws—5. Upon municipal laws—6. Punishment of crime in such territory—7. Laws of England instantly extend over conquered territory—8. Territory so occupied no part of the American Union but a part of the United States with respect to other countries—9. Effect of this distinction—10. American decisions—11. Powers of the President respecting such revenues—12. Change of ownership of private property during military occupation—13. Laws relating to such transfers—14. Allegiance of inhabitants of occupied territory—15. Lawful resistance and insurrection—16. Implied obligation of the conquered—17. Of the conqueror—18. Right of revolution—19. Right of insurrection in war—20. Punishing military insurrections—21. Historical examples—22. Alienations of territory occupied by an enemy—23. Alienations made in anticipation of conquest—24. Private grants so made—25. Transfer of territory to neutrals—26. Effect of military occupation on incorporeal rights—27. Debts due to the government of the territory occupied—28. If former government be restored—29. Examples from ancient history—30. Examples from modern history.

§ 1. THE term *conquest*, as it is ordinarily used, is applicable to conquered territory the moment it is taken from the enemy; but, in its more limited and technical meaning, it includes only the real property to which the conqueror has acquired a *complete title*. Until the ownership of such property so taken is confirmed or made complete, it is held by the right of *military occupation* (*occupatio bellica*), which, by the usage of nations and the laws of war, differs from, and falls far short of, the right of *complete conquest* (*debellatio, ultima ratio*). These will form the subjects of the next two chapters. The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the constitution, or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession.

During its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority, and such rules, are derived directly from the laws of war, as established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists, and the decisions of courts—in fine, from the law of nations. But when the conquest is made complete, in whatsoever mode, the right to govern the acquired territory follows as the inevitable consequence of the right of acquisition, and the character, form, and powers of the government established over such conquered territory, are determined by the constitution and laws of the State which acquires it, or with which it is incorporated. The government established over an enemy's territory during its military occupation, may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all the restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a *military* or a *civil* government; its character is the same, and the source of its authority the same: in either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory, or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality, or illegality of its acts. But the conquering State may, of its own will, whether expressed in its constitution, or in its laws, impose restrictions additional to those established by the usage of nations, conferring upon the inhabitants of the territory so occupied privileges and rights which they are not strictly entitled by the laws of war; and if such government of military occupation violate these additional restrictions so imposed, it is accountable to the power which established it, but not to the rest of the world.¹

Cocceius, *De Jure Victoriae*, passim; Hefster, *Droit International*, 1, 186; Fleming et al. 1, Page, 9 *Howard R.*, 603; Cross et al. 1, 150; Mason, 16 *Howard R.*, 164; Marcy to Kearny, June 11, 1847, *Ex. Doc.* 7, 31st Cong. 1st sess. 11, R; Kampff, *Littérature des Völk.*, § 307; Albert, *Ann. Pol. et Dips. Int.*, p. 115; Cushing, *Opinions U. S. Att. Gen.*, vol. viii p. 365; Gardner, *Institutes*, p. 308; Puffendorf, *De Jure Nat. et Gent.*, lib. viii. cap. vi. §§ 17, 27; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. § 197.

The Brussels Conference, 1874, declares. Art. 1 A territory is considered as occupied when it is placed actually under the authority of the army. The occupation only extends to those territories where this authority is established and can be exercised. Art. 2 The authority of the occupying power being suspended, and having actually passed into the hands of the occupier, he shall take every step in his power to re-establish peace, as far as possible, public safety and social order. Art. 3.

...to the rule of the
city, harbour, island, province,
belonging to one belligerent,
of the other, such place or ter
quest, and is subject to the law
pose on it; although he has

With this object he will maintain the
country in time of peace, and will oblige
by others if necessity obliges him to
officials of every class who at the insti
tinue to perform their duties, shall be
be dismissed or be liable to summary
ment) unless they fail in fulfilling the
and shall be handed over to justice, e
by unfaithfulness. Art. 5. The army
taxes, dues, duties, and tolls as are ab
the State, or the equivalent, if it be in
shall be done as far as possible in the
practice. It shall devote them to de
tration of the country to the same ex
government. Art. 6. The army occu
sion only of the specie, the funds, and
exigibles), which are the property of
of arms, means of transport, magazines
personal property of the State which is
war. Railway plant, land telegraphs, st
in cases regulated by maritime law, as
rally every kind of munitions of war, a
to private individuals, are to be consid
to aid in carrying on a war, which can
tion at the disposal of the enemy. Rail
as the steam and other vessels above
indemnities be regulated on the conclu
... State shall not ...

minimum et utile, he has the temporary right of possession and government. As this temporary title derives its validity entirely from the force of arms on the one side, and submission to such force on the other, it necessarily follows that it extends no further, and continues no longer, than such subjugation and submission extend and continue. Thus, if one diligent take possession of a port, or town, or province of another, he cannot, therefore, pretend to extend his government and laws over places or provinces which he has not yet reduced to submission, or, by reason of a particular possession, claim a general control and authority. By occupying a part of an enemy's coast, we have a right, so long as we retain possession, to exclude neutral vessels from such port, or to put them on such terms as to us may seem fit and proper ; we cannot exclude neutral vessels, or impose our regulations upon neutral commerce in ports of the enemy which are not in our possession. To extend the rights of military occupation, or the limits of conquest, by mere intention, imagination, or proclamation, would be establishing a *paper possession*, infinitely more objectionable in its character and its effects than a *paper blockade*. 'The rule is,' says Wildman, 'that the whole is possessed by the occupation of a part, if an intention to appropriate the whole accompany such occupation, and all others be excluded from occupying the residue.' Otherwise, possession of real property would be impossible, for it does not admit of manual apprehension or corporal inheritance in all its parts. Two persons cannot have several possessions of the same thing at the same time : such possession of one excludes the possession of another. Hence, if one be in possession, and another enter upon part which is not in the actual possession of the first, by such entry he gains possession of no more than he actually occupies. The conclusive occupation of the owner is defeated by actual occupation, so far as it extends. Thus it is said by Celsus, if an enemy enter a territory by force of arms, it is in possession so much only as it occupies. When he speaks of force, he supposes resistance on behalf of the sovereign, in defence of his possession. *An army only possesses a country so far as it compels the enemy's forces to retire.* The meaning of Paulus is probably the same, when he says that possession of part, with an appropriating mind, is possession of the whole, up to

its boundary. By boundary, he signifies the commencement of another's possession. Upon these principles, the extent of hostile possession may be distinctly defined. If an army be in possession of a principal town of a province, it is not thereby in possession of the towns and forts within the same, which hold out for the enemy. Forceful possession extends so far only as there is an absence of resistance. The occupation of part by right of conquest, with intent to appropriate the whole, gives possession of the whole, *if the enemy maintains military possession of no portion of the residuum*. Under such circumstances, military possession of a capital would be possession of a whole kingdom. *But if any part held out, so much only is possessed as is actually conquered*. Thus both the States-General and the King of Spain maintained, during the controversies that arose out of the truce between Spain and the United Provinces, that the possession of the surrounding country follows the possession of a town. The military possessors of a town must necessarily have the surrounding country in their power, unless there be a fortress within it. In which case, the country commanded by the fortress would not be in their possession. These principles show the absurdity of the pretensions of the Western and Eastern empires that have been founded on the possession of Rome and Constantinople. The same principles are recognised in the decision of Calvin's case. 'Now come we,' says Lord Coke, 'to France and the members thereof, as Calais, Guynes, Tournaie etc., which descended to King Edward III., as son and heir to Isabel, daughter and heir to Philip le Beau, King of France. Certain it is, whilst King Henry VI. had both England and the heart and greatest part of France under his actual allegiance and obedience, (for he was crowned King of France at Paris,) that they that were then born in those parts of France that were under actual allegiance and obedience, were no aliens but capable of, and heritable to, lands in England.' Those born in parts of France not under actual allegiance and obedience, and prior to King Henry's recognition and coronation were regarded as *antenatis*, and received letters patent of denization, as in the case of Reynel.¹

¹ Bouvier, *Law, Dic., verb. Conquest*; Duponceau, *Translation of Bynkershoek*, p. 116, note; Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. 1, pp. 113, 114. Calvin's case, *Coke R.*, pt. vii, p. 220; Justinian, *Pandects*, lib. 2, tit. 4. Schwartz, *De Jure Vic., in Res. Incorp.*, tit. 27.

These, as we have said elsewhere, belong of right to the conqueror, and he may demand and receive their payment to himself. They are a part of the spoils of war, and the people of the captured province or town can no more pay them to the former government than they can contribute funds or military munitions to assist that government to prosecute the war. To do so would be a breach of the implied condonation under which the people of a conquered territory are allowed to enjoy their private property, and to pursue their ordinary occupations, and would render the offender liable to punishment. They are subject to the laws of the conqueror, and not to the orders of the displaced government. Of lands and immovable property belonging to the conquered State the conqueror has, by the rights of war, acquired the use so long as he holds them. The fruits, rents, and profits are, therefore, his, and he may lawfully claim and receive them. Any contracts or agreements, however, which he may make with individuals farming out such property, will continue only so long as he retains control of them, and will cease on their restoration to, or recovery by, their former owner.¹

§ 5. The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, except so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of the conqueror. Important changes of this kind are seldom made, as the conqueror has no interest in interfering with the municipal laws of the country which he holds by the temporary rights of military occupation. He nevertheless has all the powers of a *de facto* government, and can, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones. Such changes, however, are, in general, only of a temporary character, and end with the government which made them. On the confirmation of the conquest by a treaty of peace, the inhabitants of such territory are, as a general rule, remitted to the municipal laws and usages which prevailed among them prior to the conquest. Neither the civil nor the criminal jurisdiction of the conquering State is considered as international law, as extending over the conquered territory during military occupation. Although the national jurisdiction of the conquered power is replaced by that of military

¹ Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Peters R., 542; Burlamaqui, *Princ. de la Nat. et des Gens.*, l. v. pt. iv. ch. vii.

§ 6. How then are crimes to be punished which are committed in territory occupied by force of arms, but which are not of a military character nor provided for in the military

Whilst they were occupying Versailles, no person could go in or out of that town, without a *permit* from the German military authorities. The French mayor continued his civil duties, and the French flag remained over the *Mairie* all the time.—Delerot, *Versailles*.

Regulations such as the following were issued by the Germans into the general conduct of the inhabitants in occupied districts: viz. that they give up their arms; that they put out their lights at a certain hour; and in case of a disturbance at night, show lights in all their windows; that they hold no communication with 'the enemy,' or with any person in the unoccupied part of the country; that they do not act as guides, or as guides to 'the enemy;' if called upon to act as guides to the enemy's troops, they will mislead them at their peril; that they do not join the hostile army, nor form bands on their own account; that they do not cut the telegraph or injure the railway, the penalty for disobedience in such case is death; if the railway or telegraph is injured and the offender cannot be discovered, a fine is imposed on the town or commune, and if the fine or the usual money contribution be not forthcoming, hostages are taken and detained until it is paid. The townspeople are to remain tranquil; all in the neighbourhood are to remain tranquil; they are to furnish the requisitions demanded from them and help the local authorities to pay the money contribution, and their lives and property will be safe and their property protected.—Edwards, *supra*.

The proclamation of martial law renders every man liable to be treated as a soldier. The instant the necessity ceases, that instant the state of soldiery ought to cease, and the rights with the relations of civilians be restored. *Per Lord Brougham, Debate on the trial of the Rev John Smith by court-martial—Parl. Debates, 1824.*

In the field, all followers and retainers of an army become subject to the restraint of military law, and the custom of war, and the necessity of the case then also justifies the punishment, by sentence of court-martial, of certain crimes against the safety of the army, or the person or the property of individuals belonging to it, or entitled to its protection, who are offenders themselves neither belong to nor are connected with the service.

The declaration of martial law renders all persons amenable to court-martial, on the order of the military authority, so long as the civil authority is not in force. There is also a modified exercise of martial law, when, by special intervention of the authority exercising the legislative power, courts martial have been erected into tribunals, for the trial of persons not subject to military law for certain specified offences, although the ordinary course of law may have been partially restored, or had never been altogether stayed.

As instances of the special laws creating this exceptional jurisdiction may be mentioned—the Statute (17) 39, Geo. III. c. 11, passed in Ireland in 1798, which was revived by the Irish Act, 40 Geo. III. c. 2, and further continued by the 41 Geo. III. c. 14; the Statute 43 Geo. III. c. 1, which was passed in the Imperial Parliament in 1803, re-creating the principal provisions of that before mentioned; and the *Ordinance* (Canada), 2 Vict. c. 3, passed in Canada in 1838. These Acts authorize the exercise of the powers which they may confer on the executive, whether the ordinary courts shall or shall not be open; and do not lay down any deviation from the ordinary manner of proceeding in the case of courts martial held under them. The Irish Coercion Act, passed in 1833

code of the conquering State? To solve this question it will be sufficient to recur to the principles already laid down. Although the laws and jurisdiction of the conquering State do not extend over such foreign territory, yet the laws of war confer upon it ample power to govern such territory, and to punish all offences and crimes therein by whomsoever committed. The trial and punishment of the guilty parties may be left to the ordinary courts and authorities of the country, or, they may be referred to special tribunals organised for that purpose by the government of military occupation; and where they are so referred to special tribunals, the ordinary jurisdiction is to be considered as suspended *quoad hoc*. It must be remembered that the authority of such tribunals has its source, not in the laws of the conquering, nor in those of the conquered State, but, like any other powers of the government of military occupation, in the laws of war; and, in all cases not provided for by the laws actually in force in the conquered territory, such tribunals must be governed and guided by the principles of universal public jurisprudence. How far the laws of the former government continue in force after the conquest, and how far they are replaced by those of the conquering State, by those enacted by the government *de facto*, or by new principles of jurisprudence, or usages and customs introduced with the conquerors, is considered in other places, and need not be repeated here. In the war between the United States and the republic of Mexico, it was found that no provisions had been made in the United States' rules

(3 & 4 Will. IV., c. 4), regulated the rank of the members, the punishment to be awarded, and, among other peculiar enactments, provided (sec. 1.) that the parties before the court might have the assistance of counsel and attorneys.

In Great Britain, the preamble of each successive Mutiny Act reasserts the illegality of martial law in time of peace, by reciting from the Petition of Right that no man can be forejudged of life or limb, or subjected in time of peace to any kind of punishment within the realm by martial law. Indirectly, therefore, it recognises the legality of resorting to this expedient, in time of war and intestine commotion. No legal dogma can be clearer, and being each year recognised by Parliament, it is entitled to all the deference which may be due to an act of the legislature so repeatedly revised and considered. The legal right or, more properly, the power of the sovereign, or the representative of Majesty, to promulgate martial law, has been fully set forth in many Statutes, and the acknowledged prerogative of the Crown to resort to the exercise of martial law against open enemies or traitors, is expressly declared in several earlier Statutes, and also among others more recent, in the Irish Disturbance Act of 1833 (3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 4 s. 40). See *Summons, Courts Martial*.

and articles of war for numerous cases, civil and criminal, between citizens of the United States and between such citizens and foreigners, in Mexican territory occupied by our troops and consequently without the jurisdiction of any court of the United States. All such cases, of a criminal character, arising in the territory of Mexico occupied by the 'main army' under General Scott, were referred by him to 'military commissions,' which were special tribunals constituted and appointed for that purpose; in California, they were usually left to be decided by the ordinary tribunals of the country, although special tribunals were there organised, in a few special cases, by the government of military occupation. This was in conformity to principle,—martial law of the conqueror, or, as it has been called, 'extra-territorial martial law,' was the governing rule, while the civil or special tribunal was the instrument of execution in subordination to, the military power, and the limitations to this power were the laws of war.¹

¹ Gardner, *Inst. of Am. Int. Law*, p. 208; Cushing, *Opinions of U. S. A. G.*, pp. 365, et seq.; Howard, *Parl. Deb.*, A. S., vol. cxxv, 1847; Scott, *Gen'l Orders*, No. 20, Feb. 19, 1847; Marcy to Scott, Feb. 3, 1847; *Cong. Doc.*, No. 60, 30th Cong., 1st sess. H. of R., p. 574.

In 1865, one Lambdin P. Milligan presented a petition to the Circuit Court of the United States, for the district of Indiana, to be discharged from an alleged unlawful imprisonment. The case made by the petitioner was this: Milligan was a citizen of the United States, had resided twenty years in Indiana, and at the time of the grievances complained of was not, and never had been, in the military or naval service of the United States. On Oct. 5, 1864, while at home, he had been arrested by order of General Hovey, commanding the military district of Indiana, and had been kept in close confinement.

On the 21st of that month he was brought before a military commission, convened at Indianapolis by order of General Hovey, tried on charges and specifications, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged. The matter being eventually brought before the Supreme Court, in December, 1866, Mr. Justice Davis remarked that no graver question had ever been considered by that Court than the one then before them. Had a military commission the legal power and authority to try and punish the petitioner? that there was no question which more nearly concerned the rights of the whole people of the United States, for it was the birthright of every American citizen, when charged with crime, to be tried and to be punished according to law.

The court had judicial knowledge that, in Indiana, the Federal Government was always unopposed, and its courts always open to hear criminal prosecutions and to redress grievances during the Civil War, no usurper could sanction a military trial there, for any offence whatever committed in civil life, in no wise connected with the military service; Congress could grant no such power; and to the honour of the legislature it may be said that it had never been provoked by the state of the country, even temporarily, to exercise it. One of the plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not ordained and established

dominion of the King in right of his Crown, and that the habitants of such conquered territory, once received under King's protection, become his subjects and are universally be regarded in that light, and not as enemies or aliens. A no other act than that of conquest is requisite to make the conquered territory a dominion of the Crown, and nothing more than the submission to the King's authority and protection, on the part of the inhabitants of such territory, is necessary to make them subjects of the King, such territory is no longer to be regarded, either by other nations or by other parts of the British empire, as a foreign country, or its inhabitants as aliens. In other words, foreign territory becomes dominion, and its inhabitants the subjects of the King, *in fact*, by the conquest made by the British arms, without the action of the legislature, the Parliament of Great Britain.

§ 8. But a different rule holds in the United States. The peculiar character of our government, and the powers vested in it by the Federal Constitution, have given rise to rules somewhat peculiar and anomalous, with respect to the government of conquered territory. The President, in the exercise of constitutional power as commander-in-chief of the army, and the military officers under his authority, may, when war has been declared, seize the enemy's possessions, and establish government and laws for the territory so seized and occupied. Such territory is subject to the sovereignty and dominion of the United States as soon as the enemy is driven out or submits to our arms. But neither the President nor his officers can extend the limits, or enlarge the boundaries of the United States. This can only be done by congress. As the institutions and laws of the United States do not extend beyond the limits before assigned to them by the legislative power, the inhabitants of a conquered territory, during its military occupation by the United States, can claim none of the rights and privileges established by such laws. And even where these institutions and laws are adopted by the government of military occupation, the rights which they confer upon the inhabitants of the conquered territory do not extend to the States

¹ Calvin's case, *Coke R.*, part vii. *Elphinstone v. Bedbrecht*, *Knapp R.*, 338; *Campbell v. Hall*, 23 *State Trials*, 322; *Fabriga Moslyn*, 1 *Conn. R.*, 165; *Callet v. Lord Keith*, 2 *East R.*, 260, *Blanch v. Gully*, 4 *Mod. R.*, 225.

territories of the United States. The conquered territory is under the sovereignty and authority of the Union ; but it is not a part of the United States ; nor does it cease to be a foreign country, or its inhabitants cease to be aliens, in the sense in which these words are used in our laws. They are to be governed by martial law, as regulated and limited by public law. But while such territory forms no part of the Union, and its inhabitants have none of the rights, immunities, and privileges of citizens of the United States, under the Federal Constitution and laws ; nevertheless, other nations are bound to regard the conquered territory, while in our possession, as territory of the United States, and to respect it as such, and to regard its inhabitants as under our protection and government. 'for, by the laws and usages of nations,' says Chief Justice Taney, 'conquest is a valid title, while the victor maintains the exclusive possession of the conquered country. The citizens of no other nation, therefore, have a right to enter it without the permission of the American authorities, nor to hold intercourse with its inhabitants, nor to trade with them. As regards all other nations, it is a part of the United States, and belongs to them as exclusively as the territory included in our established boundaries.'¹

19. This distinction between conquered territory in the military occupation of the United States, and territory of the United States within the limits of the federal union, as established by congress, is a very important one, and leads to very important consequences. It has been recognised and established by the decisions of the highest judicial authority, and must be regarded as the law of the land. The relations between the inhabitants of such conquered territory and foreign nations are, therefore, very different from the relations between the people of the United States and such nations, as previously established by treaties and commercial law. The intercourse of foreign nations with such territory, is regulated by the government of occupation, under the direction of the

¹ Gardner, *Institutes*, p. 268 ; Fleming et al. v. Page, 9 Howard R., 373 ; Cross, et al. v. Harrison, 16 Howard R., 164.
In February, 1866, it was resolved by Congress that the condition of the former Confederate States fully justified the President in maintaining suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* in those States, and that the retention of those States fully justified the President in maintaining military possession and control of them.

to allow intercourse at all war. So, also, the rules of its inhabitants of the United States may be very different from the and trade between different port vessel entering the port of the military occupation by the United the regulations adopted, and government of such territory, turning to the United States, regarded as coming from a foreign in the coasting trade; and the payment of duties as fixed by, for goods imported from a foreign victor to the revenues of the established and recognised by of nations. It is immaterial from import taxes, rents of ports and exports, or from any other conquest, and rightfully belong are permitted to hold commercial tory, whether they be subjects States, must conform to the established by the conquering, by the United States, the Presidentive enactments, exercises this

and with respect to the enemy's territory in the possession of the United States. 1. In the case of the Island of Santa Cruz, belonging to the Kingdom of Denmark, but in the military occupation of British forces, the Supreme Court says: 'Although acquisitions made during war are not considered as permanent until confirmed by treaty, yet, to every commercial and belligerent purpose, they are considered as a part of the domain of the conqueror, so long as he retains the possession and government of them. The island of Santa Cruz, after its capitulation, remained a British island until it was restored to Denmark.' 2. Castine, in the United States, was captured by the British forces on the first day of September, 1814, and remained in their exclusive possession until after the ratification of the treaty of peace, in February, 1815. 'By the conquest and military occupation of Castine,' says the Supreme Court, 'the enemy acquired that firm possession which enabled him to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty over that place. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender, the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognise and impose. From the nature of the case, no other laws could be obligatory upon them; for where there is no protection or allegiance, or sovereignty, there can be no claim to obedience. Castine was, therefore, during this period, so far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subject to such duties only as the British Government chose to require. Such goods were, in no correct sense, imported into the United States.' 3. In the case of Tampico, in Mexico, which was captured and occupied by the arms of the United States, during the war with Mexico, the Supreme Court held that cargoes of goods landed there were liable to the duties charged on them by the military authorities of the United States, whether shipped from the United States or from foreign countries.¹

§ 11. In the absence of any laws of Congress on this sub-

¹ *Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle*, 9 *Cranch. R.*, 191; *United States v. Rice*, 4 *Wheat. R.*, 246.

ject, the regulating and collecting of such revenues, in enemy territory in our possession, devolves upon the President of the United States, as the constitutional commander-in-chief and upon the military and naval officers under his direction. The moneys derived from these sources may be used for the support of the government of the conquered territory, or for the expenses of the war. They are war revenues and cannot belong to the treasury of the United States until so directed by a law of Congress. Being no part of the moneys of the Treasury of the United States, their expenditure is not regulated by the general laws of the United States, but by the direction of the President of the United States, under whose authority they were collected.

During the war of 1846, between the United States and Mexico, and on the conquest of the ports of the latter republic on the Gulf of Mexico, the President of the United States formed a tariff of duties on goods from the United States and foreign countries, admitted into such ports in our military possession. A different one, however, had been previously adopted for California, by the military and naval commander on the Pacific coast and gulf of California, which, with certain modifications was, with the tacit approval of the President, continued to the end of the war. Certain missions and other public property in California were rented by the military commander and governor, and certain movable property belonging to the former government was sold by the same authority. The moneys derived from these sources constituted the 'military contribution fund,' which was used for the expenses of the government of occupation, and for carrying on the war. By subsequent acts of Congress the moneys so collected, and not expended, were made to form a portion of the funds in the Treasury of the United States, and the expenditures were settled and audited by the proper officers of the Treasury Department.¹

§ 12. As military occupation produces no effect (except in special cases, and in the application of the severe right of war, by imposing military contributions and confiscations) upon private property, it follows as a necessary consequence, that the ownership of such property may be changed during such occupation, by one belligerent, of the territory of the

¹ Dunlap, *Digest of Laws of U. S.*, p. 1342.

ther, precisely the same as though war did not exist. The right to alienate is incident to the right of ownership, and unless the ownership be restricted or qualified by the victor, the right of alienation continues the same during his military possession of the territory in which it is situate, as it was prior to his taking the possession. A municipality or corporation has the same right as a natural person to dispose of its property during a war, and all such transfers are, *prima facie*, as valid as if made in time of peace. If forbidden by the conqueror, the prohibition is an exception to the general rule of public law, and must be clearly established.¹

§ 13. It has been stated elsewhere, that the *lex loci rei sitæ* governs in everything relating to the tenure, title and transfer of real property; also, that the municipal laws of a conquered territory continue in force during military occupation, except so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of the conqueror. It is not necessary, however, that such change should be made by special decree: it may be done by the introduction of a different system of jurisprudence, or a different usage and custom. As a general rule, there can be no custom in relation to a matter regulated by positive law, as custom derives its force from the tacit consent of the legislative power and the people. But, the sovereign will may be implied or presumed, as well as expressed by words. A series of facts, as a public, uniform, general and continued usage, constitutes a *custom*, which has the force of law, because the sovereign will is therein implied. *Time* is the important element of customary or common law, in an established and continuous government. But, where a new government, with different institutions, a different system of laws and different customs, is suddenly established by the operations of war, and the rights of conquest, the same effect upon the common law of the country may be immediately produced, which, under other circumstances, would require 'time, whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.' During the military occupation of California by the forces of the United States, the use of Mexican stamped paper was necessarily

¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol. i. p. 92; Riquelme, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. 2. cap. xii.; *Cobraz v. Rasin*, 3 *Calif. R.*, 445; *Welch v. Sullivan*, 8 *Calif. R.*, 165; Isambert, *Am. Pol. et Dip. Int.*, p. 115; *Kamptz, Literatur, etc.*, § 367; *Hart v. Burnett*, 15 *Calif. R.*, 559; *Payne & Dewey v. Treadwell*, 16 *Calif. R.*, 220.

dispensed with, for conveyances, and other official writings and private contracts. And, as the local officers of the then existing government of California were generally ignorant of the Spanish language and Spanish forms of conveyances, real estate was usually transferred by the simple deeds of conveyance commonly used in the United States. As such conveyances were seldom executed in conformity with the requisitions of Mexican municipal law, their validity rested upon the usage introduced with the government of military occupation. Titles to many millions of property in that country were transferred in this way, and the usage continued after the restoration of peace, and, until the enactment of laws by the local government, after its organisation as a State. Conveyances so made and executed have always been regarded as valid and sufficient for the transfer of real property. In the first place, the law requiring the use of stamped paper was a law for revenue, and, consequently, was suspended, with other political laws, *ipso facto*, by the conquest, and completely abrogated by the cession. In the second place, the *lex situs*, with respect to the forms and execution of conveyances of real property, was also suspended in its operation by the introduction of a different usage with the government of the conquerors, and, from the nature of the case, the inhabitants of California could hardly be considered as remitted to this law by the restoration of peace. But this point will be more particularly discussed in the next chapter.¹

§ 14. It may be stated, as a general proposition, that the duty of allegiance is reciprocal to the duty of protection. When, therefore, a State is unable to protect a part of its territory from the superior force of an enemy, it loses, for the time, its claim to the allegiance of those whom it fails to protect, and the inhabitants of the conquered territory pass under a temporary or qualified allegiance to the conqueror. The sovereignty of the State which is thus unable to protect its territory is displaced, and that of the conqueror is substituted in its stead. But this change of sovereignty may be only of a temporary character, for the conquered territory may be recaptured by the former owner, or it may be restored to him by a treaty of peace. During mere military occupa-

¹ *Vide post*, ch. xxxiv.; Boyer, *Universal Pub. Law*, ch. vi. *Febrero Mexicano*, tit. prelim., cap. iv.

the sovereignty of the conqueror is unstable and incomplete. Hence the allegiance of the inhabitants of the territory so occupied is a temporary and qualified allegiance, which becomes complete only on the confirmation of the conquest, and with the express or implied consent of the conquered.¹

§ 15. But when does this change of temporary allegiance actually take place? And under what circumstances may the inhabitants of a conquered city or province take up arms to repel the conqueror, and assist their former sovereign in recovering his lost possessions? These are delicate questions, not always easy of decision. And yet, their resolution involves matters of the utmost importance; for the decision of the first fixes the line between justifiable homicide and murder, and that of the second will determine whether those taken in arms are to be treated as prisoners of war, or may be executed as military insurgents. As a general rule, the inhabitants of a place lose their right to resist on its complete capture or formal surrender, and the conqueror then loses his right to kill. Those who retain their arms and refuse to surrender, are still enemies, exercising the rights of war, and subject to its consequences; but those who submit are bound by the conditions, express or implied, of such submission. Obedience to the laws which the conqueror may impose by the right of conquest, is undoubtedly one of these implied conditions. But is there no limit to such obedience, and may those who have thus submitted to the authority of the victorious enemy, throw off, at any time, this temporary allegiance to the conqueror, and restore the former and rightful sovereignty? In other words, does not their duty to their country involve the right of insurrection against that of the conqueror? In order to arrive at a satisfactory answer to this question, it may be well to consider the more general subject of *revolution*. For, although there is a broad and obvious distinction between an insurrection of a conquered city or province against the conqueror, and a revolution against established government, yet it will be found, on examina-

¹ Barlaamiquin, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, tome v. pt. iv. ch. vi.; Mancin Ins. Co. v. Cauter, 2 Peters R., 542; Calvin's case, Coke R., pt. i.; Rayneval, *Inst. du Droit Nat. des*, liv. iii. ch. xx.; Heffter, *Droit International*, §§ 132, 186; Palfendorf, *De Jur. Nat. et Gent.*, lib. viii. vi. § 21.

tants of the conquered place
conqueror from pursuing his
pose of securing the object
ages, when a place is taken
the people lay down their arms
their ordinary peaceful occupa-
strait, but with the tacit or
oppose no further resistance.
They are virtually in the
parole. No word of honour
implied; for only on that
have relinquished the extr
over their lives, and have sub
to pursue their ordinary avo
gation does not bind those w
are retained as prisoners of w
tinues. It is only those wh
queror, by a relaxation of th
that are tacitly bound by the
they decline the favour, the
Thus, a prisoner of war who
kill his guard and effect his
the laws of war, or the oblig

§ 17. It must also be obs
is mutual and equally bindin
quered are under the implied

pursue their ordinary occupations, without any further restraint than may be necessary for the safety of the conqueror. But if the conqueror should impose unusual and unnecessary restraints, should treat them with unmerited harshness, should destroy or confiscate their property, taking away the liberty of some and the lives of others,—such conduct on his part would release them from the obligation of non-resistance, and restore to them the rights of belligerents in actual war. Insurrections, in such cases, are justified by the law of necessity and the natural right of protecting life, liberty, and property.¹

§ 18. The abstract question of the right of a people to take up arms against the authorities of an established government, has often been discussed by speculative writers. However opposed it may be to the general theory of political organisation and government, it can hardly be doubted that a revolution, in certain circumstances, would be justifiable. But in what circumstances? Here opinions diverge, and doubts and difficulties increase as we advance, till all hope of a satisfactory conclusion is lost. Abandoning, then, all chance of deciding what constitutes justifiable causes of civil revolutions, we must judge of them by their effects. If we turn to history, we find that they form some of its brightest and some of its darkest pages. Sometimes nations have been benefited by them, and sometimes they have proved the utter ruin of whole States. While, therefore, the right of revolution is opposed by the juriconsult on technical grounds, and admitted by the philosopher on the ground of necessity, all agree that such a terrible rupture of the frame-work of civil society should be resorted to only where all other means of redress have failed. 'Governments, long established, should not be changed for light and transient causes. . . . But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under an absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.'²

¹ Leibniz, *Pol. Ethics*, b. iii. ch. i. § 1; b. iv. ch. ii § 29; Abegg, *Untersuchungen*, p. 86; Heffler, *Lehrbuch des Criminalrechtes*, § 37.

² Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. ch. xviii. §§ 290, 291; Taylor, *On Revolutions*, passim; Burlamaqui, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, tome v. pt. ii. ch. vi.; *Declaration of American Independence*; *Encyclopædia Americana*, verb. *Insurrection*.

to be obtained by it, revolution
right. So, also, with respect
occupation established by the
so injurious to the conquered
intolerable, and to justify their
but cruel alternative, of insurrec-
and clear, but there is great
particular cases. The historians
most invariably justify such
patriotism, while those of the
condemn them as in violation
implied obligation of submission
or failure usually gives to a mil-
character of patriotic resistance,
sacrifice of human life. They
results produced, rather than by
them, and the motives for which
all the operations of a war they
character and unsatisfactory in
attended by the most atrocious
terminating, even when successful.
As might naturally be expected
are unbridled, the innocent are
respect to age, sex, or condition
by a military insurrection seldom
which attend it or follow its track.

the same code over life and property. The insurgents taken in arms, as well as their instigators, may therefore be put to death, and their property confiscated or destroyed. But this extreme right of the conqueror over military insurgents, is limited by the laws of humanity, and he is not justifiable if he resort to cruel and unnecessary punishments. Such severe rights should always be used with moderation, and their exercise tempered with mercy. Hence, in modern wars, only the leaders and instigators of a military insurrection are usually punished with death, while the common people who are engaged in it are more leniently dealt with. Sometimes, heavy contributions are levied by way of punishment upon the place or district of country where the insurrection occurs. This practice is justified on the ground that the instigators and leaders, being usually the originators of the insurrection, should suffer the punishment due to the offence, and that a community is to be held responsible for the acts of its members where the individual offenders cannot be otherwise reached. It must be remembered, however, that although by the rules of war the conqueror has a lawful right to impose the severest punishment upon military insurgents, it by no means follows that he is justifiable in so doing. We must here distinguish between what is permitted by the law and what is forbidden by morality. As there is no legal tribunal to determine upon the justice of a war, neither is there one to determine upon the cause of a military insurrection, or the justice of the punishment imposed upon the insurgents. But there is a tribunal of public opinion to which all are subject. If, therefore, the conqueror has, by acts of tyranny and oppression, given good cause for a revolt in a place occupied by force of arms, his own conduct will be condemned, and that of the insurgents approved at the bar of conscience and in the opinion of all good men.¹

¹ Vide ante, ch. xx. and xxi; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. xviii.

² 290, 291; Barbeyrac, *Note sur Puffendorf*, tome ii. p. 474.

Attacks, by or with the presumed aid of the French inhabitants, were never left unpunished by the Germans, in the war of 1870. At Menères, near Nantes, half a village was consumed, because a party shot was fired at some Bavarians. At Foucancourt, a third of the houses were consumed, because the inhabitants were accused of being in collusion with some French tireurs, who had fired on the Germans at the entrance to the village, under cover of a thick fog. Vernon (on the road to Rouen), though an open town, was shelled by the Germans, because some gamekeepers had fired at them across the river, and the bridges being broken they could not recross.—Edwards, *supra*.

§ 21. History abounds in examples of this kind of inter-
 rection, and of punishments inflicted by the conqueror upon
 the insurgents. Without recurring to the wars of the middle
 ages, of the reformation, of Charles V., Louis XIV., and Freder-
 ick II., before the principles of international law were fully
 established or generally recognised, we find numerous examples
 in the wars of Napoleon, in Europe, and of the English in
 India. And, without noticing the military operations of Clive
 Hastings, Sir Eyre Coote, and Wellington, we have, in the
 recent war in the latter country, some most terrible examples
 of the severity with which military insurrections are punished
 at the present day, and by the most civilised conquerors. But
 a few illustrations drawn from the wars of Napoleon will suf-
 fice for our purpose. In the Italian campaign of 1796, the
 inhabitants of Pavia rose against the French troops, and made
 them prisoners. Lannes routed a portion of the insurgent
 and burnt the village of Brescia; but, as this severe exam-
 ple failed in producing intimidation, Napoleon himself returned
 to the revolted city, shot the leaders of the insurrection, and
 delivered up the place to plunder. 'This terrible example,'
 says the English historian, 'crushed the insurrection over the
 whole of Lombardy.' In the campaign of 1797, a Venetian
 insurrection was organised on the Adige, four hundred
 wounded French in the hospital of Verona were killed with
 cold blood, and the French garrison of Fort Chiusa, who
 capitulated for want of provisions, was inhumanly put to
 death. The insurrection was immediately suppressed, 3
 authors shot, and a contribution of one million one hundred
 thousand francs levied on the city. In the Peninsular war
 many of the Spaniards and Portuguese, after submitting to the
 French, took advantage of every opportunity to rise upon a
 small garrison or detachment, and to murder all stragglers.
 They were punished with severity. 'So many complaints,'
 says Napier, 'were made of the cruelty committed by Mas-
 sena's army while at Santarem, that Lord Wellington had
 some thoughts of reprisals; but having first caused strict
 inquiry to be made, it was discovered that in most cases the
 order, it was, after having submitted to the French, and received
 their protection, took advantage of it to destroy the stragglers
 and small detachments, and the cruelty complained of was
 only the infliction of legitimate punishment for such conduct.'

be projected retaliation was therefore changed for an injunction to the ordenanças to cease from such a warfare.¹

§ 22. Military occupation, as has already been stated, suspends the sovereignty and dominion of the former owner so long as the conquered territory remains in the possession of the conqueror, or in that of his allies. The temporary dominion of the latter completely excludes, for the time being, the original dominion of the former. The vanquished sovereign, therefore, has no power, as against the conqueror, to alienate any part of his own territory which may be at the time in the possession of the latter. If the conquest be completed, or confirmed, the title passes to the conqueror precisely as it was when the latter first acquired the possession. No other party can claim any rights over it arising from any conveyance or transfer from the vanquished while it was in the conqueror's possession. But, if it be surrendered up to the former owner, or recovered by him, such conveyances would become valid, for the donor would not be permitted to deny his own act. It is a principle of jurisprudence that *possession of*, and the *right to*, a thing alienated—the *jus ad rem* and the *jus in re*—are necessary in the grantor in order to constitute a complete title. During military occupation these exist together neither in the original owner nor in the conqueror. The title conveyed by her is therefore imperfect; if by the former, it is made good by a restoration of the conquest; and, if by the latter, it is completed by a confirmation of the conquest, whether by treaty or any other mode recognised in international law.²

§ 23. But suppose war to be declared and actually commenced, and that one of the belligerents has made manifest intention to effect the permanent acquisition of a particular portion of the territory of the other, which intention is afterwards accomplished by actual conquest, and that after declaration of such intention and while preparation was making to carry it out, the original owner should alienate that territory, in whole or in part,—is the conqueror bound

¹ Joinville, *Des Guerres de la Révolution*, ch. lxxvii; Thiers, *Révolution française*, tome viii. ch. iv; tome ix. ch. ii; Alison, *Hist. Europe*, vol. i. p. 468; Napier, *Hist. Peninsular War*, vol. ii. p. 451; Napoléon, *Œuvres*, tome iii. p. 195; tome iv. p. 149.

² The 'Florida,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 450; the 'Fama,' 5 *Rob.*, 97; Grotius, *De Bel. ac Pac.*, lib. ii. ch. vi. § 1; Puffendorf, *De Jur. Nat. et Gent.*, lib. iv. ch. ix. § 8.

to regard such alienation as a valid transfer, or may he disregard it *in toto*, as being an illegal attempt to deprive him of the rights of war? In other words, did not his avowed determination to effect the permanent acquisition of such territory, his preparation to make the conquest, and his ability to effect it, as proved by the result, give to the conqueror some inchoate or inceptive right to the territory subsequently conquered; or did they not at least suspend the right of the original owner to alienate it? In order to obtain a satisfactory solution of this question, we will recur to fundamental principles. The rights of conquest are derived from *fact* alone. They begin with possession, and end with the loss of possession. The possession is acquired by force, either from its actual exercise, or from the intimidation it produces. There can be no antecedent claim or title, from which any *right* of possession is derived: for if so, it would not be a *conquest*. The assertion and enforcement of a *right* to possess a particular territory do not constitute a *conquest* of that territory. By the term conquest, we understand the *fact* of acquisition of territory admitted to belong to the enemy. It expresses, not a *right*, but a *fact*, from which rights are derived. Until the fact of conquest occurs, there can be no rights of conquest. A title acquired by conquest cannot, therefore, relate back to a period anterior to the conquest. That would involve a contradiction of terms. The title of the original owner prior to the conquest is, by the very nature of the case, admitted to be valid. His rights are, therefore, suspended by force alone. If that force be overcome, and the original owner resumes his possession, his rights revive, and are deemed to have been uninterrupted. It, therefore, cannot be said, that the original owner loses any of his rights of sovereignty, or that the conqueror acquires any rights whatever, in the conquered territory, anterior to actual conquest. The former are suspended by, and the latter derived from, the *fact* of conquest, and, in order to determine the date of such suspension or acquisition of rights, we must refer to the fact of conquest, and not to any prior intention or determination of the conqueror. If these propositions be true, it follows that grants to individuals made, after the commencement of hostilities, by the original sovereign of lands lying in territory, of which he still retains the dominion and ownership,

rest upon the same foundation as those made before the war. If the title thus conveyed is, by municipal law, complete and perfect, the land becomes private property, and must be so regarded by the conqueror. If it be inchoate and imperfect, but *bond fide* and equitable, it nevertheless constitutes 'property' in the sense in which that term is used in international law. It is true that, by the extreme rights of war, the conqueror may disregard individual ownership, and take private property and convert it to his own use. But such a proceeding, as has already been said, is contrary to modern practice, and cannot be resorted to, except in particular cases and under peculiar circumstances. As neither actual hostilities, nor a formal declaration of war, can suspend or terminate the sovereignty of the original owner, he retains and may exercise his dominion over every portion of his territory, till actual conquest.¹

§ 24. But, suppose that the vanquished power, while the conqueror is actually taking forcible possession of a part of its territory, should send its agent with the retreating army, and, as the hostile force advances its standard from district to district, should deliver to individual subjects title-deeds of the territory at the moment it was about to fall into the possession of the advancing foe, with the evident intention to deprive him of the fruits of his conquest. Must the conqueror recognise such grants as valid; and if not, how shall he draw the line of distinction between them and other titles issued by the same authority after the commencement of hostilities and before actual conquest? The want of good faith on the part of such grantees, as well as on the part of the grantor, would deprive them of the rights of *bond fide* purchasers. The distinction between such titles and those acquired in good faith and granted in good faith, and in the ordinary exercise of the rights of original sovereignty, is abundantly manifest. The *fraudulent intent* vitiates the entire transaction, and renders the titles mere nullities, and the conqueror, both during military occupation and after complete conquest by the cessation of hostilities, may refuse to recognise them, unless by some express treaty stipulation he has agreed to regard them as valid. But it must be observed

¹ Bouvier, *Law Dictionary*, verb. *Conquest*; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 223; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. ii. ch. xiii. § 197.

that the same rule applies to grants made prior to the war; if not *bond fide*, the conqueror is not bound to recognise them as valid. The fact of the conqueror being in possession of a part of the country, or even of its capital, produces no effect upon the part which remains in the possession of the former sovereign. This question has been discussed in another section.¹

§ 25. Again, suppose a belligerent should, after a declaration of war, and in anticipation that a particular portion of its territory will necessarily fall into the power of the other party, transfer it to a neutral for the manifest purpose of depriving his enemy of an opportunity to acquire it by conquest: is the latter bound to recognise the validity of such transfer? Every sovereign and independent State has an undoubted right to alienate any part of its own territory, so long as it retains the ownership and dominion; and other sovereign States have an equal right to acquire such ownership and dominion by any of the modes recognised in international law. But a mere treaty-cession of a province or territory by one power to another, can never operate, by itself, as an immediate and complete transfer of the ownership and dominion of the land, or of the allegiance of its inhabitants. To produce such effect, a solemn delivery of the possession by the ceding power, and an assumption of the dominion and government by that to which the cession is made, are indispensable. Until then, the territory continues to belong to the original sovereign owner, and its inhabitants remain the subjects of the power to which their allegiance was due prior to such treaty-cession. Such ceded territory is, therefore, still liable to conquest as the territory of the enemy. But suppose the transfer be completed by a formal delivery of the possession to the neutral grantee, and the assumption by him of the dominion and government of the ceded territory. If the transaction is evidently *mali fide* and the transfer is made with the manifest intent to defraud the belligerent of the rights of conquest, the pretended ownership of the neutral sovereign will not be recognised by the conqueror. Moreover, such an attempt on the part of a neutral to hold territory for the benefit of one of the parties to a war, and in fraud of the belligerent rights of the other party, is regarded as a

¹ Mass v. Riddle & Co., 5 Cranch. R., 357.

violation of neutral duty, and as an act of hostility toward the party whose rights he thus attempts to defeat. Such transfers of territory by a belligerent to a neutral are mere nullities, for fraud vitiates the transactions of States as well as of individuals. But the general right of neutrals to purchase the property of belligerents, *flagrante bello*, if the sale be *bond fide*, is universally conceded. The character of each transaction must be decided upon its own merits, and the determination of the question belongs to the political power of the State. Although the transfer may have been made with the evident intent to defraud the belligerent of the rights to which he is entitled by the laws of war, nevertheless, policy may induce him to treat it as a *bond fide* transaction, rather than to involve himself in hostilities with the pretended purchaser.¹

§ 26. We have next to consider the effect of military occupation upon incorporeal things and rights, as debts, etc. Of these it has been justly remarked: 'They cannot in themselves be the subject of actual possession; they are not external things on which the conqueror can lay his armed hand. They are rights which exist in mental apprehension as connected with a given subject to which they are attached, and with a material object upon which they can be exercised. Therefore, the Roman law philosophically said, *ipsum jus obligationis incorporale est*, and again, *nec possideri videtur jus incorporale*.' It is, therefore, only by the actual possession of corporeal things to which the incorporeal right attaches that the conqueror can be considered as occupying the latter; but, if he possess himself of the former, he is considered to be in possession of both. A distinction, however, is made between incorporeal rights attached to a *corporeal thing* and those attached to a *person*. Man, it is said, as the subject of rights, cannot be compared to a thing; his rights do not, so to speak, hang upon him as they hang upon a piece of land; they rather proceed from him; they constitute his intellectual or spiritual property, which cannot, by the agency of what Grotius calls a *nudum factum*, be separated, without his consent, from his person. It follows, therefore, that when a per-

¹ Hefstter, *Droit International*, § 131; Duer, *On Insurance*, vol. i. pp. 437, 438; the 'Fama,' 5 Rob., 97; the 'Johanna Emelia,' 29 Eng. Law and Equity, R., 562; Cushing, *Opinions of Att'ys. Gen'l.* vol. vi. p. 638.

whole, acquire to those which attach to the whole. We must also distinguish with respect to the situations of the debts, or rather the locality of the debtors from whom they are owing, whether in the conquered country, in that of the conqueror, or in that of a neutral. If situated in the conquered territory, or in that of the conqueror, there is no doubt but that the conqueror may, by the rights of military occupation, enforce the collection of debts actually due to the displaced government, for the *de facto* government has, in this respect, all the powers of that which preceded it. But if situated in a neutral state, the power of the conqueror, being derived from force alone, does not reach them, and he cannot enforce payment. It rests with the neutral to decide whether he will, or will not, recognise the demand as a legal one, or in other words, whether he will regard the government of military occupation as sufficiently permanent to be entitled to the rights of the original creditor. He owes the debt, and the only question with him is, who is entitled to receive it? In deciding this question he will necessarily be determined by the particular circumstances of the case, and will probably delay his action till all serious doubts are removed.¹

§ 28. If the debt, from whomsoever owing, be paid to the government of military occupation, and the conquest is afterward made complete, no question as to the legality of the payment can subsequently arise. But should the former sovereign or government, after a lapse of time, be restored, and the debtor receive his discharge, may the original creditor demand a second payment? The burthen of proof, in such a case, lies upon the debtor; and in order to render the payment valid, and make it operate as a complete discharge of the debt, he must show: 1st, that the sum was actually paid, for an acquittance or a receipt, without actual payment, is no bar to the demand of the original creditor; 2nd, that the debt was actually due at the time when it was paid; 3rd, that the payment has not been delayed by a *mora* on the part of the debtor, which had thus operated to defeat the claim of the original creditor. If the debtor be a citizen of the conquered country, or a subject of the conqueror, he

¹ Real, *Science du Gouvernement*, tome v. ch. ii. § 5; Wolfius, *Jus Gentium*, cap. vii. §§ 833, 864; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. xiv. § 213.; Lauterbach, *Colleg. Pandect.*, lib. xix., t. xv. § 7.

must also show: 4th, that the payment was compulsory,—the effect of a *vis major* upon the debtor,—not necessarily effected by the use of physical force, but paid under an order, the disobedience of which was threatened with punishment. If the debtor be a neutral or stranger, he cannot plead compulsion as a justification of his making payment to the conqueror, but he must also show: 5th, that the constitutional law of the State recognised the payment, as made by him, to be valid; in other words, that it was made in good faith, and to the *de facto* authority authorised by the fundamental laws to receive it. It is not a necessary condition, but it is a substantive defence against the original creditor, that the money has been applied to his benefit; thus, in the case of a State creditor, if the money has been applied to the benefit of the State,—if there has been what the civilians term a *reversum rem*,—the payment will be regarded as valid.¹

§ 29. The earliest historical example of the effect of military occupation or conquest, on the payment or cancellation of debts due to the conquered State, is that of the hundred talents borrowed by the Thessalonians from Thebes, and remitted by Alexander, as has been stated in another chapter. This case, however, belongs rather to complete conquest, than to mere military occupation; for the debt not being paid, but remitted, as a *gift*, the validity of the gift could be sustained only on the ground that Alexander had become so entirely and absolutely master of Thebes, as to constitute him the true and universal successor to the defunct and extinguished State. In the civil war between Cæsar and Pompey, the former remitted to the city of Dyrrachium the payment of a debt which it owed to Caius Flavius, the friend of Decius Brutus. The jurists who have commented on this transaction, agree that the debt was not legally discharged: 1st, because in a civil war there could be, properly speaking, no *occupation*; and 2nd, because it was a private and not a public debt. Another classical example was that of the confiscation of Rhodian houses and debts within the Syrian dominions, by Antiochus, king of Syria; but this was settled by the peace which provided for the *status quo ante bellum*.²

¹ Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 157, 158; Klüber, *Europ. Völkerrecht*, §§ 258, 259; J. Voet, *Com. ad Pandectas*, lib. xix. tit. ii. § 2.

² Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.*, lib. v. cap. x.; Albinus Gentius, *De Jur.*

§ 30. The first example in modern times, referred to by jurists, occurred in 1349. A Fleming lent a Frenchman a thousand crowns; the latter contrived to delay the payment until war broke out between Flanders and France, and then paid the money into the French treasury. After the peace the Fleming again demanded his debt, but the Frenchman defended himself by alleging the payment to the royal treasury. He, however, was condemned to pay back so much of the thousand crowns as he should be proved to have expended to his own benefit; in other words, the court of his own country relieved him only to the extent of the sum actually paid to the sovereign of the debtor. The fraudulent *mora* does not seem to have entered into the judicial investigation of this case. In a war between Pisa and Florence, toward the close of the fifteenth century, the former compelled, by threats of punishment, its subjects, who were debtors to Florentine subjects, to pay their debts into the Pisan treasury. A Pisan debtor, named Ludovicus, who had so paid his debt, was nevertheless sued for it by his Florentine creditor; the question was referred to Philip Decius, a Milanese jurist of the highest reputation, who, reciting the premises, concludes: 'Ex quibus omnibus concludo et indubitanter existimo, quod Ludovicus mediante tali solutione fuerit liberatus.' In the year 1495, when Charles VIII. of France overran Italy, and temporarily replaced the house of Anjou upon the throne of Naples, the debts due to the State from the opposite faction were called in, as a means of enriching the Angevin party. Some of the debtors paid honestly the full amount of their debts; others paid a portion, and obtained a receipt in full; others again obtained a written discharge, without paying anything. Four months afterward, Ferdinand of Arragon was restored to power, and the French and Angevins driven out; and the validity of these payments and receipts was simply contested. The opinion of Matthæus de Afflictis, a jurist of the highest authority, was invoked, which concluded in the following words: '*Prima conclusio*, quod illi debitores regum de Arragoniâ, qui fuerunt in morâ solvendi dictis regibus communiam debitam in genere, et jussu regis Caroli et suorum

Sellii, lib. iii. cap. v.; Cocceius, *Grætius Illustratus*, t. iii. pp. 202, 236; Polyæus, *Histor. Excerpta Legationum*, cap. xxxv.; Titiman, *Order den*
deur van de Arragonië, p. 135; Kampfer, *Literatur*, etc., § 307.

tus ab illis Gallis jussu mag
perinde habetur ac si non esset.
Quarta conclusio sit ista, quod
pecuniam debitam regibus de A
tratus, cui non potuit resistere
post diem solutionis faciendæ ex
penses se retinebant pro expensi
tione officii nomine regio, si ipsæ
sunt liberati, etiam quod fuerint
sit ista, quod illi debitores, qui ex
sionem Gallorum publicam vel p
veram numerationem pecuniæ et
debent solvere veris creditorib
rint dictum jussum. *Sexta con*
se concordaverunt, et non os
totum vel in partem, *non sunt li*
istas conclusiones.' The case of
Hesse-Cassel, which has furnish
discussion by modern jurists, bel
quests than mere military occur
considered in the next chapter.
modern times, to which we shal
the war between the United Stat
The Messrs. Laurents, British su
had purchased of the Mexican

urchasers were in possession of the property, and the money still remained on deposit when the city of Mexico was captured by the American forces. This money was seized and confiscated by General Scott as the property of the Mexican government. On the return of peace the church reclaimed the property, and, on suit, recovered its possession from the Messrs. Laurents, not on the ground of a default of payment, but of illegality of sale. The Laurents then made reclamation against the United States for the money confiscated, as British subjects, before the joint commission of the two governments. The commissioners being unable to agree, the case was referred to the umpire, who decided that, according to the rules of international law, the claimants were, at least for the time being, to be regarded as Mexican citizens, and not British subjects. Their claim was, therefore, rejected.¹

¹ Paponius, *Recueil d'Arrêts*, liv. v. tit. vi. Arrêt 2; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 565-569; *Commission of Claims between U. S. and Britain*, pp. 120-160; Philip Decius, *Consilia*, cap. xxv.; Matthæus de Officiis, *Decisiones Nap.*, Dec. 150; Pfeiffer, *Das Recht der Kriegseroberung*, pp. 191, 192.

1. Conquests, how completed—3
Subjugation of an entire State
of conquest—5. Transfer of
assent of the subject required
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foreign subjects— 10 Rule
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territory—15. Conquered territories
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What laws of new sovereign
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24. Conquest changes political
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§ 1. AS already remarked, the
property taken from the enemy
ways, as, by a treaty of peace,
gation and the incorporation
civil revolution and the consequent
mere lapse of time and the failure
to recover its lost possession
these different modes of conquering
territory is made complete by
press provisions of cession, or
Accidents. Treaties of Peace.

ch treaty, unless the contrary is expressed, the conquered territory remains with the conqueror, and his title cannot afterwards be called in question. But a treaty is not the only mode in which the rights of conquest are confirmed and made valid. If the State to which the conquered territory belonged is entirely subjugated, and its power destroyed, the title of the conqueror is considered complete from the date of the subjugation of the former sovereign owner. In this case there could be no treaty of cession or confirmation, for, by supposition, the former owner no longer exists as a Sovereign State; therefore, can neither confirm nor call in question the conqueror's title. So, also, if the State to which the conquered territory belonged be so weakened by the war as to afford no reasonable hope of ever being able to recover its lost territory, but from pride or obstinacy, it refuses to make any formal treaty of peace, although destitute of the requisite means of prolonging the contest, the conqueror is not obliged to continue the war in order to force the other party into a treaty. He may content himself with the conquest already made, and annex it to, or incorporate it with, his own territory. His title will be considered complete from the time he *proves his ability* to maintain his sovereignty over his conquest, and *manifests*, by some authoritative act, as of annexation or incorporation, *his intention* to retain it as a part of his own territory. Both of these requisites—*ability to maintain* and *intention to retain*—are necessary to complete the conquest; and the latter must be manifested by some unequivocal act, as annexation or incorporation, made by the sovereign authority of the conquering State. Without some such authoritative act, the conquered territory is held by the rights of military occupation only, and not as a complete conquest. So far as neutrals are concerned, it belongs to the conquering State, but does not form a part of it. It is held by the right of possession and not by complete title, and is therefore subject to the rights of postliminy. Again, if the conquest be accompanied by a civil revolution and a change of internal government, as where a colony or province revolts against the former sovereign, and, with the assistance of the conqueror, establishes its independence, and unites itself to the conqueror, the sovereignty of the former owner may be regarded as extinguished by the act of separation, independence and voluntary annexa-

perfected by such definitive act of the United States, when war is made, and take possession of foreign territory. The President and Senate is required to declare war, Congress alone can annex it, and without such act of treaty, cession or incorporation, the title to the United States would still be incomplete.¹

§ 2. The conqueror who acquires territory from the enemy, acquires thereby territory possessed by the State from which it is taken. A constituent part of the host State is completely under its dominion, and the conqueror upon the same terms transfers the new State upon the same terms as the old one ; that is, with only such alterations of constitution and laws of the new State as it retains no political privileges, and those it never possessed before. The conqueror is neither gainer or the loser by the change, and if an absolute monarchy it becomes a republic, or will be enlarged, or, if the reverse, it will be restricted. Such restriction, in any case, is not a restriction of the rights of conquest and the law of nations. It formed a part of the Mexican

govern them with a tighter rein, so as to curb their impetuosity, and to keep them under subjection.' Moreover, the rights of conquest may, in certain cases, justify him in imposing a tribute or other burthen, either a compensation for the expenses of the war, or as a punishment for the injustice he has suffered from them. But if he attempts to reduce the conquered people to a state of absolute subjection, or slavery, there is no complete conquest, for the state of warfare betwixt that nation and himself is perpetuated. The Scythians said to Alexander the Great: 'There is never any friendship betwixt the master and the slave. In the midst of peace the rights of war still subsist.'¹

§ 4. We have already remarked, that when one belligerent acquires military possession of territory belonging to an enemy, the sovereignty and dominion of the latter is suspended. If such possession be retained till the completion and confirmation of the conquest, the temporary dominion thus acquired by the conqueror becomes full and complete, *plena dominium et utile*. Moreover, this confirmation or completion of the conquest has, so far as ownership is concerned, a retroactive effect, confirming the conqueror's title from the date of the conquest, and, therefore, making definitely valid by

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. xiii. § 201; Puffendorf, *De Jure Nat. et Gent.*, lib. viii. cap. vi. § 24; Real, *Science du Gouvernement*, tom. v. ch. ii. § 5; Abegg, *Untersuchungen, etc.*, p. 86.

Conquest gives a title, which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever may be the speculative opinions of individuals, respecting the original justice of the claim, which has been successfully asserted. It is although this title is acquired and maintained by force, however, and on public opinion, has prescribed rules and limits by which it may be governed.

Thus, it is a rule that the captured shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that their condition shall remain as eligible, as is compatible with the objects of the conquest. Most usually, they are incorporated with the victorious nation, and become subjects or citizens of the government to which they are connected. The new and old members of the community mingle with each other, the distinction between them is gradually lost, and they become one people. Where this incorporation is practicable, humanity demands, and a wise policy requires, that the rights of the conquered to property should remain unimpaired, that the new state should be governed as equitably as the old, and that corruption and dissension should gradually banish the painful sense of their being separated from their ancient connexions, and united by force to strangers. Where the conquest is complete, and the conquered inhabitants can be blended with the inhabitants, or safely governed as a distinct people, it is the opinion, which not even the conqueror can disregard, imposes the strictest restraints upon him, and he cannot neglect them without incurring the loss and hazard of his power.—Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 B. & A. 343.

over the conquered. It is only a favourable occasion of obtaining it, and for that purpose there must be an *express or tacit consent* of the vanquished. Otherwise, the state of war is still subsisting, the sovereignty of the conquered has no other title than that of force, and lasts no longer than the vanquished are unable to throw off the yoke.' It has been shown in the preceding chapter, that on mere military conquest, the conquered may, but do not necessarily, cease to be regarded as aliens to the government of the conqueror; that mere military occupation does not, of itself, transfer the allegiance of the inhabitants of the territory so occupied absolutely and unconditionally, to the conqueror. It only suspends their allegiance to their former sovereign, and imposes on them a *temporary or limited* allegiance to the government of military occupation. If the conquest is surrendered to the former owner, the temporary allegiance of the inhabitants ends with the temporary sovereignty of the conqueror, and the former owner, in recovering his sovereignty, recovers his claim to the allegiance of the inhabitants, and resumes the duty of protecting them. But, if the conquest is confirmed, the allegiance to the former sovereign is entirely severed, and that to the conqueror remains as it is, or becomes absolute, according to the relations which the inhabitants of the conquered territory hold towards the new sovereignty.¹

§ 6. The rule of public law, with respect to the allegiance of the inhabitants of a conquered territory, is, therefore, no longer to be interpreted as meaning that it is absolutely and

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. xiii. § 200; Grotius, *De Jure Pacis*, lib. iii. cap. viii.; Burlamaqui, *Droit de la Nat. et des Gens*, liv. iv. pt. ii. ch. iii.; Puffendorf, *De Jure Nat. et Gent.*, lib. viii. cap. v. § 10. Doe d. Thoman v. Arkham, 2 B. C. R., 795; *Woodenon*, vol. 1. lib. 1. p. 382, cited, 2 *Cranch. R.*, 290; *United States v. Percheman*, 7 *F. R.*, 86; *Inglis v. The S. S. Harbour*, 3 *Peters R.*, 122; *Lucas v. State*, 12 *Peters R.*, 436; *Campbell v. Hall*, 1 *Cowp. R.*, 208; *Talbot v. Talbot*, 3 *Dallas R.*, 152; *Lynch v. Clarke*, 1 *Sandf. R.*, 644; *Millaine v. Lessee*, 4 *Cranch. R.*, 211; *Rayneval*, *Inst. du Droit Nat.*, et. 1. ch. xx.; *Westlake*, *Private Int. Law*, § 27; *Riquelme*, *Derecho Pub. Int.*, lib. i. tit. i. cap. 1.

On a conquest of one nation by another, accompanied by a surrender of the soil and change of sovereignty, those of the former inhabitants who do not remain and become citizens of the victorious sovereign, but on the contrary, adhere to their old allegiance and continue in the service of the vanquished sovereign, deprive themselves of protection: their property, except so far as it may be secured by treaty.—*United States v. Repentigny*, 5 *Wall.*, 211.

unconditionally acquired by conquest, or transferred and handed over by treaty, as a thing assignable by contract, and without the assent of the subject. On the contrary, the express or implied consent of the subject is now regarded as essential to a complete new allegiance. The ligament which bound him to the former sovereign is dissolved by the transfer of the territory; for that sovereign can no longer afford him any protection in that territory. But he is still an alien to the new sovereign, and owes to him only that kind of allegiance called in law, *local* or *temporary*, and which is due from any alien, while resident in a foreign country, for the protection which is afforded him by the government of such country. If the inhabitants of the ceded conquered territory choose to leave it on its transfer, and to adhere to their former sovereign, they have, in general, a right to do so. None but an absolute and tyrannical sovereign would force them to remain and become his unwilling subjects. By doing so he holds them in a kind of slavery, and, as justly remarked by Burlamaqui, continues the state of war between him and them. The rule of international law with respect to the transfer of the allegiance of the inhabitants of conquered territory, as established by the present usage of nations, is more fully and correctly stated by Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, as follows: -- 'On the transfer of territory, the relations of its inhabitants with the former sovereign are dissolved; the same act which transfers their country, *transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it.*' The allegiance of those *who do not remain*, of course, is *not* so transferred with the territory. In other words, they do not, by the transfer of the country, become the citizens or subjects of the conqueror, nor has he acquired any 'absolute and perpetual right of sovereignty' over them. There is no 'consent,' either 'express or tacit,' on their part, in order to make the transfer of allegiance complete and binding.¹

§ 7. From the rule of international law, as thus announced by Chief Justice Marshall, it is deduced that the transfer of territory establishes its inhabitants in such a position toward the new sovereignty, that they may elect to become, or not to become, its subjects. Their obligations to the former govern-

¹ See note to last paragraph.

ment are cancelled, and they may, or may not, become the subjects of the new government, according to their own choice. If they remain in the territory after this transfer they are deemed to have elected to become its subjects, and thus have consented to the transfer of their allegiance to the new sovereignty. If they leave, *sine animo revertendi*, they are deemed to have elected to continue aliens to the new sovereignty. The *status* of the inhabitants of the conquered and transferred territory is thus determined by their own acts. This rule is the most just, reasonable, and convenient which could be adopted. It is reasonable on the part of the conqueror, who is entitled to know who become his subjects and who prefer to continue aliens; it is very convenient for those who wish to become the subjects of the new State, and is not unjust toward those who determine not to become its subjects. According to this rule, *domicile*, as understood and defined in public law, determines the question of transfer of allegiance, or rather, is the rule of evidence by which that question is to be decided.¹

§ 8. This rule of evidence, with respect to the allegiance of the inhabitants of ceded conquered territory, may be inconvenient to those who do not become subjects of the new sovereignty, as it requires them to change their domicile; but it is necessary for the protection of the rights of those who elect to become subjects of the new government, and especially necessary for determining the rights and duties of the government which acquires their allegiance, and is bound to attend them its protection. It would not do to leave the *status* of the inhabitants of the acquired territory, uncertain and undetermined, and to suffer a man's citizenship to continue an open question, subject to be disputed by any person at any time, and to change with his own intentions and resolutions, as might best suit his convenience or interest. The reasonableness of the rule is manifest, and its necessity obvious; and the inconvenience to those who refuse allegiance to the new State is unavoidable in a public law. If we abandon

¹ Foelix, *Droit Int. Privé*, §§. 35, 36; Westlake, *Private Int. Law*, § 27; *Doe v. Acklam*, 2 B. & C. R., 779; *Doe v. Malhester*, 4 C. & F. R., 771; *Doe v. Arkwright*, 5 C. & F. R., 575; *Jepson v. Rogers*, 7 Knapp R., 130; *In Re Bruce*, 2 C. & F. R., 436; *Com. v. Desires*, 11 Sim. R., 14; *Thompson v. Adv. Genl.* 13 Sim. R., 152, 12 C. & F. R., 1.

ed principle of a forcible and absolute transfer of allegiance, and adopt that of an express or implied consent, it is necessary to adopt some rule of evidence by which that point is to be determined ; and we know of none better than the rule of *domicile*, as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, and approved by the best writers on public

9. This modern and more benign construction of the rights of nations, with respect to the allegiance of the inhabitants of conquered or ceded territory, as announced by Chief Justice Marshall, avoids all questions of the *right* of the one State to transfer, and of the other to claim, the allegiance of the subjects of neutral States who are naturalised or domiciled in territory transferred by conquest or treaty. All are alike bound to the new sovereignty, if they elect to continue so, and all become its subjects, if it consents to receive them. They, by remaining in the transferred territory, signify their election to become such. The new State has the same admitted right to receive the voluntary allegiance of the subjects of a neutral power, who are naturalised or domiciled in acquired territory, as of the subjects of that power when they voluntarily enter the State and become its citizens by the ordinary modes of naturalisation. The former government, by the act of cession or confirmation of conquest, has renounced all its claim to the allegiance of the inhabitants of the transferred territory, whether natives, naturalised citizens, or domiciled aliens. The old State, by the transfer of territory, relinquishes its claim to the allegiance of its inhabitants, and the new State, by their tacit consent, receives them as its subjects. The neutral State can no more complain of the conqueror, for receiving as citizens, its subjects who were naturalised by the conquered State, than it had to complain of the latter for naturalising them. Naturalisation by conquest and incorporation can no more be complained of as a violation of naturalisation by any other mode, so long as it is voluntary on the part of the person naturalised. And the transfer of allegiance, by the rule of domicile, or *animo manendi*, in

10. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 *Peters R.*, 542; *McIlvaine v. Cox's* 4 *Cranch R.*, 211; *Inghis v. The S. S. Harbour*, 3 *Peters R.*, 404; *McKelme, Dercho Pub. Int.*, lib. 1. tit. 1. cap. 1; Westlake, *Private International Law*, § 27; Foelix, *Droit Int. Privé*, §§ 35, 36.

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at the rights of citizenship should be given them in return for their allegiance. But this general rule of justice must yield to the conditions upon which the conquered are incorporated into the new State, and to the peculiar character of the institutions and municipal laws of the conqueror. It could not reasonably be expected that the conquering State would modify or change its laws and political institutions by the mere act of incorporating into it the inhabitants of a conquered territory. The inhabitants so incorporated, therefore, may, or may not, acquire all the rights of citizens of the new government, according to its constitution and laws. It may, and sometimes does, happen, that a certain class of the citizens of the conquered territory are, by the laws of the new State, precluded from ever acquiring the full political rights of citizenship. This is the necessary and unavoidable result of the different systems of law which prevail in different States. Thus, certain persons who were citizens of Mexico, in California and New Mexico, on the transfer of those territories to the United States, by the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, never have and never can become citizens of the United States. Such citizenship is repugnant to the Federal Constitution and Federal organisation. Nevertheless, they may be citizens of California or New Mexico, according to the local constitutions and laws which those countries have already adopted, or which they may hereafter adopt.¹

§ 12. As has already been remarked, the laws of different countries with respect to the relations between the conqueror and the inhabitants of an acquired conquered territory, are very different. The rules of English law on this subject are, that 'a country conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion of the king in the right of his crown, . . . that the conquered inhabitants once received under the king's protection, become subjects, and are to be universally considered in that light, not as enemies or aliens.' Although they owe the allegiance of subjects, and are entitled to the protection of subjects, it does not follow that they are entitled to all the political rights of an Englishman in England. They have the rights of British subjects *in the conquered territory*, but not necessarily the political rights of British subjects *in other parts*

¹ Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 Howard R., 393; Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dallas R., 153.

The sixth article of
Treaty of 1823 to the United
States, by this treaty
the territories which
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In delivering the opinion
Chief Justice Marshall
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under the law of nations, of the transfer of their country and of their allegiance. Their political power under the Federal Constitution and the laws of the United States, resulted from the admission of Florida into the Union as a State, and the political rights of citizenship of the United States thereby acquired were determined and limited, with respect to age, sex, colour, and condition, by our institutions and laws. It must also be remarked that a man may become a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of any particular State, or may become a citizen of a particular State without being a citizen of the United States.'

§ 14. 'The laws of a conquered country,' says Lord Mansfield, 'continue in force until they are altered by the conqueror; the absurd exception as to pagans, mentioned in Calvin's case, shows the universality and antiquity of the maxim. For that distinction could not exist before the Christian era, and in all probability arose from the mad enthusiasm of the crusades.' This may be said of the municipal laws of the conquered country, but not of its political laws, or the relations of the inhabitants with the government. The rule is more correctly and clearly stated by Chief Justice Marshall, as follows: 'On the transfer of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has acquired their territory; the law, which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force until altered by the newly created power of the State.' This is now a well settled rule of the law of nations, and is universally admitted. Its provisions are clear and simple, and easily understood; but it is not so easy to distinguish between what are *political* and what are *municipal* laws, and to determine *when* and *how* the constitution and laws of the conqueror change or replace those of the conquered. And in case the government of the new State is a constitutional government, of limited and divided powers, questions necessarily arise respecting the authority, which, in the absence of legislative action, can be

¹ *U. S. Statutes at Large*, vol. viii. pp. 256, 257; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 *Indf. R.*, 644.

exercised in the conquered territory after the cessation of war and the conclusion of a treaty of peace. The determination of these questions depends upon the institutions and laws of the new sovereign, which, though conformable to the general rule of the law of nations, affect the construction and application of that rule to particular cases.¹

§ 15. It seems to be a well settled principle of English law, that a country conquered by British arms becomes a dominion of the king, in right of his crown, and therefore necessarily subject to the legislature,—the Parliament of Great Britain; that the king, without the concurrence of Parliament, cannot change a part or the whole of the political form of the government of a conquered dominion, and alter the old, or introduce new laws into the conquered country; but that all this must be done subordinate to his own authority in Parliament; that is, subordinate to legislation; and that he cannot make any change contrary to fundamental principles; that he cannot, for instance, exempt the inhabitants of the conquered territory from the power of Parliament, or the laws of trade, or give them privileges exclusive of his other subjects. Thus Ireland received the laws of England by the charters and commands of Henry II., John, Henry III., Edward I., and the subsequent kings, without the interposition of the Parliament of England. The same is said of Wales, Berwick, Gascony, Guienne, Calais, Gibraltar, Minorca, etc. So, of New York; after its conquest from the Dutch, Charles II. changed its constitution and political government by *letters patent* to the Duke of York. If the king comes to a kingdom by conquest, he may change and alter the laws of that kingdom; but if he comes to it by title and descent, he cannot change the laws of himself without the consent of Parliament. The constitutions of most English provinces, immediately under the king, have arisen not from grants, but from commissions to governors to call assemblies. In 1722, Sir Philip Yorke and Sir Clement Wearge reported on the assembly of Jamaica's withholding

¹ *Rex. v. Vaughan*, 4 Burr R. 2500; *Calvin's Case*, Coke R. pl. 1; 2 Am. Att'y. Gen'l v. Stewart, 2 Meriv. R., 154; *Sprague v. Southey*, 10 Cas. R., 38; *Shedden v. Goodrich*, 8 Vesey R., 482; *Mostyn v. Faint*, 10 Cas. R., 165; *Smith v. Brown*, 2 Salk. R., 666; *Exclm v. Faint*, 10 Vesey R., 481; *Clark*, *Colonial Law*, p. 4; *Bowyer*, *Universal Law*, ch. xvi. p. 158; *Burge*, *Commentaries*, vol. i. pp. 31, 32; *Maxwell's Digest of Indian Cases*, pp. 169, 170.

usual supplies, that 'if Jamaica was still to be considered a conquered island, the king had a right to levy taxes upon the inhabitants; but if it was to be considered in the same light as the other colonies, no tax could be imposed on the inhabitants but by an assembly of the island or by an act of Parliament.' They considered, says Lord Mansfield, the distinction was clear, and an indisputable consequence of the island being in the one state or in the other. Whether it remained a conquest, or was made a colony, they did not examine. A principle of constitutional law, as declared by all the judges in *King's case*, and which such men, in modern times, as Sir John Yorke and Sir Clement Wearge, took for granted, will be some authorities to shake. But, on the other side, no case, no saying, no opinion has been cited, and no instance in any period of history produced, where a doubt has been raised concerning it.¹

16. The right of the king to change the laws of a conquered territory, after the war, results, according to the decisions of English courts, from his constitutional power to make a treaty of peace, and consequently to yield up the conquest, or to retain it upon whatever terms he pleases, provided those terms are not in violation of fundamental principles. But the President of the United States can make no treaty without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, and his authority over ceded conquered territory, though derived from the treaty of nations, is limited by the Constitution and subordinate to the laws of Congress. It, however, is well settled by the Supreme Court, that, as constitutional commander-in-chief, he is authorised to form a civil or military government for the conquered territory during the war, and that when such territory is ceded to the United States, as a conquest, the existing government, so established, does not cease as a matter of course or as a consequence of the restoration of peace; that, to the contrary, such government is rightfully continued after peace, and till Congress legislates otherwise; but that the President may virtually dissolve this government by withdrawing the officers who administer it; *provided*, he does not thereby neglect his constitutional obligation 'to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' He is bound, for

¹ *Campbell v. Hall*, 1 Cowp. R., 205; *Fabrigas v. Mostyn*, 1 Cowp. R., 25; *Callitt v. Lord Keith*, 2 East. R., 260.

express or implied sovereignty of the United States to enforce and execute its laws in that territory. Congress is not to exercise the government of the colonies; or it may permit them to form a constitution, and admit them into the power of Congress over the whole; or universal, and their legislative power not to be limited than the stipulations of the treaty. But, connected with the question of Congress, there are also objections to be ascertained from the legislative power, and the principles of the constitution, as long as neither Congress nor the States establish the government established by the treaty, the restoration of peace will be the result of both. 'The right to deliver the unanimous consent of the States from the inaction of by the States continued until it had been determined by the action of a contrary intention of the States have been the cause of delay was consistent with the principles of California and New Mexico confirmed by cession. De

governments, established in each during the war, and existing at the date of the treaty of peace, continued in operation after that treaty had been ratified. California, with the assent and co-operation of the existing government, formed a constitution, which was ratified by its inhabitants, and a State government was put in full operation in December, 1849, with the implied assent of the President, the officers of the existing government of California publicly and formally surrendering all their powers into the hands of the newly constituted authorities. The constitution so formed and ratified was approved by Congress, and California was, on September 9th, 1850, admitted into the Union as a State. New Mexico also formed a constitution, and applied to Congress for admission as a State; the application was not granted; but on September 9, 1850, New Mexico and the part of California not included within the limits of the new State were organised into Territories, with new Territorial governments, which took the place of those organised during the war, and existing on the restoration of peace.¹

§ 17. It seems to be a well-established rule of the law of nations, that, on the cession of a conquered territory by a treaty of peace, the inhabitants of such territory are remitted to the municipal laws and usages which prevailed among them before the conquest, so far as not changed by the constitution or political institutions of the new sovereignty, and the laws of that sovereignty which *proprio vigore* extend over them. This leads us to inquire, *first*, whether the municipal laws in force prior to the conquest, and suspended or changed during the war, are revived *ipso facto* by the treaty of peace; and, *second*, what laws of the new sovereignty are considered as extending over the acquired territory immediately on its cession, and without any special provisions to that effect, either in the laws themselves, or, as enacted by the legislative power. It has already been shown that, according to the decision of the English courts, the laws of the conquered

¹ *Campbell v. Hall*, 1 *Comp. R.*, 204; *U. S. Statutes at Large*, vol. 1, pp. 447, 452, 453; *Cress et al. v. Harrison*, 16 *Howard R.*, 164, *Decisions of Law of U. S.*, pp. 1238-1250; *Wrightly, Digest of Law*, pp. 165, 167, 890. *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 19 *How. R.*, 393.

² On conquest, the conqueror acquires nothing but a temporary right of possession and government, over the territory conquered, until a peace is made, and, in the meantime, without by any transfer the rights of the former sovereign. — *Clark v. United States*, 3 *Wash. C. Ct.*, 101.

territory must be subordinate to the British Constitution; the king himself cannot there establish laws, or confer privileges contrary to fundamental principles. And there can be little doubt that the Federal Constitution is extended over conquered territory which, by confirmation or cession, becomes a part of the United States. It is true that the territory acquired as a *conquest* is to be preserved and governed as *such*, until the sovereignty to which it has passed legates for it, or gives it the authority to legislate for itself. In conquests made by England, this may be done by the command or letters patent of the king, and in those made by the United States, by the law of Congress. In the former case, the local government, acting under royal authority, represents the crown, and must act in subordination to Parliament, and the fundamental principles of the British Constitution. In the latter case, the local government, acting under the direction of the President, represents the sovereignty of the United States to which the territory has passed. And, as that sovereignty is the United States, under the Federal Constitution, no powers can be exercised in that territory, either by the President, or by Congress, which are opposed to the Federal Constitution, and it necessarily follows that the inhabitants of such territory acquire, immediately on its becoming a part of the United States, the privileges, rights, and immunities guaranteed by the constitution. They do not, indeed, thereby acquire the political rights of *citizens*, entitling them to vote for representatives in Congress, or to sue and be sued in the Federal courts; but they thereby become privileged as subjects of the United States, and no powers opposed to the Federal Constitution can be exercised over them; they owe an allegiance to the government of the United States, and are entitled to its protection.

§ 18. We have already remarked, that the relations of the inhabitants of the conquered territory, *inter se*, are not, in general, changed by the act of conquest and military occupation; nevertheless, that the conqueror, exercising the power of a *de facto* government, may suspend or alter the municipal laws of the conquered territory, and make new ones in their stead. Such changes are of two kinds, viz: those which relate to a suspension of civil rights and civil remedies, and the substitution of military laws, and military courts and pro-

feelings, and those which relate to the introduction of new municipal laws, and new legal remedies and civil proceedings. There can be no doubt that when the war ceases the inhabitants of the ceded conquered territory cease to be governed by the code of war. Although the government of military occupation may continue, the rules of its authority are essentially changed. It no longer administers the laws of war, but only those of peace. The governed are no longer subject to the severity of the code military, but are remitted to their rights, privileges, and immunities, under the code civil. Hence, any laws, rules, or regulations introduced by the government of military occupation during the war, which infringe upon the civil rights of the inhabitants, necessarily cease with the war in which they had their origin, and from which they derived their force. But if this government, during military occupation, has granted to the inhabitants rights which they did not possess under their former laws, or if it has abolished former municipal laws deemed odious and oppressive,—as, for example, laws conferring privileges of rank, or distinguishing between the civil rights of classes and castes,—these will not be revived as a necessary consequence of peace. They may, however, be revived as a consequence of the institutions and laws of the new sovereignty, and even rights and immunities, not suspended or infringed during the war, may entirely cease on the treaty of peace, as a consequence of the cession, and the introduction of the civil government, and civil jurisprudence of the new sovereign.¹

§ 19. We will next consider what laws of the new sovereign extend over the ceded conquered territory without legislative action, or any special provisions to that effect in the laws themselves. When a country which has been conquered is ceded to the conqueror by the treaty of peace, the *plenum of the dominium* of the conqueror will be considered as having existed from the beginning of the conquest. When it is said that the law political ceases on the conquest, and that the law municipal continues till changed by the will of the conqueror, it is not meant that these latter laws, *proprio vigore*, remain in force, but that, it is presumed, the new political sovereignty has adopted and continued them as a matter of convenience.

¹ *Green v. Fell*, 1 *Jack & Walk R.* 27, *Hether, Trust Inds. Insur.* § 143.

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§ 20. The English ex-
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141. There can be no doubt that the United States and England entered into an agreement that the independent territory acquired by Spain in 1823 should be placed under the jurisdiction of the United States, and that the United States should, at the time of the cession of territory, and until the territory had passed into the general control of the United States, exercise jurisdiction over the territory, and maintain the laws of the United States in effect in the territory, and that the existing laws of the territory should be continued in effect until the territory had been acquired, and without any express agreement, the executive is authorized to maintain the jurisdiction.

[illegible]

12. p. 152; Clarke, *Colonial Latin*, p. 4.

may change these laws, or he may, by his *charters* and *commands*, authorise the conquered country to do so. Such authority is derived directly from the crown, and without the interposition of Parliament.¹

§ 22. The Supreme Court of the United States, where questions of this kind have come before that tribunal, have adopted the decisions of the English courts, so far as applicable to our system of government. While recognising the general principle that the laws of the conquered territory remain in force after the cession, they distinctly assert that the ceded territory becomes instantly bound and privileged by the laws which Congress has previously passed to raise revenue from duties on imports and tonnage; and that such territory is subject to the acts of Congress, previously made to regulate foreign commerce with the United States, without other special legislation declaring them to be so. And although Congress may not have established collection districts or custom houses, or authorised the appointment of officers to collect the revenue accruing upon the importation of foreign dutiable goods into that territory, nevertheless, it may be legally demanded and lawfully received by the officers of the government, which was organised in such territory by the right of conquest, and existing at the date of the cession. California became a part of the United States as a ceded conquered territory, by the treaty which was ratified on the 30th of May, 1848; but the act of Congress, including San Francisco within one of the collection districts of the United States, was not passed till the 3rd of March, 1849, and the collector authorised by law to be appointed for that port did not enter upon the duties of his office till the 13th of November, 1849. The ratification of the treaty was not officially announced in California till the 17th of August, 1848. The civil government of California, which had been organised during the war, by right of conquest and military occupation, continued to collect duties under the war tariff till officially notified of the ratification of the treaty of peace; it then declared that 'the tariff of duties for the collection of military contributions will immediately cease, and the revenue laws and tariff of the United States will be substituted in its place,' and continued to enforce these laws and to collect the revenue accruing under them upon the imports

¹ Bowyer, *Universal Public Law*, ch. xvi.

tion of foreign dutiable goods into California, until the 13th of November, 1849, when the collector, duly appointed under the authority of an act of Congress, entered upon his duties. The importers of such dutiable goods denied the legality of these collections, and protested against the exaction of duties, and subsequently brought suit against the officers of the civil government to recover the moneys so collected, with interest. The legality of the acts of these officers was sustained by the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States; and Mr. Justice Wayne, in delivering the opinion of the court, said, that the officers, in coercing the payment of dutiable goods landed in California, 'had acted with most commendable integrity and intelligence.'¹

§ 23 There is one point in this decision deserving of particular notice, with respect to the operation of laws which extend, *proprio vigore*, over ceded conquered territory. A statute law of the United States, when no time is fixed in the law itself, takes effect in every part of the Union from the very day it is passed. Not so, however, with the operation of existing revenue laws over newly acquired territory, which, though a part of the United States, is not within the Union. As already remarked, nearly three months elapsed between the ratification of the treaty of cession and its official announcement in California. During that interval, tonnage and impost duties were imposed and collected according to the *war tariff*, instead of the tariff of the United States. If the revenue laws extended over California, *eo instante*, on the ratification of the treaty by which that territory was acquired, these duties were unlawfully collected. It was so claimed by those who had paid them, and suit was brought for their recovery. But Mr. Justice Wayne, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court on this question, remarked: 'It will certainly not be denied that these instructions [imposing the war tariff] were binding upon those who administered the civil government in California, *until* they had notice from their own government that a peace had been finally concluded. Or that those who were locally within its jurisdiction, or who had property there, were not bound to comply with those

¹ Cross et al. v. Harrison, 16 How. R., 201; Dunlop, *Digest of Laws of U. S.*, pp. 1214, 1215; Brightly, *Digest of Laws of U. S.*, p. 115; *U. S. Statutes at Large*, vol. ix. p. 400.

regulations of the government, which its functionaries were ordered to execute. Or that any one would claim a right to introduce into the territory of that government foreign merchandise, without the payment of duties which had been originally imposed under belligerent rights, *because the territory had been ceded by the original possessor and enemy to the conqueror*. Or that the mere fact of a territory having been ceded by one sovereignty to another, opens it to a free commercial intercourse with all the world, as a matter of course, until the new possessor has legislated some terms upon which that may be done. There is no such commercial liberty known among nations, and the attempt to introduce it in this instance is resisted by all of those considerations which have made foreign commerce between nations conventional. No treaty that gives the right of commerce, is the measure and rule of that right.¹ The plaintiffs in this case claim no privilege for the introduction of their goods into San Francisco between the ratifications of the treaty with Mexico and the official announcement of it to the civil government in California, other than such as that government permitted under the instructions of the government of the United States.²

§ 24. It has already been remarked that, in the transfer of territory by conquest or cession, the *political* rights of inhabitants may be essentially changed. This results from a difference in the powers and character of governments, depending upon their constitutions or fundamental laws. The new government may not be capable of receiving or exercising all the powers of the old one, or it may not extend to the governed all the political rights which they enjoyed under the former sovereign. But a change of sovereignty is not, in modern times, permitted to effect any change in the rights of private property. What was the property of the former sovereign becomes the property of the new one, and what was the property of individuals before, remains private property notwithstanding the conquest or cession. 'The modern usage of nations,' says Chief Justice Marshall, speaking of the transfer of a country from one government to another, 'which has become a law, would be violated; that sense of justice

¹ Vattel, liv. i. ch. viii., § 93.

² Mathews v. Zane, 7 Wheat. R., 104; the 'Ann,' 1 Gallis R., 4; Cross et al. v. Harrison, 16 Howard R., 191.

ht which is acknowledged and felt by the whole
 orld, would be outraged, if private property should
 ly confiscated, and private rights annulled. The
 inge their allegiance ; their relation to their ancient
 is dissolved ; but their relations to each other, and
 is of property, remain undisturbed.' The rule of
 al law, thus clearly enunciated by the Supreme
 he United States in 1833, has since been repeatedly
 in the decisions of the same tribunal.¹

As the new State merely displaces the former sove-
 id acquires, by cession or complete conquest, no
 ile whatever to private property, whether of indi-
 unicipalities, or corporations, and, as it assumes the
 obligations of the former sovereign with respect to
 operty within such acquired territory, it is consc-
 und to recognise and protect all private rights in
 ther they are held under absolute grants or inchoate
property in land includes every class of claim to real
 n a mere inceptive grant to a complete, absolute,
 t title. A mere equity is protected by the law of
 much as a strictly legal title. In the words of
 ce Marshall, 'the term "property," as applied to
 prehends every species of title, inchoate or com-
 is supposed to embrace those rights which lie in
 those which are executory ; as well as those which
 ted. In this respect the relation of the inhabitants
 vernment is not changed. The new government
 place of that which has passed away.'²

States *v.* Perchman, 7 *Peters R.* 87 ; Mitchel *v.* the United
 ters *R.* 734 ; Strother *v.* Lucas, 12 *Peters R.* 38. New
 The United States, 10 *Peters R.* 720 ; Riquelme, *Derecho*
 d. l. tit. 1. cap. 12.

conquered during the progress of a war, is considered, for all
 and belligerent purposes, as a part of the domain of the con-
 ing as he continues in its possession and government. What-
 may be the general commercial or political character of a pro-
 id, in such territory, the possession of the soil impresses upon
 character, so far as its produce is concerned, in the transpor-
 other country. *Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle*, 9

et al. *v.* The United States, 4 *Peters R.* 512 ; Mitchel et al.
 d States, 9 *Peters R.* 733 ; United States *v.* Perchman, 7
 ; Chouteau's heirs *v.* The United States, 9 *Peters R.* 157.
 ided by the Supreme Court of the United States that, in
 quest, the conqueror does no more than replace the sovereign

rights of property.
of the civilised world
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inhabitants, it is bound
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without which the
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or title to lands which
abundantly sufficient
owner in his rights, and
under our laws, as it
enjoyment of his property
to eject an aggressor.
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such legal attributes a
soever description, unless
be a violation of the

nations and the usage of the civilised world. A delay in applying such remedies is often equivalent to a denial of justice, or a confiscation of private property, and is, therefore, a breach of public law and a violation of national faith.¹

§ 27. It follows, from the principles laid down in this and the preceding chapters, that complete conquest, by whatever mode it may be perfected, carries with it all the rights of the former government; or, in other words, the conqueror, by the completion of his conquest, becomes, as it were, the heir and universal successor of the defunct or extinguished State. As his rights are no longer limited to mere occupation, or to what he has taken physically into his possession, they extend not only to the corporeal property of the State, as real estate and movables, but also to its incorporeal property, as debts, &c. And as his *imperium* has become established over the whole State, he is considered, in law, as in possession of the *things* (*res*), and the *rights* (*jura*), to things which appertain to the *imperium*, and may use and dispose of them as his own. It was on this ground that the validity of Alexander's gift to the Thessalonians was principally sustained, and those who advocated the claim of Thebes, did so, mainly, on the supposition that the conquest was not complete, and that the absolute and entire dominion over the universal successorship of Thebes had not accrued to Alexander. Jurists have much more difficulty in agreeing upon the question of the completion of the conquest, prior to the restoration of the former sovereign, than upon the legal consequences to be deduced from the conquest when complete; and it is only in case of restoration that any question arises with respect to the right of the conqueror to dispose of either the domains or debts of the conquered State.²

¹ *U. S. Statutes at Large*, vol. x. p. 63; *United States v. Reading*, 10 *How. R.*, 8.

² Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii §§ 561, 562; Heffter, *Droit International*, §§ 183, 186; Schwartz, *De Jur. Victori, et.*, thes. 27.

It was held, by the Rolls Court of Great Britain, that if a foreign power is prisoner an enemy, and thereby obtains possession of documents, discharging his right to a debt due from another, to him, in his private capacity, the prisoner is entitled to relief in equity; the circumstance that the foreign power is also the debtor will not alter the right: but if the documents are the property of the prisoner, in his sovereign character, and are taken possession of by the conqueror in the exercise of his sovereign and political rights, that Court could not interfere.—*Wadeer v. the*

§ 28. When the Allied powers of Europe overthrew the dynasty of Napoleon, and restored to the countries which he had subdued, their legitimate sovereigns, no general promise was made in the peace of Paris for the protection of rights acquired under the *de facto* rulers, (the amnesty provided for in the 27th article being limited in its extent,) nevertheless reason, good sense, and the law of nations, were generally allowed to prevail, and rights and titles so acquired were left undisturbed. The only exceptions were confined to one or two small German States, and these were considered as most discreditable to the petty sovereigns who made them. The most noted of these was the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, who was driven from the Electorate in 1806, and not restored till the beginning of 1814. His country had remained about a year under the military government of Napoleon, and was then incorporated into the newly formed kingdom of Westphalia, of which Jerome Bonaparte was recognised as king, by the peace of Tilsit and Schonbrunn. On his return to his hereditary dominions, in 1814, the prince refused to recognise the validity of the alienations of the domains of the country, which had taken place under the *de facto* governments, since his expulsion, in October, 1806; the purchasers of these lands were deprived of their possessions which they had purchased and paid for in good faith, and which had been delivered to them with every formality of law. The same

East India Company, 7 Jur. (N.S.) 350. See, also, the Secretary of State for India v. Kamachee Boye Sahaba, 7 Moo. Ind. App. 101, 27.

An ordinance was made by the Government of Denmark in 1807, during hostilities with Great Britain, whereby all ships, goods, money, or money's worth, of or belonging to the English subjects, were ordered to be sequestered and detained, and all persons were commanded, within three days, to transmit an account of debts, due to English subjects, in default of which, they were to be proceeded against in the Exchange, in consequence of this a suit then depending in the Danish Court, for recovering a debt due from a Danish to a British subject, was not prosecuted, and the debt was afterwards paid by the Danish government at the rate specified by the ordinance, to commissioners appointed by the ordinance to receive payment, upon production of a certificate from the Danish Court quashing the suit. This was held, in the *Principe of King's Bench*, to be no answer to an action against the Danish government to recover the same debt in the courts of Great Britain, for the ordinance was not being conformable to the usage of nations was held to be void. Wolff and others v. Oxholm, 6 Man and Selw. 92. The famous case of Alexander and the 100 talents of the Thebans, quoted by Grotius, lib. v. c. 18, is discussed in this case. See also *Recueil des Arrêts des Cours Souveraines de France*, by Johan Pepon, Paris, 1601, 460.

1. The first step in the process of the scientific method is to make an observation or ask a question. For example, a scientist might observe that a plant grows better in one type of soil than another.

2. Next, the scientist forms a hypothesis, which is a prediction or an educated guess about the outcome of an experiment. For instance, the scientist might hypothesize that the plant will grow taller in soil A than in soil B.

3. The third step is to design an experiment to test the hypothesis. This involves setting up a controlled experiment where the only variable that changes is the type of soil.

4. After conducting the experiment, the scientist collects data and analyzes the results. If the plant in soil A is indeed taller, the hypothesis is supported.

5. Finally, the scientist draws a conclusion based on the results. If the hypothesis is supported, the scientist might conclude that soil A is better for growing this type of plant.

6. The scientific method is a systematic approach to investigating a question or solving a problem. It involves making observations, forming hypotheses, testing hypotheses through experiments, and drawing conclusions based on the results.

7. The scientific method is a process that scientists use to investigate natural phenomena. It is a systematic approach to gathering and analyzing data to answer questions or solve problems.

8. The scientific method is a process that scientists use to investigate natural phenomena. It is a systematic approach to gathering and analyzing data to answer questions or solve problems.

9. The scientific method is a process that scientists use to investigate natural phenomena. It is a systematic approach to gathering and analyzing data to answer questions or solve problems.

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debts owing to the extinguished Electorate. The Bonapartes had no difficulty in collecting those due from the subjects of their newly-acquired dominions, for there for could be resorted to, in order to compel payment ; but where the debtors resided in other States, the payment was a measure voluntary, and even where the debtors were anxious to pay, a difficulty occurred in releasing the mortgages, since the record could be cancelled only by the authority of the court therein named. To remove this difficulty in the Duchy of Mecklenburg, the Duke issued an order, *circular* *number* the 15th of June, 1810, which, after reciting the complete conquest of Hesse-Cassel by Napoleon, and the extinguishment of the former sovereignty, directed the court of registration record, as extinguished, those mortgages in favour of Hesse-Cassel on estates in that duchy, for which a discharge or receipt had been given by Napoleon, or by his appointed agent for that purpose. Among the estates so mortgaged and released were those of a certain Count van Hahn, whose case acquired much celebrity and will serve to illustrate the fact and the law. After the death of the count and the restoration of the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, the latter instituted proceedings as a creditor against his estate, denying the validity of the payment and the legality of the discharge of the mortgage. The first tribunals, (the University of Breslau in 1824, and that of Kiel in 1831,) decided, in substance, that the prince might recover that portion of the debt which had not been actually paid to Napoleon, and no more. Both parties being dissatisfied with this judgment, an appeal was taken to another university (tribunal), which learned body delivered at great length the reasons of their final decision, which was, in substance, that all the debts to Hesse-Cassel, for which discharges had been given in full by Napoleon, *whether the whole sum had been actually paid or not*, were validly and effectually cancelled, and that the debtors could not be called upon to pay a second time. These learned jurists drew a broad distinction between the acts of a transient conqueror on mere military occupation and those of one whose rights and titles had been ratified by the public acts of the State, and recognised in treaties by foreign powers. The judgments of the tribunals of Breslau and Kiel were based on the supposition that the conquest was only a *temporary* one ; but the learned judges said it was

possible to consider the return of the Prince of Hesse-
sels as a continuation of his former government. They
ected the consideration of the justice or injustice of the
r, in which the Electorate had been conquered, nor did they
ach any importance to the fact, that the prince had carried
ay with him, and retained possession of, the instruments
itaining the written acknowledgment of the debtor. It
l be noticed that this decision virtually confirms the valid-
of the alienation of domains made by the *de facto* govern-
nts of the conquests of Napoleon.¹

Heffter, *Droit International*, §§ 186, 188 ; Zachariæ, *Ueber die Ver-
htung, etc.*, b. iv. p. 104.

CHAPTER XXXV.

RIGHTS OF POSTLIMINY AND RECAPTURE.

1. Right of postliminy defined—2. Its foundation—3. Time of its effect—4. Effect of a treaty of peace—5. Of allies who are restored in the war—6. Its effect upon things and persons in neutral territory—7. Upon movables on land—8. Real property—9. Towns and provinces—10. Release of a subjugated State—11. Case of Germany—12. Application of postliminy to maritime captures—13. Treaties and prize courts—14. Rights of postliminy modified by treaties and municipal laws—15. Laws of Great Britain and U. S.—16. Set forth as a vessel of war—17. Laws of France, Spain, and other States—18. Quantum of salvage on recaptures—19. Recapture of real property—20. International law on salvage—21. Military and naval salvage—22. Special rules of military salvage—23. Where recapture was unlawful—24. In case of ransom—25. A vessel recaptured by her master and crew—26. From pirates—27. By land forces in foreign ports—28. By native and allied armies in native ports.

§ 1. THE *jus postliminii* was a fiction of the Roman law, by which persons, and, in some cases, things, taken by an enemy, were restored to their original legal *status* immediately upon coming under the power of the nation to which they formerly belonged. '*Postliminium fingit eum qui captus est, in statu semper fuisse.*' With respect to persons, the right of postliminy had a double effect, passive and active. *Passive*, inasmuch as the returned son fell again under the power of his parent, and the returned slave under the power of his master; and, *active*, inasmuch as the returned person claimed to exercise his original rights over other persons or things. To produce the passive effect, the only requisite was the simple *return* of the individual; but to produce the active effect, the individual must have returned *legally* and *for the purpose* of regaining his rights. The *jus postliminii* was denied to those who illegally returned to their country during an armistice, to deserters, to those who had surrendered in battle, to those who had been abandoned by their country, or who had been the subject of *deditio*, either during the war, or at the time of making peace. With respect to things taken by the enemy, the Roman law

considered them as withdrawn from the category of legal relations during the period of the enemy's possession of them. If retaken by their former owner, they became his by the recapture; but, if retaken by the State, they were considered as booty, or prize of war, the original right of property being extinguished by the intervening hostile possession. But certain things were excepted from this rule, as real property, horses, vessels used for purposes of war, etc.; and to these the *jus postliminii* was accorded. This general maxim of the Roman law, although not in all its details, is engrafted into modern international jurisprudence, and is fully recognised as an incident to the state of war, and contributes essentially to mitigate its calamities.¹

§ 2. The right of postliminy is founded upon the duty of every State to protect the persons and property of its citizens against the operations of the enemy. When, therefore, a subject who has fallen into the hands of the enemy is rescued by the State or its agents, he is restored to his former rights and condition under his own State, for his relations to his own country are not changed either by the capture or the rescue. So, of the property of a subject recaptured from the enemy by the State or its agents; it is no more the property of the State than it was before it fell into the hands of the enemy; it must, therefore, be restored to its former owner. But if, by the well-established rules of public law, the title to the captured property has become vested in the first captor, the former owner cannot claim its restoration from the recaptor, because his original title has been extinguished. The *jus postliminii* of the Roman law applied almost exclusively to questions of private rights, but the principles of natural justice embodied in that law are applicable to States as well as to individuals, in their intercourse with each other. It has, therefore, been held in modern times to extend not only to individuals of the same State, but also to individuals of different States, and to the international relations of States themselves.²

¹ Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 403; Justinian, *Institutes*, lib. i. tit. xii. § 5; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 15; Klüber, *Droit des Gens*, §§ 259, et seq.

² Martens, *Précis du Droit des Gens*, § 283; Heffter, *Droit International*, §§ 187 et seq.; Voet, *Ad Pandect.*, tit. iv. p. 642; Pfeiffer, *Das Recht der Kriegerführung*, pp. 40 et seq.; Bello, *Principes Internationaux*, pt. ii. cap. 10. § 3.

§ 3. Postliminy is considered as taking effect the moment that the persons, or property taken on land by an enemy, come within their sovereign's territory, or within places under his command, or into the hands of his officers or agents. But, in cases of prize and maritime recapture, the question of restoration usually involves that of military salvage, which must be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Vessels and goods taken by the enemy as prizes, and recaptured by the principal belligerent, or his allies, must, therefore, be brought *infra præsidia*, and adjudicated precisely the same as in case of a prize.¹

§ 4. The right of postliminy belongs exclusively to a state of war, and no longer exists after the conclusion of a treaty of peace. The intervention of peace cures all defects of title to property of every kind, acquired in war, and such title cannot be subsequently defeated in favour of the original owner, not even in the hands of a neutral possessor, who himself becomes an enemy. Such property may be liable to capture as booty, or prize of war, the same as any other property of that neutral, now an enemy, but it is not affected by the right of postliminy. By the principle of *uti possidetis*, which is already stated, applies to every treaty of peace, unless otherwise specially stipulated, all captured property is tacitly acceded to the possessor, and, if recaptured in a subsequent war, it is subject to the laws of capture, but not to those of postliminy. Nevertheless, there are many cases, where, the treaty

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. xiv. § 206; Kent, *Lect. on the Law*, vol. i. p. 108; Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. cap. v., § 11; *Derecho Pub. Int.*, p. 403.

Recaptures are emphatically cases of prize; for the definition of a prize of war, goods is, that they are goods taken on the high seas, *jure belli*, out of the hands of the enemy. When so taken, the captors have an unquestionable right to proceed against them as belligerent property, in a court of prize, for in no other way, and in no other court, can the question presented by a capture *jure belli* be properly or effectually examined. The very circumstance that it is found in the possession of the enemy, affords *prima facie* evidence that it is his property. The question cannot be decided, unless customary proceedings of prize are instituted, and enforced. The court, then, has a legitimate jurisdiction over the property of prize, and, as such, it will exert its authority over all the incidents. It will decree a restitution of the whole, or of a part; it will decree it absolutely, or together with salvage, as the circumstances of the case may require; and whether the salvage be held a portion of the thing itself, or a mere lien upon it, as a condition annexed to its restitution, it is an incident to the prize, and a question of prize, and within the scope of the regular prize allegorically. The 'Adelina,' 9 *Cranch*, 244, 286; compare the 'Dove,' 1 *U.S.*, 303.

of peace being silent, and the principle of *uti possidetis* not applicable, it is necessary to resort to the *jus postliminii*, in order to determine the true condition of things *at the time* of the treaty, or the moment they were freed from the pressure of the captor's force, as an *enemy*; in other words, whether, when the captor ceases to be an enemy, the thing captured legally becomes his property, or returns to the former owner. Hence, the very intimate connection between treaties of peace and the rights of postliminy.¹

§ 5. It is a general rule of international law, that allies in war make but one party with the principal; the cause being common, the rights and obligations are the same. It follows, therefore, that when persons and things belonging to one of the allies, which have been taken by the enemy, fall into the hands of another ally, they are subject to the rights of postliminy, and must be restored to their former condition. The recapture by an ally is regarded the same as a recapture by the principal, and *vice versa*. So, also, with respect to territory, persons and things brought within the territory of one ally are affected by the rights of postliminy precisely the same as if brought within the territory of their own sovereign. But, if the ally does not become an associate in the war, or a co-belligerent, and merely furnishes the succours stipulated by treaty, without coming to a rupture with the enemy, his dominions are regarded as neutral, and are governed by the laws of neutrality.

§ 6. The rights of postliminy, with respect to things, do not take effect in neutral countries, because the neutral is bound to consider every acquisition made by either party as a lawful acquisition, unless the capture itself is an infringement of his own neutral jurisdiction or rights. If one party were allowed in a neutral territory to enjoy the right of claiming goods taken by the other, it would be a departure from the duty of neutrality. Neutrals are bound to take notice of the military rights which possession gives, and which is the only evidence of right acquired by military force, as contradistinguished from civil rights and titles. The fact must be taken for the law. But with respect to persons, it takes effect, not only in

¹ See *ante*, ch. ix.; Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 530; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iv. § 4; the 'Purissima Concepcion,' 6 Rob. 45; the 'Sophia,' 6 Rob. 138; Heffter, *Drnt International*, § 188.

the territory of the nation to which such persons belong and in that of his allies, but also in a neutral country, so that if a belligerent brings his prisoners into a neutral territory he has all control of them. So, if prisoners escape from their captors and reach a neutral territory, they cannot be pursued and seized in such territory, and consequently are restored to their former condition. Prisoners of war who have given their parole may, or may not, claim the right of postliminy on reaching a neutral country, or coming again under the power of their own nation according to the terms of their parole. If left entirely free to return to their own country, subject to certain stipulated conditions, such as not to serve again for a certain period, or during the war, these conditions are not changed by recapture or rescue. But if they have only promised not to escape, or to remain within certain limits assigned to them, if they are rescued by their own party, or the place of their confinement falls into the hands of their own nation or its allies, they are released from their parole, and, by the right of postliminy, are restored to their former state. So if, by the incidents of the war, prisoners, not free to return to their own country, are brought into neutral territory, they are entitled to the benefit of that right. But it must be remembered, that prisoners brought into neutral ports on board a foreign ship of war, or any prize of hers, are not entitled to the right of postliminy, because such vessels in neutral ports have a right of ex-territoriality, and such prisoners are not regarded as within neutral jurisdiction.¹

§ 7. Naturally, property of all kinds is recoverable by the right of postliminy, and there is no intrinsic reason why movables should be excepted from the rule. Such, indeed, was the ancient practice, and by the *jus postliminii* of the Romans, certain articles, on being recovered from the enemy, were required to be restored to their former owners. But the difficulty of recognising things of this nature, with any degree

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. iv. § 4; Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. vi. § 132; ch. xiv. §§ 208, 210; Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pub.*, lib. i. caps. xv, xv. Daponceau, *Translation of Bynkershoek*, 167, pp. 115, 117; Cushing, *Opinions of U. S. Att'ys Genl.* vol. iii. p. 12; Bello, *Principes Internationals*, pt. ii. cap. iv. § 8; Heffter, *Internationales Recht*, §§ 189, 190; the 'Purissima Concepcion,' 6 Rob. 45, the 'Amstel de Ruys,' 5 Wheat. R., 390.

of certainty, and the endless disputes which would spring from a revendication of them, have introduced a contrary practice in modern times; and the title of the former owner to all *brutia* is considered as completely divested by a firm possession of the captor of twenty-four hours. Some apply the same rule to cases of *prize*, while others, as has already been shown, require the sentence of a competent court.¹

§ 8. Real property is easily identified, and is not of a transitory nature; it is, therefore, considered to be completely within the right of postliminy. The rule, however, cannot be frequently applied to the case of mere private property, which, by the general rule of modern nations, is exempt from confiscation. There are some exceptions to this general rule, and wherever private real property has been confiscated by the enemy, and again comes into the possession of the nation to which the individual owner belongs, it is subject to the right of postliminy. The effect of complete conquest and retrocession will be considered in another paragraph. Grotius proposes the question with respect to the immovable property belonging to a prisoner of war, but situate in a neutral country. But Vattel summarily disposes of it with the just remark, that nothing belonging to a prisoner can be disposed of by the captor, unless he can seize it and bring it within his own possession. But the rule becomes of great practical importance when applied to questions arising out of alienations of real property belonging to the government, made by the opposite belligerent while in the military occupation of the country. We have already stated, that the purchaser of any portion of the national domain in the occupation of an enemy, previous to the confirmation or consummation of the conquest, takes it at the peril of being evicted by the original sovereign owner when he is restored to his dominions. But if the victor be so firmly established in possession, that opposition to his rule is overcome or virtually ceases, or if the conquest is accompanied by internal revolution and a recognition of the new government, in other words, if the conquest is legally complete, alien-

¹ By the ancient law of Great Britain, twenty-four hours' possession of *prize* was a sufficient conversion of the property to oust the rights of the owner. The alterations and modifications, from time to time made therein by statute, down to the 45 Geo. III., c. 72, are considered in the *Ceylon*, 1 *Dods*, 110; and see *Goss v. Withers*, 2 *Burr.*, 623.

ations of the public domain will not be annulled, even though the former sovereign should be restored.¹

§ 9. Towns, provinces, and territories, which are retaken from the conqueror during the war, or which are restored to their former sovereign by the treaty of peace, are entitled to the right of postliminy, and the original sovereign owner, or recovering his dominion over them, whether by force of arms

¹ Vattel, *Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. xiv. § 212; Kent, *Comm. on Am. Law*, vol. i. pp. 108, 109; Leibner, *Political Ethics*, b. ii. § 86; *The American Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 406, 539-574, 583; *vide ante*, chapters xxxi. and xxxiv.

The courts of the United States have determined, that grants of territory made by Great Britain, after the Declaration of Independence, are invalid. In the case of *Harcourt v. Gaillard* 7 *Curtis R.* 332. there was a piece of land, lying between the Mississippi and the Chattahoochee rivers, and granted under the above circumstances, it was laid down by the Supreme Court, as follows:—Two questions here occur: first, whether separation had taken effect by any valid act; and, secondly, if so, whether it made any difference in the case upon international principles. On both these points we are of opinion that the law is against the validity of this grant. It is true that the power of the Crown was at that time admitted to be very absolute over the limits of the royal provinces, but there is no reason to believe that it had ever been exercised by a more solemn and notorious than a public proclamation. And although the instrument by which Georgia claimed an extension of her limits to the northern boundary of that territory was of no more authority or solemnity than that by which it was supposed to have been taken from her, as otherwise with South Carolina. Her territory had been extended to that limit by a solemn grant from the Crown, to the lords proprietors, from whom, in fact, she had wrested it by a revolution, even before that of the proprietors had been bought out by the Crown. But this is a collateral matter in the case; it is this: that this limit was claimed and asserted by both of those States in the Declaration of Independence, and the right to it was established by the most solemn of all international acts, the treaty of peace. It has never been admitted by the United States that they acquired anything by way of cession from Great Britain by that treaty. It has been viewed only as a recognition of pre-existing rights, and on that principle the soil and sovereignty within their acknowledged limits were as much theirs at the Declaration of Independence as at this hour. By reference to the treaty, it will be found that it amounts to a simple recognition of the independence, and the limits of the United States, without any language purporting a cession or relinquishment of right on the part of Great Britain. In the last article of the Treaty of Ghent will be found a provision respecting grants of land made by the islands then in dispute between the two States, which affords another illustration of this doctrine. By that article, a stipulation is made in favour of grants before the war, but none for those which were made during the war; and such is unquestionably the law of nations. War is a violent proceeding by the sword, and where the question to be decided is one of original claim to territory, grants of soil made *flagrantibus bellis* by the party that falls can only derive validity from treaty stipulations. It is not necessary here to consider the rights of the conqueror in the case of an actual conquest, since the views previously presented put the acquisition of such rights out of this case.

or by treaty, is bound to restore them to their former state. In other words, he acquires no new rights over them either by the act of recapture or of restoration. The conqueror loses the rights which he had acquired by force of arms; but those rights are not transferred to the former sovereign, who resumes his dominion over them precisely the same as though the war had never occurred. He rules, not by a newly acquired title, which relates back to any former period, but by his ancient title, which, in contemplation of war, has never been divested. The places which are reconquered or restored therefore return to him with the rights and privileges which they would have possessed if they had never fallen into the power of the enemy. But if the conquered provinces and places are confirmed to the conqueror by the treaty of peace, or otherwise, they can claim no right of postliminy. Their condition is established by the rights of conquest, and the will of the conqueror. The right or title of the new sovereign is not that of the original possessor, and therefore is not subject to the same limitation or restriction. It had its origin in force, and is confirmed by treaty, incorporation, length of possession, or otherwise. It dates back to the actual conquest, but not to any period anterior to the conquest. The relations between the conquered and the conqueror are therefore very different from those which existed between the conquered and their former sovereign. They have, in their new condition, such rights only as belong to them by the general law of nations, and the stipulations of the treaty of cession, or such others as may be given to them by the will of the conqueror. If, however, the provinces and places have not themselves been considered as having been in a hostile attitude to the conqueror, he is regarded as merely replacing the former sovereign in his rights over them. They are regarded as acquired by conquest, rather than as actually conquered, and, in such cases, the acquisition or change of sovereignty is not usually attended by loss of rights. But in whatsoever way the conquest is completed, it operates as an entire severance of the relations between the conquered territory and the former sovereignty. A subsequent restoration of such territory to its former sovereign is regarded in law as a *retrocession*, and carries with it no rights of postliminy. When the inhabitants of such conquered territory become a part of the new State they must

bear the consequence of the transfer of their allegiance to a new sovereign ; and, should they subsequently fall into the power of their former sovereign, he is, in turn, to be regarded as a conqueror, and they cannot claim, as against him, any rights of postliminy. The correctness of the principle of international law, as stated above, is never disputed ; but there is great difficulty in determining when the conquest is complete, or in drawing the precise line between absolute conquest and mere military occupation. This distinction has been discussed in the preceding chapters.¹

§ 10. A State is sometimes entirely subjugated and its personality extinguished by a compulsory incorporation into another sovereignty. As the towns, provinces, and territories of which it was composed now become subordinate portions of another society, their relations to each other and to the new State result from the will of the new sovereign. If, by a subsequent revolution, the extinguished State resumes its independence, and again becomes a distinct and substantive body, its constituent parts may resume their former relations, or assume new positions and rights, according to the character of the society which is recognised, and the constitution or government which it adopts. This is a question of local public law, rather than of international jurisprudence. But if the subjugated State is delivered by the assistance of another, the question of postliminy may arise between the restored State and its deliverer. There are two cases to be considered, first, where the deliverance is effected by an ally, and second, where it is effected by a friendly power unallied. In either case, the State so delivered is entitled to the right of postliminy. If the deliverance be effected by an ally, the duty of restoration is strict and precise, for an ally can claim no right of war against its co-ally. If the deliverance be effected by a State unallied but not hostile, the re-establishment of the rescued nation in its former rights is certainly the moral duty of the deliverer. He can claim no rights of conquest against the friendly State which he rescues from the hands of the conqueror. How much stronger, then, is the duty of restora-

¹ Heffter, *Droit International*, § 188 ; Chitty, *Law of Nations*, pp. 95, 96 ; Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pùb.*, lib. i. cap. xvi. ; Bell, *Elements International*, pt. ii. cap. iv. § 8 ; Rayneval, *Inst. au Droit Nat.*, liv. ch. xviii. ; Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. i. ch. ii. § 18, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 12 ; *vide ante*, chapters xxxiii. and xxxiv.

where the deliverance is effected with the concurrence and assistance of the subjugated people, and under the exertion on their part of recovering their ancient rights and privileges. A denial of the right of postliminy, in such a case, would be contrary to the law of nations and a breach of public morality.¹

(1. The history of Genoa furnishes an illustration of this principle. The ancient republic of Genoa had been subjugated in consequence of the French invasion and conquest, and was annexed to the French empire in 1805. In 1814 the city of Genoa was surrendered to the British troops, and the command of Lord Bentinck, who issued a proclamation on the 26th of April, stating 'that considering the natural desire of the Genoese seems to be to return to that form of government under which it enjoyed liberty, tranquillity, and independence; and considering, likewise, that the natural desire seems to be conformable to the principles recognised by the high allied powers, of restoring to all their ancient rights and privileges,' and declaring 'that the Genoese State, as it existed in 1797, with such modifications as the general interest of the public good, and the spirit of the original constitution to require, is re-established.' Nevertheless, by the 17th article of the treaty of Paris, of the 30th of May, 1814, the states of Genoa were ceded to the King of Sardinia. The provisional government of Genoa remonstrated against this cession, and appealed to the guarantee of its independence contained in the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1745. The conduct of England was severely censured in Parliament at the time, and has since been condemned by publicists generally.²

(2. Having considered the law of postliminy applicable to retaking of movable and immovable property captured on land, it remains to examine its application to the retaking of vessels, or property captured at sea,—what was called in Roman law *recuperatio*, and is known in English law, as *recapture*. There is a manifest difficulty in applying the right of postliminy to maritime recaptures, on account of the uncertainty

¹ Vattel, *De Jur. Nat. et Gent.*, lib. viii. cap. vi. § 26. Wheaton, *Hist. Law of Nations*, pp. 487, 488; Klüber, *Acten des Congresses*, b. vii. §§ 420 433; Mackintosh, *Manual Works*, pp. 42; Alison, *Hist. of Europe*, vol. iv. pp. 370, 503; Rotteck, *Hist. World*, vol. iv. p. 248; *Annual Register*, 1814, p. 191; Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. xxx. pp. 894 et seq.

of the time when the title of the original proprietor is completely divested. If all nations had adopted the principle, that condemnation, by a competent court of prize, was necessary, in all cases, to effect a change of ownership, the rules of postliminy applicable to prizes would be the same in all countries; but as this principle has not been universally adopted, there is not, in practice, any well-established rule of maritime recapture. Different text-writers have advocated different principles, and different legislators have enacted different laws, and, as a consequence, the prize-courts of different countries have adopted different rules of decision.¹

§ 13. It is remarkable, says Phillimore, that of all the ancient codes of maritime law,—the Consolato del Mare, the Rôle des Judgements d'Oleron, the Laws of Wilsby, the ancient Statutes of Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, and the Hanse-Towns,—the Consolato del Mare alone deals with the case of recaptures. The doctrine of *perductio infra præsidia*, as constituting a sufficient conversion of property, is there expressed but not in terms very intelligible in themselves. These terms, however, have been satisfactorily explained by Grotius and Barbeyrac, and the whole subject has been most ably discussed by Bynkershoek. Nevertheless, it was left unsettled whether the right of postliminy should apply to all maritime recaptures, or only to ships; whether they must be taken *infra præsidia* of the captor, or whether the bringing *infra præsidia* of a neutral was sufficient to change the property; moreover, it was often a matter of dispute what should be understood by the phrase *infra præsidia*. This state of the question led to various treaty stipulations and municipal statutes, by which the subject of recapture was regulated with

¹ Wheaton, *Elem. Int. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 12; the 'Santa Cruz' 1 Rob., 58; Bello, *Diritto Internazionale*, pt. ii. cap. v. § 6; Hall, *Int. Law*, § 191; Hautefeuille, *Des Nations Neutres*, t. i. art. 10; Jouffroy, *Droit Maritime*, p. 313; Poehls, *Seerecht*, ch. i. b. iii. § 333, ed. sc 4; Kaltenborn, *Seerecht*, ch. i. b. iii. p. 378; Dalloz, *Repertoire*, *Art. 1*, *Prize Maritime*, § 3; Pistoye et Duverdy, *Des Prizes*, tit. vii.

It was not essential, to constitute a capture, or such a one as to occasion to a recapture under the former Prize Acts of Great Britain, that the enemy should have taken actual possession.—The 'Edward & Mary' 3 Rob., 305.

In questions of restitution of property recaptured, the *onus probandi* in the first instance lies on the recaptors, to show the absence of necessity as to restitution, by the Laws of the claimant's country, but on *prima facie* evidence being shown by the recaptors, the *onus* of proof of necessity shifts to the claimant. The 'Santa Cruz' 1 Rob., 60.

respect to the contracting parties and their own subjects; and with respect to countries with which the recaptor had no treaty in relation to the application of postliminy to such cases, the courts have sometimes adopted the rule of reciprocity. Sir William Scott considers this the most liberal and rational rule which can be applied. 'To the recaptured,' he says, 'it presents his own consent, bound up in the legislative wisdom of his own country; to the recaptor, it cannot be considered as injurious, where the rule of the recaptured would condemn, whilst the rule of the recaptor prevailing amongst his own countrymen, would restore, it brings an obvious advantage; and even in case of immediate restitution, under the rules of the recaptured, the recapturing country would rest secure in the reliance of receiving reciprocal justice in its turn. It may be said, what if this reliance should be disappointed? Redress must then be sought from retaliation; which, in the disputes of independent States, is not to be considered as vindictive retaliation, but as the just and equal measure of civil retribution. This will be their ultimate security, and it is a security sufficient to warrant the trust. For the transactions of States cannot be balanced by minute arithmetic; something must, on all occasions, be hazarded on just and liberal presumption.'¹

§ 14. Every power is obliged to conform to the law of nations, relative to postliminy, where the interests of neutrals are concerned, unless otherwise regulated by treaty stipulations. But such conventions or treaty stipulations establish a factitious right, which relates only to the contracting parties, and cannot bind others. So, with respect to allies, two allies may enter into an agreement by which the rights of postliminy may be restricted or extended, as between themselves, but such agreement can in no way affect the rights of postliminy of the third co-ally, who is not a party to it. His rights and duties in that respect are governed and regulated by the rules of postliminy, which are recognised and established by the law of nations. But, in many cases, as already remarked, there is no recognised and well-established rule of international law, which can be applied. So of municipal laws, they may

¹ Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. § 419; Goss et al. v. Withers, 2 Burr. K., 693; Loecennus, *De Jure Maritimo*, lib. ii. cap. iv.

In questions of reciprocity in claims for restitution of property recaptured, the cases must be determined with respect to the law of the claimant's country at the time of the recapture. The '*Santa Cruz*,' *supra*.

modify the right of postliminy in its application to cases arising between the subjects of the same belligerent State, as they cannot change it so as to prejudice the absolute rights of citizens of other States, whether allies or neutrals. In other words, municipal statutes cannot deprive the subject of an ally of the benefit of postliminy, in case of recapture, nor take from the subject of a neutral State what he holds by a title which is regarded as valid by the law of nations. They may, however, give to both certain benefits of postliminy, which they could not claim under the well-established principles of the law of nations as absolute rights. Such has been the general character of the modifications of postliminy which have been made, or attempted, by municipal laws and regulations.

§ 15. The British Prize Act, 17 Vict. c. 18, s. 9, provides that, '— Any ship, vessel, goods or merchandise, belonging to any of her Majesty's subjects captured by any of her Majesty's enemies, and afterwards recaptured from the enemy by any of her Majesty's ships or vessels of war, shall be adjudged by the decrees of the Court of Admiralty to be restored to the

¹ This statute is repealed, but it is enacted by the 27 & 28 Vict. c. 40, that where any ship, or goods belonging to any of her Majesty's subjects, after being taken as prize by the enemy, or are retaken from the enemy by any of her Majesty's ships of war, the same shall be restored to the owner of a prize-court to the owner, on his paying as prize salvage one eighth part of the value of the prize to be decreed and ascertained by the court, or such sum not exceeding one eighth part of the estimated value of the prize as may be agreed on between the owner and the recaptors, and approved by order of the court, provided, that where the recapture is made under circumstances of special difficulty or danger, the prize court may, if it think fit, award to the recaptors as prize salvage a larger part than one eighth part, but not exceeding in any case one fourth part of the value of the prize; provided also, that where a ship being so taken is not forth, or used by any of her Majesty's enemies as a ship of war, the provision for restitution shall not apply, and the ship shall be adjudicated on as in other cases of prize. And by s. 41, where a ship belonging to any of her Majesty's subjects, after being taken as prize by an enemy, is retaken from the enemy by any of her Majesty's ships of war, she may, with the consent of the recaptors, prosecute her voyage, and shall not be necessary for the recaptors to proceed for adjudication of her return to a port of the United Kingdom. The master or owner of the ship, may, with the consent of the recaptors, unload and dispose of the goods on board the ship before adjudication. In case the ship does not, within six months, return to a port of the United Kingdom, the recaptors may nevertheless institute proceedings against the ship or goods in the High Court of Admiralty, and the court may there award prize salvage as aforesaid to the recaptors, and may enforce payment thereof, either by warrant of arrest against the ship or goods, or by monition and attachment against the owner.—And see *ante*, p. 112.

owner or proprietor thereof, upon payment for, and in lieu of, one eighth part of the true value of the said ship, vessel, goods, or merchandise, respectively, and such salvage one eighth shall be divided and distributed in such manner and proportion as is hereinbefore directed in cases of prize; provided, nevertheless, that if any such ship or vessel captured and recaptured as aforesaid shall have been by her Majesty's service *set forth* or used as a ship or vessel of war, it shall be restored to the former owner or proprietor thereof, but shall be adjudged lawful prize for the benefit of the captors.' It has been shown elsewhere, that, according to the practice of the British prize-courts, property captured in war is not deemed to be changed so as to debar the owner or captor, till there has been a sentence of condemnation; and therefore, till that period, the title of the original owner is not divested, and he is entitled to restitution, in the hands of whomsoever he may find the property. But if such sentence of condemnation has passed, it is a sufficient title to a vendee, and would also have entitled a recaptor to condemnation of the property, if the statute did not step in, and, *as to British subjects*, revive the *jus postliminii* of the original owner, on payment of salvage. This principle of ownership would extend to allies and neutrals the benefit of postliminy till *after* condemnation, if the courts had not engrafted on it the rule of property already alluded to. The United States, by the Act March 3rd, 1800, have enacted—'That when any vessel other than a vessel of war or privateer, or when any goods which shall hereafter be taken as prize by any vessels, acting under authority of the Government of the United States, shall appear to have before belonged to any person or persons resident within or under the protection of the United States, under authority, or pretence of authority, from any prince, government, or state, against which the United States have authorised, or shall authorise, defence or reprisals, such vessel or goods not having been condemned as prize by competent authority before the recapture thereof, the same shall be restored to the former owner or owners, he or they paying for, and in lieu of, salvage, if retaken by a public vessel of the United States, one eighth part, and if retaken by a private vessel of the United States, one sixth part, of the true value of the vessel or goods so to be restored, allowing and except-

ing all imports and public duties to which the same may be liable. And if the vessel so retaken shall appear to have been *set forth* and armed as a vessel of war, before such capture afterwards, and before the retaking thereof as aforesaid the former owner or owners, on the restoration thereof, shall be adjudged to pay for, and in lieu of salvage, one moiety of the true value of such vessel of war or privateer'. The sixth section of this Act extends the foregoing provisions to the recapture of property claimed by the United States, allowing a salvage of one-sixth in case of recapture by a private vessel, and one-twelfth if by a public vessel. Section third extends the provisions of the first section to the restoration of recaptured property claimed by alien friends, the amount of salvage to be paid 'being such proportion of the true value of the vessel or goods so to be restored, as by the law or usage of the prince, government, or state, within whose territory the former owner or owners shall be so resident, shall be required on the restoration of any vessel or goods of a citizen of the United States, under like circumstances of recapture, made by the authority of such foreign prince, government, or state and where no such law or usage shall be known, the same shall be allowed as is provided by the first section of this Act'. But the Act was not to apply to cases where the foreign government would not restore the vessels or goods of citizens of the United States under like circumstances. It is thus seen that the municipal laws of the United States relating to recapture are essentially different from the British statutes on the same subject, and that they conform to the true principles of the *jus postliminium* as modified by the rule of reciprocity.¹

¹ *British Statutes*, 17 Vict., c. 18; 43 Geo. III., c. 160; 45 Geo. III., c. 72; *U. S. Statutes at Large*, vol. II, p. 10.

The Prize Act of 45 Geo. III., c. 72, making provision for the restoration of British vessels taken from the enemy, though it only mentions the usual mode of recapture at sea, was held not to exclude other modes of recapture. The '*Ceylon*,' 1 *Howd.*, 110.

Where a British vessel has been seized in a French port for an assumed violation of French municipal laws, condemned, and sold under the sentence to a French merchant, and afterwards recaptured on the breaking out of a war between France and England, it was held that it was to be restored on salvage to the former British proprietor: the recapture being the former owner mentioned in the Prize Act being confined to property taken by the enemy as prize. The '*Jeune Voyageur*,' 5 *R.*, 10.

The rule of section 1 of the Statute of 1819, which provided for the restoration to the former owners, upon the payment of certain salvage, of vessels recaptured, before condemnation, by public armed ships of the

§ 16. The same provisions are made in the British and American statutes, with respect to the *setting forth as a vessel of war*, prior to the capture. We know of no American decision as to what constitutes such *setting forth*, but the meaning of the term has been fully settled by adjudications in the British prize-courts. It has been decided that a commission of war is sufficient, if there be guns on board; that where the vessel has been fitted out as a privateer, after capture, although when recaptured she was navigating as a merchant vessel, it is conclusive against her, and the title of the former owner is considered as for ever extinguished. So, where she has been employed in the military service of the enemy, by authority of the government, although she be not regularly commissioned, and the order of the commander of a single ship will be presumed to have been given by competent authority. But the mere fact of employment in the military service of the enemy, is not a sufficient *setting forth* as a vessel of war. Where a ship was originally armed for the slave trade, and, after capture, an additional number of men were put on board, but where there was no commission of war and

United States, was held to apply to a vessel recaptured after a capture by a Confederate privateer, and a condemnation and sale by a Confederate prize-court.—The ‘*Lalla*,’ 2 *Sprague*, 177; 15 *Law Rep.*, N. S., 81.

An American vessel was captured by the enemy, and, after condemnation and sale to a subject of the enemy, was recaptured by an American privateer. Held, that the original owner was not entitled to restitution on payment of salvage, under the Salvage Act of March 3, 1800, and the Prize Act of June 26, 1812.—The ‘*Star*,’ 3 *Wheat.*, 78.

In a case of possession, at the suit of the former British owner of a vessel, which had been captured by the French, and carried into a port of Spain, then an ally of the French, where she was condemned by the prize tribunal at Paris, but was afterwards seized by Spain on becoming an enemy of France, and sold, it was held, on proof of such first sale, that the right of the former British owner was divested, and that the Spanish seizure was not in the nature of a recapture entailing to the benefit of the former British owner.—The ‘*Victoria*,’ *Edw.*, 97.

There is one species of recapture from the enemy which vests the whole interests in the recaptors—viz., when an enemy’s ship, taken originally by one English vessel, and lost again to an enemy’s cruiser, is subsequently recaptured by another English vessel.—Note to the ‘*John and Jane*,’ 4 *Ker.*, 217.

By the old practice a recaptured vessel belonged neither to the king, the admiral, nor the former owners, but to the recaptors (2 *Browne*, 11, 8 *Jan.*; *Weston’s case*, citing 7 *Edw.* IV., c. 14, 2 & 3 P. and M. D., 128), unless the owner claimed it on the day on which it was retaken, and *ante re-venit solis Jure*, 201, P. 22). So also as to recaptured ships, the property of allies of Great Britain, and retaken by British subjects from a common enemy.—*Ibid.*

armed vessels, yet it was the
such property when recaptured
ordinance of June 15th, 1779,
after twenty-four hours' pos-
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hours have elapsed, she is entitled
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hours' possession, to the whole
recapture of a French vessel
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respect to recaptures, have
with those of France. In 1801
to the property of friendly na-

¹ The 'Horatio,' 6 *Rob.*, 320.
'*Actif*,' *Edm. R.*, 185; the 'Santa'

is the least for the purpose of making a fair estimate of the percentage of the total production of the country which is consumed by the army and navy. The total production of the country is estimated at 100,000,000 tons of food, and the army and navy are estimated to consume 10,000,000 tons of food. This is a fair estimate of the total production of the country and the consumption of the army and navy.

Let the sum of the production of the country be 100,000,000 tons of food. Let the sum of the consumption of the army and navy be 10,000,000 tons of food. Let the sum of the consumption of the rest of the country be 90,000,000 tons of food. Let the sum of the production of the country be 100,000,000 tons of food. Let the sum of the consumption of the army and navy be 10,000,000 tons of food. Let the sum of the consumption of the rest of the country be 90,000,000 tons of food. Let the sum of the production of the country be 100,000,000 tons of food. Let the sum of the consumption of the army and navy be 10,000,000 tons of food. Let the sum of the consumption of the rest of the country be 90,000,000 tons of food.

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no additional arming, it was held not to be a setting forth as a vessel of war, under the Act. Lord Stowell observed, that the Act was drawn with the intention of expressing the sense and meaning of international law, with respect to what constitutes a vessel of war.¹

§ 17. Although the letter of the French ordinances previous to the Revolution, condemned, as good prize, French property recaptured after being twenty-four hours in possession of the enemy, whether the same be retaken by public or private armed vessels, yet it was the constant practice to restore such property when recaptured by the king's ships. By the ordinance of June 15th, 1779, all French property recaptured after twenty-four hours' possession by the enemy was condemned to the crown, the king in council regulating the amount of salvage to be allowed to the recaptors according to circumstances. The Arrêté du 2 Prairial, an XI., which is in part, a reproduction of the ordinances of 1681, provides, that if the recapture be made by a public ship of war (*navire de l'Etat*), it shall be restored to the original proprietor on payment, to the recapturing crew, of the thirtieth part of the value if the twenty-four hours have not elapsed, and the tenth part if they have elapsed; all the expenses incident to the recapture to be borne by the recaptured vessel. If the recapture be made by a privateer before the twenty-four hours have elapsed, she is entitled to one-third of the value of the recaptured ship and cargo; and, if after the twenty-four hours' possession, to the whole. The law applicable to the recapture of a French vessel is equally applicable to the recapture of the vessel of an ally. The laws of Spain with respect to recaptures, have generally agreed almost entirely with those of France. In 1801, she made a rule with respect to the property of friendly nations, that where the recapture

¹ The 'Horatio,' 6 Rob., 320; the 'Ceylon,' 1 Dod. R., 141; the 'Actif,' Fido R., 185; the 'Santa Bragada,' 3 Rob., 36; the 'Columbo,' 1 Dod. R., 397; the 'Nostra Senora de Rosario,' 3 Rob., 10; the 'Gross,' Fido R., 210, 222.

The fact of the enemy having placed an additional number of men on board a prize, previously armed as a slave ship, without her being commissioned by them as a ship of war, or further armed, was held not to amount to a setting forth of the prize, as a ship of war, in the meaning of the existing Prize Act, so as to defeat the claim of the former owner. Restitution to him, on salvage, decreed accordingly.

The 'Horatio,' 6 Rob., 320.

is not laden for the enemy's account, it is to be restored on the payment of a salvage of one eighth if recaptured by the ships, and one sixth if by privateers; provided, that the nation to which such property belongs has adopted, or is to adopt, a similar conduct towards Spain. The rule with respect to recaptures of Spanish property was the same as the French rule with respect to recaptures of French privateers.

On the 5th of February, 1814, Spain concluded a treaty with Great Britain with respect to recaptures, by which the rule is to be made on the payment of the specified salvage, without reference to the time the ship has remained in the captor's hands, or whether it has been brought into the hands of the captor or been condemned. Portugal, in her ordinances of 1704 and 1796, adopted the French and Spanish rule with respect to recaptures. But in May, 1797, she revoked her former ordinance, by which twenty-four hours' possession by the enemy rendered the property of the former owner, and allowed restitution after that time, on salvage of one eighth if recaptured by a public ship, and one fifth if by a privateer. The ancient ordinance of Denmark condemned after twenty-four hours' possession by the enemy, and restored if the property had been a longer time in the enemy's possession, upon the payment of a salvage of one half the value of the property recaptured. But the ordinance of 1810 restored Danish, or allied property, without regard to the time it had been in the enemy's possession, on the payment of salvage of one third the value. With respect to Sweden, the ordinance of Charles XI. enacted, 'in case a ship belonged to Swedish subjects, after having been taken by the enemy, should be retaken, the recaptor should have two thirds of its value, and a third shall be restored to the proprietor, without respect to the time during which it had been in the enemy's hands.' The ordinance of 1792 made the same provisions, only changing the rate of salvage to one half of the value of the property recaptured. There were many and great variations in the laws promulgated at different times, by the States-General of the United Provinces. The ordinance of 1654, without making any distinction between the times of recapture and the quality of the captors, allows a salvage of only one-ninth of the vessel and cargo.

But the ordinance of 1672, with respect to recaptures, that a salvage of one third

of recapture before the property had been forty-eight hours in the enemy's possession, of one third if more than forty-eight and less than ninety-six hours, and one half if beyond that time. It was understood that the ordinance of 1659 was continued in force with respect to recaptures made by ships of war. It is thus seen, that the States-General allowed restoration in all cases, the rates of salvage being different according to character of the recaptor and the length of time the captured property had remained in the possession of the enemy. It is thus shown that the municipal laws of different nations, with respect to the application of the right of postliminy to maritime recaptures, are very different, some adhering in part to the rigorous rule of the ancients, that twenty-four hours' possession by the enemy completes the capture, and that a recapture after that length of time is no good prize of war; while others have relaxed the rule with respect to recaptures by public vessels, but enforce it as to those made by privateers; while others, again, enforce it with respect to the property of their own citizens, but relax it with respect to foreign nations, on the ground of reciprocity.¹

§ 18. It appears from the foregoing synopsis of the law of recapture, that there is no uniform or fixed rule as to the *quantum* of salvage allowed in cases of recapture of a foreign vessel or foreign goods, the rates being different in different countries, and, even in the same country, in different cases. In the United States, by the Act of March 3rd, 1800, the amount of salvage is regulated by the law and usage of the government to which the person claiming the vessel or goods belongs, applies, under like circumstances, to the vessel and goods of the United States, and where no such law

¹ Phillimore, *On Int. Law*, vol. iii. §§ 413, 418; Whetton, *F. & M. Law*, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 12; the 'Santa Cruz,' i. *Kob.*, § 8; Harpigny, *Nations Neutres*, tit. xiii. ch. iii.; Emenson, *Traité de la Mer*, tit. xii. § 23; Azuni, *Droit de la Mer*, pt. ii. ch. iv. § 11; Pothier et Daire, *Précis*, tit. vii.; Abreu y Bertodano, *Collision, etc.*, pt. ii. p. 371; *Manuel des Armateurs*, pp. 49, 200; Bynkershoek, *Quæst. Jur. Pub.*, l. i. cap. 5.

An American ship was taken by a privateer, A., who kept possession ten days, when the prize was retaken by an American cruiser, B., who kept possession thirteen days. It was then again recaptured by a third cruiser, C., at the time of whose recapture of her the privateer and crew of A., the first captor, were on board the prize. Held that A. was to be considered as the actual captor, and C. as the recaptor, and accordingly; salvage awarded to the recaptor equivalent to the share of a joint captor.—The 'Lucretia,' *Hay & Marriott*, 227.

usage shall be known, the same salvage is allowed as in case of recapture of the property of our own citizens. In England, it is left, in a great measure, to the courts to determine what is fit and reasonable. In France, and other States on the Continent, the rate of salvage varies with the length of time the property recaptured had been in the enemy's possession. A distinction is also made in the rate of salvage allowed to a privateer and to a government vessel, the allowance to the former being usually much larger than to the latter. It being the duty of every citizen to assist his fellow citizens in war, and to retake their property out of the enemy's possession, non-commissioned vessels are usually allowed the same amount of salvage on a recapture as commissioned vessels.¹

§ 19. Neutral property recaptured from the enemy, if not subject to condemnation by the rules of international law, is not subject to pay salvage to the recaptor. This rule is founded upon the supposition that justice would have been done if the vessel had been carried into the enemy's port, and that if injury had been sustained by the act of capture, it would have been redressed by the tribunal of the country to whose cognizance the case would have been regularly submitted. This is a presumption which is to be entertained in favour of every State which has not sullied its character by gross violations of the law of nations. Thus, a Spanish vessel, bound from Monte Video to London, was recaptured from a French privateer, after recapture from a British privateer. No edict was produced from the French code to show that the vessel would have been subject to condemnation in a prize-court of France, and salvage was pronounced not to be due. But if it be shown that the recaptured vessel of the neutral would, in all probability, have been condemned if she had been carried into the enemy's ports and subjected to the decisions of the enemy's tribunals, a real benefit has been conferred upon the neutral by the recapture, and a reasonable salvage will be allowed. Thus, where a neutral vessel, retaken from a French captor, was bound to a neutral port

¹ The 'Helen,' 3 *Rob.*, 224; *Act of Congress*, March 3, 1800, ch. xiv. § 3; the 'Urania,' 5 *Rob.*, 148; the 'Progress,' *Fido. R.*, 215; the 'Hope,' *Hay & Marriott R.*, 216; the 'Two Friends,' 1 *Rob.*, 271; the 'Mary,' 5 *Rob.*, 200; Dunlop, *Digest of Laws of U. S.*, pp. 271-273; Talbot v. Seaman, 1 *Cranch. R.*, 1; the 'Adeline,' 9 *Cranch. R.*, 244, 287.

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¹ Kent, *Com. on Am. Law*, vol
vol. iii. § 422: *Pistone et Duverdy*

A vessel which has been used
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Blanché Pr. Cas., 99)

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on the part of the recaptor, and as a right which may be demanded by the owner of the recaptured property, it seems unreasonable and contrary to the principles of postliminy, that any heavy salvage should be allowed. Where, however, a positive benefit has been conferred, it is proper that the recaptor should be rewarded for his risk and trouble. Moreover, this remuneration should be sufficient to serve as an incentive to vessels of the belligerent to use their best endeavours to rescue from an enemy the property which he has captured from their own citizens and allies, as well as from alien friends. Such views seem to have influenced the drawing of the statutes of the United States, on the allotment and quantum of salvage in cases of recapture by American vessels.¹

§ 21. There is an obvious distinction between *military* and *civil* salvage, the former being allowed for rescuing vessels or goods from an enemy, and the latter for assistance rendered to a vessel or its cargo derelict at sea. Thus, if a vessel be captured going in distress into an enemy's port, and is thereby saved, it is merely a case of civil and not of military salvage. The same salvors, however, may, in some cases, be entitled to both these kinds of salvage; thus, where, upon a recapture, the parties have entitled themselves to a *military* salvage under the prize law, the court may also award them, in addition, a *civil* salvage, if they have subsequently rendered extraordinary services in rescuing the vessel in distress from the perils of the sea.²

§ 22. The following special rules respecting military salvage, are collected by Mr. Wheaton, from the decisions of English and American courts of prize. If a convoying ship

¹ Chitty, *Law of Nations*, pp. 105-107; the 'Two Friends,' 1 *Rob.* 271; the 'Johann,' 1 *Rob.* 38; *U. S. Statutes at Large*, vol. ii. p. 16; Brightly, *Digest of Laws of U. S.*, p. 82; Dunlop, *Digest of Laws of U. S.*, pp. 271-273.

There is no uniform rule among nations, as to the time when recaptured property vests in captors, to the exclusion of the owners. Nations concur in principle, indeed, so far as to require firm and secure possession, but the rules of evidence respecting the possession are not uniform. The law of England, on recapture of property of allies, is the law of reciprocity. It adopts the rule of the country to which the claimant belongs. In the event of that country having no rule thereon, the Court of Admiralty would apply to the case, the law of England on recapture, as between its own subjects.—The 'Santa Cruz,' 1 *Rob.*, 60.

² The 'Louisa,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 317; the 'Franklin,' 4 *Rob.*, 147; the 'Sir Francis,' 2 *Hagg. R.*, 156; the 'Sir Peter,' 2 *Dod. R.*, 73. 'Beaver,' 3 *Rob.*, 292.

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123. If the original capture was unlawful, the recaptor, says Emerigon, acquires no property in the recapture. Thus, the French bark 'Victoire,' chased by an English privateer, took refuge under the castle of the island of Majorca, and was taken by the privateer while at anchor within pistol shot of the castle. Some days after, the bark was recaptured by another French vessel. The original capture was held to have been unlawful and void, for having been made in neutral territory, and consequently, in violation of the law of nations. The recaptor, however, received a large salvage for the recapture, probably as a fair compensation for his trouble, time, danger and expense in the rescue. This principle is applied to the recapture of neutral property, that is, of property neutral to both of the belligerents. If the original capture was a violation of the law of nations, the recaptors from the possession of the enemy acquire no right of property whatsoever. This is the universally received doctrine of the law of nations. A belligerent,' says Story, 'by recapturing neutral property, neutral to all the belligerents) has done no meritorious service, and is not entitled even to any salvage. Nay, the recaptors may be held responsible in damages for the act, unless there was a real danger of condemnation to the neutral by the original captors, from their lawless disregard of the law of nations; and, if there was such danger, then the recaptors are entitled to salvage only.'

Edward and Mary,' 3 Rob., 305; the 'Pensamento Felix,' 1 Edw., 116; the 'Astrea,' 1 Wheat. R., 125; the 'Lord Nelson,' 1 Edw. R., 1; the 'Diligencia,' 1 Dod. R., 404; the 'Mary,' 2 Wheat. R., 123; the 'John and Jane,' 4 Rob., 216; the 'Gage,' 6 Rob., 273; the 'Charlote Grodine,' 1 Dod. R., 192; the 'Blendenhall,' 1 Dod. R., 414; the 'Apollo,' 3 Rob. R., 308; Talbot v. Seaman, 1 Cranch R., 1; the 'Barbara,' 3 Rob., 171; the 'Helen,' 3 Rob., 224; the 'Polly,' 4 Rob., 7, note; the 'Mary Ford,' 3 Dallas R., 188; the 'Adventurer,' 8 Cranch R., 327; 1 Wheat. R., 128, note; Hudson v. Guestier, 4 Cranch, 233; 6 Cranch. R., 281; the 'Louisa,' 1 Dod. R., 317; the 'Seditious,' Dod. R., 259.

¹ Emerigon, *Traité des Assurances*, ch. xii. § 23; Story, *Miscell. writings*, p. 580 et seq.; Valin, *Com. sur l'Ordonnance*, art. viii. tit. 'Des prises'; Merlin, *Repetoire*, verb. 'Prise Maritime,' § 3, art. iv.; Miller v. 'Resolution,' 2 Dallas R., 1; Talbot v. Seaman, 1 Cranch R., 1; the 'War Ouskan,' 2 Rob., 299; Bello, *Derecho Internacional*, pt. ii. cap. v.

² If a ship be taken by letters of marque, and be not brought *infra pendia* of that State by whose subjects it was taken, it is no lawful prize, and the property is not altered, and therefore a sale in such a case is void. — Anon. 6 Vin. Abr., 519.

§ 24. Emerigon discusses at considerable length the effect of a recapture of the ransom bill and hostage. Is the recaptor entitled to retain the hostage, and to demand the price of the ransom? A privateer out of Guernsey which had ransomed a French bark coming from Bayonne, was afterwards taken, with the hostage and ransom bill on board, by the French corvette 'Amaranthe.' The admiral declared the prize good and decreed the ransom to the king, who, by his ordinance annulled the bill and discharged the owners of the bark from the payment of the ransom. Valin maintains that the ransom bill and hostage represent, each separately and *in solidum*, the ransomed vessel; so that the recapture of the privateer with one or the other on board, suffices to deprive her of all claim and title under the ransom bill, and transfers her rights to a new owner. But, if the privateer has remitted the bill to her owner, and at the same time sent the hostage on shore, the owner will then be entitled to payment of the ransom money, although the privateer should be afterwards taken. Emerigon quotes Oleva to prove, that the ransomed bill is neither the vessel ransomed nor the ransom itself—that, although *propter* the obligation, it is not the obligation itself. With respect to the hostage, he cannot become a prisoner of war to his own countrymen. He, therefore, is of opinion that the ransom bill captured in this case is valueless, and that the hostage recovers his liberty. The rights of the enemies' privateer have vanished with his defeat; and the French privateer has no claim beyond the actual booty he has made. But if the ransom bill was accompanied by a bill of exchange drawn by the captain of the ransomed vessel, and this bill has been negotiated in good faith to the order of a third party *for cash received*, it is to be paid by the owners of the ransomed vessel, notwithstanding the liberation of the hostage found on board of the captured privateer.¹

§ 25. The same author discusses the question of recapture of a vessel by her own crew. He says that those who throw off the yoke of an enemy, simply re-enter into all their rights and recover their first condition. That, it being the duty of the captain and crew of a captured vessel to retake her, when

¹ Emerigon, *Traité des Assurances*, ch. xii. § 23; Valin, *Traité des Prises*, ch. xi. §§ 2, 3; Dalloz, *Répertoire*, verb. 'Prises Maritimes,' 43; Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, liv. iii. tit. iii. §§ 29, 30.

possible, they cannot claim her by the right of recovery when so retaken. By throwing off the yoke of the captor, they have merely rendered themselves master of their own vessel, and re-entered upon their former rights, but have acquired no new rights of property in the recovered vessel or cargo. But, in a case decided in the British Court of Admiralty, large salvage was decreed for such recapture. The circumstances, however, were somewhat peculiar, and perhaps formed an exception to the general rule. The vessel was American, a portion of the crew were British seamen, working their passage home. They assisted in recapturing the vessel from the enemy, and were allowed salvage on the property brought into a British port, it being held that, under the circumstances, it was no part of their duty as seamen to attempt the recapture, and that they would not have been guilty of desertion if they had declined it. The act of recapture was, therefore, on their part, a voluntary act.¹

§ 26. Captures by pirates being unlawful, no title can properly rest either in the captors or their vendees, and, in case of recapture, the original owner is, on principle, entitled to complete restitution.² But on account of the risk incurred and benefit conferred, courts have usually allowed a pretty large salvage to the recaptors, where not regulated by municipal law. Some States have left this matter of salvage for rescue from pirates discretionary with the courts, while others have regulated it by law or ordinance. The French law of 2 Prairial, an XI, allows to the recaptor a salvage of one-third the value of the ship and cargo. The Spanish ordinance put the possession by a pirate upon the same footing as by a privateer, the title to property being changed by twenty-four hours' possession, and, consequently if recaptured after that period, no restitution could be claimed, but if before, restitution on payment of a salvage of one third the value. Such was also the former usage of Holland and Venice, which was justified on the ground of public utility, as an inducement to attack pirates. The salvage for recapture from pirates in

¹ Emerigon, *Traité des Assurances*, ch. xii. § 25 ; Sirey, *Recueil*, etc., an. xii. pt. ii. p. 5 ; the 'Two Friends,' 1 Rob., 271.

² The Barbary States were formerly considered piratical, and the *san* rule applied to them ; but they now form an established government. See the 'Helena,' 4 Rob., 3.

Great Britain, is also one third the value of the captured property. With respect to restitution and salvage in case of the recapture from pirates of the property of alien friends the rule of reciprocity is usually followed. *Hautefeuille* objects to the allowance of salvage in such cases, or at least to as large a salvage as one third of the value, and refers with approbation to the treaty of 1783, between the United States and Sweden, by which it was agreed that property retaken from pirates, by a ship of war or privateer, should be restored entire to the true proprietor.¹

§ 27. The rules of joint capture, given in a preceding chapter, are equally applicable to joint recapture. It is held in England, that although the Prize Act only mentions recaptures by ships and boats, it does not intend to exclude those made by the assistance of land forces. Where an island was taken by a joint naval and military force, the ships recaptured were held liable to be adjudged under this Act, and to be condemned to the captors, or to be restored on payment of salvage, as the case might be. Moreover, a land force may be entitled to sustain a claim of salvage for recapture of vessels in a maritime port, without the co-operation of a naval force, where the recapture is a necessary and immediate result of a military operation directed to the capture of the place within whose port the property is lying. Thus, where the delivery of captured English vessels resulted from the reconsecration of Oporto by the allied army under the Duke of Wellington, which was effected by military operations and a battle fought in the neighbourhood for that object, the army was held to be entitled to salvage. It was also held that this claim of salvage would attach upon property landed and warehoused by the enemy, where it remained to be reclaimed by the owners on the recapture of the place, and was resumed and returned on board as parts of the cargoes of the vessels so recaptured.²


§ 28. But a distinction is made where vessels of the same

¹ Brown, *Civil and Admiralty Law*, vol. ii, ch. iii, p. 260; the 'Calypso,' 2 *Hagg. R.*, 213; Pothier, *Traité de Propriété*, No. 101; *Hautefeuille*, *Des Nations Neutres*, tit. xiii, ch. 3; *Daloz*, *Expériences*, vol. * *Prises Maritimes*, § 3; De Cussy, *Droit Maritime*, lib. i, tit. iii, § 60.

² The 'Ceylon,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 116; the 'Progress,' *Falg. R.*, 210; the 'Wanstead,' *Falg. R.*, 268; the 'Spankier,' 1 *Dod. R.*, 360; the 'Lee & Foster,' 6 *Rob.*, 88.

country are recaptured in native ports by a native army alone, or with the co-operation of allied forces. Thus, in the case of Oporto, it was held that although salvage was due for the recapture of English vessels in that port, none could be allowed for the Portuguese vessels recaptured at the same time. By the reoccupation of the port by the forces of the State, the rights of the former sovereign were restored, and his subjects were entitled to receive their property back as it stood before the irruption of the enemy. The whole would revert instantly to the former owners, on the well-established principle of postliminy. 'The history of the world has produced no instance in which a claim of salvage for the rescue of a capital city, by the native army, has been made and allowed, and, therefore, on principle and practice, the claim is not sustainable. That is the state of the transaction in its simplest form. But, suppose allies to be co-operating with the native army in the recapture, in that case the army coming as allies, and associated with the native army, compose part of the same body ; they are pursuing the same objects, and stand in every respect on the same footing ; they would have the same rights and no more, and the proportion of force can make no difference. The whole together must be considered as one army in every respect, where native property is concerned ; and if the native army would not be entitled to salvage, the armies of the allies can claim none.'¹

¹ Heffter, *Droit International*, § 187 et seq. ; Wildman, *Int. Law*, vol. ii. p. 288 ; the 'Progress,' *Edw. R.* 219.



APPENDIX.

No. I.

FOREIGN ENLISTMENT.

33 and 34 Vict. c. 90. An Act to regulate the conduct of Her Majesty's subjects during the existence of hostilities between foreign States with which Her Majesty is at peace.
[9th August, 1870]

Whereas it is expedient to make provisions for the regulation of conduct of Her Majesty's subjects during the existence of hostilities between foreign States with which Her Majesty is at peace ; it enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with advice and consent of the Lords, spiritual and temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :—

PRELIMINARY.

- This Act may be cited for all purposes as 'The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870.'
- This Act shall extend to all the dominions of Her Majesty including the adjacent territorial waters.
- This Act shall come into operation in the United Kingdom immediately on the passing thereof, and shall be proclaimed in British possession by the Governor thereof as soon as may be he receives notice of this Act, and shall come into operation in British possession on the day of such proclamation, and the date at which this Act comes into operation in any place is, as respects such place, in this Act referred to as the commencement of the Act.

ILLEGAL ENLISTMENT.

4. If any person, without the licence of Her Majesty, being a British subject, within or without Her Majesty's dominions, accepts or agrees to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with any foreign State at peace with Her Majesty, and in this Act referred to as a friendly State, or whether a British subject or not within Her Majesty's dominions induces any other person to accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any

such foreign State as aforesaid.—He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

5. If any person, without the licence of Her Majesty, being a British subject, quits or goes on board any ship with a view of quitting Her Majesty's dominions, with intent to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with a friendly State, or, whether a British subject or not, while in Her Majesty's dominions, induces any other person to quit or go on board any ship with a view of quitting Her Majesty's dominions with the like intent,—He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offence is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

6. If any person induces any other person to quit Her Majesty's dominions or to embark on any ship within Her Majesty's dominions under a misrepresentation or false representation of the service in which such person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that such person may accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with a friendly State,—He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

7. If the master or owner of any ship, without the licence of Her Majesty, knowingly either takes on board, or engages to take on board, or has on board such ship within Her Majesty's dominions any of the following persons, in this Act referred to as illegally enlisted persons, that is to say,—

(1) Any person who, being a British subject within or without the dominions of Her Majesty, has, without the licence of Her Majesty, accepted or agreed to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with any friendly State;

(2) Any person, being a British subject, who, without the licence of Her Majesty, is about to quit Her Majesty's dominions with intent to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with a friendly State;

(3) Any person who has been induced to embark under a misrepresentation or false representation of the service in which such person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that such person may accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with a friendly State;

Such master or owner shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and the following consequences shall ensue, that is to say,—

(1) The offender shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment,

furnishes such particulars of the contract and of any matter relating to, or done or to be done under the contract as may be required by the Secretary of State ;

(2) If he gives such security, and takes and permits to be taken such other measures, if any, as the Secretary of State may prescribe for ensuring that such ship shall not be delivered, delivered, or removed without the licence of Her Majesty and the termination of such war as aforesaid.

9. Where any ship is built by order of or on behalf of any foreign State when at war with a friendly State, or is delivered to the order of such foreign State, or any person who to the knowledge of the person building is an agent of such foreign State, or is employed by such foreign State or such agent, and is employed in the military or naval service of such foreign State, such ship shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been built with a view to being so employed, and the burden shall lie on the builder of such ship in proving that he did not know that the ship was intended to be employed in the military or naval service of such foreign State.

10. If any person within the dominions of Her Majesty, and without the licence of Her Majesty—By adding to the number of the guns, or by changing those on board for other guns, or by the addition of any equipment for war, increases or augments, or procures to be increased or augmented, or is knowingly concerned in increasing or augmenting the warlike force of any ship while the time of her being within the dominions of Her Majesty was a ship in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with any friendly State,

Such person shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted ; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

11. If any person within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions, and without the licence of Her Majesty, -

Prepares or fits out any naval or military expedition to proceed against the dominions of any friendly State, the following consequences shall ensue :

(1) Every person engaged in such preparation or fitting out, or assisting therein, or employed in any capacity in such expedition, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted ; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

(2) All ships, and their equipments, and all arms and munitions of war, used in or forming part of such expedition, shall be forfeited to Her Majesty.

12. Any person who aids, abets, counsels, or procures the commission of any offence against this Act shall be liable to be tried and punished as a principal offender.

13. The term of imprisonment to be awarded in respect of any offence against this Act shall not exceed two years.

ILLEGAL PRIZE.

14. If, during the continuance of any war in which Her Majesty may be neutral, any ship, goods, or merchandise captured as prize of war within the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, in violation of the neutrality of this realm, or captured by any ship which may have been built, equipped, commissioned, or despatched, or the force of which may have been augmented, contrary to the provisions of this Act, are brought within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions by the captor, or any agent of the captor, or by any person having come into possession thereof with knowledge that the same was prize of war, so captured as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the original owner of such prize, or his agent, or for any person authorized in that behalf by the Government of the foreign State to which such owner belongs, to make application to the Court of Admiralty for seizure and detention of such prize, and the court shall, on due proof of the facts, order such prize to be restored.

Every such order shall be executed and carried into effect in the same manner, and subject to the same right of appeal, as in case of any order made in the exercise of the ordinary jurisdiction of such court; and in the meantime and until a final order has been made on such application the court shall have power to make all such provisional and other orders as to the care or custody of such captured ship, goods, or merchandise, and (if the same be of perishable nature, or incurring risk of deterioration) for the sale thereof, and with respect to the deposit or investment of the proceeds of any such sale, as may be made by such court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction.

GENERAL PROVISION.

15. For the purposes of this Act, a licence by Her Majesty shall be under the sign manual of Her Majesty, or be signified by Order in Council or by proclamation of Her Majesty.

LEGAL PROCEDURE.

16. Any offence against this Act shall, for all purposes of, and incidental to, the trial and punishment of any person guilty of any such offence, be deemed to have been committed either in the place in which the offence was wholly or partly committed, or in any place within Her Majesty's dominions in which the person who committed such offence may be.

17. Any offence against this Act may be described in any indictment or other document relating to such offence, in cases where the mode of trial requires such a description, as having been committed at the place where it was wholly or partly committed, or it may be averred generally to have been committed within Her Majesty's dominions, and the venue or local description in the margin may be that of the county, city, or place in which the trial is held.

18. The following authorities, that is to say, in the United Kingdom any judge of a superior court, in any other place within the jurisdiction of any British court of justice, such court, or, if there are more courts than one, the court having the highest criminal juris-

diction in that place, may, by warrant or instrument in the nature of a warrant in this section included in the term 'warrant,' direct that any offender charged with an offence against this Act shall be removed to some other place in Her Majesty's dominions for trial, in cases where it appears to the authority granting the warrant that the removal of such offender would be conducive to the interest of justice, and any prisoner so removed shall be triable at the place to which he is removed, in the same manner as if the offence had been committed at such place.

Any warrant for the purposes of this section may be addressed to the master of any ship or to any other person or persons, and the person or persons to whom such warrant is addressed shall have power to convey the prisoner therein named to any place or places named in such warrant, and to deliver him, when arrived at such place or places, into the custody of any authority designated by such warrant.

Every prisoner shall during the time of his removal under such warrant as aforesaid, be deemed to be in the legal custody of the person or persons empowered to remove him.

19. All proceedings for the condemnation and forfeiture of a vessel or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war, in pursuance of this Act, shall require the sanction of the Secretary of State, or such chief executive authority as is in this Act mentioned, and shall be held in the Court of Admiralty, and not in any other court, and the Court of Admiralty, shall, in addition to any power given to the court by this Act, have in respect of any ship or other matter brought before it in pursuance of this Act all powers which it has in the case of a ship or matter brought before it in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction.

20. Where any offence against this Act has been committed by any person, by reason whereof a ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war has or have become liable to forfeiture, proceedings may be instituted contemporaneously or not, as may be thought fit, against the offender, in any court having jurisdiction of the offence, and against the ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war, for the forfeiture in the Court of Admiralty, and it shall not be necessary to take proceedings against the offender, because proceedings are instituted for the forfeiture, or to take proceedings for the forfeiture, because proceedings are taken against the offender.

21. The following officers, that is to say,—

(1) Any officer of Customs in the United Kingdom, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the Commissioner of Customs or any officer of the Board of Trade subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the Board of Trade;

(2) Any officer of Customs or public officer in any foreign possession, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the Governor of such possession;

(3) Any commissioned officer on full pay in the military service of the Crown, subject nevertheless to any special or general instruction from his commanding officer;

(4) Any commissioned officer on full pay in the naval service of the Crown, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the Admiralty or his superior officer, may seize or detain any ship liable to be seized or detained in pursuance of this Act, and such officers are in this Act referred to as 'the local authority,' but nothing in this Act contained shall derogate from the power of the Court of Admiralty to direct any ship to be seized or detained by any officer by whom such court may have power under its ordinary jurisdiction to direct a ship to be seized or detained.

22. Any officer authorized to seize or detain any ship in respect of any offence against this Act may, for the purpose of enforcing such seizure or detention, call to his aid any constable or officers of police, or any officers of Her Majesty's army or navy or marines, or any police officers or officers of Customs, or any harbour master or dock master, or any officers having authority by law to make seizures of ships, and may put on board any ship so seized or detained any one or more of such officers to take charge of the same, and to enforce the provisions of this Act, and any officer seizing or detaining any ship under this Act may use force, if necessary, for the purpose of enforcing seizure or detention, and if any person is killed or maimed by reason of his resisting such officer in the execution of his duties, or any person acting under his orders, such officer so seizing or detaining the ship, or other person, shall be freely and fully indemnified as well against the Queen's Majesty, her heirs and successors, as against all persons so killed, maimed, or hurt.

23. If the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority is satisfied that there is a reasonable and probable cause for believing that a ship within Her Majesty's dominions has been or is being built, commissioned or equipped contrary to this Act, and is about to be taken beyond the limits of such dominions, or that a ship is about to be despatched contrary to this Act, such Secretary of State or chief executive authority shall have power to issue a warrant stating that there is reasonable and probable cause for believing as aforesaid, and upon such warrant the local authority shall have power to seize and search such ship, and to detain the same until it has been either condemned or released by process of law, or in manner hereinafter mentioned. The owner of the ship so detained, or his agent, may apply to the Court of Admiralty for its release, and the court shall, as soon as possible, put the matter of such seizure and detention in course of trial between the applicant and the Crown.

If the applicant establish to the satisfaction of the court that the ship was not, and is not being built, commissioned, or equipped, or intended to be despatched contrary to this Act, the ship shall be released and restored.

If the applicant fail to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or equipped, or intended to be despatched contrary to this Act, then the ship shall be detained till released by order of the Secretary of State or chief executive authority.

The court may in cases where no proceedings are pending for its condemnation release any ship detained under this section on the

owner giving security to the satisfaction of the court that the ship shall not be employed contrary to this Act, notwithstanding that the applicant may have failed to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or despatched contrary to this Act. The Secretary of State or the chief executive authority may likewise release any ship detained under this section on the owner giving security to the satisfaction of such Secretary of State or chief executive authority that the ship shall not be employed contrary to this Act, or may release the ship without such security if the Secretary of State or chief executive authority think fit so to release the same.

If the court be of opinion that there was not reasonable and probable cause for the detention, and if no such cause appears on the course of the proceedings, the court shall have power to issue an order that the owner is to be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages in respect of the detention, the amount thereof to be assessed by the court, and any amount so assessed shall be payable by the Commissioners of the Treasury out of any moneys legally applicable for that purpose. The Court of Admiralty shall also have power to make a like order for the indemnity of the owner, on the application of such owner to the court, in a summary way, in cases where the ship is released by the order of the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority, before any application is made by the owner or his agent to the court for such release.

Nothing in this section contained shall affect any proceedings instituted or to be instituted for the condemnation of any ship detained under this section where such ship is liable to forfeiture under this provision, that if such ship is restored in pursuance of this section all proceedings for such condemnation shall be stayed, and where the court declares that the owner is to be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages for the detention, all costs, charges, and expenses incurred by such owner in or about any proceedings for the condemnation of such ship shall be added to the costs and damages payable to him in respect of the detention of the ship.

Nothing in this section contained shall apply to any foreign or commissioned ship despatched from any part of Her Majesty's dominions after having come within them under stress of weather or the course of a peaceful voyage, and upon which ship no building or equipping of a warlike character has taken place in this country.

24. Where it is represented to any local authority, as defined in this Act, and such local authority believes the representation, that there is a reasonable and probable cause for believing that a ship within Her Majesty's dominions has been or is being built, commissioned, or equipped contrary to this Act, and is about to be despatched beyond the limits of such dominions, or that a ship is about to be despatched contrary to this Act, it shall be the duty of such authority to detain such ship, and forthwith to communicate the facts of such detention to the Secretary of State or chief executive authority.

Upon the receipt of such communication the Secretary of State or chief executive authority may order the ship to be released if he thinks there is no cause for detaining her, but if satisfied that there

reasonable and probable cause for believing that such ship was built, commissioned, or equipped or intended to be despatched in contravention of this Act, he shall issue his warrant stating that there is reasonable and probable cause for believing as aforesaid, and upon such warrant being issued further proceedings shall be had as in cases where the seizure or detention has taken place on a warrant issued by the Secretary of State without any communication from the local authority.

Where the Secretary of State or chief executive authority orders the ship to be released on the receipt of a communication from the local authority without issuing his warrant, the owner of the ship shall be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages in respect of the detention, upon application to the Court of Admiralty, in a summary way in like manner as he is entitled to be indemnified where the Secretary of State having issued his warrant under this Act releases the ship before any application is made by the owner or his agent to the court for such release.

25. The Secretary of State or the chief executive authority may, by warrant, empower any person to enter any dockyard or other place within Her Majesty's dominions and enquire as to the destination of any ship which may appear to him to be intended to be employed in the naval or military service of any foreign State at war with a friendly State, and to search such ship.

26. Any powers or jurisdiction by this Act given to the Secretary of State may be exercised by him throughout the dominions of Her Majesty, and such powers or jurisdiction may also be exercised by any of the following officers, in this Act referred to as the chief executive authority within their respective jurisdictions; that is to say,

(1) In Ireland by the Lord Lieutenant or other the chief governor or governors of Ireland for the time being, or the chief secretary to the Lord Lieutenant;

(2) In Jersey by the Lieutenant Governor;

(3) In Guernsey, Alderney, and Sark, and the dependant islands by the Lieutenant Governor;

(4) In the Isle of Man by the Lieutenant Governor;

(5) In any British possession by the Governor.

A copy of any warrant issued by a Secretary of State or by any officer authorised in pursuance of this Act to issue such warrant in Ireland, the Channel Islands, or the Isle of Man, shall be laid before Parliament.

27. An appeal may be had from any decision of a Court of Admiralty under this Act to the same tribunal and in the same manner to and in which an appeal may be had in cases within the ordinary jurisdiction of the court as a Court of Admiralty.

28. Subject to the provisions of this Act provided for the award of damages in certain cases in respect of the seizure or detention of a ship by the Court of Admiralty no damages shall be payable, and no officer or local authority shall be responsible, either civilly or criminally, in respect of the seizure or detention of any ship in pursuance of this Act.

29. The Secretary of State shall not, nor shall the chief executive authority, be responsible in any action or other legal proceedings

whatsoever for any warrant issued by him in pursuance of this Act, or be examinable as a witness, except at his own request, in any court of justice in respect of the circumstances which led to the issue of the warrant.

INTERPRETATION CLAUSE.

30. In this Act, if not inconsistent with the context, the following terms have the meanings hereinafter respectively assigned to them that is to say,—

'Foreign State' includes any foreign prince, colony, province, or part of any province or people, or any person or persons exercising or assuming to exercise the powers of government in or over any foreign country, colony, province, or part of any province or people; 'Military Service' shall include military telegraphy and any other employment whatever, in or in connection with, any military operation; 'Naval Service' shall, as respects a person, include service as a marine, employment as a pilot in piloting or directing the course of a ship of war or other ship when such ship of war or other ship is being used in any military or naval operation, and any employment whatever on board a ship of war, transport, store-ship, privateer or ship under letters of marque; and as respects a ship, includes any user of a ship as a transport, store-ship, privateer or ship under letters of marque.

'United Kingdom' includes the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, and other adjacent islands; 'British possession' means any territory, colony, or place being part of Her Majesty's dominions and not part of the United Kingdom as defined by this Act; 'The Secretary of State' shall mean any one of Her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State; 'The Governor' shall, as respects India, mean the Governor-General or the Governor of any Presidency, and where a British possession consists of several constituent colonies, mean the Governor-General of the whole possession or the Governor of any of the constituent colonies, and as respects any other British possession, it shall mean the officer for the time being administering the government of such possession; also any person acting for or in the capacity of a Governor shall be included under the term 'Governor'.

'Court of Admiralty' shall mean the high Court of Admiralty in England or Ireland, the Court of Session of Scotland, or any Admiralty Court within Her Majesty's dominions; 'Ship' shall include any description of boat, vessel, floating battery, or floating craft; also any description of boat, vessel, or other craft or machine, made to move either on the surface of, or under water, or sometimes on the surface of, and sometimes under water.

'Building' in relation to the ship, shall include the doing thereof towards or incidental to the construction of a ship, and all words having relation to building shall be constructed accordingly.

'Equipping' in relation to a ship shall include the furnishing of a ship with any tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions, arms, munitions, or stores, or any other thing which is used in or about a ship for the purpose of fitting or adapting her for the sea or for naval service, and all words relating to equipping shall be constructed accordingly.

'Ship and equipment' shall include a ship and everything belonging to a ship:

'Master' shall include any person having the charge or command of a ship.

REPEAL OF ACTS, AND SAVING CLAUSES.

31. From and after the commencement of this Act, an Act passed in the 59th year of the reign of His late Majesty King George the Third, chapter 69, entitled 'An Act to prevent the enlistment and engagement of His Majesty's subjects to serve in foreign service, and the fitting out or equipping, in His Majesty's dominions, vessels for warlike purposes, without His Majesty's licence' shall be repealed : provided that such repeal shall not affect any penalty, forfeiture, or other punishment incurred or to be incurred in respect of any offence committed before this Act comes into operation, nor the institution of any investigation or legal proceedings, or any other remedy for enforcing any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid.

32. Nothing in this Act contained shall subject to forfeiture any commissioned ship of any foreign State, or give to any British court over or in respect of any ship entitled to recognition as a commissioned ship of any foreign State any jurisdiction which it would not have had if this Act had not passed.

33. Nothing in this Act contained shall extend or be construed to extend to subject to any penalty any person who enters into the military service of any prince, State or potentate in Asia, with such leave or licence as is for the time being required by law in the case of subjects of Her Majesty entering into the military service of princes, States, or potentates in Asia.

The following Proclamation of Neutrality was made by Great Britain in 1877 :—

VICTORIA R.

WHEREAS We are happily at Peace with all Sovereigns, Powers, and States :

And whereas, notwithstanding Our utmost Exertions to preserve Peace between all Sovereign Powers and States, a State of War unhappily exists between His Majesty the Emperor of All the *Russias* and His Majesty the Emperor of the *Ottomans*, and between their respective Subjects and others inhabiting within their Countries, Territories, or Dominions :

And whereas We are on Terms of Friendship and amicable Intercourse with each of these Sovereigns, and with their several Subjects and others inhabiting within their Countries, Territories, or Dominions :

And whereas great Numbers of Our loyal Subjects reside and carry on Commerce, and possess Property and Establishments, and enjoy various Rights and Privileges, within the Dominions of each of the aforesaid Sovereigns, protected by the Faith of Treaties between Us and each of the aforesaid Sovereigns :

And whereas We, being desirous of preserving to Our Subjects the Blessings of Peace which they now happily enjoy, are firmly purposed

ade lawfully and actually established by or on behalf of either of the said Sovereigns, or by carrying Officers, Soldiers, Despatches, Arms, Ammunition, Military Stores or Materials, or any Article or Articles considered and deemed to be Contraband of War according to the Law or Modern Usages of Nations, for the Use or Service of either of the said Sovereigns, that all persons so offending, together with their Ships and Goods, will rightfully incur and be justly liable to hostile Capture, and to the Penalties denounced by the Law of Nations in that Behalf.

And We do hereby give Notice that all Our Subjects and Persons entitled to Our Protection who may misconduct themselves in the Premises will do so at their Peril, and of their own Wrong; and that they will in nowise obtain any Protection from Us against such Capture, or such Penalties as aforesaid, but will, on the contrary, incur Our high Displeasure by such Misconduct.

Given at Our Court at *Windsor*, this Thirtieth Day of *April*, in the year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and seventy seven in the Fortieth Year of Our Reign.

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN.

On the same date, the following letter was addressed by the Earl of Derby to the Treasury, the Home Office, the Colonial Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, and the India Office:—

Foreign Office,

April 30, 1877.

H^R Majesty being fully determined to observe the duties of neutrality during the existing state of war between the Emperor of all the Russias and the Emperor of the Ottomans, and being moreover resolved to prevent, as far as possible, the use of Her Majesty's harbours, ports, and coasts, and the waters within Her Majesty's territorial jurisdiction, in aid of the warlike purposes of either belligerent, has commanded me to communicate to you, for your guidance, the following rules, which are to be treated and enforced as Her Majesty's orders and directions:—

Her Majesty is pleased further to command that these rules shall be put in force in the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands, on and after the 5th of May instant, and in Her Majesty's territories and possessions beyond the seas, six days after the day when the Governor, or other chief authority of each of such territories or possessions respectively, shall have notified and published the same; stating in such Notification that the said rules are to be obeyed by all persons within the same territories and possessions.

1. During the continuance of the present state of war, all ships of war of either belligerent are prohibited from making use of any port or roadstead in the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, or the Channel Islands, or in any of Her Majesty's Colonies or foreign possessions or dependencies, or of any waters subject to the territorial juris-

diction of the British Crown, as a station, or place of resort, for any warlike purpose, or for the purpose of obtaining any facilities of warlike equipment; and no ship of war of either belligerent shall hereafter be permitted to sail out of or leave any port, roadstead, or waters subject to British jurisdiction, from which any vessel of the other belligerent (whether the same shall be a ship of war or a merchant ship) shall have previously departed, until after the expiration of, at least, twenty-four hours from the departure of such last mentioned vessel beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty.

2. If any ship of war of either belligerent shall, after the time when this Order shall be first notified and put in force in the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands, and in the several Colonies and foreign possessions and dependencies of Her Majesty respectively, enter any port, roadstead, or waters belonging to Her Majesty, either in the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, or the Channel Islands, or in any of Her Majesty's Colonies or foreign possessions or dependencies, such vessel shall be required to depart and to put to sea within twenty-four hours after her entrance into such port, roadstead, or waters, except in case of stress of weather, or of her requiring provisions or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew, or repairs, in either of which cases the authorities of the port, or of the nearest port (as the case may be), shall require her to put to sea as soon as possible after the expiration of such period of twenty-four hours, without permitting her to take in supplies beyond what may be necessary for her immediate use, and no such vessel which may have been allowed to remain within British waters for the purpose of repair shall continue in any such port, roadstead, or waters, for a longer period than twenty-four hours after her necessary repairs shall have been completed. Provided, nevertheless, that in all cases in which there shall be any vessel (whether ships of war or merchant ships) of the said belligerent parties in the same port, roadstead, or waters within the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, there shall be an interval of not less than twenty-four hours between the departure therefrom of any such vessel (whether a ship of war or merchant ship) of the one belligerent, and the subsequent departure therefrom of any ship of war of the other belligerent; and the time hereby limited for the departure of such ships of war respectively shall always, in case of necessity, be extended so far as may be required for giving effect to this proviso, but no further or otherwise.

3. No ship of war of either belligerent shall hereafter be permitted while in any port, roadstead, or waters subject to the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, to take in any supplies, except provisions and such other things as may be requisite for the subsistence of her crew, and except so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her own country, or to some near destination, and no coal shall again be supplied to any such ship of war in the same or any other port, roadstead, or waters subject to the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, without special permission until after the expiration of three months from the time when the coal may have been last supplied to her within British waters aforesaid.

4. Armed ships of either party are interdicted from carrying passengers.

made by them into the ports, harbours, roadsteads, or waters of the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, or any of Her Majesty's Colonies or possessions abroad.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) DERBY.

NO. II.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURTS OF EGYPT.

Besides the native tribunals, there are in Egypt sixteen or seventeen consulates, having rights of jurisdiction over the subjects of the nations they represent.

Consequently, in this state of things, the universal rule followed with regard to competence in civil and commercial matters, was that the defendant was necessarily brought before his own tribunal; that is to say, the native before the local tribunal, and the foreigner before the tribunal of his consulate. It was the absolute application of the rule *actor sequitur forum rei*. It was also the custom that each tribunal should apply a different legislation, and should judge according to its special procedure.

A first consequence of this mode of proceeding was, that at the moment parties entered into a contract, they could not know under what jurisdiction they would have to plead, nor according to what rules of law and procedure they would be judged, if they were obliged, afterwards, to cause the value and bearing of their contract to be ascertained by law.

The interest of each contracting party, therefore, during the execution of the bargain, was necessarily to endeavour, in the prospect of a lawsuit, to get possession of the object in litigation, and to retain the sums he might have to pay, in order to be sure, as defendant, of being judged at his own consulate, before judges and a public whom he knew, and who knew him, and according to his own laws. In a second place, when a plaintiff had before him several adversaries of different nationalities, he was obliged to enter into as many suits as there were defendants in the cause. It often resulted from this that there were as many contradictory judgments. The rules of equity are, doubtless, everywhere the same, and the principles of law which govern European legislations greatly resemble each other. It is, however, no less true that each of the tribunals called upon to decide a certain case, might not consider the fact and the law in the same manner.

A difficulty of the same nature was met with in matters where there was occasion for action on a guarantee, for the defendant could not sue the person who guaranteed, when he was not of the same nationality as himself.

In most cases, also, the tribunal could not take cognisance of cross claims, unless sometimes by way of compensation.

A very grave inconvenience further resulted in the appeal from consular sentences not being tried in Egypt.

The plaintiff who had gained his cause, in the first instance, was compelled at the call of his adversary, to plead his cause abroad, in a country where he knew no one, where it was difficult to defend himself, which often amounted, in fact, to a real denial of justice.

As regarded criminal matters, the action of the Egyptian Government was null in matters of police; infractions grave or light were committed by foreigners, but the Government, while responsible for the public peace, had no means of relieving itself of its responsibility, its police were disarmed, that is rather, the police of the different consulates, and, nevertheless, its responsibility still remained. When a crime was committed, the police had to ask for authority to arrest the foreign culprit, unless he were caught in the fact. When the culprit was arrested, the investigation was made by the consuls, and the accused sent far away from the country which has been troubled by his crime; proved criminals were often known to go about at liberty in the sight and to the knowledge of everyone; this state of things was discouraging to the administration, dangerous to all, and the natives were convinced that, when a foreigner was sent back to his country to be tried, it was for the purpose of withdrawing him from punishment. Moreover, the European colony itself was alarmed at the state of things.

An International Commission, represented by Egypt, Austria-Hungary, the North German Confederation, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia having assembled at Cairo on the 28th October, 1869, certain reforms proposed by the Egyptian Government in the administration of justice were examined; on the 10th November, 1874, certain judicial reforms were agreed between the Khedive and the French Government, and on the 19th May, 1875, a similar agreement was entered into between the Khedive and Germany. On the 31st July, 1875, it was agreed between the British and Egyptian Governments, that all or any of the stipulations and reservations contained in the conventions relating to judicial reforms concluded between the Egyptian, and the French, Prussian, and German Governments, and any other arrangements which the Egyptian Government might have already made, or might thereafter make, with any foreign power on that subject, should be immediately and unconditionally extended by the Egyptian Government to the British, and to British subjects, should the British Government at any time express a wish to that effect.

The Reformed Tribunals were inaugurated by order of the Khedive on the 28th June, 1875, with power to entertain a mixed process between natives and foreigners. For the use of these tribunals, the Egyptian codes were drawn up, consisting of a Civil Code, a Code of Commerce, a Code of Marine Commerce, a Code of Civil Commercial Procedure, a Penal Code, and a Code of the Criminal Process (*Instruction*); they were ordered to come into force on the 1st January, 1876.

The constitution of these tribunals is as follows:—There are three *tribunals* of first instance at Alexandria, Cairo, and Zagazig. Each tribunal is composed of

inferior judges (*juges*), four being foreigners, and three natives. The judgments are delivered by five of these judges, of whom three must be foreigners and two be natives. One of the foreigners presides with the title of Vice-President, and is chosen by the decided majority of the foreign and native members of the tribunal.

In commercial matters the tribunal associates to itself two merchants, one foreigner and one native; they have the right of deliberation, and are chosen by election.

There is at Alexandria, a superior tribunal, or *Court of Appeal*, composed of eleven superior judges (*magistrats*), four being natives and seven being foreigners. One of these foreign judges presides, under the title of Vice-President, and is chosen in the same manner as the vice-presidents of the lower tribunals. The decrees of the Court of Appeal are made by eight of the superior judges, of whom five must be foreigners and three be natives.

Both at the Court of Appeal, and at each tribunal, there are sworn interpreters chosen by the Government.

These tribunals alone take cognisance of all disputes in civil and commercial matters, between natives and foreigners, and between foreigners of different nationality, not affecting the personal status—(*en dehors du statut personnel*). They are to take cognisance also of all real actions (*actions réelles immobilières*) between all persons, even belonging to the same nationality. The Government, the Administrations, the Dairas (the administration of the personal estate) of His Highness, the Khedive, and of the members of his family, are justiciable in these tribunals, in process with foreigners. These tribunals, without being able to adjudicate upon property of the public domain (*domaine public*), or to interfere with or to arrest the execution of an administrative measure, may adjudicate, in cases provided by the Civil Code, in any attempt directed against a right acquired by a foreigner by an act of administration.

Demands of foreigners against a religious (*pieux*) establishment, claiming the real property possessed by such an establishment, are not to be submitted to these tribunals; but these tribunals may determine on the intended demand, on the question of legal possession, without reference to whom may be the plaintiff or defendant. The fact alone of the existence of a *hypothèque* (mortgage) in favour of a foreigner on real property, without reference to the *possesseur* and to the *propriétaire*, renders these tribunals competent to determine on the validity of the *hypothèque* and on all its consequences, up to and including the forced sale of the realty, as well as the distribution of the proceeds.

All proceedings are conducted in the language of the country, Italian and French.

The execution of the judgments takes place apart from all administrative consular action or otherwise, and is on the order of the tribunal. It is carried out by the officers of the tribunal, with the assistance of the local authorities, should the same be necessary, but always apart from all administrative interference. The officer charged with the execution is obliged to warn the consulate involved of the day and hour of the execution, under pain of nullity and of damages against himself. The consul so warned has the means of being present at

the execution, but in case of his absence, the matter is proceeded with notwithstanding. In case of silence, insufficiency, or obscurity of law, in the Codes above mentioned, the judges may adopt the principles of natural law and of the rules of equity.

In Criminal matters, in the case of foreigners, the judge of infractions (*contraventions*) is one of the foreign members of the tribunal.

The Council Room (*chambre de conseil*), both in matters of offences (*délits*) and in matters of crimes, is composed of three judges, of whom one must be a foreigner and two be natives, and of four foreign assessors. The Police Court (*tribunal correctionnel*) is composed in the same manner. The Assize Court is composed of three Councilors, one native and two foreigners; the twelve jurymen are foreigners. But the assessors and jury may at the demand of the accused be of his nationality.

The consul of the accused must without delay be advised of all prosecutions for crimes or offences directed against the latter. The examination and the trial are to be in the judicial language which the accused knows.

Except in the case of a flagrant offence, or of a call from within a house, no house of a foreigner may be entered during the night, and in the presence of the consul or his delegate, unless the consul has authorised it to be entered in his absence.

If the consul claims that a matter in prosecution appertains to his jurisdiction and that it ought to be submitted to his tribunal, the question, if contested by the Egyptian Government, is to be referred to the arbitration of a council composed of two councillors or judges chosen by the president of the court, and of two consuls, chosen by the consul of the accused.

Excellent as the Code appears in theory, its practical working is deficient. Thus it is to be observed that, although provision is made for rendering the Egyptian Government amenable to the tribunals, the Code omits to state what property of the Government can be sequestered, for the purpose of satisfying unexecuted judgments against itself. According to the general principles of law, State property devoted to a public service, or to public utility generally, is not subject to sequestration. The rule is based on public utility, and arises from the necessity of the separation of the judicial and administrative functions, as well as from the principle that the public good must prevail over the private interest. The new tribunals, therefore, for more than a year, have seen their authority defied, through the refusal of the Government to permit judicial sentences against itself to be executed. Indeed Judge Haakman closed his court in despair, as early as the end of the year 1876. The latest case, that of *Keller v. the Egyptian Government*, is one of great importance; the plaintiff having established his claim before one of the tribunals, to be paid all arrears of salary due to him as an officer of the Government, proceeded to place a sequester on the funds of the State lying in the Egyptian treasury. The Government appealed against the validity of the seizure, and on the 7th February, 1878, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, on the ground that State property could not be sequestered, and that, however deplorable might be the consequences of

App. which must result to public security and to the observance of the rules laid down in the "Basic Treaty". It should not interfere with administrative measures, nor it should hinder their strictly judicial functions. There shall be no interference to execute its engagements towards its partners.

But this position of the Courts involves a great necessity, and much affects their utility, that the Court in every branch used should follow the judgment in this case and the following, to wit:

'The Court of Appeal has long remained true to the Egyptian Government the execution of the sentences given against it. It has for some months past pointed out that it was wrong when, in the present case, availing itself of the limits imposed by the provisions of the Judicial Treaty and the general principles of law, it has disregarded the property of the State, should persist in avoiding the consequences of all adverse judgments.

The Court is of opinion that the situation is not only derogatory to the dignity of the Egyptian Government but that it will also irreparably compromise the judicial reform in Egypt. It is allowed to con-

The Court maintains, as a matter of great urgency, that it is never
to assure to the creditors of the Government a protection as com-
plete as that which the Courts accord to all parties in their legal relations
with each other.

'The Court begs its President to transmit this declaration to the Egyptian Government, and further authorises its foreign members to communicate it to the Powers, in the hope that their intervention will lead to a prompt and satisfactory settlement.'

A copy of which was ordered to be forwarded to all the Governments that had signed the Judicial Treaty.

Sec. III.

TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

Express from *The Times*, February 28, 1901

The Last Chapter of the case is the the admission of the defense is requested in the presentation of the Crown & the territorial states (the defense were especially was concerned in the recent case of a Frenchman, and it presents a bid on the subject. The intellectual world is that it had intention was not over even now, and that the defense is request of that the controversy that even after the presentation of the territorial states is that over of some of the cases which have of the subcontinent the basis of the Chapter, at first sight, would appear to be a question of law. In Chapter

they would be without a protection, because if no part of the land extended to the sea surrounding the seaboard, all parts of the world might come to the part of the high seas to the land and resort to practices which might be of a serious character to people on shore. So, again in the hostilities carried on by belligerents outside the shore, a neutral Power to the greatest danger. It might be asked, if the question was not solved, so far, at all events, as to the extent to which unquestionably the territorial jurisdiction extended to the low water mark it must be remembered that in many parts of the coasts where there were considerable intervals between high and low water mark, and also there were in the knowledge of the Lordships, many places where the sea came so close to the land that there was absolutely no horizontal interval between the high and low water marks. It had been suggested, or might be suggested, that the jurisdiction of this country extended over the seas immediately adjoining the shore, inasmuch as the right of passage over that part was allowed to foreign ships, it would be a jurisdiction as against them. He was quite willing to concede the right of passage contended for, but he had imagined that to be conceded on this footing and this footing only, that those who availed themselves of the right of passage should not be subject to any complaint of a violation of the rights of the country, if the right of passage was conceded. In truth, any such concession would apply to the case of foreign ships coming into the port. What made it necessary for him to bring this matter under the consideration of their Lordships was a case of considerable interest, that had arisen between the 'Franconia' and the 'Strathelyde' off the coast of Devon, in which a number of persons lost their lives. [His Lordship here related the history of the facts.] He would endeavour to explain the grounds on which he stood to be the main ground of the judgment of the majority of the Judges in the 'Franconia' case. But before he did so, he wished to mention to their Lordships an

Parliament to legislate as it may think fit for these waters. I think that usage and the common consent of nations, which constitute international law, have appropriated these waters to the adjacent State to deal with them as the State may deem expedient for its own interests. They are, therefore, in the language of diplomacy and of international law, termed by a convenient metaphor the territorial waters of Great Britain, and the same or equivalent phrases are used in some of our statutes, denoting that this belt of sea is under the exclusive dominion of the State. But the dominion is the dominion of Parliament, not the dominion of the common law. . . . Therefore, although, as between nation and nation these waters are British territory, as being under the exclusive dominion of Great Britain, in judicial language they are out of the realm, and any exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a foreign ship in these waters must, in my judgment, be authorized by an Act of Parliament.'

As he understood these words, if Sir Robert Lush had found that in the particular place Parliament had stepped in and said that portion of the water was part of the United Kingdom, he would have been of opinion that the Crown had territorial jurisdiction over it, and the conviction ought not to be quashed. It was fortunate for the prisoner in the 'Franconia' case, though not fortunate for the vindication of the law, that Mr Justice Lush was under the impression that that had not been done which really had been done. It appeared that in an Act of 1848 for the regulation of Customs there was a provision authorising the Lords of the Treasury to establish ports in many places where ports were required, and to define their limits. Under that provision the Lords of the Treasury issued a warrant, which was inserted in the *London Gazette* of the 3rd of March, 1848. In that warrant were these paragraphs :—

'That the limits of the port of Dover shall commence at St. Margaret's Bay aforesaid, and continue along the said coast of Kent to Copt Point in the said county. That the limits of the port of Folkestone shall commence at Copt Point aforesaid, and continue along the coast to Dun-
geness, in the said county.'

'And we, the said Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, do further declare that the limits seaward of the said ports shall extend to a distance of three miles from low-water mark out to sea, and that the limits of such ports shall include all islands, bays, harbours, rivers, and creeks within the same respectively.'

So that under Parliamentary powers the proper authorities had declared long before the 'Franconia' case that the limits of the port of Dover extended three miles out to sea. We understood the view of the majority of the Judges to be this, that there was one jurisdiction by land and the other by sea; that the jurisdiction by land was one limited by the limits of counties, taking into the county the low-water mark and the harbours and rivers within the county; and the jurisdiction by sea, the old jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral now exercised by the Central Criminal Court; that the jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral extended to the high seas, but the persons over whom it was exercised must be British subjects, not foreigners; and that the Central Criminal Court had no jurisdiction over the persons of foreigners beyond the low-water mark. That he understood to be the common ground on which the majority of the Judges acted in quashing the conviction. And taking that as the *ratio decidendi* of

the Judges in a decision which he accepted, it would at first sight appear that there was nothing more for him to do than to let the favourable consideration of their lordships for a Bill to amend the law; but there fell some observations from Sir Robert Phillimore, the Lord Chief Baron, and the Lord Chief Justice, whose judgment was the most elaborate, and might be regarded as the leading judgment of the majority, and which contained a principle that seemed to challenge the right of Parliament to legislate on this subject. The expression of the Lord Chief Justice would certainly seem to imply that we could not legislate with respect to the high seas even within the limits of the belt or zone to which he had referred without the consent of foreign nations, or until after communication with foreign nations. That was a very serious question. If the judgments of those learned Judges amounted, as they were supposed to do, to a proposition of that kind, of course Parliament would be extending its powers if it entered into legislation applying to that belt or zone with the view of making foreigners amenable to our law. But he would ask their lordships to consider whether there was any foundation for that principle. He ventured to think there was not, and he thought it would be a very serious thing if there were. He would say before their lordships the views of great constitutional writers of the Kingdom and of the United States on this question. Then he would add the views of international jurists on the Continent, and next he would show what our own Judges had ruled in international cases, and lastly he would direct attention to what their lordships themselves had done in the course of legislation. [His Lordship here referred to the principal English, American, and foreign writers on International Law.] It appeared to be established as a matter of principle that there must be a zone. The only doubt was as to how far the limit extended. The authorities were clear on this—that if three miles were not found sufficient for the purpose of defence and protection, or if the nature of the trade or commerce in the zone required it, there was a power in the country on the sea-board to extend the zone; but at present there was a consensus of opinion among the authorities that certainly the jurisdiction extended to three miles. If that were not the established law, nations with a sea-board would be very much worse off than those which had none, because a neighbour on land you could make a treaty with or treat as an enemy, but a nation with a sea-board had no control over a zone it would be liable to dangerous aggression from beyond the sea. (Hear, hear.) He would now refer their lordships to judicial opinion. In a case in which Prussia claimed restitution of a ship seized by an English war-of-war within three miles of Prussian territory, Lord Stowell, said—

‘A claim has been given for the Prussian Government, asserting the capture to have been made within the Prussian territory. It has been contended that although the act of capture itself might not have taken place within the neutral territory, yet that the ship to which the prize boats belonged was actually lying within the neutral limits. The fact to be determined is the character of the place where the captured ship lay, whether she was actually stationed within those portions of land and water, or of something between water and land, which are considered to be within Prussian territory. She was lying within the eastern zone’

of the Ems, within what I think may be considered at a distance of three miles at most from East Friesland. I am of opinion that the ship was lying within those limits in which all direct operations are by the law of nations forbidden to be exercised. No proximate acts of war are in any manner to be allowed to originate on neutral ground, and I cannot but think that such an act as this, that a ship should station herself on neutral territory and send out her boats on hostile enterprises, is an act of hostility much too immediate to be permitted. The capture cannot be maintained.

In another case—that of the ‘*Maria*’—Lord Stowell said :—

‘It might likewise be improper for me to pass over entirely without notice, as another preliminary observation, though without meaning to lay any particular stress on it, that the transaction in question took place in the British Channel, close upon the British coast, a station over which the Crown of England has from pretty remote antiquity always asserted something of that special jurisdiction which the Sovereigns of other countries have claimed and exercised over certain parts of the seas adjoining to their coasts.’

He would now refer their lordships to an opinion expressed by Sir John Nicholl on a claim by a lord of a manor to goods derelict. Sir John said :—

‘As to the right of the lord extending three miles beyond low water, it is quite extravagant as a jurisdiction belonging to any manor. As between nation and nation, the territorial right may, by a sort of tacit understanding, be extended to three miles ; but that rests upon different principles—viz., that their own subjects shall not be disturbed in their fishing, and particularly in their coasting trade and communications between place and place during the war. They would be exposed to danger if hostilities were allowed to be carried on between belligerents nearer to the shore than three miles.’

A case occurred when the Duke of Wellington held the office now held by his noble friend (Earl Granville). In 1829, within three miles of one of the Cinque Ports, some fishermen at sea were fortunate enough to discover a whale valued at 370*l*. A claim to the fish was made by the Lord Warden, and the Admiralty claimed against him. The learned Judge who tried the question came to the conclusion that the office of Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports was more ancient than that of Lord High Admiral, and the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports succeeded in carrying away the whale. What were the views of Dr. Lushington? He said :—

‘What are the limits of the United Kingdom? The only answer I can conceive to that question is—the land of the United Kingdom and three miles from the shore.’

Again, the same learned Judge, speaking on the question of compulsory pilotage, said :—

‘The Parliament of Great Britain, it is true, has not, according to the principles of public law, any authority to legislate for foreign vessels on the high seas, or for foreigners out of the limits of British jurisdiction ; though, if Parliament thought fit to do so, this Court, in its instance jurisdiction at least, would be bound to obey. In cases admitting of doubt, the presumption would be that Parliament intended to legislate without

violating any rule of International Law, and the construction has been accordingly. Within, however, British jurisdiction, namely, within British territory, and at sea within three miles from the coast, and within British rivers *infra finem*, and over foreigners in British ships, I apprehend that the British Parliament has an undoubted right to legislate.

Then he would add to that the opinion of the late Lord Wensleydale in that House in 'Gemmell v. The Commissioners of Woods and Forests,' a well-known Scotch salmon fishery case :—

'It may be worth while to observe that it would be hardly possible to extend it seaward beyond the distance of three miles, which belongs to the acknowledged law of nations, belongs to the coast of the country under the dominion of the country by being within cannon range, and is capable of being kept in perpetual possession.'

In advising that House in another case, a noble and learned friend (Lord Chelmsford), whom he was glad to see there to night, and who held the office which he (the Lord Chancellor) had the honour to hold, said :—

'The three miles limit depends upon a rule of International Law by which every independent State is considered to have territorial property and jurisdiction in the seas which wash their coast within the ascertained distance of a cannon shot from the shore.'

He would add to that the opinion expressed by another noble and learned friend of his (Lord Hatherley), whom he was also glad to see there. His noble and learned friend, in the case of a collision between a foreign and a British ship, said :—

'With respect to foreign ships, I shall adhere to the opinion which I expressed in "Cope v. Doherty," that a foreign ship meeting a British ship on the open ocean cannot properly be abridged of her rights by an Act of the British Legislature. Then comes the question, how far our Legislature could properly affect the rights of foreign ships within the limit of three miles from the coast of this country. There can be no possible doubt that the water below low-water mark is part of the high seas, and it is equally beyond question that for certain purposes every country may by the common law of nations, exercise jurisdiction over that portion of the high seas which lies within three miles from its shores.'

In the case of the 'Free Fisheries of Whitstable v. Gann,' Sir William Erle said :

'The soil of the sea-shore to the extent of three miles from the beach is vested in the Crown.'

Now, these were the opinions—and as far as he was aware there was no opinion in the other way—of the eminent judges who had considered this subject. He said he would inform their Lordships what had been done in the way of legislation. He might refer them to many Acts of Parliament, but he would only refer to one. He would take the last edition of the Foreign Enlistment Act. That Act, an Act which, if the words 'deliberation,' 'care,' might ever be applied to the passing of an Act, might be applied to the passing of it. It was brought forward by the Government of the day under the advice of its legal advisers. It had also the gravest consideration from many persons outside the Government. What that Act did was this :

provided that 'this Act shall extend to all the dominions of Her Majesty, including the adjacent territorial waters.' He had troubled their lordships with these references because he felt bound, after the doubts supposed to be cast on the question, to establish the position that their lordships were entitled to legislate as he proposed. The right which we claimed over the high seas was a right which we had always exercised, and he asked their lordships to pass an Act for the purpose of obviating the doubts he had pointed out. Her Majesty's Government did not wish to make any new enactment as regarded the case of British subjects within the territorial waters of this country. No person doubted the full jurisdiction of the Crown over them. It was only in the case of those who were not British subjects that doubts had been expressed. With regard to those who might be foreigners, and temporarily within the three-mile limit, Her Majesty's Government wished that there should not be an absolute necessity of proceeding against them for a breach of our law. They proposed to enact that an offence committed by a person who was not a subject of Her Majesty on the open sea within the territorial waters of Her Majesty's dominions, although the offence might have been committed on board a foreign ship, might, with the consent of one of the principal Secretaries of State, be tried by a British tribunal. He asked their lordships to read the Bill a first time, and he proposed the second reading for this day week.

Lord Selborne said, that as far as the case connected with the 'Franconia' proceeded on a technical ground for the trial of a criminal offence on the high seas, within the territorial waters of this country, he did not profess to entertain an opinion which would entitle him to criticise the judgment of the majority of the Judges; but he must say that on reading that judgment some doubt was entertained as to the existence in principle of the territorial right properly so called in the Sovereign of this country over waters which all writers on International Law had regarded as territorial waters. It was by the general consent of nations that the three-mile limit had been fixed, and within that limit other nations claimed exactly the same jurisdiction and rights that we ourselves claimed. The Bill proposed, very properly, to assert our right to punish criminal offences committed within that limit, and much prudence was shown in not seeking to extend by this measure our jurisdiction for this purpose beyond the three-mile limit. It had been argued that, in consequence of the increase in the range of artillery, that limit should be extended to five or even six miles; but although that might be a very sensible alteration to make in International Law, it should only be effected by the general consent of all nations.

[The case of the 'Franconia,' quoted as *Reg. v. Keyn*, and the principal authorities on the questions of law involved, will be found *ante*, in vol. i. p. 135.]



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
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
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